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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to define the relationship of the Cloud of 
Unknowing and its principal ancillary treatises to the Dionysian 
tradition of negative mystical theology. The study centres-on the 
mystical vocabulary of these texts and the approach to language as a 
medium for theological discourse which they embody. Both are grounded 
in the theology of divine transcendence which characterizes the Dionysian 
school. The compilation of an appropriate terminology was integral to 
the evolution of the tradition of negative mysticism and its use 
continued to distinguish works which allied themselves with this 
tradition. The development of the principles and vocabulary of Dionysian 
theology are therefore considered in conjunction with one another and 
chronologically in connexion with the major exponents of the tradition. 
The emergence and consolidation of negative mysticism as a properly 
Christian tradition from hebraic and hellenic sources is treated in 
relation to Gregory of Nyssa as well as Ps. -Dionysius, with particular 
emphasis on the role of the latter in determining the form in which the 
tradition was received by medieval theologians. The study of the 
transmission of negative theology to the Middle Ages concentrates on 
the De Mystica Theologia, which constitutes a direct link with the Cloud 
author, who translated it into English as the Deonise Hid Diuinite. 
Comparison of the English text with its immediate Latin sources (the 
versions of Thomas Gallus and Sarracenus) shows the author's literal 
treatment of Dionysian concepts and vocabulary as the Latin translators 
had interpreted them. The Deonise Hid Diuinite also provides a valuable 
index to the author's use of Dionysian material in his original works. 
His interpretation of Dionysian theology seems to have been influenced 
in both cases by secondary sources within the same tradition - notably 
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the Viae Syon Lugent of the Carthusian Hugh of Balma. The thesis 
concludes with a general, largely speculative chapter which attempts 
to establish the significance of this study for the issues of provenance, 
circulation and authorship. Manuscript evidence and the texts' theological 
affinities with the particular development of the Dionysian mystical 
tradition represented by Hugh of Balma seem to connect the author 
closely with the Carthusian order. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of religious language has been debated amply and 
from widely differing standpoints by philologists, philosophers and 
theologians. It is accordingly difficult to treat it in a summary 
or partial fashion, and particularly so since religious language can- 
not properly be considered as an autonomous medium, with forms and 
functions of its own, apart from language as it operates in other 
situations. As one writer has observed, 
,. * a great many of the expressions which find a place 
in religious utterance, in fact the vast majority of such 
expressions, derive their sense from their use in other 
and nonreligious contexts ... Nor does religion confer 
on such expressions a new and esoteric meaning. 1 
Its terms, that is, do not constitute a code, nor do they function 
otherwise than words in normal discourse. It has often been recog- 
nised, for example, that religious language has special affinities 
with abstract language, insofar as its referent is insubstantial, 
and that the manipulation of the connotative properties of words by 
writers of religious prose is sometimes akin to poetic usage. 
The particular circumstances of Christian theology, however, un- 
doubtedly impose special conditions on language and the strong biblical 
tradition has perpetuated attitudes to language and specific forms of 
expression which accommodate the demands of Christian doctrine. The 
idea of the word, indeed, is itself integral to the central tenets of 
the Christian faith. In O. T. theology, the Hebrew notion of 'dabhar' 
('word') supplies the Genesis compiler's metaphor for the divine act 
of creation. The primitive connexions of word with event or potency 
1 
are sublimated into a sophisticated system for comprehending and formu- 
lating God's entire creative and redemptive activity towards man with 
the identification of Christ as the incarnate Iioyos ('Word') in the 
Johannine Gospel. St. John attempts to understand the Incarnation, to 
establish its significance within a coherent divine plan for creation, 
by bringing to bear the concept of AoYos as it had evolved in Greek 
philosophy upon Hebraic religious tradition. 2 Briefly, the term aoyos 
incorporates a suggestion of revelation; it applies, in platonist 
contexts, to the rational principle on which the universe is held to 
operate and to the corresponding faculty whereby man perceives its 
logic and cohesiveness. The development of the idea in Christian 
neoplatonist thought is described by Thomas Tomasic in his article, 
"Negative Theology and Subjectivity. An Approach to the Tradition of 
Pseudo-Dionysius": 
the existence of God never becomes a conclusion deduced 
from prior premises, as though there could be any prior 
ground: it is, rather, the existence of God that makes 
all logical inference not only possible but intelligible. 
Any theory which implies that God is known as a conclusion 
derived from inference is simply non-cognizant of the opera- 
tive logos functioning as the metaphysical matrix of all 
intelligibility. 3 
The Johannine designation of Christ as Aoyos thus affirms the continuity 
of the divine scheme by resuming the O. T. figure of the creative word 
('dabhar') and postulates, -further, that it is manifested and made in 
some sense intelligible by the fact of the Incarnation. It also re- 
asserts the status of the Word as intermediary between God and man - 
though, in both cases, the implied differentiation between God and the 
Word is checked by the avowal that they are simultaneously one: the 
sense in Genesis that the Word is at once the instrument of creation, 
and thus distinct from God, but also a metaphor which expresses the 
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essential creativity of the divine being, is made explicit with regard 
to Christ in St. John's Gospel ('In principio erat verbum, et verbum 
erat apud Deum, et Deus erat verbum'(John l. i)). 
The mediatory function which is inherent in the concept of the 
Word on a figurative level, however, is also fundamental to the literal 
sense of 'word', and the O. T. records many instances of God's direct 
intervention in human affairs through actual speech. The audibility 
of God's words is emphasized in the account of His call to Samuel 
(I Samuel 3.1-14), for example, where Samuel mistakes God's voice 
for Eli's on three occasions. In theological terms, narratives such 
as this seem to invest language with a special significance as a means 
of communication between God and man. The divine authority behind the 
transmission of God's message by the writers of the O. T. prophetic 
books, moreover, has traditionally been allowed to imbue scriptural 
language with a peculiar relevance and power. This underlies the 
exegetical approach to biblical narrative and the method of figural 
interpretation4: the exposition of the Canticle and. the book of 
Exodus in particular has established them as major sources for mystical 
theology and vocabulary. 
This kind of approach to-religious discourse has been said to 
demand a sympathetic attitude, a predisposition to admit the doctrinal 
principles which determine its character and function, on the part of 
theological writers and their audience. I. T. Ramsey, for example, has 
urged that "discernment" and "commitment" are prerequisites for the 
proper application and appreciation of language in the context of 
Christian theology. 5 The tendency of such arguments, however, is to 
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blur distinctions between different usages of language which are 
embraced by the generic term "religious". They are apt, also, to 
absolve the theologian from the responsibility of speaking intellig- 
ibly to the unbiassed understanding of the reader, though exploitation 
of the traditional resonances of biblical language is both legitimate 
and effective in discourse on religious subjects. The range of 
mystical language which is the concern of this thesis certainly 
profits by these resonances, but it is, besides, in its own way 
logically accountable. Its referents - the theme of divine trans- 
cendence and the union of the soul with God as they are represented 
in Dionysian theology - are located beyond the scope of the human 
intelligence and are inaccessible to all natural faculties of per- 
ception. The shift in perspective from phenomenal to transcendent 
objects involves-, in linguistic terms, a transposition of the normal 
meaning of words to a higher plane. But, it should be stressed, the 
normal meaning persists, and is, indeed, the foundation for the 
sense of the word in its new situation, and mystical language derives 
its coherency from the manipulation of verbal functions which make 
language viable in other contexts. 
The Johannine concept of Christ as the incarnation of the divine 
Aoyos, in fact, suggests that language has a specific role in religious 
situations which is integral to the substance of N. T. theology. It 
endorses the general sanction for language as a means of communication 
between God and man and, hence, between men which is embedded in O. T. 
theology. Aoyos, however, as a term of philosophy, is connected 
with the principle of intelligence and it implies that the faculty 
of language is emblematic of man's distinction from other creatures 
in the possession of rationality. The gospel writer retains the O. T. 
formula of the Word ('dabhar') as intermediary between the divine 
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essence and creation: Christ as the embodiment of Aoyos, John infers, 
represents a kind of bridge between Absolute God and humanity. But 
the term Aoyos intimates, further, that creation and Christ himself, 
to the extent that he participated in human nature, are within the 
scope of the intellect and properly compatible, therefore, with 
language, whereas the pure essence of God exceeds the normal range 
of both. Thus language is entirely appropriate as a medium for 
symbolic theology, for example, which is similarly dependent on the 
intellect as a means of arriving at knowledge of God insofar as it 
is accessible by analogy with creation. 
By the same token, however, language, though it is indispensable 
for communication, is essentially inadequate as a vehicle for mystical 
theology and even antithetical to the precise formulation of the 
transcendent nature of God and the soul's mystical encounter with 
Him. The tendency of Dionysian theology is fundamentally reductive: 
its object, that is, is an experience of union between the soul and 
the essential being of God in which the dichotomy which persists even 
when the soul has receded from all external phenomena and from the 
extraneous elements of self is, as far as possible, overcome. In its 
reversion to singleness, both within the individual soul and between 
the soul and God, the mystic way is thus radically opposed to the 
process of intellection, which presumes a distinction between the 
perceiver and the object of perception. The consequent negative 
dialectic of Dionysian theology is explained against its background 
of neoplatonist philosophy by Tomasic: 
The question, then, of the transcendent self, as opposed 
to the phenomenal self or atria, necessitates a mode of 
approach which increasingly prescinds from exteriority, 
objectivity or 'otherness'. The serious depth of the 
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via negativa, via remotionis or apophatike, is seen in 
the fact that it is the destruction of the last illusion 
of reason and objectivity. The process of neantisation 
cuts across all categories pretending objectivity, none 
of which permits raising the primal question. Intellect, 
the specialized aspect of the self as a form of conscious- 
ness properly directed towards objectivity, must be com- 
pletely discarded as ineffectual. The neo-Platonist is 
acutely aware that the function of intellect is existen- 
tially direct to objects and can evoke only the dimension 
of objectivity; 'at home' in this relation, it ceases to 
be when subjectivity emerges as primal instress and logic 
becomes defunct. The way of negation is essentially a 
purgation, an asceticism, indispensable for attaining 
subjectivity. Due to the spatio-temporal imagery insepar- 
able from human thinking, no direct approach to interiority 
is accessible to intellect; the only accessibility is given 
by the purgation of all modes of limitation, objectivity 
and reasoning. Since all intellectual knowledge bears on 
being, and every being is limited, then, by consequence, 
that which stands beyond being stands also beyond knowledge 
- it is beyond knowable (ü, repäyvwaTov) because it is beyond 
limit. One is confronted with the intellectually inacces- 
sible and unimaginable. 
N(antisation is not a departure from what may be called 
'experience'; it is an intensification of experience in 
its ground. The function of the via negativa is not merely 
the negation of objectivity qua objectivity but very consc- 
iously the negation of subjectivity qua objectivity. In 
rejecting every aspect of objectivity as 'otherness', the 
way of negation asserts by the simplest dialectic the 
radical, ontological 'otherness' of subjectivity over 
against what is not. The via negativa establishes 'another 
knowledge'. What, therefore, is brilliantly achieved is, in 
fact, an absolute and sophisticated grasp of approaching 
subjectivity qua subjectivity in the negation of quid esse. 
The concept of language as a function of the intellect, which became 
integral to Christian theology through the adaptation of the philoso- 
phical theory of Aoyos in the Johannine Gospel and accrued signific- 
ance in Dionysian theology from both Christian and neoplatonist 
sources, thus requires that metaphor rather than literalism should be 
the dominant mode of mystical discourse. It entails, further, the 
ascendancy of the negative over the positive idiom in the same context. 
Negation is both a means of distinguishing mystical experience from 
other acts of cognition - "unknowing" from "knowing", for example - 
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and a corrective to misleading propositions about the being of God. 
The very process of ascribing attributes to God entertains as a 
possibility that the divine nature can be circumscribed in human 
concepts and terms, and this, from a theological standpoint, is 
wholly untenable. The negative dialectic excludes all restrictive 
connotations and serves to emphasize God's transcendence in both 
respects. It also obviates the tendency of positive attributes to 
imply pluralism in God, since epithets such as "great", "good" and 
even "one", belong to a relative rather than an absolute vocabulary. 
The vocabulary of negative mysticism is thus inalienable from 
its doctrinal basis. It evolved with the formalisation of the prin- 
ciples of Dionysian theology, and the intention of the present thesis, 
following this rudimentary account of the particular circumstances of 
religious and, specifically, mystical discourse, is to study its 
development in close conjunction with the mystical literature which 
expounds the theory. The negative dialectic assumed, in fact, the 
status of a technical vocabulary: it is not so much a vehicle for 
expressing the immediacy and intensity of individual mystical experi- 
ence as a logical system for denoting the fact of divine transcendence 
and the contemplative theory which ensues from this theological pro- 
position. It is a premise of this dissertation that the fourteenth 
century English author of the Cloud of Unknowing formulated his 
personal intuition of the contemplative way according to the prin- 
ciples of Dionysian apophatic theology and, consequently, adopted the 
vocabulary associated with the Dionysian mystical tradition in his 
account of it. It is a coherent terminology which corresponds 
precisely to the theological position, though it is not, he makes 
clear in the Book of Privy Counselling, the only possible linguistic 
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mode for conveying an experience which is independent of all concept 
and expression: 
For bis same werk, 3if it be verrely conceyuid, is at 
reuerent affeccion & be frute departid fro be tre bat 
I speke of in bi lityl pistle of preier. Dis is be 
cloude of vnknowyng; Dis is at priue loue put in purete 
of spirit: }gis is be Arke of be Testament. bis is Denis 
deuinite, his wisdom & his drewry, his li3ty derknes & his 
vnknowyn kunnynges. bis is it at settib Dee in silence as 
wele fro Dou3tes as fro wordes. (P. C. 154/13-19). 7 
The decision to make the Christian neoplatonist writer Gregory 
of Nyssa the starting point for this study of the Dionysian mystical 
tradition is largely pragmatic. The extent and occasionally even the 
existence of his influence on Ps. -Dionysius' theology have been 
challenged, and the purpose of the present enquiry into his work is 
not to enter into the controversy on these questions and still less 
to imply that Gregory's impact on Dionysian thought in general was 
crucial. The Dionysian Corpus is eclectic and its philosophical and 
theological background is, in consequence, extraordinarily complex. 
It is also, however, disconcertingly cryptic. The author clearly 
assumes that his readers will appreciate the intellectual and relig- 
ious context of his work, and he incorporates without elucidation 
ideas and terms which would presumably have been readily intelligible 
within the milieu of contemporary Christian neoplatonism. One pos- 
sible approach to the Dionysian Corpus which takes account of these 
circumstances is exemplified in the work of Stephen Gersh: the in- 
troduction to his recently published book on the subject includes a 
summary assessment of Ps. -Dionysius' position in Christian-neoplaton- 
ist tradition and puts the case for studying the Corpus against the 
background of specific trends in neoplatonist philosophy: 
S 
The historical significance of Ps. -Dionysius stems from 
the fact that his doctrine is the first Christian version 
of a type of Neoplatonic philosophy taught mainly in the 
two centres of learning, Athens and Alexandria, from 
approximately the fourth to the sixth-century A. D. Earlier 
Christian writers such as Augustine in the West and Gregory 
of Nyssa in the East had followed Neoplatonic doctrine, but 
the evidence suggests that they had been influenced by earl- 
ier phases of development. In Ps. -Dionysius, however, we 
" have a transmitter of the dominant philosophy of late Antiq- 
uity in its most elaborate and developed form. This school 
of thought can be traced back to Iamblichus who therefore 
furnishes a suitable starting point for an enquiry. 8 
Gersh's research presents Ps. -Dionysius as a Christian who system- 
atically transformed pagan thought. He acknowledges the contribution 
which writers such as Gregory of Nyssa made to the composition of 
Dionysian theology, though this is not the focus of his treatment 
of the Greek Corpus: 
Ps. -Dionysius was not the first Christian philosopher, 
and it goes without saying that some of his deviations 
from the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus or Proclus were 
occasioned not by his own reflections alone but by the 
work of earlier theologians, especially the Cappadocian 
fathers. 9 
Gersh's approach to the Dionysian Corpus and that adopted in the 
present context are, in fact, in many ways complementary. The 
emphasis here on the aspect of the background to the Corpus repres- 
ented by Gregory of Nyssa reflects the bias of the thesis as a whole, 
which is towards negative theology as the cornerstone of a Christian 
mystical tradition. The affinities between the two writers in respect 
of certain fundamental principles of Christian mystical theology are 
salient, and coincide with some of the areas which are of primary 
concern in this thesis. Gregory's claim to consideration in the 
context of Dionysian studies consists partly in his anticipation of 
Ps. -Dionysius on these points, and partly also in his tenure of a. 
position of orthodoxy against which the particular developments of 
9 
Dionysian theology may be properly quantified. More importantly, 
however, Gregory expounds at length the biblical sources for his 
mystical theory and vocabulary; his exegetical works define within 
r 
a coherent scheme concepts which Ps. -Dionysius treats only allusively 
and terminology which he includes without specific explanation. 
The discussion of Ps. -Dionysius concentrates on his principal 
mystical work, the De Nystica Theologia. This is also the focus of 
the third section of the thesis, which is, however, proportionately 
less preoccupied with the-theoretical aspect of mystical language 
insofar as Dionysian vocabulary early acquired a technical standing 
as the traditional mode of negative theology. It rather traces the 
transition of mystical doctrine and terminology through the various 
Latin translations produced during the Middle Ages and down to the 
fourteenth century English version ascribed to the Cloud author, 
the Deonise Hid Diuinite. The study of the translators' handling 
of Dionysian vocabulary involves consideration of method and intent, 
as well as of the linguistic resources which Latin and, later, 
English afforded. It also entails, however, close analysis of the 
developments in Dionysian mystical theology which were formulated in 
the vast body of medieval literature associated with the Dionysian 
tradition. The works of the Victorine abbot Thomas Gallus and of 
the Carthusian prior Hugh of Balma have merited special consideration 
in this connexion, since the particular interpretation of Dionysian 
theology which they propound seems to have shaped the Cloud author's 
contemplative theory and consequently, therefore, his application of 
the traditional vocabulary of negative mysticism. 
The mystical vocabulary of the Cloud itself has been largely 
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approached through the Deonise Hid Diuinite, since the De Mystica 
Theologia is its major source and the study of the author's method 
as a translator provides many insights into his understanding of its 
terminology. The Deonise Hid Diuinite also serves as a standard by 
which to judge the manner and frequency with which, in his original 
works, the author uses or evades the technical vocabulary of Diony- 
sian theology which was demonstrably available to him. His practice 
in this respect in Cloud and Privy Counsel - the treatise most closely 
related to Cloud and Deonise Hid Diuinite, and thus of equal concern 
with them in this thesis - is revealing of his priorities as an author 
and an indication of the degree to which his responsiveness to the 
requirements and limitations of his prospective audience determined 
the character of his work. 
The final section reaffirms the pervasive influence of Dionysian 
theology on the Cloud author's thought and expression, and explores 
the application and some of the possible implications of the study 
of Cloud within the precise context of the Dionysian mystical tradi- 
tion. My submission is that the extent and, perhaps more tellingly, 
the nature of the Cloud author's achievement are fully estimable only 
with due appreciation of the theological and allied literary back- 
ground of the texts. The inferences drawn from this study, moreover, 
have an important bearing on research into tangential issues concern- 
ing the circulation, authorship and probable provenance of the Cloud 
Corpus. 
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CHAPTER I 
GREGORY OF NYSSA (c. 330-95) 
I. Theology: the character and background 
St. Gregory of Nyssa was a dominant figure in the eastern church 
of the fourth century. As Bishop of Nyssa he enjoyed great political 
as well as ecclesiastical power, and he had an influential voice in 
some of the major theological controversies of his time. ' He was also 
drawn to contemplation as an ideal, however, and much of his work as 
an exegete was directed to furnishing the newly-founded monastic move- 
ment in Cappadocia with a substantial literature expounding the theol- 
2 
ogical basis for the contemplative life. 
His importance in the development of the Christian mystical 
tradition seems, in fact, to have been determined by the circumstances 
of his individual spiritual temper and its interaction with the relig- 
ious and intellectual milieu of contemporary Cappadocia. His principal- 
works, the Commentary on the Canticle and the Life of Moses (both 
written c. 389), express a profound Christian faith and a thorough 
familiarity with the Judaic tradition of biblical scholarship. At the 
same time, he is heir to a strong tradition of neo-platonist thought, 
which impressed itself both negatively and positively on his theology: 
he recognized, that is, that the vigour and acumen for which it merited 
respect also represented an immediate threat to the consolidation of 
the Christian church in the East. He was also eloquent in his defence 
of the orthodox church when its dogma of divine transcendence was 
challenged by the intellectualist Eunomian heresy. Gregory's position 
has been summarized by Jean Danielou, S. J.: 
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L'oeuvre de Gregoire de Nysse est ä un croisement de pensee 
trýs interessant. D'une part, par son cote speculatif, eile 
se rattache ä la doctrine des grands alexandrins, ä toute une 
mystique intellectuelle, contemplative dont eile est un exemple 
remarquable. Mais par ailleurs Gregoire est le frere de Basile, 
le l'egislateur de la vie monastique. I1 est le contemporain de 
l'eclosion du:, monachisme. Tout un cote de son oeuvre s'apparente 
ä celle des Peres du Desert, ä cette psychologie pratique de la 
vie spirituelle, des tentations, des consolations, que ceux-ci 
pousseront ä un rare degree de perfection. C'est meme un des 
caracteres deconcertants d'un ouvrage comme la Vie de Noise, 
que des considerations de psychologie spirituelle elementaire 
sly melent constamment aux plus hautes speculations. 3 
Gregory's achievement in accommodating elements of these diverse 
traditions within a single coherent theology was largely instrumental 
in establishing the doctrinal principles on which - with the inter- 
mediary influence of Ps. -Dionysius - one of the dominant schools of 
mystical theology in western Christianity was founded. 
It is impracticable, in the context of the present thesis, to 
give an ample account of Gregory's mystical theory and its relation- 
ship to its theological and philosophical background. The subject has, 
in any case, been responsibly treated by various scholars in this field: 
the work of Gersh and Danielou has already been alluded to, and refer- 
ences to further detailed studies of areas which can only be touched on 
in the body of the thesis will be included in the footnotes to this and 
the following chapter. The theological basis of Gregory's treatises is, 
however, closely allied to their particular use of language and must be 
outlined as a preface to the analysis of their linguistic characteristics. 
Both rest upon the premise of God's imperviousness to human powers of 
cognition: 
Listen to the counsel of Ecclesiastes: 'Do not utter a word 
before God. For God', he says, 'is in heaven, and thou upon 
earth' (Eccles. 5.1). And he shows, I think, especially by 
the distance that separates heaven and earth, despite their 
mutual affinity, how far the divine nature surpasses the 
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compass of man's thought. For as much as the stars are 
beyond the grasp of the fingers, so much and many times 
more does that nature which is above all human minds tran- 
scend our earthly thoughts. 4 
The fact of man's creation in the divine image, Gregory affirms, 
nevertheless constitutes a relationship between God and man which 
implies the possibility of some form of creaturely knowledge of God's 
nature: 
The Lord does not say that it is blessed to know something 
about God, but rather to possess God in oneself: 'Blessed 
are the clean of heart, for they shall see God' (Matth. 5.8). 
By this I do not think He means that the man who purifies 
the eye of his soul will enjoy an immediate vision of God 
(aVTi1rpöoc)TrOV Ti Aeaua Töv 8eöv TrpOTiOevat); rather I think 
this marvellous saying teaches us the same lesson that the 
Word expressed more clearly to others when He said: 'The 
kingdom of God is within you' (Luke 17.21). And this teaches 
us that the man who purifies his heart of every passionate 
impulse will see the image of the divine nature in his own 
beauty. So too in this short sentence the Word, I think, is 
giving us the following advice; All you mortals who have within 
yourselves a desire to behold (O wpias) the supreme Good, when 
you are told. that the majesty of God is exalted above the 
heavens, that the divine glory is inexpressible, its beauty 
indescribable, its nature inaccessible, do not despair at 
never being able to behold what you desire. For you do have 
within your grasp tie degree of knowledge (KaTavorcrEws PETPOV) 
of God which you can attain. For, when God made you, He at 
once endowed your nature with this perfection: upon the struct- 
ure of your nature He imprinted an imitation of the perfections 
of His own nature, just as one would impress upon wax the out- 
line of an emblem. But the wickedness that has been poured all 
over this divine engraving has made your perfection useless and 
hidden it with a vicious coating. You must then wash away, by 
a life of virtue, the dirt that has come to cling to your heart 
like plaster, and then your divine beauty will once again shine 
forth. 5 
The theory involves a redefinition of knowledge in the context of man's 
apprehension of God: at the highest level it is non-intellectual, but 
rather comprises a loving intuition of God's presence in the soul, a 
properly mystical awareness which is at the same time a conviction of 
God's unknowability, not merely relative to man's limited understanding, 
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but as an essential quality of His being. Gregory emphasises this 
point in his exposition of the account of the Bride's search for her 
Beloved in the Canticle: 
Hence she gets up again and in spirit traverses the entire 
spiritual and transcendental world, which she here calls a 
'city' .... In her search she surveys the entire angelic 
army. And not finding among the good things there the object 
of her quest, she reasons thus with herself: Is it possible 
that my Beloved can be comprehended (anTrTÖV)? 'Have you seen 
him whom my. soul loveth? ' Their only answer to the question 
is silence; and by their silence they show that what she seeks 
is incomprehensible ( äarITrTOV) to them. After she has gone 
about the entire supermundane city by the operation of her 
mind (Ti 7roalTrpayuoaüvn Tns dtavoias) and has not recognized 
her Beloved even among things spiritual and immaterial, then 
at last she gives up all she has found; for she realizes that 
what she seeks can be understood only in the very inability 
to comprehend His essence, and that every intelligible attri- 
bute becomes a mere hindrance to those who seek to find him (TV PO'V(ý 11h KaTaAaj. lbäVEQeat Ti EQTtV, OTl, eaTl y1VWJKÖPEVOV, 
OL 7räv yv6ptaua KaTaa9TfTtKOV, tpi Siov rots avacnTOÜOl Trpos 
TTJV EvpCaiV ytvcTat). 
This mystical awareness, which is the culmination of the soul's yearn- 
ing for immediate apprehension of God, thus transcends the scope of 
the intellect, though Gregory suggests that it can only, succeed on an 
approach to God which engages man's intellectual and sensual faculties 
to their utmost capacity and exhausts created phenomena: the fountain 
in the garden of the Canticle 4.12, he insists in the ninth sermon of 
his commentary on the text, denotes man's intellect which, if it is 
rightly directed, promotes the soul's first impulse for union with 
God, just as the garden is nourished by the channelling of the water 
from the fountain.? The different stages of the ascent are traced in 
Sermon XI: 
Our initial withdrawal from wrong and erroneous ideas of God 
is a transition from darkness to light. Next comes a closer 
awareness of hidden things, and by this the soul is guided 
through sense phenomena to the world of the invisible. And 
this awareness is a kind of cloud, which overshadows all ap- 
pearances, and slowly guides and accustoms the soul to look 
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towards what is hidden. Next the soul makes progress through 
all these stages and goes on higher, and as she leaves below 
all that human nature can attain, she enters within the secret 
chamber of the divine knowledge, and here she is cut off on all 
sides by the divine darkness. Now she leaves outside all that 
can be grasped by sense or reason, and the only thing left for 
her contemplation is the invisible and the incomprehensible. 
And here God is, as the Scriptures tell us in connection with 
Moses: 'But Moses went to the dark cloud wherein God was' 
(Exod. 20.21). 8 
The distinctions between the modes of knowledge which are proper to 
the various phases of the mystic way are not formally articulated by 
Gregory, however, but his is the pattern for Ps. -Dionysius' systematic 
differentiation of mystical theology from symbolic or analogical theol- 
ogy, and, hence, of the negative from the affirmative way of contemp- 
lation. 
Gregory's concept of the contemplative way is dominated by the 
belief in man's creation in the divine image. 9 Union with God is 
realized by the progressive stripping away of elements which obscure 
the image, and necessitates purification of the intellect as well as 
the spirit. On one level, it is a process of recollection, in which 
the soul withdraws into its inmost being and rediscovers there its 
own divinity. 10 The affinities with the platonist theory of intro- 
version in this respect are evident, and Gregory's comparison of the 
procedure with the art of the sculptor in On the Making of Man (chs. 
29-30)11 is very reminiscent of Plotinus' use of the same simile, 
for example, in the Enneads I, 6.9.12 Gregory, however, reasserts 
the unique significance of the Christian claim: he insists that man's 
possession of the divine image (c Kv Tov OEov) distinguishes him from 
the rest of creation, that it is implanted in him by divine grace and 
that it is only to be recovered by the intervention of this grace. 13 
Man's own efforts, unaided by divine grace, are inadequate to the 
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attainment of the soul's perfection. The platonist teaching concern- 
ing man's potential for the achievement of perfection, by contrast, 
is grounded in the belief that the human soul - in platonist terms, 
his intellectual being or Xoyos, that is - is connatural to the Good 
from which it ultimately derives its existence and is, therefore, 
itself innately good. No distinction in kind is made between them, 
and thus the process of achieving perfection consists in the discovery 
of the divine within the self and is, first and foremost, a continuous 
act of the intellect determined by the individual will. It is generally 
admitted that the tendency of neoplatonist philosophy - particularly as 
it was developed by Plotinus - was more mystical: it seems to concede 
a role for love in the ascent to perfection and envisages ultimate 
knowledge of the One as being accessible to the soul only in an ecstasy 
of union. 14 It remains, however, a speculative mysticism, whereas 
Gregory defines the realization of the divine image as a progressive 
transformation into Christ whose medium is love: 
In the same way the bride, in saying, 'I to my beloved, and 
my beloved to me', declares that she has modelled herself on 
Christ, thus recovering her proper loveliness, that blessed 
state which our human nature had in the beginning, for now 
her beauty has developed 'in the image and likeness' of that 
sole true Beauty which is the prototype. 15 
The transformation, moreover, is never complete: Gregory repudiates 
platonist theory on the common nature of the divine and the human, and 
this involves a redefinition of perfection as a perpetual striving for 
likeness to Christ. Gregory's term for the process is epectasis 
(eirEKTaats); he gives an account of it in the fifth sermon of the 
Commentary on the Canticle: 
But in our changeable natures, however, good and evil exist 
by turns, because of the power we have to choose equally either 
side of a contradiction. The consequent evil becomes the limit 
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of our good ... But the divine nature is simple, pure, unique, 
immutable, unalterable, ever abiding in the same way, and 
never goes outside of itself ... When therefore it draws 
human nature to participate in its perfection, because of 
the divine transcendence it must always be superior to our 
nature in the same degree. The soul grows by its constant 
participation in that which transcends it; and yet the per- 
fection in which the soul shares remains ever the same, and 
is always discovered by the soul to be transcendent to the 
same degree. 16 
The neoplatonist notion of contemplative ecstasy, however, is also 
integral to Gregory's concept of the soul's way to union with God. On 
the one hand, the soul withdraws into itself to restore the purity of 
its divine image: yet once it has advanced in the way of perfection, 
the intensity of its love for God also impels it to reach beyond itself 
to attain the union it desires. This is the tenor of Gregory's inter- 
pretation of Abraham's migration (Genesis 12.1-4)17 and his close and 
lengthy exposition of the symbolism of Moses' experience on Sinai and 
the Bride's search for her Beloved in the Canticle. Gregory insists, 
therefore, on the paradoxical character of the unitive way - both in 
this respect and insofar as the soul's abandonment of self is at once 
an initiation into a higher state of perfection. The point is illustr- 
ated and commented on by Danielou: 
Le double caractere d'etre un au-delä de 1'äme, auquel on 
parvient cependant en rentrant au plus interieur de 1'äme 
(par opposition a l'exteriorite du monde sensible), qui 
constitue un des paradoxes de la vie mystique, comme la 
nuee lumineuse, s'exprime par le rapprochement de l'entree et 
de la sortie: c'est Textase - intase: '0 bienheureuse 
sortie que celle oü l'äme sort ä la suite du Verbe. Le 
Seigneur gardera ton entree et to sortie, dit le Prophete. 
C'est lä vraiment l'entree (n cicodos) et la sortie (i cCo6os) 
reservees par Dieu ä ceux qui en sont dignes. Et en effet 
la sortie de ce dans quoi nous sommes est entree dans les 
biens qui sont au dela' ... Ainsi Paul ne cessait de se tendre (eTrcKTetvöpEVOS)l8 vers ce qui etait en avant et de sortir 
de l'etat oü il se trouvait pour penetrer (eiaSu6VEvos ) 
plus ä 1'interieur (Eis TO evtoTepov) dans celui ou il n'etait 
pas encore. ' (XLIV, 1024D; 1036A). 19 
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Gregory's theory of ecstasy nevertheless differs significantly from 
its counterpart in neoplatonist thought: it involves transcendence 
not only of the phenomenal world, but also of the self. 20 The 
condition of the soul in ecstasy is described in the treatise On 
Virginity: 
Lifted out of himself (oiov EKbaS eauTOv) by the Spirit, 
he glimpsed in that blessed ecstasy God's infinite and 
incomprehensible beauty. 21 
Thus, whereas ecstasy in neoplatonist terms connotes the final per- 
fection of the intellectual being which admits the soul to knowledge 
of the One, 22 it consists, for Gregory, in the surmounting of man's 
intellectual faculties of cognition and entails an awareness of God's 
being which is essentially non-rational. The linguistic implications 
of Gregory's concept of ecstasy are hinted at by Dani&ou: its expre- 
ssion, that is, constitutes a challenge to the relationship between 
language and rationality which sanctions the use of paradox as an 
appropriate verbal mode. 
i 
II. Development of a mystical vocabulary 
It has already been suggested that Gregory's importance in the 
history of Christian theology consists primarily in his evolution of 
a coherent mystical doctrine which assimilated a complex background 
of judaic and platonist thought. His attitude to non-Christian culture 
is both receptive and discriminating: just as Moses was nurtured as a 
child by Pharaoh's daughter, herself unable to bear children, so, 
Gregory explains, in his exposition of Exodus 2, other ideologies con- 
tribute much to the pursuit of the mystic way, though their learning 
is ultimately sterile without the infusion of Christian faith. 23 He 
exercizes the same principles of eclecticism in assembling a vocabulary 
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which corresponds to the particular demands of mystical theology as 
he developed it. He is, indeed, acutely aware of the correlation 
between language and theology, and he was largely instrumental in 
instituting the technical terminology of negative mysticism which 
was formalized with the Dionysian mystical tradition. 
Gregory's treatises stand as a practical attempt to come to 
terms with the inherent difficulties of reconciling language with 
the special conditions of Christian theology. They include, however, 
much theoretical analysis of the problem. His account of it rests on 
the premise that a distinction exists between the nature of God and 
that of man. The implications of this are twofold. On the one hand, 
he emphasizes the intrinsic limitations of man's rational faculties, 
which preclude any possibility of his attaining discursive knowledge 
of the divine essence: 
.... no created being can go out of itself by rational 
contemplation (KaTaifTrTlKns 6Ewpias). Whatever it sees, 
it must see itself; and even if it thinks it is seeing 
beyond itself, it does not in fact possess a nature which 
can achieve this. And thus in its contemplation of Being 
it tries-to force itself to transcend a spatial represent- 
ation ( oiov Tlly 6lcL t IIICLTIKT1y 
Evvolav ev TTj TWV OVTwv Rcwpia 
TrapeXOciv ßi erc t), but it never achieves-it. 
For in every possible thought, the mind is surely aware 
of the spatial element which it perceives in addition to 
the thought content; and the spatial element is, of course, 
created. Yet the Good that we have learned to seek and to 
cherish is beyond all creation, and hence beyond all compre- 
hension. Thus how can our mind, which always operates on a 
dimensional image, comprehend a nature that has no dimension, 
especially as our minds are constantly penetrating, by anal- 
ysis, into things which are more and more profound. And 
though the mind in its restlessness ranges through all that 
is knowable, it has never yet discovered a way of comprehend- 
ing eternity in such wise that it might place itself outside 
of it, and go beyond the idea of eternity itself and that 
Being which is above all being. 24 
In spite of man's innate desire for more perfect knowledge of God, 
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Gregory insists that his perceptual powers are constrained by their 
own created nature and cannot encompass uncreated reality. Further- 
more, he stresses that even if this were not the case, the absolute 
transcendence of the Godhead would of itself inevitably check any 
human aspiration to complete comprehension of its nature. Man exists, 
he suggests, as it were at the edge of a precipice, poised on the 
firm ground which represents the accessible created world and con- 
fronted with the immeasurable gulf of God's unknowability. 
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The importance of these complementary doctrinal assertions in 
linguistic terms is highlighted in the succinct statement of the 
problem which occurs in his exposition of Matthew 5.8; 
Men have never discovered a faculty to comprehend the 
incomprehensible (Tnv TWV ? KXTITITWV KaTaVÖnalV); nor have 
we ever been able to devise an intellectual technique for 
grasping the inconceivable (KaTaanITTIKn TwV 
äunXävwv). 26 
In denying the adequacy of reason as a means of apprehending God, 
Gregory pointedly demonstrates the allied impossibility. of conveying 
religious experience of this level in human language. Just as the 
process of intellectual speculation is arrested before it can achieve 
its goal, so here the expected sequence of language is thwarted and 
the vocabulary forced to recoil upon itself - man cannot comprehend 
(K(XTaanTTTlKn)the incomprehensible (eKXºjlrTwv). The positive impulse, 
in actuality and linguistically alike, necessarily tends towards 
negation. Discursive thought and, therefore, language, so long as it 
maintains its normal direct relationship with intellectual or sensual 
perception, are hence both manifestly inappropriate in the context of 
apprehension of the ultimate Godhead. Indeed, Gregory emphasizes that 
the insistence on verbal formulation of something which is, by its 
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very nature, inexpressible is an implicit contradiction of the 
fundamental tenets of this theology: 
And he who obstinately tries to express it in words 
(Ulro Tr1V TOO Aoyov GrluaQiav KaOeAKetv), unconsciously 
offends God. For He who is believed to transcend the 
universe must surely transcend speech (Xdyov). He who 
tries to circumscribe the infinite in speech (AoYj 
Staaau6ävetvtrtXetpwv TO äöptoTOV) no longer admits that 
He is transcendent by the very fact that he equates God 
with his speech, under the impression that the proper 
description of God is only such as his discourse is cap- 
able of expressing. He is unaware that the proper notion 
of the supreme Being is preserved precisely in our belief 
that God transcends knowledge (üfrep YviiaiV Etvat). 27 
The relationship between God and language is, therefore, unique 
and ambiguous. Ultimately, words are shown to have no direct bearing 
on the divine essence. It is, however, interesting to note that the 
prose in which Gregory defines the linguistic problem is conspicuously 
lucid and confident - both qualities which are by no means incongruous 
with the predominantly theoretical character of the passages, though 
they do seem to be at variance with the repudiation of language in 
respect of certain areas of belief which Gregory consistently maintains. 
And indeed, the nature of his writing will be seen to be significantly 
different and often powerfully evocative in more experiential contexts 
which seek to resolve rather than simply identify the apparently insur- 
mountable difficulties involved. It might be inferred, then, that 
Gregory envisages diverse usages of language as reflecting the various 
functions which words must perform within the broad spectrum of experi- 
ence which may generally be termed 'religious', and the necessity for 
pressing patently heterogeneous claims concerning Gregory's linguistic 
practice must, in consequence, as will become increasingly evident, be 
seen to stem from the paradox which is central to the religious situ- 
ation. Thus, while there is clearly a sense in which Gregory acknow- 
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ledges all language to be in the last resort futile as a means of 
expressing God, it must be said that his extensive corpus in itself 
represents a tacit recognition of the necessity of communicating 
spiritual truth; moreover, the existence of biblical authority, 
together with the implications of his theology as to the potential 
applicability of language in certain contexts will all sanction a 
use of language which is limited and closely adapted to answer the 
peculiar demands of the religious situation. 
In essence, it is Gregory's insistence on the absolute disjunction 
between earthly and spiritual reality and the different human modes of 
experiencing them which governs his notions of linguistic propriety: 
Divine providence has divided creatures into two classes: the 
one is material and bound to the senses; the other is immaterial 
and spiritual. By the sensuous I mean anything that we can per- 
ceive by our sense faculties; and the spiritual is that which 
transcends the sensuous. Now the spiritual is without bound or 
limit, whereas the other is completely circumscribed by limit- 
ations. For everything material is determined by quantity and 
quality, and in our concept of its properties there is always 
limitation in its magnitude, form, appearance and shape; no 
one who considers matter can grasp anything in his imagination 
beyond these dimensions. 
What is spiritual and immaterial, however, is free of all such 
determinations, it evades all terms and has no limits. 28 
Similarly, Gregory. affirms elsewhere that the only definition of virtue 
is its boundlessness, 29 and the only comprehension of God the acknow- 
ledgement of His complete independence of finite concepts. 3° Indeed, 
not only are attempts at conceptual formulation manifestly inappropriate 
in relation to spiritual truth, but the principles of phenomenal reality 
to which they rightly correspond are actually contradicted in the 
spiritual sphere. Hence he says of man's progress in perfection: 
C'est lä la plus paradoxale (iiapaSo9öTaTov) de toutes les 
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choses, que stabilite et mobilite soient la meme chose. 
Car d'ordinaire celui qui avance nest pas arrete et 
celui qui est arrete n'avance pas. Ici il avance du 
fait meme qu'il est arrete. Quest-ce que cela veut 
dire? Que plus quelqu'un demeure fixe et inebranable 
dans le Bien, plus il avance dans la voie de la vertu. 31 
The coincidence of usually opposing ideas which obtains in this 
spiritual condition can therefore only be embodied linguistically in 
paradox. Gregory's practice here is undoubtedly consistent with his 
recognition of the proper function of language as articulating the 
perceptions of the senses or intellect, which he outlines formally in 
his treatise On Virginity: 
Here our senses are quite adequate in admiring and absorbing 
this beauty, and in communicating it to others by expressing 
it in language, using the descriptive power of words as a 
kind of picture. And yet the archetype of this beauty escapes 
our comprehension. For how can words possibly find any mode 
of description which could make it visible? One may not appeal 
to color or shape or size, or the proportions of form, or any 
other trivial detail of that sort. Since this beauty is with- 
out form or shape, and is alien to any material quality or to 
anything that we observe in connection with bodies by sense 
perception, how could anyone come to know it by any of those 
qualities which can be perceived by the senses. 32 
In resorting to paradox, Gregory is thus implicitly rejecting the pos- 
sibility of offering an accurate description of this spiritual state 
which can be verified by reference to ordinary experience; instead 
he aims at an approximate representation in language of the inherent 
abnormality of the situation, which effectively locates it outside the 
limits of normal modes of apprehension and expression. The language 
in some sense reflects rather than describes the situation. It seems, 
therefore, that a reappraisal of the accepted relationship between 
language and its object is, in fact, taking place within the specific 
context of verbal formulation of spiritual truths. 
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The recognition that the shift occurs in the function of language 
rather than in its nature is a crucial one. To change the form of 
words themselves would be to create an esoteric system of communi- 
cation, incomprehensible except to those initiated into its secrets. 
Such a development would, of course, be diametrically opposed to the 
evangelical ideals of Christianity; yet it is undeniable that Gregory 
relies to a large extent on his readers' sympathetic assent to the 
doctrinal principles which govern his language and places much of the 
onus for proper understanding of his work on them. The process of 
moral and intellectual purification which prepares the soul for 
mystical union also ensures that the reader will interpret his words 
in the pure spirit in which they are intended. Hence Gregory writes 
at the outset of the first sermon of his Commentary on the Canticle: 
All of you, then, who have been transformed into something 
divine and sinless - it is to you that I speak of the mystery 
of the Canticle of Canticles. Come within His incorruptible 
bridal chamber, now that you have put on the white garment of 
pure and chaste thoughts. Some there may be who do not wear 
the garment of a clean conscience as befits the divine espousals; 
they may be involved in their own thoughts, and try to drag 
down the pure words of the Bride and Bridegroom to the level 
of irrational animal pleasure, and thus become absorbed in 
shameful images. Such as these must be cast out of the com- 
munity who joyfully participate in the marriage, and be assigned 
to the 'weeping and gnashing of teeth' instead of the happiness 
of the marriage chamber. 33 
The basis for proper understanding is emphatically spiritual, as is 
the uncompromising penalty for misinterpretation. The words themselves, 
it must be noted, remain unchanged, but their significance has been re- 
defined by the context in which they now occur. They are, in effect, 
stripped of their normal seductive sensuality, though, paradoxically, 
they depend upon retaining some vestige of it for their evocative 
power. Their meaning has largely become conditional upon apparently 
extraneous factors - namely, the state of grace of the reader and, 
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equally importantly, the writer. It seems certain, indeed, that 
Gregory advocates this positive re-use of language on the authority 
of biblical example. He commends the power of biblical language: 
For what could be more paradoxical than that nature itself 
should purify its own passions? For in words that seem to 
suggest passion it offers us precepts and instruction in purity. 
For he (i. e. Solomon) does not say that we ought to be beyond 
all carnal passion, that we should mortify our members on earth, 
or that our lips should not be sullied by sinful words; rather 
he so manages our souls that we are made to look to chastity by 
means of words which seem to suggest the opposite, and through 
sensuous expressions he reveals a meaning which is incorruptible. 34 
Thus through the exploitation of this form of semantic paradox, as 
with the instances of different kinds of verbal paradox alluded to 
above, Gregory is in some sense able to formulate positive assertions 
of religious truths from the ordinarily inadequate fabric of language. 
Similarly, in theological terms, he asserts that man's essential mut- 
ability must become the principle of his perpetual progress in perfect- 
ion. 35 The consistently close relationship between doctrine and 
language in Gregory's works is reaffirmed here; in respect of both, 
the potentially debasing elements become creatively invested with the 
force of affirmation. 
The implications of this situation for the writer of works of 
theology are analysed more closely in On Virginity: 
Once a man has purified his heart, so that he may perchance 
see the Lord's beatitude fulfilled, he will then despise all 
human utterance as absolutely incapable of expressing what he 
has experienced. Again, if a man is immersed in carnal passions, 
so that these inclinations, like a rheum, put a glaze over the 
window of the soul, anything you might say, no matter how strong, 
would be wasted on him. When speaking of miracles it does not 
matter whether you understate or exaggerate to those who have no 
sensibility whatever. 
It is the same thing with the sunshine. If a man has not seen 
it from his earliest days, any effort to translate the experience 
into words is useless and meaningless. You cannot make the bril- 
liance of the sunlight shine through his ears. 36 
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The passage is characteristic of Gregory's style in its vitality and 
naturalistic re-use of entirely traditional imagery. Nevertheless, 
it insists that since the relationship between God and language is at 
best oblique and so heavily dependent on sympathetic interpretation by 
the reader, there is actually a certain arbitrariness about the choice 
of words to embody truths which are, by their very nature, ultimately 
inexpressible. The principal effect on language is thus liberating. 
It is largely because of this that Gregory is able to communicate the 
same unchanging reality by means of diverse terminologies which are, 
in consequence, at once intrinsically irrelevant and supremely mean- 
ingful and authoritative. 
This is perhaps one of the most significant aspects of Gregory's 
achievement in respect of his influence on the later tradition of 
negative mysticism. It permitted him to absorb into his fundamentally 
biblical vocabulary and pattern of thought - for the most part without 
incongruity - an apparently alien phraseology mainly derived from 
Platonism, which was decisive in shaping the vocabulary which charact- 
erizes Christian mysticism as well as its doctrine. 37 Danielou raises 
two important points in this connexion: he notes, 
.... la liberte avec laquelle Gregoire use du vocabulaire 
platonicien. Jamais chez lui de citations litterales. Mais 
les expressions platoniciens sont groups librement. C'est 
ce qui nous montre pleinement a la fois combien il etait 
impregne de 1'imagerie platonicienne et en meme temps combien 
il en est peu esclave. C'est un vocabulaire chiffre, un,, 
systeme de symboles, analogue ä celui que lui fournit 1'Ecriture, 
et qui ne vaut pas par lui-meme, mais par les significations 
dont il le charge. Il n'y a pas chez lui de litteralisme 
mosaique, mais ce sont deux systemes de symboles qui lui servent- 
ä exprimer la realite, les veritables ovra, c'est-ä-dire le 
Christ et ses mysteres. 38 
Danielou's comments support the inference that Gregory was guided by 
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utilitarian rather than purely aesthetic considerations in his manipu- 
lation of the resources of language. He emphasizes, too, the technical 
and symbolic status of the various ranges of vocabulary in which Gregory 
couches his mystical theology, and which, indeed, determined the role 
of language with regard to mystical theory and experience which became 
integral to the Dionysian mystical tradition. 
Figural language 
The synthesis of elements of thought and language from various 
sources which Gregory achieved in his theology may be illustrated in 
respect of one of the most influential areas of his work - that is, the 
allegorical interpretation of the life of Moses as a pattern for the 
mystic ascent. Both in its general allegorical method and in its ex- 
position of many significant narrative details, the Life of Moses in 
the first instance is largely dependent on Philo. 39 Hans Lewy summar- 
izes the nature and importance of Philo's approach to scriptural 
exegesis in the introduction to his compilation of translated extracts 
from Philo's work: 
The events related are to be understood as signs of spiritual 
happenings independent of time and space; their scene is man's 
soul and their content his everlasting struggle for salvation. 
Thus allegory becomes the instrument for the expression of a 
strictly personal form of religious experience. 40 
However, it was largely through the mediation of Origen, who, writing 
in the third century, palliated some of the unacceptable extremes of 
Philo's thinking, that his method was rendered capable of being absorbed 
into the orthodox Christian tradition to which Gregory belongs. Danielou 
thus remarks concerning the formative effect of Philo's notions that, 
InOrigen and Gregory of Nyssa the influence of Philo will give 
an 'interiorness', a reflective depth, which normal typology 
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was inclined to overlook .... We see here the mutual impact 
of two planes of action; the evolution of history and the 
individual soul .... 
41 
Particular illustrations of Gregory's indebtedness to Philo and Origen 
for crucial points of doctrine and expression will be included in the 
course of this chapter. 
It must, however, be clear that the mystical interpretation of 
the life of Moses in Gregory's works is inseparable from his notion 
of the soul's perpetual progress in perfection -a concept which is, 
in fact, Stoic in origin, though it is completely redefined by Gregory, 
for whom the condition is eternal and not the prelude to a final state 
of absolute perfection. Yet superimposed on this, is the analogous 
idea, which is quintessentially Platonic, that the process of becoming 
perfect is one of continuous ascent. Elements from entirely disparate 
traditions thus coalesce into a unified and dynamic theology, and the 
exposition of the life of Moses and, equally importantly, the Canticle 
of Canticles, according to Philonian allegorical principles, as having 
reference to the mystic way, is reinforced by the basically Platonic 
assumption that the biblical texts are governed by a scheme of ascent. 
The idea is interestingly explored by Anders Nygren in his book 
Agape and Eros, 
42 
where he attempts to trace the evolution of these 
conflicting concepts from their separate origins, through the period 
of their uneasy yoking together in religious thought up to the time of 
the reformation. Nygren marks Gregory as one of the earliest theolo- 
gians to effect a plausible synthesis between the two notions. He 
places particular emphasis on the inherently aspiring quality of 'erns', 
which, in contrast to the fundamentally Christian concept of 'agape', 
is Platonic in origin, and he demonstrates convincingly the centrality 
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of this idea in Gregorian spirituality - particularly in the area of 
his mystical theology. He substantiates his argument by reference to 
the frequency with which Platonic images of ascent occur in Gregory's 
works: e. g., the ladder, the arrow, the flame, wings and the chain 
of love. 
It should also be noted in this context, though the point will 
subsequently be discussed in greater detail, that Gregory inherited 
from Platonism a terminology which was not only dominated by the gen- 
eral principle of ascent, but one which was already to some extent 
categorized according to the traditional association of its expressions 
with different stages of the progress towards perfection. 43 In this 
respect, Gregory's Platonist phraseology predictably found a close 
parallel in the vocabulary which he assembled on the basis of Scripture, 
and it is therefore essential that careful consideration should first 
be given to his approach to the Bible and its impact on his writings. 
Gregory's attitude to biblical language is above all profoundly 
reverential. For him, the Bible is "the inspired word" (S OCdIrveu6TOs 
A 'os)44 of divine revelation, and the intrinsic integrity and 
evocative power of its language is preserved even when it is assimil- 
ated into his own written works, justifying and,. indeed, sanctifying 
the attempt to express something of the ineffable nature of God in 
words. There is, moreover, a fundamental conviction that the words 
of the Bible are intended to be interpreted in a spiritual sense. In 
his Commentary on the Canticle, for example, Gregory emphasizes that 
the soul seeking perfection must persevere in extricating the inner 
meaning of scriptural texts: 
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We do, of course, say that it is sufficient if we are filled 
with the obvious sense of Scripture, if (just as Moses com- 
manded for the celebration of the Passover) we eat the flesh 
that appears and leave untouched the bones of obscurity (Exod. 
12.8-10). +5But if anyone desires the hidden marrow of the 
Word, he must seek it of Him Who reveals His mysteries to 
those who are worthy. 46 
Similarly, earlier in the same treatise Gregory alludes to the "sym- 
bolic wall of doctrine" (Tog TU1T1KOU Tns SlSacKaaias TO(Xou), 
47 and 
goes on to assert that interpretation of the Bible for the benefit of 
fellow Christians is among the primary duties of those who have ach- 
ieved the end of contemplation, typified by the figure of Moses the 
Law-Giver. 48 
There is thus a sense in which Gregory regards the text of the 
Bible as obviously symbolic and therefore needing to be perpetually 
translated to "an allegorical level suitable for the divinity". 49 In 
his discussion of the account of Abraham's migration, for example, he 
argues in support of a symbolic interpretation of the passage, since 
the narrative can have no deep spiritual significance if it is under- 
stood in historical terms alone: 
But let us, if we may, interpret the meaning of the sacred 
history (Gen. 12.1-4) according to the profound insight of 
the Apostle (Hebr. 11.8-10) by transposing the story to an 
allegorical level, even though we allow the validity of the 
literal meaning. Abraham at the divine command went forth 
from his own country and from his own kin, but his migration 
was such as befitted a prophet in quest of the knowledge of 
God. Indeed, there is no physical migration, I think, that 
can prepare us for the knowledge of those things which are 
discovered by the spirit. But by going out of his native 
land, that is, out of himself, out of the realm of base and 
earthly thoughts, Abraham raised his mind as far as possible 
above the common limits of our human nature and abandoned the 
association which the soul has with the senses. 50 
In the same way, the detailed description of Moses' priestly vestments 
(Exod. 28) and the construction of the Tabernacle (Exod. 25-27) seem 
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to Gregory to be fully explicable only in terms of a symbolic meaning. 
51 
Indeed, he feels compelled at least to suggest an interpretation of the 
text, even when, as with the reference to cinammon in the Canticle 
4.14, the only apparent explanation seems by his own admission to out- 
strip the bounds of probability. 52 
At the beginning of the Commentary on the Canticle, Gregory in 
fact sets down several important precepts concerned with the proper 
interpretation of Scripture, with specific reference to the nuptial 
imagery which is central to the text in question: 
In the art of painting the material of the different colors 
fills out the representation of the model. But anyone who 
looks at the picture that has been completed through the skil- 
ful use of color does not stop with the mere contemplation of 
the colors that have been painted on the tablet; rather he 
looks at the form which the artist has created in color. So 
it is with the Scripture we are discussing. We must not as 
it were look merely at the material of the colors (in this 
case, the words), but rather at the form of the King that the 
chaste concepts of the mind have expressed in words. Now the 
colors, as for example, white, yellow, black, red, blue, are 
in this case the words in their obvious meanings, as for example, 
mouth, kiss, myrrh, wine, parts of the body, bed, maidens, and 
the like. And the form that is expressed by these words is that 
state of integrity and blessedness, union with God, the banish- 
ment of all evil, and the assimilation of the truly good and 
beautiful. 53 
The emphasis here is on comprehending the text as an entity reflecting 
a single coherent spiritual meaning. The meaning of individual details 
must therefore be subject to the overall significance of the passage. 
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The decisive factor is the underlying sameness of the religious truth, 
which not only renders all terminologies in a sense arbitrary, as has 
been argued above, 
55 but also fosters a remarkable fluidity of language, 
so that diverse images may with equal propriety convey the same essential 
meaning. Thus, by associating the inner significance of the apparently 
unrelated verses of Canticle 3.8, Romans 9.6 and Luke 11.7, Gregory is 
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able to assert that the warrior, the true Israelite and the child 
referred to in the various texts are alike symbolic representations 
of God's elect. 56 More importantly, the bridal imagery of the Canticle 
thus effectively becomes synonymous with the mystical terminology 
centring on the account of the life of Moses. The texts are seen to 
be mutually corroborative by virtue of their inner significance. Hence 
Gregory verifies his interpretation of the Canticle by referring to the 
symbolism of Exodus: 
.... having come, as she thinks, to the height of her hopes, 
and thinking that she is already united with her Beloved, she 
speaks of her more perfect participation in good as a 'bed', 
referring to the 'night' (viKTa), the time of darkness ((YKdTOUS). 
By the 'night', she refers to the contemplation of the invisible 
(Twv aopaTwv Tito Oewpiäv), just as Moses, who entered into the 
darkness to the place where God was; and God, as the Prophet 
says, 'made the darkness his covert round about him' (Ps. 17. 
12). 57 
The commutability of mystical expressions which follows from this is 
one of the most extraordinary characteristics of Gregory's language, 
as well as one of the most influential. Indeed, the assumed identity 
of meaning in these biblical texts served to consolidate them both in 
subsequent Christian tradition as primary sources for both the dogma 
and the vocabulary of mysticism. 
Implicit in this discussion of Gregory's attitude to biblical 
language, however, is the recognition that there is a vital relation- 
ship between the actual and symbolic connotations-of the text. In 
connexion with his interpretation of Canticle 4.12, for example, 
Gregory expounds the mystical significance of the fig by precise 
reference to the natural properties of the fruit. 58 Similarly with 
the allusion to God's 'back' in Exodus 33.23, Gregory argues insist- 
ently for a symbolic interpretation of the passage - but on the sure 
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basis of its literal meaning. 59 His method in this instance is, in 
fact, interesting and entirely representative. He works from a rational 
account of the superficial sense of the text to the conclusion that to 
attribute physical characteristics of this kind to the transcendent 
God in real terms would be patently ridiculous; hence the vocabulary 
must necessarily be understood symbolically. Significantly, however, 
the tenor of the words in a non-figurative context must be strictly 
adhered to on the symbolic level. The mention of God's back will there- 
fore denote the need to follow Him in spirit, since in physical terms, 
the leader's back would be visible only to those who follow. The reader, 
like the writer, has to make an imaginative shift to a specifically 
religious perspective, but, having done so, the language will be seen. 
to maintain a consistent logic of its own. 
It will be apparent from this outline of Gregory's concept of the 
relationship between the literal and symbolic meanings of Scripture 
that his attitude is in close agreement with the principles which govern 
the figural approach to biblical narrative and human experience. Indeed, 
as might be supposed, the impact of this enormously influential inter- 
pretative method on Gregory's theology was decisive - as well in its 
strictest form as in its most general. 
The most penetrating studies of the bearing of theories of pre- 
figuration on the history of Christian thought have been produced by 
Jean Danielou, in From Shadows to Reality, and by Erich Auerbach in his 
seminal essay 'Figura'. 
60 The treatment of the topic and the principal 
areas of interest are in each case different, but both writers concur 
in respect of the essential characteristics of figural interpretation. 
Thus Auerbach asserts, 
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Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two 
events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself 
but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfils 
the first. The two poles of the figure are separate in time, 
but both, -being real events or figures, are within time, within 
the stream of historical life. Only the understanding of the 
two persons or events is a spiritual act, but this spiritual 
act deals with concrete events whether past, present or future, 
and not with concepts or abstractions .... Since in figural 
representation one thing stands for another, since one thing 
represents and signifies the other, figural interpretation is 
'allegorical' in the widest sense. But it differs from most 
of the allegorical forms known to us by the historicity both 
of the sign and what it signifies. 61 
Auerbach is thus emphatic in his insistence on the actuality of the 
events which are the substance of figural interpretation; it is only 
the impulse to interpret them by associating their significance which 
is in any way dependent upon spiritual vision. 
62 Clearly, therefore, 
it should be stressed that Gregory's exposition of the life of Moses, 
for example, as the pattern for mystical ascent does not at all detract 
from the historical validity of the biblical narrative. It rather con- 
forms with the notion of prophetic prefiguration in its narrowest sense, 
whereby episodes in the Old Testament are seen to foreshadow particular 
events in the New, which themselves look forward to their impact on the 
individual human soul in time and in eternity. 
63 The truth which under- 
lies them is unchanging and foreknown by the divine intelligence. Thus 
the significance of the Moses story is effectively enriched by being 
subjected to figural interpretation because it is located temporally 
within the eternal divine plan of salvation as the prefiguration, in 
the first instance, of Christ's historical act of redemption in his 
crucifixion, and also, prophetically, of the perpetual process of sal- 
vation which takes place within each Christian soul. The exposition of 
Moses' story, which it has already been claimed that Gregory derived 
from Philo, may therefore now be defined as fully typological rather 
than in a general sense allegorical. 64 
35 
The linguistic implications of this point may hardly be over- 
stated. In the Life of Moses, Gregory affirms, "Le sens litteral 
correspond bien aux realites", 
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and it is this conviction that a 
radical interrelation exists between the actual and figurative mean- 
ings of the text which invests the biblical language with a unique 
appropriateness and power as a means of communicating mystical theology. 
Similarly the nuptial imagery of the Canticle is seen to possess a 
force which is in some way more than symbolic; it is intimately 
connected with the real personal experience of the contemplative soul. 
It is perhaps as a result of this that the mystical vocabulary which 
evolved from these scriptural texts is characterized by a vitality and 
immediacy which is yet substantiated by the solid authority of patristic 
tradition. Indeed, this may possibly account in some measure for the 
continued prevalence of this terminology among major spiritual writers 
as late as the Middle Ages. 
It may, however, be argued that the Canticle is not in the strict- 
est sense of the word 'typological', since it has no specific counter- 
part in the historical events of the New Testament but only symbolizes 
the experience of the individual soul. Certainly the practice of inter- 
preting according to figural principles seems to have encroached early 
on spheres in which it was theoretically inappropriate. Danielou 
attributes this largely to the influence of Philo, whose universal 
allegorizing was often at the expense of the literal meaning of the 
text: 
Then we meet Philo's influence in the manner of approach which 
consists in seeking a spiritual sense in the whole Scriptures. 
This is an extension of typology to the realms where there is 
no proper foundation for it, as for example the development of 
the measurements of the ark. 66 
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Gregory, in fact, follows Philo's example in the specific instance 
alluded to by Danielou, 67 and it is clear that Philo's method permeated 
Gregory's entire reading of the Bible. 
Sacramental vocabulary 
However, there are other areas, still properly amenable to 
typological exposition, in which this mode of interpretation served to 
give currency to a more pervasive though perhaps less schematic use of 
biblical imagery than, for example, in the case of the coherent symbol- 
ism derived from the sequence of events recorded in Exodus. Of these, 
the most important in the present context furnished the early church 
Fathers with a superstructure of imagery which centred on the sacraments 
and spanned the whole of the Bible. Danielou stresses the frequency 
with which passages occur in Scripture which are susceptible of being 
interpreted in a sacramental sense: 
Typology seeks in the Old Testament not only the type of the 
realities of the New Testament but also the type of the 
'sacramental beneath which this reality is expressed and which 
are themselves sacraments of the realities of the Old Law: for 
if God has chosen certain signs rather than others, as St. Hilary 
remarks (Tract. Myst. 1,33), it is because they constitute a 
system of 'correspondences' in the course of history, between 
the different covenants, thus bringing out that they form parts 
of a whole. The group of water and wood which typify Baptism 
in the Old Testament form one of the oldest of these 'sacramental. 
We meet it in the Flood, in the wood which sweetened the waters 
of Maxah, in the axe of Elisha floating on the waters. It forms 
part of the mystagogical catechesis of Baptism in the early 
Church. 68 
The significance of this in theological terms is evident; but its 
implications for language are also extremely far-reaching. In the first 
part of this chapter, the need for continual self-purification in the 
soul aspiring to contemplative union was much emphasized. It may, 
however, be further demonstrated that Gregory characteristically envis- 
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ages this process as a perpetual re-enactment of the spiritual re- 
generation which takes place at baptism and is symbolized in its 
initiatory rites. Thus the account of the Israelites' crossing of 
the Red Sea in Exodus 14, for example, is in his eyes simultaneously 
and unquestionably representative of the actual and figurative 
cleansing which is first achieved through baptism and is subsequently 
confirmed in the successive purifications which are essential to the 
mystic way: 
Par lä l'histoire nous enseigne en outre que ceux qui traversent 
l'eau (üöwp) ne doivent plus rien trainer avec eux de 1'armee 
ennemie, une fois qu'ils ont emerge. Si en effet l'ennemi 
remonte avec eux, ils demeurent ses esclaves meine apres l'eau: 
n'ont-ils pas garde le tyran vivant au lieu de l'engloutir dans 
l'ablme? Cela signifie, si l'on degage le sens cache, que tous 
ceux 7ui passent par l'eau sacramentelle du bapteme (To j1UaTuKÖV USwp CV Ti ßalTTi011CM) doivent faire mourir dans l' eau toute 
l'armee des vices qui leur font la guerre.... 69 
Similarly in his exposition of the Canticle, the reference to the 
'vineyards of Engaddi' (Cant. 1.13) implicitly evokes for Gregory the 
wine which is consecrated at the celebration of the eucharist, and thus, 
again, in sacramental terms, the soul or Bride at the culmination of 
her ascent is seen as participating in a union with the Divine which 
is the counterpart of the union which is believed to be realised at 
the eucharist and is symbolized in its rites. Hence, 
she now becomes the mother of the divine cluster of grapes that 
bloomed, that is, flourished before the Passion, and during the 
Passion poured out its wine. For after the divine drama of the 
Passion the wine that cheers the heart (Ps. 103.15) is rightly 
called the blood of the grape. 70 
This sense of the interpenetration of different levels of spiritual 
experience must clearly have a distinctive effect on language. The sac- 
ramental terminology is indeed symbolic; yet the notion that, typolog- 
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ically, the biblical references to the mysteries of the sacraments 
foreshadow a continuing reality which takes place in the individual 
soul imbues the vocabulary with something of the force of literal 
truth. The literal and symbolic value of the terms is defined by 
context alone, and full appreciation of their significance is dependent 
on the readers' understanding of sacramental theology. It seems, 
indeed, that the vital relationship which Gregory established between 
the sacraments and the ascent to mystic union is grounded in their 
common verbal associations with the central Christian symbols of, for 
example, water, blood. and wine. Thus-his collation of these distinct 
doctrinal propositions effectively brought to bear on mystical theology 
the multifarious resonances which sacramental language already intrins- 
ically possessed in the minds of spiritually committed readers and 
writers alike. 
The threefold division of the mystic way: purgation, illumination, 
contemplation. 
Gregory thus pressed into service a range of symbolism whose 
immense evocative power permitted a unique fluidity of thought and 
expression. It has, however, been implicit in the examples of sacra- 
mental language cited above, that there is some element of formality 
in the association of the individual sacraments with different aspects 
of the contemplative ascent. In fact, while Gregory's fundamental 
conception of the mystic way as progressive transformation into Christ 
is itself largely unschematic, he does envisage three distinct though 
not inflexible stages in the ascent. This division clearly underlies 
his summary of the meaning of the Canticle: 
But when she (i. e. the Bride) has torn herself from her 
attachment to sin, and by that mystic kiss she yearns to 
bring her mouth close to the fountain of light (Cant. 4.15), 
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then does she become beautiful, radiant with the light of 
truth, having washed away the dark stain of ignorance. 
She is compared to a steed (Cant. 1.8) because of the 
speed of her progress, to a dove (Cant. 2.10) because of 
the agility of her mind. Like a steed she races through 
all she perceives by sense or by reason (Trö ¢aiv6uevov); 
and she soars like a dove until she comes to rest with 
longing under the shade of the apple tree (Cant. 2.3). 
That which overshadows her the text calls an apple tree 
instead of a cloud (&vTivE4cAns). But then she is 
encompassed by a divine night (Heias vuKrös, Cant. 3.13), 
during which her spouse approaches but does not reveal 
himself. 71 
Subsequent theologians defined the three stages more precisely as 
purgation, illumination and contemplation or union. Gregory's concept 
of their several characteristics and their association with the sacra- 
ments of the church is described by Danielou: 
le bapteme correspond ä la premiere voie sous son double 
aspect de purification (Ka8apais) et d'illumination (4wTlauös), 
la Confirmation correspond ä la seconde par son double aspect 
d'obscurcissement du monde visible (ve# Xq) et d'elevation 
vers le monde invisible (ITeplcTepä), enfin I'Eucharistie est 
en rapport avec la vie mystique ä la fois comme union (aVaKpaats) 
et comme sortie hors du monde et de soi (£KaTaalS). La vie 
sacramentelle, est vraiment conSue comme une 'mystagogie', 
comme une initiation progressive qui conduit l'äme jusqu'aux 
sommets de la vie mystique, jusqu'ä la 'sobre ivresse'. 72 
The basic threefold division of the mystic life was a development from 
Origen's philosophy, which was doubtless transmitted to Gregory by his 
brother Basil - as, indeed, was the decisive additional association of 
the three books of Solomon, that is, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the 
Canticle, with the purgative, illuminative and contemplative stages 
of the ascent respectively. 73 Danielou argues that Basil himself had 
comprehended the entire process in terms of baptism and that Gregory's 
inclusion of the sacraments of confirmation and the eucharist in the 
scheme was therefore entirely original. 
74 The most important point to 
be noted here, however - and it is one which was crucial for the later 
development of mysticism and the vocabulary peculiar to it - is that 
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Gregory's evolution of a properly mystical theology was from the first 
inseparable from his attempt to forge an appropriate terminology, and, 
further, that the raw materials of language drawn from diverse sources 
with which he worked were themselves already to some extent categorized 
according to the associations they themselves possessed. Thus, in the 
case of the ultimate contemplative stage with which this thesis is 
primarily concerned, the eucharistic terminology which he applied to 
it, and the expressions derived from both the Canticle and, as has 
been suggested earlier, from Platonism, were already connected with 
the highest spiritual states, and Gregory's achievement was in effect 
to redirect and consolidate their proper significance within the con- 
text of a thoroughly Christian mystical theology. 
Purgatorial vocabulary. 
However, while the focus of this thesis dictates that primary 
emphasis should be given to the vocabulary associated with the third 
way, its distinctive characteristics cannot be fully understood without 
some reference to the language normally connected with the preceding 
stages of the ascent. In linguistic terms, the initial purgative stage 
is perhaps the least complex. As a result of its inherent human orient- 
ation, the terminology which expresses it is largely unscathed by the 
problems involved in the attempt to communicate anything concerning the 
ineffable nature of God Himself - though it is subject to the same 
conditions as all use of language in religious contexts and the vocab- 
ulary associated with baptism shares the peculiarities of all sacramental 
language. 
Illuminative vocabulary. 
It must always be stressed that, for Gregory, this purificatory 
process and all that it entails theologically and linguistically, is 
prolonged throughout the mystic ascent; however, the illuminative stage 
41 
is denoted principally by its emphasis on discursive thought as a 
means of attaining the degree of knowledge of God which is accessible 
to human faculties. Thus, by analogy with the created universe which 
is within the range of his experience, man may deduce something of the 
attributes, though not the essence, of its Creator. Gregory demonstrates 
this notion by comparison with the relationship between the human artist 
and his work: 
For we can see Him, Who has 'made all things in wisdom' (Ps. 
103.24), by the process of inference through the wisdom that 
is reflected in the universe. It is just as in human works 
of art, where the mind can in a sense see the author of the 
ordered structure that is before it, inasmuch as he has left 
his artistry in his work. But notice that what we see here 
is not the substance of the craftsman, but merely the artistic 
skill that he has impressed in his work. So too, when we con- 
sider. the order of creation, we form an image not of the sub- 
stance but of the wisdom of Him Who has done all things wisely. 75 
The idea is also supported by his exegesis of Exodus 19.16-19, where 
the sounding of the trumpets before Moses enters the tabernacle which 
represents God's transcendence is interpreted as the manifestation of 
divine glory throughout the whole of creation. 76 
The specifically linguistic significance of Gregory's doctrine on 
this point is suggested in an important passage from his Commentary on 
Fr nl ccia a+. aa e 
Thus in speaking (Aoyols) of God, when there is a question of 
His essence, then is the 'time to keep silence'. When, however, 
it is a question of His operation (äya, -JOris 
cvepystns), 
a know- 
ledge (yvwois) of which can come doom even to us, that is the. 
'time to speak' of His omnipotence by telling of His works and 
explaining His deeds, and to use words to this extent. 77 
Clearly Gregory acknowledges the appropriateness of language in the 
context of discussion of the comprehensible aspects of God, which are 
His activities in respect of man, but maintains his conviction of its 
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inadequacy as a means of expressing anything of the nature of God 
Himself. There is thus implicit in his assertions a recognition that 
so long as language preserves its fundamental relationship with rational 
perception, it is peculiarly appropriate to the illuminative stage of 
the mystic ascent, where the importance attached to the process of 
inference makes this preeminently the sphere of intellectual apprehen- 
sion. Indeed the prose in which Gregory formulates experience of this 
order, like that of his theoretical statements concerning religious 
language, is frequently characterized by a sureness and clarity which 
accords well with its function as a stimulus to the intellect. The 
transition from discourse of this order to the use of a mystery langu- 
age, (whose special characteristics will be considered below78) when 
Gregory moves from discussion of the illuminative stage to depict the 
final phase of the mystic way is strongly marked in such passages as 
the extract from Sermon XI of the commentary on the Canticle which has 
been cited above. 79 Language, in the context of illuminative theology, 
operates effectively and unambiguously as a medium for analysis and 
persuasion. A perfect cooperation obtains between the vehicle and the 
meaning it conveys, and prose of this order is characterized by its 
poise and cadence. Moreover, with regard to the individual elements 
of vocabulary, Charles Journet argues in his general study of the theor- 
etical justification for negative mystical language, that, from a 
Christian standpoint, adjectives such as 'wise' and 'good', whose 
applicability to God is deduced from observation of the properties of 
the created world, have an absolute sense only when they are employed 
80 to describe God's being. He cites Aquinas in support of his claims: 
Such words, in fact, open out upon an Abyss of Simplicity 
wherein the perfection they signify is not destroyed or sub- 
merged or preserved in its entirety (God truly is; He is truly 
one, truly good, truly wise; formally one, formally good, formally 
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wise). Indeed, the perfection such terms signify can receive 
in God alone, and for the first time, its real fulness of 
meaning. The words being, unity, goodness, wisdom are more 
true of God than they could ever be of creatures; they are 
'by priority said of God rather than of creatures' - 'per 
prius dicuntur de Deo quarr de creaturis' (S. T., I, 13,6).... 
Being thus exalted, the perfection such words signify is 
identified with all the other perfections in the supreme, 
supereminent, unnamed, formal conception of the Godhead. 81 
Further conclusions may be reached concerning the language which 
characterizes the illuminative stage by enquiring more closely into 
the manner of analogical supposition. It is, inevitably, through 
man's interpretation of his sensual experience of the universe that 
he is able to comprehend its Creator. Gregory emphasizes this in his 
ti 
Commentary on Ecclesiastes: 
The life of the senses, however, which is transacted by the 
operation of our sense faculties, is bestowed upon our nature 
that the perception of sense phenomena (Tnv Twv 4aivouevWV 
yvwoiv) might lead. the soul to the knowledge of the invisible 
(Tnv Twv aopäTWV e-iTiyvwaiv), as the Book of Wisdom says: 'By 
the grandeur of the beauty of creatures we may by analogy see 
the creator of all things' (Wisd. 13.5). 82 
He goes on to affirm, however, that the soul possesses spiritual 
faculties which correspond to the corporeal senses and permit a parallel 
apprehension of spiritual realities. 83 Thus, in the Commentary on the 
Canticle: 
There is another lesson that we are incidentally taught by the 
deeper study of this book: it is that we have two sets of 
senses (aiaOnais), one corporeal (owuaTIOn) and the other 
spiritual (ecioTEpa), as the Word tells us in the book of 
Proverbs: 'Thou shalt find the sense of God'. There is a 
correspondence between the motions and movements of the soul 
and the sense organs of the body, as we learn from the words 
of the Spirit given in our text. Wine and milk, it is true, 
are distinguished by the taste; but the spiritual realities 
which they signify are grasped rather by the intellectual 
power of the soul. A kiss is an operation of the sense of 
touch: in a kiss two pairs of lips touch. There is, however, 
a spiritual faculty of touch, which comes in contact with the 
Word, and this is actuated by a spiritual and immaterial sense 
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of touch ( Sla Ttvos 
äaWUaTOU 
Kai vonTns 
CTraýrls 
cVEpyOujlEV l >> 
as it is said: 'Our hands have handled the word of life' (I 
John 1, l). So too the smell of the divine perfume does not. 
proceed from the smell of our nostrils but from a spiritual 
faculty which draws in the sweet odor of Christ by an inhala- 
tion of the spirit. 84 
The linguistic situation which ensues from this is interesting and in 
several respects problematic. In the first instance, the two applica- 
tions of sense language - physical and spiritual - are in no way dis- 
tinguished from one another verbally. Correct interpretation of their 
significance is to some extent conditional upon their context, but is 
ultimately dependent upon the reader's insight. 
Further, the range of vocabulary which is associated with the 
spiritual senses is essentially metaphoric, yet it both utilizes and 
categorically repudiates its normal sensual connotations. Thus, in 
his article on early notions of the spiritual senses, Karl Rahner 
aptly classifies expressions of this kind as "mi - figuratives, 
mi - reelles". 
85 Sense language is, in fact, both logical in its 
operation, in so far as it works by analogy with physical modes of 
apprehension, and, simultaneously, entirely non-rational, in that it 
implies a means of perceiving God which is itself the reverse of 
intellectual even though it forms the basis for speculative thought. 
Indeed, it may be that it was the radical ambiguity attached to the 
language of the spiritual senses which made it peculiarly appropriate 
as a vehicle for expressing the heterogeneous tenets of Christian 
theology. 86 
The possible importance of this last contention becomes particul- 
arly apparent in the light of one central point to emerge from Rahner's 
article - that is, the association which Origen established and perpetuated 
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between the spiritual senses and Christ. He demonstrates that, 
i En s'appuyant sur l'Ecriture, Origene precise souvent 
11objet de chaque sens. Le texte suivant nous servira 
d'exemple: '.... Le Christ devient 1'objet de chaque sens 
de 1'9me. I1 se nomme la vraie Lumiere pour illuminer les 
yeux de 1'äme; le Verbe, pour etre etendu; le Pain de Vie, 
pour etre goüte. De meme il est appele huile d'onction et 
nard pour que l'äme se delecte ä 1'odeur de Logos; il est 
devenu'le Verbe fait chair' palpable et saisissable, pour 
que 1'homme interieur puisse saisir le Verbe de Vie. Le 
meme Verbe de Dieu est tout cela (Lumiere, Verbe, etc. ), il 
le devient dans une oraison fervente et il ne permet pas 
qu'aucun des sens spirituels soit depourvu de graces'. 
(In Cantic., lib II. PG. XIII, 142A). 87 
Origenb trinitarian theology is, however, generally acknowledged to 
be questionable and the distinctions between God as Father and Son 
characteristically blurred. He seems inclined, moreover, to define 
all knowledge of God as in some sense mystical. Yet it might be 
argued - albeit with many qualifications - that this in itself made 
his philosophy peculiarly attractive to Gregory. It has been emphas- 
ized that the essential spiritual impluse for Gregory, which is 
towards progressive transformation into Christ, finally transcends 
all categories of the mystical ascent. Thus, in his exposition of 
Exodus 33.21-22, Gregory interprets the 'rock' as an allusion to 
Christ and claims that, 
.... c'est dans le Christ que nous croyons que sont contenus 
tous les biens espergs, lui en qui nous savons que 'sont tous 
les tresors' des biens, celui qui est en quelque bien, celui- 
lä est forcement dans le Christ qui contient tout bien. 88 
Clearly there is no suggestion in Gregory's theology that Christ is 
in any way secondary to God 89 - an intermediary to be repudiated by 
the soul seeking union with the absolute God. Yet, without impairing 
the truth of this assertion, it should also be recognized that, 
through the incarnation, a unique relationship exists-between humanity 
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and Christ as the fusion of God and man. Hence it is, significantly, 
Christ who is the object of the spiritual senses. Similarly, the 
language in which Gregory speaks specifically of Christ is sometimes 
characterized by an appropriate anthropomorphism and positive lyrical 
vigour which is absent from his discussions of the absolute Godhead. 90 
Most important of all, perhaps, in his interpretation of the episode 
of the burning bush in Exodus 3, Gregory directly identifies Christ 
Incarnate with the fulfilment of the illuminative stage of the mystic 
ascent: 
Que si c'est d'un buisson d'epines que s'allume la flamme par 
laquelle 1'9me du prophete est illuminee, cela non plus ne 
sera pas sans interet pour notre recherche. Si en effet 'la 
v6rite est Dieu et si elle est aussi 'lumiere' (ems) - ce sont 
lä les expressions sublimes que l'Evangile emploie pour designer 
le Dieu qui s'estT manifesto pour nous dans la chair -, il suit 
que la conduite de la vertu nous amene ä la connaissance de 
cette lumiere qui s'est abaiss4e jusqu'ä la nature humaine. 91 
Linguistically, the connexion is decisive. Because there is 
inherent in the nature of Christ a human focus which is in one sense 
accessible to man's intellectual apprehension, language which preserves 
its normal relationship with noetic or sensual perception must have 
a valid and material function in conjunction with religious experience 
of this order. Yet having admitted the general association between 
Christ and the illuminative stage of the mystic ascent, it is still 
necessary to determine more precisely the manner in which language 
operates within this situation. Journet, in fact, argues that the 
ordinary connotations of words are effectively heightened in this con- 
text and their significance infinitely extended by virtue of the fact 
that each individual divine attribute must be understood to imply all 
the rest. He asserts that it is only the analytic character of human 
thought as it is reflected in language which inevitably fragments the 
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essential unity of God: 
It will split up into a multitude of concepts which will 
signify so many pure and absolute perfections. Each of 
these perfections will signify explicitly a certain partic- 
ular aspect of the total richness, that aspect being conceived 
as freed from all limitations and carried up to the infinite 
level (infinite unity, infinite goodness, etc). But each 
perfection, -while remaining incapable of signifying explicitly 
more than that single aspect, will doubtless implicitly admit 
the indivisible divine plenitude, as necessarily presupposed 
and connoted but nevertheless unformulated. 92 
The point is an important one, since it conveys simultaneously both 
the genuine appositeness of language in this area and the special 
conditions attached to the inclusion of language in a religious con- 
text at all. It serves, moreover, to elucidate further the question 
which was posed earlier in this chapter concerning possible modes of 
manipulating language to communicate in some measure the inexpressible 
truths of religion. 93 Thus, in the first instance, Journet's emphasis 
on the extent to which statements about God are conditional upon human 
perception and methods of articulation must involve the conclusion 
that, even allowing for the presumed assent by reader and writer to 
the notion that language is perfected when it is applied to God, such 
propositions can never be accepted as unqualified embodiments of the 
nature of God Himself. To categorize positive assertions about Christ 
as descriptive without imposing some restrictions on the term would 
therefore, it seems, be misleading. In the continuation, of the 
passage alluded to above which celebrates Christ as the Good Shepherd, 
Gregory himself astutely anticipates such demurs: 
'Skew me, 0 thou whom my soul loveth' (Cant. 1.6). This is 
the name I give Thee, for Thy name 'is above all names' (Phil. 
2.9) and is inexpressible and inaccessible to all rational 
creatures (Träap aoyiK. 1 ýüoci äppaaTÖV Te Kai aXwpnTOV). But 
this name expresses Thy-goodness and the attitude of my soul 
towards Thee (i1 Tls `Ik s uov Jrcp i oe oXeoi s) . 
94 
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A shift in the function of nominal epithets has taken place here, so 
that they are no longer directly descriptive of the nature of their 
object which is Christ, but rather indicate obliquely his relationship 
with humanity. 95 
The second point of major significance to emerge from Journet's 
observation is the intensely positive quality of the language in this 
context. It has, indeed, already been stressed that such phraseology 
is peculiarly appropriate to the illuminative stage of the mystic 
ascent. However, Gregory's insistence in theological terms that the 
entire contemplative process is effectively one of perpetual transform- 
ation into Christ must in some sense militate against rigid distinctions 
between the second and final mystic ways. Linguistically, therefore, 
it will follow that the mode of expression which appertains in partic- 
ular to illuminative theology will nevertheless retain its validity 
even in relation to the highest contemplative states. 
The ensuing coalescence of distinct terminologies in the area of 
unitive theology is among the most remarkable and significant facets of 
Gregory's achievement. While on the one hand asserting the fundam- 
ental transcendence and hence inexpressibility of the Godhead, Gregory 
is thus able to affirm simultaneously and without inconsistency that, 
The only name you could find to express that ineffable nature 
and power is that of the Good (äyaOöv). 
It is this Good, beyond all good, that truly is, and by 
itself it has given and continues to give all things the power 
to come into existence and to remain in being. 96 
The attempt to perfect words through their application to God has been 
shown to be essentially a characteristic of illuminative language, and 
it is, in fact, interestingly developed here in the effort to confer 
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an absolute value on the state of 'being'. The effect is comparable 
when, in the Commentary on the Canticle, Gregory refers to God as 
"Him Who is forever "(T% ae 1 ov-r I )f; 
7 
the anticipated syntactical 
pattern is thwarted, and the verb has no complement, but is completed 
only by an adverbial reiteration of its meaning. Elsewhere Gregory 
endeavours to counter the retrogressive tendencies of words by qualif- 
ying them with adjectives suggestive of perfection. Hence God is 
designated "eternal beauty" (TOlovTOV KaXöv äv)98 and the mystic union 
with Him described as "that spotless and divine marriage" (T s Aeias 
TE Kai Ö(XpaVTOUj1ET' a)TOÜ aup61waEws)99. It is as if Gregory seeks 
to restore language to its prelapsarian condition by nullifying its 
potentially corruptive sensuality and re-applying its inherently pure 
connotations. The point is, of course, crucial in relation to the 
entire marriage imagery of the Canticle, as was suggested earlier, 
where the important connexion between Gregory's linguistic theory and 
his doctrinal insistence on the necessity of rechannelling degenerative 
human characteristics as aids in the mystic ascent was also strongly 
emphasized. 100 
Similarly, in several important respects, the eucharistic imagery 
which Gregory habitually connects with the ultimate mystic union does 
not differ in its function from the sacramental imagery which properly 
pertains to the earlier stages of the ascent. His exposition of Cant. 
2.4-5 is comparable with his treatment of baptismal language, for 
example, and is equally remarkable for the. positive sensuous quality 
of its prose: 
Her thirst has so greatly increased that she is not satisfied 
with the cup of wisdom; her thirst is not quenched even though 
a whole cup is poured into her mouth, but she asks to be brought 
into the very wine cellar, and have her mouth held right beneath 
50 
the vats bubbling over with sweet wine. She asks to see 
the cluster crushed in the vats, to see the vine that prod- 
uced the cluster and the Husbandman of 'the true vine' Who 
made the cluster so sweet and nourishing. 
It would be superfluous for me to explain all this, for 
the spiritual meaning of each detail is manifest. Surely 
the mystery which the bride wants to see is how the Bride- 
groom's garments become red by treading the winepress, as 
the Prophet says: 'Why is thy apparel red, and thy garment 
like theirs that tread the winepress? ' (Is. 63.2). This, 
then, is the meaning of her desire: she wants to enter the 
house where the mystery of the wine is enacted. 101 
The impetus of the passage clearly lies in Gregory's sense of the 
profound association between the sacramental and mystic lives, which 
necessarily implicates the passion in each stage of the contemplative 
ascent. On a doctrinal level, this denotes the possibility that man 
is able through Christ to participate in the absolute Godhead, and 
its particular bearing on language is forcefully illustrated in this 
quotation. The words are not descriptive of the nature of God Himself, 
but rather, as in the case of illuminative language, aptly convey in 
metaphor something of the relationship which exists between the soul 
and God, now at the culmination of the mystic way. Moreover, since 
Gregory repudiates any final distinction between Christ and God, the 
terminology centring on the concept of the spiritual senses, which 
attaches primarily to the second stage of the ascent, in fact attains 
its fullest significance only in the context of unitive theology. 
Thus the eucharistic imagery and the bold allusion in the language 
of the spiritual senses to the 'taste' of Christ become fused in this 
supremely affirmative evocation of the nature of mystic union. 102 
Unitive vocabulary 
However, having suggested some of the ways in which the language 
of the third way operates according to the same rationale as illumin- 
I 
ative terminology, it is essential to identify the exact sense in which 
it is autonomous. The divergence, like the similarity of function )is, 
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for Gregory, firmly grounded in theology. Danielou provides a conven- 
ient recapitulation of the doctrinal position, which was explored in 
greater depth in the early part of this chapter: 
La seconde voie est done bien le domaine de 1'intelligence. 
C'est a ce titre quelle correspond ä ce qu'on appellera 
'vie illuminative'. Ceci est surtout caract6ristique de 
Gregoire. Pour_Origene, en effet, la troisieme voie est 
encore activit6 noetique. Pour Gregoire, eile est hyper- 
noetique et proprement mystique. L'äme est jetee hors des 
voies ordinaires de la connaissance. Et tout le domaine 
intellectuel est rejete dans la seconde voie. 103 
Danielou has claimed that it is precisely in respect of his concept 
of the super-intellectual character of the unitive way that Gregory 
may be regarded. as the originator of the Christian tradition of 
mystical theology. 104 
The inevitably profound impact on language of a theology in which 
the powers of the intellect are totally transcended in an impulse of 
love is manifest throughout Gregory's writings. Indeed, it might be 
argued that just as the positive quality of illuminative language and 
the sense in which it functions according to rational principles con- 
tinue to obtain in the context of the third way, so the problem of 
divine incomprehensibility which undermines the normal relationship 
between language and intellectual perception at this level is also 
necessarily reflected in the language of the preceding stages - parti- 
cularly in the emphatically non-rational connotations of the sensual 
and sacramental terminologies. 105 
It seems, however, that some of the distinctive characteristics 
of unitive language have their roots in traditions which flourished 
prior to the era in which Gregory wrote. His eucharistic imagery, for 
example, while clearly located firmly within the liturgical experience 
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of the orthodox Christian, also draws through Platonism on the 
ritual language of the hellenistic mystery religions. 106 The point 
is developed in some detail by Danielou on the basis of a discussion 
of the diverse meanings which Gregory attached to the term 'uu6Trjpiov' 
itself. 107 
Dani'elou discerns four principal senses of the word in Gregory's 
writings. Of these, its application to the hidden inner significance 
of Scripture and its allied association, partly pagan in origin, with 
initiation into the rites of the sacraments were both decisive influ- 
ences on his evolution of. a mystical terminology - as well in respect 
of his inclusion of sacramental vocabulary in a mystical context as 
in his general persuasion of the profundity of biblical language and 
the necessity for spiritual commitment as a condition for proper inter- 
pretation of its substance. But perhaps the most important sense here 
is its implicit relationship with the highest states of mystical appre- 
hension: 
Nous trouvons d'abord en ce sens Ta JUOTrtpta.... 
Ainsi Gregoire parle-t-il de 'Benjamin instruit des mysteres 
du Paradis' (XLlV, 384 A), ou de 'David qui parcourait les 
mysteres celestes' (XLV, 7440). Nous notons tout de suite 
que dans ces divers passages, Tä uvcTrjpia est en rapport avec 
le degre le plus haut de la vie spirituelle, 1' 'extase' de 
Benjamin, le 'rapt' de Paul au Paradis, le 'voyage au ciel' 
de David. Les 'mysteres' ici designent done proprement 1'objet 
de la connaissance 'mystique'. 
Il est remarquable, en effet, que le mot apparaisse particul- 
ierement pour designer les deux cas les plus typiques de con- 
naissance mystique, celui de Paul et celui de Moise. 108 
A complex pattern of correspondencesthus emerges here, grounded in 
1 
the connexion which Gregory establishes between the 'mysteries' and 
the unitive stage of the contemplative ascent in terms of their common 
insistence on the essentially ecstatic character of the spiritual ex- 
perience involved. The mystery language which Gregory absorbed into 
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his vocabulary, therefore, intrinsically reinforced his assertions 
as to the fundamentally non-rational quality of the ultimate mystical 
awareness, which informs his paradoxical definition of it as, simult- 
aneously, a penetration to the centre of the soul and a stretching 
out beyond the self in an impulse of love. 109 
The immense significance linguistically of this notion of 
ecstasy has already become to some extent apparent in Gregory's 
frequent recourse to the non-rationalistic terminology associated 
with the spiritual senses as a means of charting the most advanced 
levels of mystical experience. It is implied with particular trench- 
ancy in his use of the noun ''pws', as Danielou demonstrates, in 
connexion with the third way of the contemplative ascent: 
L'Epws est done un aspect de l'äyawn, sa forme le plus intense, 
sa ferveur. C'est toujours cet aspect qu'il presente dans les 
textes oü nous le trouvons .... L'ayä7n nous laissait dans la 
participation, dans le miroir. L'epws nous lance au delä, vers 
une relation ä Dieu 'tel qu'il est'. Il exprime ainsi le sommet 
de l'äyä7Tn, Textase oü l'äme est impatiente de tous les voiles 
qui la separent encore de Dieu - et l'aspect extatique que 
l'union ä Dieu garde toujours. 110 
While he diverges from Anders Nygren with regard to several key aspects 
of the meaning of epws and äyäirn in Gregory's works, Danielou is in 
complete agreement with him concerning the suggestions of intensity 
and, indeed, irrationality which are inherent in the concept of 
£Pws. 111 
Gregory's distinction between the concepts of 
epws 
and 
ayaTrn 
and his 
application of their separate connotations are nevertheless far from 
consistent - indeed, it will be shown in the following chapter that 
Ps. -Dionysius, whose Christian orthodoxy, unlike Gregory's, has been 
seriously challenged, is both more astute than Gregory, and more faith- 
ful to Christian principles, in reconciling the platonist notion of 
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Epws 
with the Christian doctrine of ayaTm. The prominence in Gregory's 
treatises of symbols traditionally coupled with 'epwshas been indicated 
above, 112 and further examination of the symbol of the arrow which was 
alluded to there serves to illustrate the point in greater detail. In 
an interesting passage from the Commentary on the Canticle, for example, 
the platonist connotations of the symbol are interwoven with its biblical 
suggestions and associated, moreover, with a concept of ecstatic txyänf: 
The Bride says: 'Because I am wounded with love' (TCTpWPEVn... &Y&lTns 6Yw). Here she explains the dart (OcXcs) that has gone 
right through her heart, and the Bowman is Love (ay'rn). From 
the Scriptures we learn that 'God is Love' (Aydirn) (I John 4.8), 
and also that He sends forth His only begotten Son as His 'chosen 
arrow' (ßcXos) (Is. 49.2) to the elect, dipping the triple point 
at its tip in the Spirit of life .... As the soul then is raised up by these divine elevations, she 
sees within herself the sweet dart of love that has wounded her 
(Tb yXUKÜ Tres &Yäirns ßAos ev eauTp, c" LTpL6n), and she glories 
in the wound: - 'I am wounded with love'. Indeed it is a good 
wound (Kaaoü TpaüuaTos) and a sweet pain (YAuKeias TrX y s) by 
which life penetrates the soul; for by the tearing of the arrow 
she opens, as it were, a door, an entrance into herself. For no 
sooner does she receive the dart of love than the image of archery 
is transformed into a scene of nuptial joy. 113 
The context of the passage and its bridal imagery provide indisputable 
evidence of its reference to the final stage of mystic union, and the 
symbol of the arrow which inflicts a wound of love powerfully evokes 
the searing intensity of the soul's experience at this juncture. It 
conveys, moreover, a sense of the passive condition of the contemplative 
soul. Yet the violent imagery of wounding is qualified emphatically by 
the superficially incongruous epithets, "good" and "sweet". In the 
paradox thus created, the sensuous implications of the language are 
enforced, yet at the same time curiously held in abeyance, and the 
effect is to reproduce metaphorically not only the nature but also 
something of the essential otherness of the situation and its contrariety 
to normal modes of intellectual perception and expression. 
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This overriding sense of the non-rationality of contemplative 
experience, which is reflected in both the epws-symbolism and in the 
paradoxical character of the formulae used to describe it, also has 
some considerable bearing on the biblical vocabulary which forms the 
basis of Gregory's mystical terminology. His main scriptural sources, 
it has been shown, are the Book of Exodus and the Canticle of Canticles, 
and the intertwining of the strands of bridal and Mosaic imagery to 
articulate the ascent to mystic union are illustrated in an extremely 
interesting passage from the Commentary on the Canticle: 
'Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my perfect one: 
for my head, is full of dew, and my locks with the drops of 
night'(vuKTos) (Cant. 5.2). Our interpretation will help 
you to grasp the meaning of this text. Moses' vision of God 
began with light (4wTos) (Exod. 19.18); afterwards God spoke 
to him in a cloud (vc Ans) (Exod. 20.21). But when Noses 
rose higher and became more perfect, he saw God in the dark- 
ness (yvöýw) (Exod. 24.15-18). 
Now the doctrine we are taught here is as follows. Our 
initial withdrawal from wrong and erroneous ideas of God is 
a transition from darkness to light (&Trö Too cKÖTous eis ems). 
Next comes a closer awareness of hidden things (Kpu1TTwv), and, 
by this the soul is guided through sense phenomena (ýaivouevwv) 
to the world of the invisible (äöpaTOV). And this awareness is 
a kind of cloud (vc4can), which overshadows all appearances, and 
slowly guides and accustoms the soul to look towards what is 
hidden (Kpüýiov). Next the soul makes progress through all these 
stages and goes on higher, and as she leaves below all that human 
nature can attain, she enters within the secret chamber of the 
divine knowledge (EvTÖs Twv a6UTwv Tns Ocoyvwcrias yivcTal), and 
here she is cut off on all sides by the divine darkness (yvdýw). 
Now she leaves outside all. that can. be grasped by sense or by 
reason (ýaivouEVOV... KaTaaaußavopevat ), and the only thing left 
for her contemplation is the invisible and the incomprehensible 
(ä0paTÖV... &KaTaXg7TT0v ). And here God is, as the Scriptures 
tell us in connection with Noses: 'But Moses went to the dark 
cloud (yvo'ov) wherein God was'(Exod. 20.21). 114 
The ultimate mystic union is envisaged as taking place in a darkness 
(usually QKÖTOS), which - according to the scriptural account - is 
also closely allied with the cloud (ve#ean), often by implication the 
dark cloud (Yvo4os) which encompasses God. 
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The background of this notion, which is absolutely central to 
negative mystical theology, is a useful index to its precise signif- 
icance in Gregory's theology. His immediate debt was to Philo, whose 
allegorical interpretation of the life of roses supplied the foundation 
for Gregory's entire treatment of the topic. Philo describes the cul- 
mination of Moses' experience in these terms: 
Moses entered into the darkness where God was, that is into the 
unseen, invisible, incorporeal and archetypal essence of exist- 
ing things. Thus he beheld what is hidden from the sight of the 
mortal nature, and, in himself and his life displayed for all to 
see, he has set before us like some well-wrought picture, a piece 
of work beautiful and godlike, a model for those who are willing 
to copy it. 115 
The concept of darkness as H. -C. Puech observes in his article, "Le 
tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et daps la tradition 
patristique", was also frequently associated by Philo with cloud imagery 
in consequence of the implied relationship between them in Exodus. 1l6 
But the connotations of 'darkness' for Philo, according to Puech, are 
evidence of the essentially intellectual quality of Philonian mysticism, 
which sets him in a "tradition allegorico-mystique"117 in many ways 
alien to Gregory. He asserts that the Philonian image denotes the 
progressive stripping away of the material elements which impede human 
apprehension of the divine. The image is thus suggestive of a genuinely 
reductive process. 118 
The most important assessment of Philo's position in the present 
context comes, however, from Danielou, who focusses on the linguistic 
rather than the generally philosophical aspects of the question and 
isolates the specific sense in which Gregory deviates from his pre- 
decessor: 
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Pour celui-ci (i. e. Philo) l'entree de Noise dans le yvo os 
signifie la quete de l'äme ä la recherche de Tatre qui est 
sans forme. C'est le depouillement des images, qui est un 
element de toute mystique, naturelle ou divine, mais qui 
n'excedepas le plan philosophique de la sagesse. Gregoire 
use parfois du mot en ce sens, mais pour lui la tenebre, 
c'est la realite positive de l'exces de la lumiere divine 
par rapport ä tout esprit cree. Donc ce n'est plus la presence 
de 1'element charnel qui fait ecran entre Dieu et l1ame. ISeme 
pour fange, Dieu reste tenZýbre. Ce qui apparait ici, c'est la 
transcendance absolue de Dieu par rapport a toute creature, et 
c'est lä ce qui jette lame qui cherche dans les voies de 1' 
extase. 119 
Several pertinent issues are raised by Danielou here. It is demonstrable, 
in the first instance, that the speculative character of Philonian 
'darkness' made some impact on Gregory's thinking. In the passage 
quoted above, 120 'darkness' seems in some respects to imply a negation 
of. normal modes of apprehension, and other examples may be adduced of 
Gregory's attempts to provide a highly logical account of this sense 
of his metaphor: 
C'est le lieu nomme 'tenebre' (yvöýos) par 1'Ecriture, ce qui 
signifie, comme on l'a dit, 1'incognoscibilite (äyvwctov) et 
1' invisibilite (&Occ pnTOv) . 
121 
But Dani6lou goes on to argue that the most forceful connotations of 
the'darkness' metaphor in Gregory's writings are positive. It seems, 
in fact, that in designating the final stage of mystic union 'darkness', 
Gregory is seeking to express the immeasurable extent to which the being 
of God exceeds the knowledge of Him which was achieved analogically 
during the second stage of the ascent and represented, by contrast, as 
'illumination'. It therefore becomes a metaphor for the divine trans- 
cendence. As such, the term is relative, in that it denotes something 
of the nature of God in respect of man; but it is also simultaneously 
absolute, in that it conveys some sense of the being of God as He is 
in Himself without regard to any element of His creation. More remark- 
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ably, it also seems to concede the possibility of man's attaining, 
in spite of the divine transcendence, a real apprehension of the 
unknowable Godhead. The notion that for the bride, enveloped in the 
divine darkness, "the only thing left for her contemplation is the 
invisible and the incomprehensible", 122 effectively intimates both 
the existence of a mode of perception independent of the inadequate 
faculties of the human intellect and the conditions in which it obtains. 
It is clear, therefore, that the idea of 'divine darkness' in 
Gregory's theology embraces a multiplicity of meanings expressive of 
the various facets of the relationship between God and man. Puech 
summarizes the inherent ambiguity of the term in connexion with the 
Pseudo-Dionysius in an interesting paragraph which places the issue 
in a wider context: 
En realite, yv4os ou GKOTOS chez Denys est un terme ambivalent 
qui revet deux significations reciproques: une signification 
subjective, concernant l'attitude de l'äme qui contemple, et 
une signification objective, relative au caractere inaccessible, 
ä l'absolue transcendance de la Lumiere contemplee. Lune 
commande lautre: c'est parce que Dieu reste inconcevable en 
soi que l'etat du sujet sera 'inconnaissance'. La Tenebre 
figurera, en fin d'analyse, le lieu et la modality de l'appre- 
hension mystique, superieure ä Popposition d'un sujet connaissant 
et d'un objet connu, mais determinee par leur relation qui ne 
peut ici que demeurer inadequation. 123 
Puech's resolution of the question into its two major aspects is, in 
fact, especially stimulating in conjunction with Lossky's article on 
the background of Dionysius' negative theology. Lossky identifies 
two basic philosophical systems in the van of the Dionysian corpus. 124 
The first, exemplified in particular by Clement of Alexandria, attached 
paramount importance to the transcendence of the Deity as the main 
obstacle to human knowledge of His nature; the second, however, which 
was most clearly articulated by Origen and the Neoplatonists, insisted 
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on man's innate ability to contemplate Him after the stripping away 
of all human imperfections124&Lossky acknowledges the importance of 
the Cappadocian fathers as moving towards a synthesis of these dis- 
parate streams. Yet he signally fails to appreciate the significance 
of Gregory's achievement in this respect, and, while insisting that 
Dionysius was the first writer to establish "une d6marcation nette 
entre la theologie negative et la theologie positive", 125 seems to 
disregard the extent to which Dionysius' distinctions were already 
implicit in Gregory's theology. Yet the point must surely be a 
decisive one in documenting the evolution of the negative mystical 
tradition. 126 
Puech, on the other hand, is confident in his conclusions that 
Gregory was both an innovator in respect of the notion of 'divine 
darkness' and a key figure in its transmission. 127 He asserts, more- 
over, that in Gregory of Nyssa the concept of 'darkness' seems to 
possess a personal, experiential quality, in addition to its tradit- 
ional biblical connotations, which is unparalleled among early writers. 128 
Some such inference seems inescapable in the light of passages of this 
nature from the Commentary on the Canticle: 
Thus in our text the bride refers to the soul; God is called 
the Spouse, Whom she loves with all her heart and soul and 
strength. And consequently, having. come, as she thinks, to 
the height of her hopes, and thinking that. she is already 
united with her Beloved, she speaks of her more perfect par- 
ticipation in good as a 'bed', referring to the 'night'(vuKTa), 
the time of darkness (6KÖTOUS). By the. 'night!. she. refers . to the contemplation of the invisible (Twv äopcrwv Tnv OEU)piav), 
just as Loses, who entered into the darkness (Yvdfw) to the 
place where God was; and God, as the Prophet says, 'made the 
darkness (aKÖTos) his covert round about him' (Ps. 17.12). 
Arriving at this point, the bride is then instructed that, 
far from attaining perfection, she has not even begun to 
approach it. Now, she says, that I have been deemed worthy 
of the nuptial rites, I rest as it were upon the 'bed' of all 
that I have hitherto understood. But I am suddenly introduced 
into the realm of the invisible (äop6Twv), surrounded by the 
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divine darkness (Tn 0eiavV: T\), searching for Him Who is 
hidden in the 'dark cloud' (yvöýw). Then it was that I felt 
that love (äyäirrl) for Him Whom I desired - though the Beloved 
Himself resists the grasp of our thoughts. And so 'I sought 
him in my bed by night' (Cant. 3.1), to learn of His substance, 
His beginning and His end, and in what His essence consists. 
But 'I found Him not'. I called Him by name - as though it 
were possible to find Him in a name when He cannot be named.... 
.... and when I gave up every finite mode of comprehension (KaTaX117TT1KgV Eýo5 iv), then it was that I found my Beloved by 
faith. ' And 'I will never let Him go', now that I have found 
Him, from the grasp of faith, until He comes within my'chamber' 
(Cant. 3.4). 129 
The impetus of the imagery remains unflinchingly biblical. Yet there 
seems to be a certain intense realism about the depiction of the bride's 
desperate search and a sensuous immediacy inherent in the language 
through which it is expressed. 13° Indeed, Gregory's collocation of 
the Canticle and the Moses narrative may in itself have made the 
biblical terminology which denoted the theory of the mystic way cap- 
able of conveying something of the unitive experience of the individual 
soul. 
It is also characteristic of such passages, moreover, that they 
convey a powerful sense of the positive nature of mystic union. The 
state of intellectual darkness to which the soul submits is conceived 
of as being simultaneously cognitive or "light", but at this level the 
medium of knowledge is faith and loving consciousness of the divine 
presence. "Knowledge", therefore, has a special significance as a 
term denoting cognition of this order. Indeed, it is characteristic 
of Gregory to shift his ground linguistically where he analyses the 
nature of the soul's unitive apprehension of God: thus, for example, 
he similarly retains "vision" (ide{v) as an objective term for mystical 
awareness, but he redefines it with reference to his own theology as a 
state in which "celui qui Jeve les yeux vers Lui ne cesse jamais de le 
desireri131 - he applies a vocabulary normally associated with yearning, 
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that is, to a word which is normally cognate with terms of perception. 132 
In the first instance, however, he expresses the distinction between 
mystical and ordinary modes of cognition metaphorically, in the oxymoron 
aaunpös yvö4os ('luminous darkness'). 133 The stimulus to Gregory's 
literary resourcefulness is the need to evolve a vocabulary which cor- 
responds to the principles of his theology. This involves overcoming, 
insofar as it is possible to do so, the spatial and temporal dimension 
which, in the passages from the commentaries on Ecclesiastes and the 
Canticle cited above, 134 Gregory recognizes as being integral to human 
modes of discerning and expressing natural phenomena, but which have 
no bearing on God or relevance to mystical awareness of the divine 
transcendence. The-emphasis in Gregory's mystical theology is on the 
soul's reaffirmation of its own singleness through the exercise of 
recollection and its union with God by the rediscovery of the image 
of God within itself. 135 It is fundamentally opposed, that is, to the 
dualism of perceiver and perceived, which is implicit in man's means 
of apprehending natural phenomena, by appreciating their integrity and 
their relation to himself, and in language, whose function is to embody 
the distinctions between objects. Dualism is transcended, however, in 
the sphere of mystical experience: above all, the process of introversion, 
Gregory insists, is at the same time a passing beyond the self in an 
ecstasy of love. Through the use of verbal paradox, Gregory represents 
in language the coalescence of opposing concepts which is essential to 
his mystical theology, just as, it has been suggested, he seeks to over- 
come the pluralism which is implicit in affirmative epithets for God by 
conferring an absolute meaning on them and suggesting that each attri- 
bute of God involves all others. 136 He exploits the metaphoric potential 
of language, experimenting, in the case of aapTrpös yvö4os, with the 
positive and negative connotations of the words in order to express 
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the location of the unitive experience beyond what may be conceived 
and to suggest something of the excess and inadequacy which have been 
shown to be in different ways essential to man's apprehension of the 
divine. 
This last point is developed in Danielou's discussion of the 
negative elements in Gregory's vocabulary. 137 He bases his argument 
on an analysis of the significance of the term 'ä6UTOV (normally denoting 
'sanctuary', but, literally, 'impenetrable') in Gregory's treatises. 
The word derives originally from the mystery religions and came to be 
applied consistently to the Holy of Holies in the temple of Jerusalem. 
The expression reached Gregory through Philo, having already acquired 
these associations and having, in fact, come to refer by extension to 
the inmost regions of the spirit. It therefore followed that the term 
became connected with spiritual experience of the most advanced order 
and, in particular, with ecstatic union with the Divine in the dark- 
ness. Dani6lou cites as evidence a passage from the Life of Moses, 
since the notion occurs most frequently in this work: 
'L'ame a quitte d'abord le pied de la montagne, et s'est 
separee de tous ceux qui ont recule devant l'ascension. 
Ensuite eile percoit par ses oreilles les trompettes, ä 
mesure quelle s'eleve dans sa montee. Enfin eile penetre 
dans le sanctuaire invisible de la connaissance mystique 
(eis Tb äöpaTOV Tns Ocoyvwßias äduTov)' (XLlV, 377 C-D). 138 
Two important observations are prompted by this extract: firstly, the 
apophatic composition of the word ä6UTOV, which comprises a stem 
coupled with the negating prefix 'a-'; and, secondly, its correlation 
with the term äöpaTOV, which is constructed on precisely the same 
principle. Danielou also enumerates analogous formations - ä7öppfTOV 
('forbidden'), ävCTribaTOV ('inaccessible'), äannTOV ('incomprehensible'), 
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J:, 
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apprrrov('ineffable' )- which repeatedly appear in conjunction with 
ä6UTOV. 
Clearly, therefore, these epithets are based on a common model 
and may be assumed to fulfil a parallel and closely connected function. 
They do not propose assumptions about the essential being of God Him- 
self, but rather reflect diverse aspects of His relationship to finite 
concepts. Their construction posits an imaginable condition for the 
divine, which is simultaneously retracted by the negating prefix. In 
effect, as with the other examples of unitive language discussed above, 
the apophatic mode becomes an affirmation that the reality to be ex- 
pressed so far exceeds the compass of human intellect and expression 
that it can only be communicated in comparative terms by negation of 
the inadequate resources of language. The identical composition of 
the words, moreover, purports that, against this theoretical background, 
Gregory was evolving a technical vocabulary of unitive theology. This 
assertion is in some measure supported by making brief reference to his 
application of epithets with the prefix "ü&rep-". Danielou again cites 
the Life of Moses to'illustrate this terminology: 
'il se trouve dans les sanctuaires hypercelestes' 
(ev Tois ülrcpoupavlols cSuTOts) (XL1V, 1152A). 
139 
The conjunction of 'üncpovpaviois' and 'ädütois' is immediately evident. 
Furthermore, the adjective will be seen to be constructed on the same 
pattern as the negative epithets and also to carry the same semantic 
force - though here the sense of excess is stated rather than implied. 
It might therefore be deduced that Gregory was developing a verbal 
formula and, as a direct result, assembling a coherent body of langu- 
age which was inherently associated with the third way of the mystic 
ascent. It is in any case certain that the Pseudo-Dionysius assimilated 
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both versions of this formula as the proper language of mystical 
theology. 
The self-consciousness of this attempt to develop a terminology 
which was as far as possible consonant with the demands of his mystical 
doctrine is also demonstrated by Gregory's further usage of derivatives 
of the verb 'Süeiv' (literallyy'to lead' or 'go'). The point is 
intimately bound up with his insistence theologically on the paradox- 
ical character of contemplative union: he defines it as an ecstatic 
going out of oneself (eEoSos) in quest for the Divine, which is at the 
same time a penetration (cicoSos) into the inmost regions of the soul 
where the image of God is implanted. 140 In linguistic terms, there is 
a marked paradox contained in the nouns through which he describes this 
experience. The stems of the two nouns are identical, which in fact 
serves to accentuate the precisely contradictory character of the pre- 
fixes. Danielou explores a similar point with regard to Gregory's 
'Süsiv' vocabulary, and introduces an interesting passage from the 
Commentary on the Canticle: 
'L'ame ayant penetrg (6ia5ue'Qa) par l'esprit plus ä l'inte10 rieur 
(eis Td 'ev56Tepov) des lieux interdits (&ffoppnTwv), crie que sa 
course nest plus seulement dans le vestibule (npoOüpois) des 
biens, mais dans les premices de l'Esprit, par la grace de qui, 
comme par un baiser, eile a ete rendue digne de scruter les 
profondeurs de Dieu et de voir dans les sanctuaires (ä5uTa) du 
Paradis les chosen invisibles de Dieu (XL1V, 785A). 141 
The entire statement is erected on the basis of a bold oxymoron - 
'Sia &ueica .... 
ädura ', 'penetrate the impenetrable' - which rep- 
resents a reflection in language of the paradox which is at the centre 
of Gregory's mystical theology. 142 
The foundation for Gregory's oxymoronic phraseology is thus 
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located in his concept of the third way and his insistence on its 
essentially ecstatic quality. In its thwarting of the normal comple- 
mentary relationship between noun and adjective, it mirrors the total 
contravention of the reasoning faculty which is intrinsic to the ex- 
perience of ecstasy. Clearly, therefore, the oxymoron was uniquely 
appropriate to Gregory's purpose and he exploited to the full its 
innate applicability to mystical experience. It did not, however, 
originate with him, as Hans Lewy establishes in his book on the early 
development of oxymoron, Sobria Ebrietas Untersuchungen zu Geschichte 
der antiken Mystik. 143 He observes judiciously that the practice of 
divesting words of certain aspects of their customary meaning by the 
inclusion of qualifying adjectives led quite naturally to the develop- 
ment of the oxymoronic formula. 144 The working of this process is 
particularly evident in Philo, who in fact evolved the notion of 
IlEAn vnýaXios ('sober intoxication'). The idea was early absorbed 
by Origen and transmitted through him to the eastern patristic writers 
with its implicit association with the highest spiritual states already 
consolidated. 145 It was also Origen who first forged the decisive link 
between pEOn vn4aXios and the reception of the Eucharist. 146 
The most important text to be considered in an assessment of 
Gregory's interpretation of the notion and his influence on its trans- 
mission occurs in the Commentary on the Canticle: 
'Eat, my friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my brothers' 
(Cant. 5.1). For one who is familiar with the mysteries of 
the Gospel there will appear no difference between this text 
and the words used in the mystic initiation of the Apostles. 
For there too does He say: 'Eat and drink'. Now the exhort- 
ation to the brethren in the present text to become 'inebriated' 
might seem to many to go much further than the Gospel. But 
anyone who examines both texts carefully will find that this 
text is quite in harmony with that of the Gospel. For the 
command that is here given to the brethren in words is, in 
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the Gospel, transformed into deed. All intoxication causes 
the mind, overwhelmed with wine, to go into an ecstasy (L'KCTaaiv). 
Hence what is urged in our text actually is realized in the 
Gospel through the divine food and drink. And this constantly 
recurs insofar as there is a continual ecstasy (EKCSTaßews) in 
this food and drink, that is, there is a transformation from 
a worse to a better condition. 147 
The corroborative juxtapositioning of different biblical allusions has 
been seen to be characteristic of Gregory's method. 148 In this instance 
it affirms his notion of the fundamental relationship between the Euch- 
arist and the spiritual ascent depicted in the Canticle, both of which 
culminate in ecstatic union with the divine. The extent of Gregory's 
dependence on the language of the mystery religions has also already 
been indicated, 149 and it is evident that, in certain respects, his 
doctrine'of 'sober intoxication' represents a working out of this imagery 
to its logical if extreme conclusion. 
150 However, the continuation of 
the passage cited above discloses Gregory's concern to dissociate the 
experience as he conceives it from profane drunkenness151 - which, indeed, 
is emphasized by the chastening epithet 'sober'. The oxymoron in fact 
operates by suggesting a state which resembles 'intoxication' in its 
intense rapture and supersession of the rational faculties; but the 
degenerative implications of the term are simultaneously nullified by 
the contradictory connotations of the adjective which defines it. It 
thus becomes a metaphor which is in one sense descriptive of the highest 
contemplative state, which in another embodies the remoteness of the 
state from normal patterns of experience. 
The metaphor of 'watchful. sleep' (eyppyopis-virvos) which grew out 
of the notion of 'sober intoxication', also functions according to the 
same principle. Gregory's discussion of the phrase in his Commentary 
on the Canticle is particularly illuminating, since it in some way 
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factorizes the expression as well as establishing its precise connexion 
with 'sober intoxication': 
Sleep usually follows drinking, and in this way the banqueters 
can promote their good health by allowing time for digestion. 
Thus after her banquet the bride, too, is overcome with sleep. 
But this is indeed a strange sleep and foreign to nature's 
custom. In natural sleep the sleeper is not wide awake, and 
he who is wide awake is not sleeping. Sleeping and waking 
(vTrvos 
... 
cYPnYdPnots) are contraries, and they succeed and 
follow one another. But in this case there is a strange. and 
contradictory fusion of opposites in the same state (6vTauea 
ÖE Tts Kalvhj Kai 7Tapa6oýos p( is Tfly evaVT16V Kai cnvodos Ocwpcitai 
Trepi aüTnv). For 'I sleep', she says, 'and my heart watcheth' 
(Cant. 5.2). 
What meaning ought we to take from these words? Sleep is 
the image of death. All the body's sensory perception is 
suspended: in sleep, sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch 
do not perform their function. In sleep bodily tension is 
relaxed, a man's worries are forgotten and fears are put to 
rest, anger is calmed; so long as sleep has control over the 
body, it relaxes the strain of those who are in grief and makes 
them unaware of any evil. 152 
Gregory stresses the respects in which this condition is akin to 
ordinary sleep, in that the subject remains passive and receptive 
for the duration of the state. By combining the noun with the con- 
tradictory adjective 'watchful', however, its simultaneously cognitive 
quality and hence its essential dissimilarity to ordinary sleep is 
also emphatically communicated. Thus the oxymoronic model is again 
seen to be logically accountable in terms of the inherent abnormality 
of the doctrinal situation which it reflects. 
Jere important, however, is the recognition that the expression 
'watchful sleep' was originally coined by Gregory himself. Danielou 
sketches the theological background on which Gregory undoubtedly drew 
for the phrase - the striking allusion to sleep in Cant. 5.2; the 
depiction of life as a sleep of illusion in Ecclesiastes; the early 
liturgical practice of keeping vigil; and the various biblical texts, 
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as for instance, I Thess. 5.7, in which wakefulness and sobriety are 
enjoined together. 153. But the crucial point here is that Gregory con- 
structed his individual metaphor for the highest mystical awareness on 
the established oxymoronic model of IvEOf vn4äatos'. Daniglou notes 
that this evidences his habitual recourse to negative modes in the 
context of mystical theology proper: 
La conception generale de la vie spirituelle comme 'veillee' 
est donc un theme de la litterature religieuse hellenistique; 
mais 1'originalite de Gregoire est de montrer que cette 'veillee' 
presente 'un sommeil', c'est-ä-dire quelle s'exprime avant tout 
. en son 
etat le plus haut comme une negation. Comme partout, 
c'est donc l'element n6gatif, apophatique, caracteristique de 
la vie mystique sur lequel il insiste. Nous retrouvons toujours 
chez lui le meme procede: pour designer cette experience ineffable, 
il emploie toute une sdrie d'oxymorons; il empruntecertains d'entre 
eux: la 'sobre ivresse', vrl4aXios ueOrl, ou la 'nuee lumineuse', 
yvöýos Aapiipos, ä Philon; la vie-mort ä saint Paul. Mais il en 
cree aussi: dans la Vie de Noise, la a TÜ'a1S-K1Vl61S et ici 
1' Eypriyopais -uTrvos . Ce procede 
etait facilite par le gout 
litteraire de l'epoque pour les oxymorons. Mais ici, comme pour 
le symbolisme, Gregoire utilise des procedes litteraires pour 
exprimer des experiences spirituelles. 154 
It is also significant, as Danielou suggests at the end of this para- 
graph, that Gregory's linguistic creativity in respect of the oxymoron, 
as in the case of his negative terminology, operated largely upon a 
groundwork of received formulae - formulae which were, moreover, al- 
ready implicitly associated with the ecstatic state of mystic union. 
It is possible, therefore, to define Gregory's linguistic achieve- 
ment as an important milestone in the consolidation and development of 
a technical vocabulary and a fund of verbal models specifically assoc- 
iated with mystical theology. He was, moreover, as Lewy emphasizes, 
a key figure in the transmission of this mystical language to the sub- 
sequent tradition of contemplative writing: 
Gregor wurde in der späteren Ostkirche höchste Autorität seine 
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Abendmahllehre also die offizielle anerkannt und die Homilien 
zum Hohenlied mit ihrer Beschreibung des mystischen Aufstiegs 
der Seele zu Gott viel gelesen und nachgeahmt. Damit geht auch 
das philonische Oxymoron in den allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch der 
späteren Zeit über .... 
155 
In order to determine the character of the language which Gregory 
evolved, it is, however, essential to recognize a distinctive quality 
of the oxymoron as he employed it - namely, that in spite of its negative 
construction, it is akin to the apophatic elements in his vocabulary in 
conveying an intensely positive sense of the nature of contemplative 
union. This is in some respects entirely consistent with its function, 
since it is the accountability of the state in rational terms and hence 
its expressibility which is intrinsically problematic and not its 
existence. Yet it might be argued that, in Gregory's prose, the dis- 
parate elements of his paradoxical phraseology are somehow compounded 
to embody a higher concentration of meaning which, by implication, is 
powerfully affirmative. The dynamic character of Gregory's language, 
its compression and reconciliation of opposing meanings within a single 
word or phrase, has a firm theological basis in Gregory's insistence 
that the ultimate contemplative experience is one of progressive trans- 
formation into Christ through an ecstatic impulse of love. 156 The 
impact of the language thus corresponds precisely with the religious 
situation which it articulates. However, as Danielou demonstrates, 
the contradictory components of Gregory's terminology are equally 
emblematic of the duality which is essential to Christian theology: 
Si nous cherchons la derniere explication de cette situation 
spirituelle de l'Ame, il nous parait quelle a son dernier 
fondement dans la double relation quelle aä Dieu, sous son 
double aspect d'o&iic imparticipable et de Süvapis participable. 
La lumiere et la tenebre, he repos et le mouvement, la sobriete 
et 1'ivresse sont moins deux moments successifs que deux aspects 
complementaires. L'un, lumiere, repose correspond ä la reälite 
de la participation; lautre correspond ä la transcendance 
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infinie de 1'essence. L'etat mystique dans sa realite 
ineffable est precisement d'etre la synthese de ces deux 
elements apparemment inconciliables. La genie de Gregoire 
est de p'avoir pas sacrifie l'un ä lautre, de n'avoir pas 
abandonne la realite de la participation ä la maniere des 
mystiques du vide, un Eckhardt par exemple; ni non plus d' 
avoir minimise la transcendance, comme le fait Origýne. D'oü 
la difficulte de le ranger dans une categorie. 11 est ä la 
fois le plus exigeant dans fordre du depouillement et le 
plus suave dans celui du 'gout de Dieu'. 
Et precisement l'etat qui correspond ä cette dualite d' 
element, qui est ä la fois possession et sortie, c'est ce 
qu'il cherche ä decrire par cette 'epectase' etrange, qu'on 
ne trouve que chez lui. Le mot par sa composition me me se 
prete ä exprimer le double element. I1 est, dune part, 
possession, ''eire'; il ya saisi reelle de quelque chose 
et interiorite de Dieu dans 1'e, me. I1 est d'autre part, 
tCKI, sortie de soil irreductibilite infinie de Dieu ä 1'äme, 
qui arrache toujours 11äme ä elle-meine dans Textase de 1'amour. 
Par lä aussi se trouve depassee l'opposition de la Aewp, ia et de 
1'äY&7rn. Par l'intelligence Dieu est interieure , l'äme et y demeure, mais par l'amour eile est jetee hors delle vers lui. 
Ainsi 'Dieu vient dans 1'äme et l'äme emigre en Dieu', 'la 
sortie de soil et 'l'entree en soil sont les deux aspects in- 
discernables dune realite unique. 157 
It is this sense that God is simultaneously knowable in terms of Hip 
activity towards man - witnessed in the creation and in the incarnation 
of Christ - and transcendent in His Essence, which in the first instance 
makes epectasis the only possible mode of apprehending Him and hence, 
on a linguistic level, determines the radically paradoxical character 
of Gregory's writing. In larger terms, moreover, it sanctions the 
inclusion of positive and negative terminologies alike in the religious 
situation and, indeed, dictates their mutual dependence. 158 
The distinctive characteristic of Gregory's work, therefore, seems 
to be his insistence on the impossibility of finally differentiating 
positive and negative doctrines and designating a terminology peculiar 
to each. 159 It has, in fact, repeatedly emerged from this discussion 
of Gregory's mystical language that his apophatic vocabulary is at the 
same time inherently positive in its implications. Yet clearly the 
potential existed in Gregory's work for the formal demarcation of the 
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negative and affirmative ways which was undertaken by Ps. -Dionysius 
in the De Mystica Theologia and the De Divinis Nominibus. It contained, 
too, the potential for development into two. distinct schools of mystical 
theology, as Dani4lou suggests in his discussion of the doctrine of the 
spiritual senses, 
On pourrait citer des textes capitaux de saint Augustin, de 
saint Bernard, de saint Bonaventure, de sainte Ther'se. Peut- 
etre toutefois cette tradition represente-t-elle une ecole qui 
nest pascelle de Denys l'Areopagite, de Tauler, de Saint Jean de 
la Croix. La premiere insiste sur le gout de Dieu, la seconde 
sur son inaccessibilitee. L'importance de Gregoire de Nysse est 
ici que l'une. et lautre tcndances sont representees, qu'il est 
aussi bien le precurseur de saint Bernard - et auparavant de 
Diadoque - par sa doctrine de la suavite divine, que de Jean de 
la Croix - at auparavant de Denys - par sa th(ologie de la 
tenebre. En realite il ne faudrait pas forcer Popposition: 
les deux courants representent, en effet, deux aspects essentiels 
de la mystique. D'une part eile est tenebre pour 1'esprit, mais 
par ailleurs eile comporte une connaissance de Dieu d'ordre exi- 
stentiel qui est precisement ce que cherche ä exprimer la doctrine 
des sens spirituels. 160 
It seems, indeed, that subsequent mystical tradition fragmented the 
synthesis which was at the centre of Gregory's theology, and may in 
consequence be supposed to have in some sense tempered the force of 
the terminology which was originally dependent on this cohesion. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, Gregory's linguistic achievement may be said to 
lie in his evolution of a specifically mystical terminology, which drew 
on a complex background of scriptural and non-Christian writings and 
rechannelled the traditional implications of their language to express 
his innovatory theology. He thus perpetuated both a distinctive vocab- 
ulary for mystical theology and also the use of linguistic formulae 
inherently evocative of the nature of contemplative union which served 
later religious writers as models for their own articulation of the 
experience. Gregory's is above all an exploratory language, but one 
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which is nevertheless firmly located in theology and which possesses, 
moreover, a power and immediacy which consistently intimate its close 
association with its spiritual and literary background as well as its 
relationship to the individual experience of mystic union. 
Certain problems inherent in such an adaptation of language have, 
however, become apparent in the course of this chapter. The extent to 
which it depends on the reader for proper understanding of its meaning, 
for example, accentuates its vulnerability and instability as a medium. 
Similarly, the application of a common language in diverse senses to 
diverse categories of the mystic ascent necessarily entails difficulties 
of interpretation for the reader. Thus the concept of 'darkness' 
variously denotes the final stage of contemplative union and the 
blind and ignorant condition of the unregenerate soul; 161 "sleep" 
conveys metaphorically both the highest spiritual state and the earthly 
delusions which impede the soul at the beginning of its ascent; in 
different contexts the "spouse" is both Christ, with whom the soul 
seeks to be united, and the physical senses which must be repudiated 
before the soul is able to make progress towards perfection. 162 It is 
undoubtedly arguable that the meaning of the words is amply defined by 
their context that their very fluidity is a major source of their 
immense evocative power, and that it is in any case unreasonable to 
demand precise logical accountability of theological language. Certainly 
the innate biblical resonances of the words and the association of the 
distinct connotations of a single image with different stages of the 
ascent effectively articulate a sense of the essential unity of the 
process. Yet there seems to be no constant or objective frame of ref- 
erence for interpreting Gregory's language, and hence the question of 
its precision as a means of communicating his mystical theology lacks 
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an entirely satisfactory solution. 
A further facet of this problem is aired by Danielou in his dis- 
cussion of Gregory's use of images of sleep and wounding: 
Cette interpretation est evidemment parfois delicate. Dans 
quelle mesure teile expression recouvre-t-elle une experience 
mystique proprement dite? Dans quelle mesure sommes-nous en 
presence d'un emploi symbolique? Faut-il entendre 'le sommeil' 
dont nous parle Gregoire dune 'suspension des sens' ou seule- 
ment d'un recueillement profond de 1'äme en Dieu? Nous sommes 
loin ici des precisions psychologiques de certains mystiques 
ult(ýrieures- et dans une mystique qui garde - et c'est son prix 
- une orientation d'abord theologique. Reste avec cela quelle 
fait entendre un accent experimental qui me parait difficilement 
pouvoir etre contests et qui donne le droit d'accorder leurs 
pleines significations aux expressions que nous rencontrons. 163 
It must indeed be acknowledged that while the extraordinarily composite 
nature of Gregory's terminology is responsible for its impressive 
dynamism, it is also in a pejorative sense productive of a disturbing 
insecurity in the relationship between the writer and his audience. 
It seems impossible to determine with complete confidence the extent 
to which Gregory's mystical language evokes the actual experience of 
union with the divine, or whether it is in fact intended to have no 
reference beyond the biblical context from which it originates. There 
is thus a radical ambiguity about the terms in which Gregory's language 
should be interpreted and, as a direct result of this, about the nature 
of the response which is demanded from the reader. 
The problems thus outlined are important ones; and in the final 
analysis, it must be acknowledged that Gregory transmitted to later 
tradition a language as well as a theology which were in diverse respects 
at once embryonic and highly developed, and therefore susceptible of 
widely differing interpretations. 
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CHAPTER II 
PSEUDO - DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE: THE FORMALIZATION OF NEGATIVE 
THEOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATION OF A CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL TRADITION 
I. Significance in the history of mystical theology 
It has been suggested that the basis of a mystical theology and 
allied terminology which assimilated material from Christian and 
platonist sources had been evolved by St. Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
likelihood that Ps. -Dionysius was directly influenced by Gregory's 
work has been urged convincingly by various scholars. The most 
insistent advocate of this view is Walter Völker, whose book Kontem- 
plation und Ekstase bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagital has sometimes 
been taken to task by other scholars for its extremism in putting 
the case for Gregory's impact on Dionysian thought: Stephen Gersh, 
for example, has demonstrated that Völker overworks the argument for 
Cappadocian influence at the expense of the evidence for the influence 
of pagan neoplatonism, 2 though he is representative of modern scholars 
who have concentrated on the pagan neoplatonist aspect of the back- 
ground to the Dionysian Corpus in conceding the soundness of Völker's 
basic proposition. It is, indeed, clear, whatever the extent of 
Gregory's influence on Ps. -Dionysius at first hand, that both authors 
worked with some of the same Christian and platonist sources. It may 
be said that Ps. -Dionysius' definition of mystical theology developed 
and systematized the concept which Gregory evolved, but it is equally 
apparent that Ps. -Dionysius' formulation of the theory of negative 
theology is far from being merely derivative, and that it reflects 
his personal resolution of the Christian/platonist dilemma which con- 
tinued to preoccupy the eastern church during the early centuries of 
its foundation. 
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The issue of the precise philosophical and theological back- 
ground of the Dionysian Corpus is bound up with the still unanswered 
questions as to the identity of the author and the date of his works. 
Scholars have variously assigned them to the late fourth, fifth and early 
sixth centuries, and supported their datings by attempting to establish 
Ps. -Dionysius' position relative to the ideological controversies which 
dominated particular periods during this broad epoch. The consensus 
of recent studies in this field seems to be that Ps. -Dionysius was 
probably writing in the late fifth or early sixth century: Rene 
Roques favours the later of these dates - his thorough and useful 
review of the relevant general evidence and critical opinion on this 
point is published in Structures Theologioues. De la Gnose ä Richard 
de Saint-Victor3 - while Gersh concludes that Ps. -Dionysius probably 
studied at the Academy during the late fifth or early sixth century. 
4 
Gersh reaffirms here the importance of Hugo Koch's work, Pseudo- 
Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Be3iehungen Sum Neuplatonismus und 
Mysterienwesen, 5 though he recognizes that it is as partisan in its 
association of the Dionysian Corpus with neoplatonic tradition, and 
in attesting its particular affinities with Proclus, as Völker in 
pressing the Christian affiliations of the texts. 
6 
Gersh's dating, 
he maintains, is consistent with Ps. -Dionysius' use of ideas which 
also occur in Proclus and Damascius. 
Gersh represents Ps. -Dionysius as "a genuine Christian philosopher" 
who thoroughly transformed paganism, realizing the need to make it 
accord with the newer doctrine of Christianity.? The present discus- 
sion supports this view, though it will be necessary to consider some 
of the areas of Dionysian theology whose Christian orthodoxy is open 
to doubt in greater detail. The extent of Ps. -Dionysius' commitment 
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to the Christian faith has been much debated, and the issue is 
complicated by the compression and allusive method of his work, 
and notably, in the case of the De Mystica Theologia, by the absence 
of any reference to Christ. Such circumstances have induced some 
scholars to regard his Christianity as merely superficial: Anders 
Nygren, for example, holds that, "the fundamental neoplatonism is 
but scanTily covered with an exceedingly thin Christian veneer ': 8 
Gersh's view, however, has been anticipated by other scholars, who 
have recognized in Ps. -Dionysius' use of neoplatonist structures and 
terminology a means of challenging pagan philosophy on its own ground. 
The point is made by Ceslas Pera, O. P., in his article "Denys le 
Mystique et la OEOMAXIAI'. 
9 Endre von Ivanka, in his article "La 
Signification Historique du Corpus Areopageticum", has also argued 
that Ps. -Dionysius adopted the hierarchic, triadic structure of neo- 
platonism in order to subject it to the Christian scheme: 
... la situation hierarchique elle-meme, dans cette succession 
de degres d'actes et d'etats illuminatifs, ne signifie nullement 
une position superieure ou inferieure dans 1'approche de Dieu, 
puisque le rang inferieur, tout comme le superieur, est immedi- 
atement soumis a 1'influx divin, et puisqu'il est egalement 
donne ä chaque degre de realiser. ce qui est la fin de tous les 
ordres hierarchiques: le parfait amour de Dieu et la parfaite 
cooperation ä son oeuvre. La succession graduelle de la commun- 
ication du divin, concue par le neoplatonisme de teile sorte que 
le divin va se degradant et se diminuant de degre en degre est 
devenu chez Denys une multiplicite des formes de la participation 
immediate au divin, participation qui demeure entiere et parfaite 
a chaque degre, quoique suivant la nature propre de chacun. 10 
Gersh follows this line of argument when he locates Ps. -Dionysius 
within a tradition culminating in Erigena's philosophy, which transformed 
"the world-view in which God relates to man through a hierarchy of inter- 
mediate causes into one in which there is a more direct rapport ". 1 
He also emphasizes Ps. -Dionysius' modification of platonist principles 
with regard to the relationship of the negative and affirmative modes: 
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... whereas the traditional method of exegesis had been to 
apply the first hypothesis (negative predicates of the One) 
to the First Principle and the second hypothesis (affirmative 
predicates) to a succession of principles consequent upon the 
One, Ps. -Dionysius engineers a complete transformation by 
applying both hypotheses (negative and affirmative) tö the 
Christian God. The pagan Neoplatonic world-picture is thus 
left intact by applying the first hypothesis to God who thereby 
transcends all the characteristics denied, but the pagan scheme 
is transformed by applying the second hypothesis to God, for he 
" is now declared to possess all the characteristics affirmed. 
12 
The implications of this realignment of traditional concepts for the 
negative and affirmative ways of contemplation are elaborately worked 
out, as will be shown, in Ps. -Dionysius' principal treatises, the 
De Mystica Theologia and the De Divinis Nominibus. 
By taking as a pseudonym the name of a convert of St. Paul, 
moreover, Ps. -Dionysius seems to have allied himself formally with 
the Christian tradition of mystical theology. J. Vanneste, S. J., has 
suggested in his book, Le I4ystere de Dieu. Essai sur la Structure 
Rationelle de la Do ctrinelNNvstique du Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite, that 
the fiction has to do with St. Paul's reference to the altar in Athens 
dedicated "To an unknown God" (ayvmoTW 6e`: Acts 17.23): Ps. -Dionysius, 
that is, in accordance with an accepted literary practice of his day, 
attached his personal conviction of God's unknowability - the idea 
which dominates his theology - to a higher authority, and wrote as 
the recipient and expositor of apostolic wisdom. 13 It was a fortunate 
choice of pseudonym. It ensured that the Dionysian Corpus was received 
with something of the reverence which was accorded to the divinely 
inspired writings of the apostles, and that its striking affinities 
with neoplatonism and the mystery religions were not allowed to disturb 
the securely Christian interpretation of the texts. The fiction per- 
sisted even down to the Middle Ages: the translator and commentator 
Sarracenus alludes to the apostolic status of the author of the Corpus 
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in the prologue to his commentary on the De Coelesti Hierarchia, 
probably written c. 1140.14 Indeed, it will be shown in the following 
chapter that the Corpus owed its translation into Latin to its assumed 
apostolic character, and that it achieved thus a widespread currency 
during the Middle Ages which was denied to Gregory of Nyssa's work, 
for example, since it was not readily available in Latin - and this 
despite the fact that the earlier writer's work is in many respects 
more congenial to medieval tastes in spirituality. 15 The foundations 
of the Christian tradition of negative mystical theology may, there- 
fore, have been laid by Gregory, but the medieval church received it 
in the form given it by Ps. -Dionysius. 
The discussion of Dionysian mystical theology in the present 
chapter uses the analysis of Gregory's doctrine in Chapter I of this 
thesis as a touchstone, and prepares the ground, in its turn, for the 
detailed examination of specific elements of Ps. -Dionysius' mystical 
vocabulary and their handling by successive translators of the Corpus 
in Chapter III. It is largely confined, for reasons of space, to the 
major works of the Corpus, the De Divinis No minibus and the De Nystica 
Theologia. The same practice has been adopted with regard to quotations 
as in the preceding chapter. 
16 
II. Mystical Theology 
The character of Dionysian mystical theology cannot be established 
except with reference to the theological scheme which underlies the 
Greek Corpus as a whole. As Ps. -Dionysius himself suggests in Ch. III 
of the De Dystica Theologia, his formulation of the principles of ascent 
to God by way of negation in this work both complements and depends upon 
his exposition of affirmative theology in the De Divinis Nominibus. 
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The negative and affirmative ways are interdependent: both, moreover, 
are conditional upon the fact of divine transcendence, and their 
perfection consists, therefore, in a properly mystical awareness 
of God which supersedes all discursive forms of knowledge. Ps. - 
Dionysius insists on this point in the first chapter of the De I, stica 
Theologia: 
Thus while it possesses all the positive attributes of the 
universe (7äacs T CS T(IV 
OVTUV TtO vat Kai KaTafäcKClV O(GEis) 
(being the universal Cause), yet in a stricter sense it does 
not possess them (Tr&oas auras KUp1LTEpOV 0i C'CGKElV), since 
it transcends them all (ws ü&rsp Tra"VTa 
i 
rcpoüap), wherefore 
g that there is no contradiction. between affirming and deny r 
it has them (vii oicdOai T(Is &iro4äcEts äVTIKElpEVas Eivai TaIS 
KaTaýaUECtlV) inasmuch as it precedes and surpasses all depriv- 
ation, being beyond all positive. and. negative distinctions 
(&xx ITOXU lrp&TEpoV a? TnV ýT1Ep T(XS UTEPTfQE1S ElVat, T1V 
UTr6p Träaav 
% Kal &4alpEci1V Kal O aiv) . 
17 
Rene Roques gives a clear account of the organization of Dionysian 
theology in Structures Theologiaues: 
... il subsiste entre theologie negative et contemplation. 
mystique deux differences essentielles et d'ailleurs rattachees 
entre elles. La premiere est que la theologie negative reste 
une demarche discursive de l'intelligence, tandis que la con- 
templation mystique se situe au-delä du discours; la deuxieme 
est qu'il n'y a theologie negative qu'en reference ä une 
theologie affirmative dont eile limite et corrige les formul- 
ations. La contemplation mystique, au contraire, ne se refere 
ä aucune de ces demarches quelle suppose pourtant. Elle est 
pure vision immaterielle d'oü les sens et 1'intelligence, au 
sens ordinaire de ces mots, sont radicalement exclus. 
18 
Roques' insistence here that negative theology, no less than 
affirmative theology, is dependent on intellectual procedures, is 
fundamental to an understanding of the De Tlystica TheoloRia. It is 
a cryptic, highly allusive work - Vanneste notes "son extreme con- 
cisiön et 1''soterisme de son vocabulaire mystique"19 - differing 
considerably in mode from the De Divinis Nominibus and perhaps no 
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longer so readily intelligible. Both texts, however, tend to the 
same conclusion. The De Divinis Nominibus is unequivocally an 
analytical text. Its purpose is summarized by Roques: 
. to l'object est de soumettre successivement 
ä la double 
dialectique de l'affirmation et de la negation les attributs 
intelligibles de Dieu. 20 
Vanneste makes the further point that Ps. -Dionysius' attempt to 
verify and establish the logical status of epithets applied to God 
is conducted within the framework of neoplatonic cosmology - 
le pseudo-Denys ecrivait pour des contemporains, qui. 
n'ignoraient pas la philosophie neoplatonicienne: il s 
devaient connaitre la structure du monde, emanant de 
Dieu que celle-ciproposait et ce qu'elle disait des rel- 
ations des etres avec ce Principe transcendantalement - Un. 
Pour sa dialectique dune connaissance de Dieu, 11auteur 
assume ces etres, aussi bien du monde sensible que du monde 
intelligible, comme autant d'attributs. Suivant le mouve- 
ment diffusif de 1'emanation divine, il affirme successivement 
ces attributs, en les ordonnant dans une waste structure. 
Noms divins qui refletent les idees neoplatoniciennes, symboles 
scriptuaires qui contiennent un sens spirituel: ce sera le 
domaine oil operent 1'intelligence et la raison ä l'aide de 
l'affirmation - 
but he goes on to reaffirm that Ps. -Dionysius' presumption of divine 
transcendence not only circumscribes the sense of all positive term- 
inology which postulates anything of God, but also implicitly under- 
mines the affirmative way of contemplation to which it is closely 
allied: 
Comme l'analyse des Noms divins le demontrera, le pseudo-Denys 
temoigne dune mefiance croissante envers ce mode de connais- 
sance. Pour atteindre le Transcendant, il n'y a que 'ce non-" 
voir et ce non-connaitre, qui est, en toute v(5rite, un voir 
et connaltre et chanter ..., dans un hymne, le Suressentiel 
par la negation abstractive de tous les etres' (M. T. 2). 
21 
The logical corollary of the fact of divine transcendence, that is, 
is that the soul which aspires to unitive knowledge of God is committed 
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to an approach whereby finite concepts are progressively repudiated 
- "la negation abstractive de tous les 
titres" (Tns 1FcUTWV TWV OVTWV 
a 0'P ` E'Os (580)). Ps. -Dionysius' term for this process is aphairesis 
()C10ipeats). In the way of aphairesis, the soul proceeds by negation 
until it achieves agnosia (äyvmaia), the state of unknowing or mystical 
contemplation in which the soul is prepared to encounter God. 22 The 
method of aphairesis is formally described in the De Mlystica Theologia. 
Vanneste's account of the De Mystica Theologia merits quoting at 
length, since it identifies the essential characteristics of Ps. - 
Dionysius' theory of aphairesis and thus fixes the precise theological 
context in which Dionysian mystical language operates: 
En trois chapitres, 11auteur nous introduit progressivement 
dans les secrets de sa methode, selon un procede qui ressemble 
ä une initiation aux mysteres. I1 exige, comme condition 
prealable äla realisation de 1'union au Transcendant, l'abandon 
de toute connaissance des sens et de l'intelligence. Symbolisee 
par un episode de l'ascension de Moise au Sinai, la necessite 
de ce renoncement est inculquee ä nouveau parce que, au niveau 
des intelligibles, 'on ne voit pas encore Dieu'. 
De cet abandon, qui ne vise que la connaissance de Dieu par 
affirmations, emerge l'aphairesis. Elle est une operation 
logique de negations successives de tous les attributs 
divins, qui nous est expliquee a l'aide de la comparaison 
plotinienne des sculpteurs. I1 est caracteristique, ajoute 
l'auteur, que le mouvement des negations procede ä 1'inverse 
de celui des affirmations. Mais l'explication qu'il nous 
donne de ce phenomene ne depasse guere les limites de la 
dialectique. 
Livrant enfin toute sa pensee, Denys precise la technique 
dune theologie negative: ä base de negations successives et 
ordonnees selon la structure du cosmos neoplatonicien, eile 
vise un terme oü doit se realiser 1'union mysterieuse au 
Transcendant par un non-connaatre. 
En ce premier moment, le pseudo-Denys n'en appelle pas 
ä une experience personnelle de connaissance mystique: tout 
au plus a-t-on rencontre une affirmation radicale de 1'absolue 
transcendance de Dieu. Le recit de l'experience mystique de 
Moise - mis 
ä part ce que nous reserve l'etude de la tenzýbre - 
semble n'avoir servi qu'ä introduire la negation abstractive 
en soulignant la condition precaire de la connaissance affirm- 
ative de 1'intelligence. D'un niveau moral, oü s'opere une 
purification par le renoncement au monde et au mal, il nest 
guere ici question: l'allusion ä la purification de Poise est 
trop faible pour constituer un point de doctrine. Il n'y a, 
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en somme, que cet enchainement de negations, 6voluant au 
niveau de la connaissance, et qui, dans un elan vers la 
negation totale, pousse l'intelligence vers 1'inconnaissance. 
ý3 
The substance of Vanneste's argument is that Ps. -Dionysius' approach 
to mystical religion is that of a logician rather than a metaphysician 
or practising mystic. Aphairesis is defined as a technique of logical 
progression whereby sensible and intelligible phenomena are success- 
ively negated: its logical term is the condition of unknowing (agnosia), 
when the soul has finally abandoned natural modes of knowledge 
according to the senses or intellect. At this point, however, the 
soul is impelled by the fact of God's transcendence to pass beyond 
itself and enter through ecstasy into a state of union (EVwc1S, 
henosis (568)). The culmination of the mystic way is described in 
De Dystica Theology Ch. I: 
... His incomprehensible presence 
(r1 i irep 7räaav CiTIVolav aüTOU 
lrapoucia)... plunges the true initiate into the Darkness of 
Unknowing (Llo TOV yv6 ov Tns &yvwoias) wherein he renounces 
all the apprehensions of his understanding (Kad OV aTrouu£i 
rrä(Y as TaS yVwCTiKCCS aVTIXTI £ls) and is enwrapped in that which 
is wholly intangible (&vaýEi) and invisible (&opäTw), belonging 
wholly to Him that is beyond all things (Trän 
9V-TO7.1rc(VTwV 
errEKSlva) and to none else (whether himself or another), and 
being through the passive stillness of all his reasoning powers 
(TWý faVTEXWS Se äyvwcTW TnS Träans yvcia£ws äv£v£pyr161a) 
united by his highest faculty to-Him that is wholly 
Unknowable 
(KaTa TO Kp£1TTOV EVOUjl£VOS ... TW JIT16EV y1VWCYKcIV). ) 
of whom thus by a rejection of all knowledge he possesses a 
knowledge, that exceeds all his understanding (Täß TraVT£ac'ýs 
Sc 
, yVC'YTw ... 
un£p vouv yivwaKwv). 2L+ 
Ps. -Dionysius insists on the cognitive nature of this union - but the 
faculty of unitive knowledge transcends discursive modes of knowledge. 
Stephen Gersh has noted parallels between Ps. -Dionysius' concept of 
the unitive faculty and the notion of knowledge in the "flower of the 
intellect" (ävüos Toü voü), the intellect transcending itself, which 
was a development of later neoplatonist thought, expounded by Proclus 
in his Commentary on the Chaldaean Philosophy. 
25 Vanneste defines the 
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conditions of unitive knowledge in the De Mystica Theologia: 
Le troisieme moment, l'union ä Dieu (evwois Trpos Aeöv) 
couronne le mouvement de la negation abstractive. Le non- 
connaitre, en effet, est une 'connaissance aü-delä de 1' 
intelligence' au moyen de cette faculte que Denys, employant 
ä nouveau le terme polyvalent de henösis, a designee comme 
'une unit4 äu-delä de l'intelligence'. I1 s'ensuite que 
1' intelligence, pour connaitre 1' Inconnaissable, pour atteindre 
l'Un transcendant, do it 'sortir de soil en depassant son mode 
habituel de proceder par les affirmations: c'est lä ce que 
la theologie mystique appelle extase. 
Ainsi, la force qui jette l'intelligence dans l'au-delä du 
Transcendant inconnaissable est le mouvement meme de la negation 
abstractive vers son terme: c'est le dynamisme de l'inconnaiss- 
ance et non l'amour qui fait arriver 1'intelligence par son 
'unite' eminente ä l'En-soi de Dieu. La logique meme de la 
demarche mystique dionysienne impose cette conception et 
l'enseignement des Noms divins sur l'eros la tonfirme entiere- 
ment. 26 
The significance of epws ('eros') in Dionysian theology will be con- 
sidered below. 27 The De Mystica Theologia necessarily stops short of 
dealing with the unitive experience itself; its scope is limited to 
the preparatory phases of the mystic way which are properly amenable 
to intellectual enquiry, and the structure of the text is correspond- 
ingly logical and coherent. As in the case of the De Divinis Nominibus, 
the rational accountability of Christian theology is established against 
a background of neoplatonic cosmology, but the two texts work in 
contrary directions : the tendency of affirmative theology is to 
become dissipated in a multiplicity of symbols, whereas in negative 
theology, the De Pystica Theologia insists, the soul concentrates its 
entire desire on the divine essence and seeks, through union with God, 
to transcend all distinction between itself and the object of its 
desire. 
Vanneste's description of the De Mystica Theologia confirms what 
seems to be Ps. -Dionysius' own estimate of the object of his work. 
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The 'Hierotheus' to whom he refers as his mentor and fellow disciple 
of St. Paul in De Divinis Nominibus 111.2 may be a fictitious figure 
- part of the writer's attempt to authenticate his claim to discourse 
with the authority of a convert of the apostle. Nevertheless, just as 
the assumption of a pseudonym seems intended to reaffirm the author's 
position in respect of Christian tradition, so the submission that 
his treatises expound the lofty and esoteric teachings of Hierotheus 
for the benefit of the newly-initiated accurately represents his sense 
of their character and function. His suggestion that he shares the 
responsibility of all Hierotheus' pupils to subject the more advanced 
theology to the kind of rational investigation which will make it 
accessible to the intellect of novices in Christian doctrine points 
to the fact that the purpose of the Dionysian Corpus is fundamentally 
analytical and that the treatises are not, in the usual sense, exper- 
iential. The term 'experiential', as Vanneste has indicated, applies 
to the Corpus only in a limited and very specialized sense: 
le seule experience du pseudo-Denys, une experience de teneur 
metaphysique: l'intuition rofonde de la transcendance et de 
1'incognoscibilite de Dieu. 28 
The mode of the Dionysian Corpus, then, is essentially philosophic, 
but within the framework it observes, its Christian orthodoxy seems 
assured. Nevertheless, Ps. -Dionysius' rationalistic approach to 
mystical and revealed religion undoubtedly offers significant differences 
in interpretation or shifts in emphasis from the received Christian 
attitude. In considering the nature of evil in De Divinis Nominibus IV. 
18-35, for example, he resolves the issue in terms of 'being' and 'non- 
being' - developing, as Stephen Gersh has shown, Plato's argument in 
the Sophista that the concept of 'non-being' is not meaningless but 
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denotes 'otherness'. 29 The principle is also fundamental to Ps. - 
Dionysius' theory of aphairesis, the technique of attaining union 
with the transcendent God by way of negation. 3° In establishing it 
here, however, Ps. -Dionysius neither takes account of the Christian 
notion of sin nor insists on distinctions between moral and intellectual 
forms of error. Moral purgation is thus of correspondingly little 
importance in Dionysian mystical theology, and the contrast with 
Gregory of Nyssa's doctrine, in this respect, is marked. 31 Equally, 
while it has already been noted that Ps. -Dionysius uses the platonist 
emanatory theory of the universe to reaffirm the Christian concept of 
a beneficent- and gracious God and to assert the possibility of immediate 
union between the soul and God against the platonist principle of hier- 
archic ascent to knowledge of the One, 32 the idea of God as 'Father', 
which is central to the Christian religion has no real force in the 
Dionysian Corpus. 33 Gersh comments on a related difficulty with 
regard to Ps. -Dionysius' use of eKaraGIS 
('ecstasy') and ý(Toboalä 
('light bestowal') as emanation metaphors: he registers uncertainty 
as to whether they are intended to convey an automatic process or 
whether they allow for the intervention of the divine will. 34 The 
difficulty is illustrated by passages such as the following from De 
Divinis Nominibus IV: 
Now let us consider the name of 'Good' (äyaOoü) which the 
Sacred Writers apply to the Supra-Divine Godhead in a trans- 
cendent manner, calling the Supreme Divine existence itself 
'Goodness' (as it seems to me) in a sense that separates it 
from the whole creation, and meaning, by this term, to indicate 
that the Good, under the form of Being, extends its goodness by 
the very fact of its existence unto all things ( KTEýVElýTrEpt 
TTäVTas T11V TTis &'YaLe6TfTOS atYÄTjV 4UUIKws EV TZ E{Val ryaeov) . 
For as our sun, through no choice. or deliberation; but by the 
very fact of its existence (otK äXAo Ti wv), gives light 
(ýwTiCEi) to all those things which have any inherent power 
of sharing its illumination, even so the Good (which is above 
the sun, as the transcendent archetype by the very mode of its 
existence is above its faded image) sends forth upon all things 
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according to their receptive powers the rays of its 
undivided Goodness (Ka\ 4wTlCci ýuqýKws ýv Tw chat ýws 
1ävra Ta öuväueva PETCXety aUTOU). 
Similarly, the role of Christ as intermediary between God and man is 
maintained with logical precision and scrupulous orthodoxy in the 
Dionysian Corpus - Ps. -Dionysius claims to be citing the apostolic 
convert Hierotheus as his authority when he defines Christ's place 
in the scheme of creation in De Divinis Nominibus II. 10 - but the 
devotional fervour and sense of the personal relationship between man 
and Christ which features prominently in much Christian literature 
and has been shown to give warmth and lyricism to Gregory of Nyssa's 
theology and prose style is entirely alien to Ps. -Dionysius' treatment 
of the subject. 
36 
Eros and Agape 
One of the most contentious points of Dionysian theology, in 
respect of its relative affinities with platonist and Christian trad- 
ition has been the concept of love - the significance of the terms 
which Ps. -Dionysius applies to it and the role it fulfils in the 
Dionysian scheme. The focus of the debate is De Divinis Nominibus IV. 
10-17. In this section of the work, Ps. -Dionysius considers 
Epws 
('erns'), as well as the biblical notion of äyairn ('agape'), as 
appropriate attributes of God. His defensiveness, even uneasiness, 
in putting the case for ascribing eros to God, and his insistence on 
the pure connotations of the term, suggest that he recognized that 
its association with platonism and its connexion with sensual love 
might cast far-reaching doubts on his imputation of eros to the 
Christian God: 
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Let us not, therefore, shrink from this title of 'Yearning' 
11 pwTos), nor be perturbed and affrighted by aught that any (e 
man may say about it. For methinks the Sacred Writers regard 
the titles 'Love' (äyänrls) and 'Yearning' (pwTos) as of one 
meaning; but preferred, when speaking of Yearning in a heavenly 
sense (Thv Tov EpuTOS 0swvvuiav), to qualify it with the word 
'real'ýj7 because of the inconvenient pre-notion of such men. 
For whereas the title of 'Real Yearning' is employed not merely 
by ourselves but even by the Scriptures, mankind (not grasping 
the unity (Evoec6ýs) intended when Yearning is ascribed to God 
(Tris EpwTuKrS Aewvuviis), fell by their own propensity into the 
notion of. a partial (SlnpnuEVOV), physical (awpaTonpeirn) and 
divided (pepioTÖv) quality, which is not true Yearning. (&Xrtehs 
epws) but a vain image of Real Yearning (Tot OE ov )EIpwros) or 
rather a lapse therefrom. For mankind at large cannot. grasp 
the simplicity of the one Divine Yearning (To evlaiov to Ociou 
'pwTos), hence, because of the offence it gives to most men, 
it is used concerning the Divine Wisdom to lead and raise them 
up to the knowledge of the Real Yearning (Tnv TO b'VTws epWTOS 
yvwoly) until they are set free from all offence thereat ... To those who listen aright to Holy Scripture, the word 'Love' 
(ha7frls) is used by the Sacred Writers in Divine Revelation 
with the same meaning as the word 'Yearning' ('pwros). 38 
Ps. -Dionysius' argument that eros and agape are synonymous as terms 
for divine love is intended, in the view of Anders Nygren, to oust 
the biblical concept of agape and reassert the validity of the neo- 
platonist principle of eros on Christian ground. 39 Gabriel Horn, on 
the other hand, suggests in his article, "Amour et extase d'apres 
Denys l'Areöpagite", 4o that Ps. -Dionysius had to deal with a much 
weakened concept of agape, and that he compensated for this by pressing 
into service the more forceful notion of eros as a term for divine 
love, whilst, at the same time, rejecting the-degenerative connotations 
which had accrued to the word pros. Later scholars, however, have 
given a more satisfactory account of Ps. -Dionysius contention that 
eros and agape are equivalent terms. John M. Rist, in "A note on 
Eros and Agape-in Pseudo-Dionysius", 41 has demonstrated that the two 
words had already become synonymous as a result of developments in 
neoplatonist thought during the fourth century: eros, he notes, had 
accumulated some suggestion of the kind of beneficent , descending 
force of love usually signified by agape. Eros and agape, then, are 
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genuine synonyms for Ps. -Dionysius - though as Rist explains, he is 
understandably guarded about his use of eros in a Christian context: 
Since, however, most of his contemporaries thought of Eros 
as a cosmic power, and since Dionysius is always writing 
what can be called 'cosmic theology', it is natural that 
he should talk more about Eros than about Agape. Hence 
he has to justify its omission from the New Testament and 
easy justification is to hand. There is a heavenly Eros 
and an earthly, and it is dangerous to talk of Eros in the 
presence of the uninitiated. Such language can very easily 
be misinterpreted; and it is likely that Dionysius has in 
mind that many of the readers of Scripture would be converts 
from paganism and thus easily misled about Eros. 42 
The connotations of eros, in fact, correspond precisely with Ps. - 
Dionysius' concept of the operation of divine power in creating and 
sustaining the universe. Eros is essentially ecstatic, and the force 
of divine eros (tioü Oc ou )EI: pWTOS), Ps. -Dionysius suggests, creates 
spontaneously by the fact of its overflowing from God: God is, "through 
the excessive yearning of his goodness, transported outside of Himself 
(Si' ünep6o)Lnv äyaOotwros ''Ew eauTOÜ yiveTai)", 
43 though His nature 
remains undiminished by the progression. While it is true, therefore, 
that the difficulty of estimating the significance of the will in Ps. - 
Dionysius' theory of divine ecstasy gives rise to legitimate doubts 
as to the strict Christian orthodoxy of the Corpus, it is nevertheless 
certain that Ps. -Dionysius recasts the platonist concept of a universe 
based on emanation within the framework of Christian cosmology, and 
insists that the cohesive principle of creation is love. The insistence 
on the role of eros in the following passage, it should be noted, is 
more marked than Rolt's translation allows: 
To those who listen aright to Holy Scripture, the word 'Love' 
(&Yänns) is used by the Sacred Writers in Divine Revelation 
with the same meaning as the word 'Yearning' (pros). It 
means a faculty of unifying (evo7oiov) and conjoining 
(avyKpaTlKnv) and of producing a special commingling together 
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(6vyKt ivwvTatdnaadn Ta IrävTa 
ws epwvT(X ) in the Beautiful 
(Ka; köv) and Good (&yaeov): a faculty which pre-exists for the 
sake of the Beautiful and Good, and is diffused from this 
Origin to this End, and holds together things of the same 
order by. a mutual connection. (i'va 5 Xov OTi. 7Tpös äaanaa Ta 
u£v OPOTayn aUVCXWVTat WS ävä uepos EpwvTa TE Kai 
Epwueva), 
and moves the highest to take thought (KivoiVTO Kai ep(wkv) 
for those below and fixes the inferior in a state which seeks 
the highest (Tä 6c KaTa6cEOTepa irpos Ta ünEpTepa äya(rT1KWS 
EXoicv). 44 
The corollary of imputing eros to God is, thus, that the soul responds 
in kind and reverts to God by passing beyond itself through love. 
Ps. -Dionysius reaffirms this point in De Divinis Nominibus IV. 13: 
And the Divine Yearning (Oc os epws) brings ecstasy (EKaTaTlKOS), 
not allowing them that are touched thereby to belong unto 
themselves ... 
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But, characteristically, Ps. -Dionysius says little about the nature 
of the individual soul's ascent to God under the impulse of love. 
The notion of eros effectively confirms Ps. -Dionysius' account of 
the logic of the negative way, as Vanneste suggested in the passage 
cited above46 - though Stephen Gersh has noted that the theory of the 
soul's ascending ecstasy received greater prominence in mystical 
literature following Ps. -Dionysius. 
47 In this respect, too, the 
contrast with Gregory's exposition of the Canticle, as a model for 
the soul's personal search for union with God, is marked. Rist 
identifies one of the reasons for this apparent deficiency in Ps. - 
Dionysius' writing: 
It is first necessary to repeat that in this section of 
his writings48 Dionysius is not describing an ascent to 
God but giving God his names. Naturally therefore an 
aspiring Eros does not occur and a Proclan downward-flowing 
Providential Eros does. It has been frequently observed, 
most recently by Roques (in Structures theolo iaues de la 
gnose ä Richard de St. Victor Paris, 1962), pp. 121-2 , 
that in the Mystical Theology and in his First and Fifth 
Letters where Dionysius is concerned with the mystical ascent 
to God, neither Eros nor Agape is mentioned at all. It is 
true, of course, that Dionysius does not thereby mean to 
9o 
exclude love as the motive force in the Christian's ascent, 
but it is at least worthy of notice that when Dionysius 
actually uses these terms they are primarily descriptions 
of God not attributes of man. 49 
They are part, indeed, of a logical account of the principles of 
Christian theology, and the De Mystica Theologia proceeds from this 
basis to explain the rationale of the way of unknowing, which is 
itself the logical inference from the theology of divine transcendence. 50 
The narrative of Moses' experience on Sinai is subjected to much the 
same treatment. }L-C. Puech, in his article "La tenebre mystique chez 
le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et dans la tradition patristique", has 
indicated the affinities between Ps. -Dionysius' handling of the subject 
and Gregory of Nyssa's mystical interpretation of the Book of Exodus: 
Lei 3 du eh. I de la Theologie Mystique est 1ui-meme bäti sur 
un type traditionnel, dont la Vie de Moise de Gregoire de Nysse 
donne le meilleur echantillon: un bref resume du recit biblique «CFTOpia) suivi dune 6Ewpiä, d'une interpretation allegorico- 
mystique31 
The point is a valid one - the exegetical method and its conclusions 
relative to the theory and practice of the mystic way are fundamental 
to the De Mystica Theologia. They are subsumed, however, within a 
larger and, it has been stressed, logical rather than scriptural 
framework. As Vanneste has suggested in his account of the De Mystica 
Theologia, the Moses narrative, as symbolizing abandonment of natural 
modes of knowledge by way of the senses and intellect in order to 
achieve union with God, has the same status in the text as the symbol 
of ritual initiation into secret knowledge, which Ps. -Dionysius drew 
from the mystery religions: the procedure is enacted in chapters I-III 
of the text, as the disciple Timothy is tutored in the successive 
rejection of finite cognitive methods in order to be initiated into 
unknown knowledge. 
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There is no doubt that Dionysian mystical theology sacrifices, 
as a result, the personal dimension which is strongly present in 
Gregory's work: whatever mystical experience Ps. -Dionysius himself 
may have had, in his writings he treats the subject of mystical religion 
dispassionately as a dialectician, and he makes no appeal to the indiv- 
idual experience of his readers. His language, too, lacks the kind of 
richness and evocativeness which characterizes Gregory's mystical 
vocabulary by virtue of its scriptural basis. Its gain in precision,, 
however, insofar as it refers to a rationalized scheme of theology, 
is considerable. Rist makes a cognate point in his final assessment 
of Ps. -Dionysius' achievement in objectifying the Christian doctrine 
of love: his rationalistic approach allowed him to accommodate the 
concept of eros within a coherent cosmology which reaffirms love as 
the unifying principle in the true Christian spirit, whereas Gregory, 
whose Christian orthodoxy goes unchallenged, struggled uncertainly 
and ultimately less convincingly, with the more intractable notion 
of. a ape,. and eros remained imperfectly assimilated into his theology. 52 
III. IMýystical Vocabulary 
In linguistic terms, the expository character of the Dionysian 
treatises has its counterpart in the author's acute attentiveness to 
words and meticulous concern with their precision as vehicles for 
theological propositions. His approach to religious language has 
affinities with that of Gregory of Nyssa, inasmuch as both writers 
recognize the linguistic repercussions of the doctrine of divine 
transcendence. Ps. -Dionysius states the problem cogently in the first 
chapter of the De Divinis Nominibus: 
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For even as things which are intellectually discerned (Tä 
vonTä) cannot be comprehended or perceived (W1rTaý by means 
of those things which belong to the senses (Tots a16AnTOS), 
nor simple and imageless things by means of types and images 
(Tots Ev Tr)Lä6El Kai auvüe6Et Kai TdTrw Ta aTrX& Kai aTuTrwTa 
nor the formless and intangible essence of unembodied things 
(Tä a6XnhCTi(JTa) by means of those which have bodily form 
(KaTä ax paTa pEpop¢wpEvois), by the same law of truth (X6yov) 
the boundless Super-Essence surpasses Essences (u7EpeXEi ö 
AEös) Ö PATE oi3Qta, &XX uTrep oücs 'av), the) Super-Intellectual 
Unity surpasses Intelligences (uº1TE voüs, aX uTrEp vovv 
EvoTrns), 
the One which is beyond thought surpasses the apprehension of 
thought (un 6iawupwv Ttvwv frpos evwßiv Kai ßuvöpounv vorloäTw Tls), 
and the Good which is beyond utterance surpasses the reach of 
words (ob yap TrEpi TotoUTwv pö aoyos vav). 53 
Like Gregory, too, Ps. -Dionysius concedes that, although God is 
essentially beyond the scope of the human institution of language 
because He exceeds natural modes of cognition, scriptural language 
nevertheless has a unique claim to have some bearing on God in that 
it is held to be divinely inspired. The authoritativeness of the 
scriptural titles of God is, indeed, a basic premise of the De Divinis 
Nominibus, and Ps. -Dionysius seems also to endorse the theory of the 
intermediary and revelatory function of language as it had become 
integral to Christian theology: he writes of scriptural language, 
For, if we may safely trust the wise and infallible Scriptures, 
Divine things are revealed unto each created spirit in proportion 
to its powers, and in this measure is perception granted through 
the workings of Divine goodness, the which in just care for our 
preservation divinely tempereth unto finite measure the infinitude 
of things which pass man's understanding (ä7rö Twv 
ev 1CTpw Kal 
XwpnTwv Tnv äjETpiav (A)T60, Ws äXmpnTOV,. CC ava), oyias TO 
&KaTäXnT1TOV TijS Trepi Ocoü yvwcssws eVTc Oa 7apicyTaTat). 54 
The idea that the true meaning of scripture is wrapped in symbolic 
language and accessible only to those with a proper commitment to 
Christian doctrine seems also to have impinged on Ps. -Dionysius' 
thinking. In this respect, however, the influence of the earlier 
mystery cults was confirmatory and perhaps dominant, and Ps. -Dionysius 
speaks of the hidden truths of religion as being intelligible only to 
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its initiates, using the specialized vocabulary of the mystery sects: 
And in all other divine enlightenments which the occult 
tradition of our inspired teachers hath, by mystic inter- 
pretation, accordant with the Scriptures, bestowed upon us, 
we also have been initiated (öoas äaaas 61SaYKaaias Tais, l'paýais aKOaoü6ws n TWV S16aaK&Xwv itjWV Kpuýia Trapädoßts eV 
1iuaTnpli ,.. nuiv): apprehending these things in the present 
life, (according to our powers) (ävaX yws Tb SUVäpEi Tres f1ETEpas voliaEas), through the sacred veils (TrapatrcTaaucTwv) 
of that loving kindness which in the Scriptures (ryautKwv) and 
Hierarchical Traditions, enwrappeth spiritual truths in terms 
drawn from the world of sense, and super-essential truths in 
terms drawn from Being (eva Xwprlen To YonTOV Kai ax pnTOV Ev 
r`1utyI a1ß6nTOis ßuu6dXots EXptj6aTO , otovEt T16t T1COp1KaX1Jjij10CT1), 
clothing with shapes and forms things which are shapeless and 
formless, and b? y a variety of symbols, fashioning manifold 
attributes (Tä airXä Ev Ti1 TroiKiXta TI3V PEp1QTWV auj166Xwv) of 
the imageless and supernatural Simplicity. 55 
Thus, whereas Gregory of Nyssa insists on moral purity as a prerequisite 
for perfect understanding of the inner meaning of scripture, purification 
in the moral sense has no more force in the Dionysian Corpus as a 
criterion for the interpretation of biblical language than Ps. -Dionysius 
allows it theologically as a condition for progress in the mystic way. 
The initiate of religion, in the Dionysian Corpus, appreciates that he 
is in the presence of a mystery which is to be preserved from violation 
by those who do not respect it - but having once accepted the principle 
of divine transcendence, the fact of his admission to the knowledge of 
this mystery is in itself no qualification for comprehension of religious 
literature: Ps. -Dionysius relies rather on making scriptural language 
intelligible from a rational standpoint and ensuring the logical account- 
ability of his own works. His approach to scripture is, therefore, not 
that of an exegete in the sense that the tern is applicable to Gregory. 
While he constantly refers to texts from the Bible in the De Divinis 
Nominibus, he is less concerned to extrapolate a coherent meaning from 
the whole than to identify the precise significance of individual titles 
of God as components of a verbal system for denoting religious propositions. 
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In view of this, and because Ps. -Dionysius is preoccupied in 
both the De T"iystica Theologia and the De Divinis Nominibus with what 
can and cannot be properly affirmed of God, it is noteworthy and 
perhaps disturbing that the Dionysian Corpus includes very little 
examination of the linguistic medium itself. Linguistically as well 
as theologically, Ps. -Dionysius seems to have drawn heavily on trad- 
ition, adopting terminology and verbal models which were already closely 
associated with mystical theology, and using them independently without 
entering into detailed analysis of their theoretical background. His 
interest in language accords with the largely expository purpose of 
his writings in being primarily semantic, and he attaches considerable 
importance to the efficacy and precision of words as a means of commun- 
ication - so that, he writes, 
. ý. our whole Discourse should be made clear 
(SjXos ö Acyos 
YcvfTal), and, being free from all doubtfulness and obscurity 
(&aaýcs), may (to the best of our powers) give a distinct, 
plain and orderly statement of the matter (oarws iisptopi'wv). 
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Ps. -Dionysius here enlarges on his statements in relation to scriptural 
language and seems to impute to language in general the same inter- 
mediary and essentially interpretative function. He puts the point 
more forcefully later in the De Divinis Nominibus, where he strengthens 
his defence of the case for applying eros to God by insisting that words 
in themselves have no more than a symbolic status and fulfil a purely 
utilitarian role: 
Need is there to understand that in proper truth we do but 
use the elements and syllables and phrases and written terms 57 (aEEewv Kai ypaýwv Kai X ywv) as an aid to our senses (ai66nrmv). 
Ps. -Dionysius seems to suggest here that the operation of language in 
a religious context is intrinsically metaphoric, insofar as the rel- 
ationship of words to the objects they describe is necessarily oblique. 
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He establishes, moreover, a firm connexion between language and 
the perception and intellection of sense phenomena. He develops the 
point further in an important passage from the De Mystica Theologia: 
the process of aphairesis, it has been stressed, demands successive 
abandonment of things of the senses and intellect (Täs aicOricCts 
äiröAetirs, Kai Tas voepas 6vepycias), 
5a 
and he insists that in trans- 
cending these, the soul passes beyond the range of phenomena which 
are amenable to finite modes of cognition and thus to formulation in 
the allied medium of language: 
For the more that we soar upwards the more our language becomes 
restricted to the compass of purely intellectual conceptions 
(oi XOYot Tais ovvdleßl Thv VofTZv TrcptoTeaaovTa), even as in 
the present instancy plunging into the Darkness which is above 
the intellect (TÖV vircp vouv eiaSüvo'res yvdýov) we shall find 
ourselves reduced not merely to brevity of speech (ßpaxoXoyicv) 
but even to absolute dumbness both of speech and thought 
(&Xoyiav TavTCan Kai &vonai(xv). 59 
It is noteworthy that the passage deals with the transition from the 
illuminative to the unitive phase of the mystic way as they were 
defined in Gregory's theology; Ps. -Dionysius, however, neither 
emphasizes the doctrinal distinctions between these stages nor 
accentuates differences in the language which properly pertains to 
each of them - though it is hoped to show that he assimilated and 
made use of both. Dionysian theology is dominated by the concept of 
divine transcendence, and its principal movement is therefore towards 
unknowing: on a linguistic plane, therefore, its logical tendency is 
towards the "secret silence" (KpUý1O11UQTOU GlyTjs) which the author 
refers to in Ch. I of the De Mystica Theologia. 
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The Dionysian Corpus is thus largely unencumbered by lengthy 
preparatory discussion of its medium, and Ps. -Dionysius' formulation 
of difficult theological propositions is as a result impressively 
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forthright and penetrating. On the other hand, however, Ps. -Dionysius' 
unwillingness to explore the theory of language is perhaps not un- 
connected with a fundamental insensitivity to its subtle operations. 
Thus, for example, his theoretical appreciation of the mediating role 
of language does not seem to be complemented by a practical regard for 
the complex relationship which is established between writer and 
audience by the interposition of words. The attempt to induce words 
to operate as symbols which exactly denote a dialectical theology 
means that their suggestive potential is not exploited to best advantage, 
and it must be doubted whether this potential may be mastered by the 
author to the extent that his system demands. These deficiencies are 
particularly apparent where Ps. -Dionysius is considering the sense in 
which relative terms may be applied to God: God, he writes, is not, 
... beautiful in one part and foul in another 
(ot KaTä Ti Kal 
ävä PEpos KaX? v); nor yet at one time and not at another 
(oüde Kara Ttva Xpövov Kaa'ov); nor yet beautiful in relation 
to one thing but not to another (Kart Ttva SE oü o66£ irpös 
Ti KaAöv), 61 
and later, 
Now . 
God. is. called Great in His peculiar Greatness 
(Ai EycTat Kai iEyas KaTa TO UTrepirXiipcs aUTOV Kai uey(Y. aoupyov) 
which giveth of itself to all things that are great and is 
poured upon all Magnitude from outside and stretches far 
beyond it (oTl ai 1rrlyai Twv pEwV aJTOÜ, Trapä lTaVTwv 
pcTEXopEVai, 
äPEiWTO1 
0131 . 
92 
_ 
In the first instance, Ps. -Dionysius asserts that the adjective 
"beautiful" must have an absolute rather than a relative meaning 
when it designates God; in the second instance, he interprets the 
meaning of "great"'as a description of God by supplying a paraphrase 
of its connotations. An awareness of the problems of applying relative 
terms to an absolute entity underlies both passages, 
63 
and the first 
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passage seems to imply a recognition on the part of the author that 
intellection and labelling are associated activities and together 
introduce a spatio-temporal dimension to theology, which inherently 
contradicts the belief that God exceeds both space and time and con- 
tains all opposites in singleness. Ps. -Dionysius, however, attempts 
to resolve the problem at the level of redefining meaning: he treats 
effects rather than causes, that is, and does not get to the root of 
the problem by dealing explicitly with the dualistic nature of language 
itself. Stephen Gersh makes an allied point: 
It is one of the cardinal points of Ps. -Dionysius' doctrine 
that the divine effulgence is a unity which cannot be captured 
adequately by created things and is thus multiplied according 
to their modes of participation. This notion forms the basis 
of his approach to the nature of human cognition which he con- 
siders in various passages as operating "rationally and dis- 
cursively and so to speak with composite and variable activities" 
( AOY1K(AS Kal S1EýOÖ1K(ilS Kai OtOV 6U11111KTO1S Ka\ j1ETaßaT1Ka1S 
cvepyEials) or as "wandering" (iraävn) in comparison with the 
stability of divine intellection. Ps. -Dionysius does not com- 
bine these two notions to form the logical conclusion that 
, 
the 
structure of the human mind is responsible for the fact that God 
himself is necessarily conceived as a manifold, but this argument 
is worked out explicitly by later Christian Neoplatonists. 64 
These seem disturbing inadequacies in works which are concerned with the 
rationale of Christian theology and its verbal formulation. 
Ps. -Dionysius' approach to language, therefore, may be said to 
be utilitarian and pragmatic, and it seems inappropriate to claim any 
special distinction for his use of words as'being either creative or 
inventive in any literary sense. He has been shown to have assimilated 
traditional concepts with regard to the status and function of scriptural 
language, and similarly, in the broader context of theological language, 
he accepts the precept of applying percep¬u. al terminology to God on 
the basis of analogy. Thus, he writes in the sixth chapter of the 
De Divinis Nnminihus! 
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For the Supra-Vital and Primal Life (CE aJTnS AS 
üirep 1ýäoav 
ýwrly 6Eias Owns Kai swot) is the Cause of all Life, and 
produces and fulfils it and individualizes it (ýwoüai Tä 
QwuaTa, Ev n. Tn 6Eta awn). And we must draw from all life 
the attributes we apply to it when we consider how it teems 
with all living things (iroaaai eial ýwai Kai 
O]lVOuoi ai 
KaO' r`luäs, &V oüv svoEldwS Kai Kath uiav TIN CWT1Kily aiTiav 
irpovtiaTavTat), and how under manifold forms it is beheld 
and praised in all Life and lacketh not Life or rather abounds 
therein, and indeed hath Very Life, and how it produces life 
in a Supra-Vital manner and is above all life and therefore is 
described by whatsoever human terms may express that Life which 
is ineffable (A rEly ... Tö 
urrepTrlripps 
, KaOO Tö 
äyaOöv Tiffs Cwis 
Kai Eiii Trca Aoi S ETEpo1S Traf CcITis X ETal' Ti aüTo wos, Kai U1TEpýWOS, 
n ýwoTrotos, n: oTrws'aXAws avüpwTrtKws av vuriaot Tis Tnv &4OEyKTOv 
EKEtvnv Kai 6Eiav Cwrtv). 65 
The creative relation in which God stands towards man allows man to 
participate in the divine perfections and sanctions the ascription 
of the properties of creation to God as attributes, though He is 
simultaneously held to transcend them all. 
66 This is the language 
of symbolical theology, which operates by inference and is closely 
associated with the illuminative way by St. Gregory of Nyssa. Ps. - 
Dionysius seems to concede the appropriateness of language - as having 
connexion with cognition through the senses and intellect - in the 
context of affirmative theology, the method of which is essentially 
discursive and which deals in revealed religion. 
Affirmative Vocabulary 
The use of positive terminology in relation to God in the 
Dionysian Corpus thus has a basis in theology. Ps. -Dionysius 
elaborates on this point in the fifth chapter of the De Divinis 
Nominibus, where he is considering Wisdom, Life, Godhead and Being 
as fitting titles for God. He affirms their validity, in that-they 
are, 
... Names which reveal 
the Providence of God (o Aoyos UC pvnaal Tas 
TIS 1TpoVOlaS CK4aVTOp1Kas). 
67 
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The names do not purport to describe the essence of God Himself, 
that is, but rather express the beneficient aspect of God's being 
which, by reason of its relationship to creation, is in some measure 
accessible to human perception and verbal formulation. 
The Dionysian Corpus is marked by its emphasis on divine trans- 
cendence, however, and, consequently, on the incongruity of applying 
language to God at all. Ps. -Dionysius, like Gregory, is concerned 
to manipulate words, which properly embody finite concepts, to convey 
ontological propositions which exceed their normal scope. He insists, 
in the first instance, that language can only apply to God in a very 
specialized sense: in the second chapter of the Be Divinis Nominibus, 
for example, he maintains that, 
..., if ones says that Very Life lives (Ei Tls ýaln CnV AV ýWOUßaV Kai a? TOcwnv), or that Very Light is enlightened 
(Kal ýxTlCEaOal To aUTdýws), he will be wrong (according 
to my view) unless, perchance, he were to use these terms. 
in a different sense from the ordinary one (E)l un ToU KaO' 
ETC OV Tpoirov) to mean that the qualities of created things 
pre-exist, after a superlative manner as touching their true 
Being in the Creative. Originals (neplaaws, Kal oüalwdws, Kai 
Ob KaTä uETOXnV, itp0 T(V a)TlaTWV EVE1(Jl TaUTa TOTS a1T10is). 
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Two points seem to emerge from this passage. On the one hand, Ps. - 
Dionysius appears to be questioning the use of verbs in relation to 
God: verbs are subject to tense, and are therefore embedded in the 
temporal process, whereas God is held to exist outside the dimension 
of time. The implication is that abstract nouns, by avoiding these 
restrictive connotations, are a more appropriate means of expressing 
something of the divine. Further, the dissociation of the noun from 
its cognate verb - 'life' from 'live', 'light' from 'enlighten' - and 
the prefixing of the qualifying epithet 'Very' (aüTO-) - aüTOCwnv, 
aüTÖýws - combine to confer a special and absolute status on the noun 
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when it is used to describe God. Thus, the problem which was 
apparent where Gregory of Nyssa proposed a similar redefinition of 
language in a religious context - namely that words must be assumed 
to have altered their function and meaning while remaining unchanged 
in form - is perpetuated, perhaps inevitably, in the Dionysian Corpus. 
Like Gregory, Ps. -Dionysius both explains the significance of nouns 
in relation to God by paraphrase and adopts the verbal model of noun 
preceded by a qualifying adjective to underline the consummate meaning 
which words must be assumed to possess when they refer to God: 
comparable examples occur in chapter five of the De Divinis Nominibus, 
where, in addition to 'Very Life' (a)UTOýwnv), Ps. -Dionysius refers to 
'Very Wisdom' (awTOOO4iav), 'Very Being' (alTOEival)and 'Very Similarity' 
ýaüTOOuolÖTnTa). 69 It is worth noting, however, that Ps. -Dionysius' 
attempt to enforce the perfect meaning of his vocabulary is not con- 
nected, as it is in Gregory's theology, with the spiritual purgation 
undertaken by the individual contemplative, but is rather integral to 
his design of establishing the logical accountability of religious 
language. 
For both authors, however, descriptive terms of this kind convey 
more than the sense in which God consummately incorporates all finite 
concepts. They affirm, simultaneously, the apparently contradictory 
proposition of divine transcendence, in that they perfect these con- 
cepts to a degree which elevates them beyond comparison with their 
empirical counterparts. They reflect, in fact, the essential paradox 
of the divine nature, though the paradox is latent in these expressions 
and not, as in other elements of Dionysian vocabulary, pointedly 
embodied in the verbal formulae themselves. 
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The paradoxical implications of this positive terminology are 
sometimes urged more insistently, however. Ps. -Dionysius' exposition 
of Life as a title for God, for example, demonstrates his manipulation 
of verbal functions in order to achieve as accurate a representation 
of a theological proposition as the medium of language will allow. 
He begins with an account of the various connotations of the title: 
Now we must celebrate Eternal Life (Tns auiviov. "" twits 
as that whence cometh very Life and all life 
(aüTOCwil Kai 
fräv(1 Cwn), which also endues every kind of living creature 
with its appropriate meed of Life (oiKStws 
cKa TW KaTa TOV 
Trjs 4üßews aüroü X yov rö 6v Staa7rclpET(It). 
70 
The descriptive title "Eternal Life" embodies a doctrinal claim con- 
cerning the nature of God - that as the source of all life, He contains 
it in perfection and without being subject to time. 
71 Ps. -Dionysius 
goes on to explain, however, that this condition necessarily involves 
the transcendence of all life: 
And, as, in thinking of the title 'Existent', we said that 
it is an Eternity of very Being, so do we now say that the 
Supra-Vital or Divine Life is the Vitalizer and Creator of' 
Life. And all life and vital movement comes from the Life 
which is beyond all Life and beyond every Principle of all 
Life (Atwviav SE AEYEt,, o1X 3T1 TOV a twvos vcTEXtý (aXT rtA 
yäp trEpteXEt Kat TODS atwvas') äaj wßiitp XeycTau iev K at ov 
% O AEOS, XEYETal SE Kal utrEpTO OV'TO HIEV, OTl E6TLU unap is 
týTrEp UTrapEtV To SE, OTt ou 1ETEXE1 Tot) Etvat, aXX ulrEp TO 
Ei Vat ECT iV. OUTw Kai aiwvtos Ti ýwiý aUTOÜ, Kai traaty urrEpatWVtos 
).. ). Aiwvios ucv, S10TI alTOS EauTw EUT1V atwv Kai a161OTrIS' 
r I, %)/L-I) UTTEpalwViOS SE, OTl Kai atwvwv OUTOS EQTi 7roinTn6.72 
Pursuing the paradox which is implicit in these theological statements 
to its logical conclusion, Ps. -Dionysius develops a vocabulary 
to 
embody both elements of the paradox at once: God 
is described as 
"plusquam ens" (Ü7fep To 
öv), "supraquam existentia" vfrep TO eivat), 
"supraquam aeterna" (üTrepatuvtos). This last 
term operates in the 
same way as the perfecting formula discussed above 
(eg aüTOýwnv, 
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auTocivai etc. ) - that is, by at once affirming the applicability 
of a particular attribute to God in its most sublime form. and 
denying its appropriateness, in that God may be supposed to possess 
the quality to a degree exceeding human conception. The construction 
of the two sets of terms is identical, though the paradoxical connot- 
ations of the "üirep-" vocabulary are more explicit. 73 
Ps. -Dionysius explains the rationale of the ' 
irep-" vocabulary 
more precisely in the second chapter of the De Divinis Nominibus. 
Rolt's translation is not sufficiently close to Migne's Greek text 
to merit quotation here, and has therefore been replaced by the 
parallel Latin text printed in the P. G.: 
Nomen igitur unita, scilicet totius Deitatis, Trinae unitatis, 
sicut alibi diximus, sunt supra guam bonuni (To 
uirepaya6ov), 
et caetera, quibus praepositio supra praeponitur, quae vocat 
ablationis secundum exsuperantiam (Trpoaaap6avopuns -rns 
urrep 
TrpoOeßcws, a 6n Kai Tr`1s 6frepoXtKrjs ä4aipeßews. aeyei); siquidem 
etiam ablativum. est nomen immortale et increatum, sed secundum 
affirmationem (aýalpcpaTtKov yap Kai To 
5avaTou, Kat To 
äKTi6TOV, a)Aa. KaTä älroýaaiv). Ablativum etiam est supraauam 
bbnum (Ä#alpcpaTtKOV Kät Tö iTrepäyaOa ; non enim simpliciter 
bonuni et sapiens, sed supra haec (ou6e yäp äTraas äyaObv Kai 
0`0ý101J, aX9 UTrep Taüra), et sine comparatione (äßuyKpiTws), et 
idcirco superlative ablationem continent (6iä TOZTO üTrepoX1Kws 
TTjv a¢aipeßty cXoucn) , quibus adnumerantur omnia quae ad rationem 
Causae pertinent. 
74 
To designate God iTrspäyaOov ("Super-Excellent" in Rolt's translation) 
is to make a grammatically affirmative statement concerning the divine 
nature, and there is no intrinsically negative component in the con- 
struction of the word itself. The intent of the statement, however, 
is predominantly negative: the force of the contention that God 
possesses an attribute - in this case, 'excellence' - to excess, 
that is, is to suggest that God does not possess it in any sense 
that man can comprehend. The prefix 
Snep-, therefore, as Ps. - 
Dionysius explains, signifies a negative of excess, and is thus 
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connotatively the equivalent of the explicitly negative terminology 
(e. g. "immortal" (äOävaTov), "uncreated" (&KTi6Tov)) which denies 
the applicability of finite concepts to God. Both function similarly 
within grammatically affirmative sentence structures - "God is Super- 
Excellent", "God is Immortal" - which are nevertheless negative in 
intent. Both are, in fact, methods of embodying the principle of 
divine transcendence linguistically, and thus represent different 
aspects of the negative mode which Ps. -Dionysius insists to be the 
logical corollary of the theology of transcendence. They are connected 
here with the process of aphairesis - the negative way of the soul 
whereby it attains the condition of unknowing which precedes its 
ecstatic union with God - which is itself also logically determined 
by the fact of divine transcendence. The ascendancy of negative over 
affirmative values in both cases also reasserts the fundamental prin- 
ciple of Dionysian theology - that the fact of divine transcendence 
dictates that even the affirmative way culminates in negation. 
Negative Vocabulary 
Ps. -Dionysius analyses the negative dialectic itself more closely 
in Ch. IV of the De Divinis Nominibus: 
Now if the Good is above all things (ünep ¶ VTa Tä öVTa) 
(as indeed It is) Its Formless Nature produces all-form; 
and in It alone Not-Being is an excess of Being, and 
Lifelessness is an excess of Life and Its Mindless state 
is an excess of Wisdom (ai orepnoeis eiriAeov vrcp6oaai 
eint 6eßemv SpaoTriptot, ws TO äveideos, ävoüoios, äýwos, 
avows), 
and all the Attributes of the Good we-express in 
a transcendent manner-by negative images (ev Tw Aew üirepou f'ws OVT1 KaTä Tnv äý(Xipeßty & VTU)v... ü7'rCpOKlKMS 
voo6vTai). 75 
Here again, Ps. -Dionysius insists that divine transcendence is the 
controlling factor, and reaffirms that both the negative and the 
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affirmative uTrep- terminologies make precisely the same claims 
concerning the naturb of God: as the `nrcp- vocabulary implies 
negation, so the explicitly negative attributes of God denote his 
transcendence of finite concepts by exceeding them. 
Ps. -Dionysius constructs his negative vocabulary on the verbal 
model already intimately associated with Christian mystical theology 
by Gregory of Nyssa - the negating prefix "ä-" is conjoined to a 
stem which expresses a finite concept. Further examples of the kind 
cited by Ps. -Dionysius in De Divinis Nominibus IV occur prominently 
in the De IZystica Theologia: God is here described as "the immaterial 
and indivisible Good" (To' äüaov Ka, avepoüs äyaOoü)76 as the 
"intangible and invisible" (äva ci Kai aopäTw)77 which encompasses 
the soul once it has come, through aphairesis, to the condition of 
unknowing, and which demands that the soul should achieve unitive 
awareness only "through the loss of sight and knowledge" (61 a6AEpias 
Kai äivwaias)"78 These examples illustrate that the negative vocab- 
ulary of the Dionysian Corpus is something more than a system of 
symbols to denote God's transcendence of conceptual forms: Ps. - 
Dionysius pursues the logic of the theology of transcendence on both 
the doctrinal and the linguistic levels, and also applies the negative 
dialectic to the mystic way (aphairesis) and to the condition of the 
soul which has reached the term of aphairesis and is prepared for 
union. It designates, therefore, both the mode of knowledge and 
what is known. Ps. -Dionysius emphasizes this point in the second 
chapter of the De Mystica Theologia: 
... and may attain unto vision 
(ideiv) through the loss of 
% 11 sight and knowledge (61 
a6Acii'as Kai a vwaias), and that in 
ceasing thus to see or to know (auTÖ Tb pö Tv un6's yvwvat 
we may learn to know (Yvwvai) that which is beyond all 
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perception and understanding (to iirep eEav Kcu yvWcr'v) 
in order that we may attain a naked knowledge (&Tre lKaaüIrrws 
yviiluev) of that Unknowing (eKeivnv Ti1v &yvwoiav). 
7ý 
Both these meanings are implicit in Gregory's use of negative termin- 
ology. Moreover, Ps. -Dionysius did not only adopt the verbal model 
which Gregory had connected with Christian mystical theology, but 
some of the specific terms - 
äopäTw 
and äyvwaia, for example - which 
Gregory had established as part of the technical vocabulary associ- 
ated with the unitive way. 
80 Ps. -Dionysius seems, therefore, in 
some respects to have consolidated Gregory's usage, but he clearly 
approached the traditional language of Christian mysticism independ- 
ently and rather more as a logician than, as in Gregory's case, a 
theologian and exegete. He displaced the biblical orientation of 
Gregory's mystical terminology, and substituted an objective, logical 
and therefore constant framework for the interpretation of mystical 
discourse, closely allied to his investigation of the rationale of 
Christian theology, which ensured it the kind of precision and account- 
ability which had been lacking in Gregory's works. 
It is important, however, in insisting on the negative connotations 
of Ps. -Dionysius' vocabulary, not to underestimate its affirmative 
aspects. 
81 The goal of Dionysian theology, as the De Mystica Theologia 
presents it, is "knowledge" (yZvai) of that "Unknowing" (äyvwcsiav) by 
means of "unknowing" (xyvmoias); the title "Unknowing" implicitly 
affirms two things concerning God - the fact of His existence, that 
is, and His transcendence of finite concepts - and the notion of 
"knowledge through unknowing" or "vision ... through ceasing thus to 
see" (iSciv... aürö TO un ideiv 
) affirms that there is an awareness 
of God which consists in the abandonment of finite modes of cognition. 
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Ps. -Dionysius effectively proposes a new method of apprehension 
which is appropriate to the incomprehensibility of its object -a 
method whose alienation from natural processes of sensual and intell- 
ectual perception is imaged in, rather than properly described by, 
the paradoxical construction of the individual words and the corresp- 
onding juxtapositioning of the contradictory terms which are made to 
express it. 
Mystical Darkness 
This definition of mystical awareness necessitates a metaphoric 
use of language, and Ps. -Dionysius brings metaphor of a different kind 
to bear when he associates the condition of unknowing with darkness. 
He writes at the end of the first chapter of the De Mystica Theologia 
of, 
... the Darkness of Unknowing 
(Tbv yVO¢OV Trjs ayvwoias) 
wherein he renounces all the apprehensions of his understanding 
(a7OPOE i 7raßas TLS yvwc1T 1 Käs ävr t Ariipc i s) and is ... united by 
his highest faculty (Kara To KpEITTOV EvouucVOS) to Him that is 
wholly Unknowable (Tw undev ylv KELV), of whom thus by a 
rejection of all knowledge (Tij iravtcAws Sý & vuc[ )_he possesses 
a knowledge that exceeds his understanding ()wEp 
vovv ylvwaKwv). 82 
The conjunction of darkness and unknowing was, of course, traditional, 
and derives from the Exodus account of Foses' experience on Mount 
Sinai. Its precise significance in the Dionysian Corpus, however, 
has provoked considerable critical discussion, whose focus has been 
the extent to which "darkness" may be supposed to signify a personal 
experience of mystical union - as the term undoubtedly does, for 
example, in the works of the ! 'ixteenth century exponent of the negative 
tradition, St. John of the Cross. H. -C Puech's article, "La t6nbbre 
mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys 1'Areopagite et dans la tradition 
patristique" is devoted to an exploration of this issue. Opposing 
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viewpoints have been taken by Lebreton83 - who insists that Ps. - 
Dionysius is fundamentally a neoplatonist and that the notion 6f 
darkness, in common with the other negative aspects of Dionysian 
theology, can thus have nothing other than a purely intellectual 
basis in the proposition of divine transcendence - and V6lker84 
who is inclined to see a more inward experience of mystic union as 
underlying Ps. -Dionysius' usage of the concept of dark contemplation 
in the first three chapters of the Be Mystica Theologia. 
Darkness is, in fact, connected with two distinct phases of the 
mystic way in the Dionysian Corpus. It is most often associated with 
the highest level of mystical awareness, but it can also denote -- 
again traditionally - the condition of the unregenerate soul which 
has not been initiated into the mysteries of religion. Thus, Ps. - 
Dionysius writes in the fourth chapter of the De Divinis Nominibus: 
The Good God is called Spiritual Light (4Zs, äaaä vonTÖv 
because He fills every heavenly mind with spiritual light 
TraVTa äyyEalKÖV VOüV 4WTiýEiv), and drives all ignorance 
and error (&yvotav) from all souls where they have gained 
a lodgment, and giveth them all a share of holy light 
(ýWTICElV Tb 4W"s) and purges their spiritual eyes from the 
mist of ignorance which surrounds them, and stirs and opens 
the eyes which are fast shut and weighed. down with darkness 
(TOV ýUXWV lrpdTEpOV änrEXaOVElV TO T11S TrA&VTjS OKOTOS Kai. OUTW 
4)WTICCiV). 85 
Darkness here is contrasted with the more perfect state of illumination. 
The concept and terminology are familiar from Gregory of Nyssa's teach- 
ing on the preliminary stages of contemplation, though the neoplatonic 
connotations are marked, and the image of "darkness" is used to signify 
intellectual error rather than sin. "Darkness", as indicating "absence 
of light", is the logical contrary of the state of awareness which is 
designated "light". 86 
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"Darkness" and "light" are equated, however, as terms signifying 
divine transcendence. Ps. -Dionysius establishes their identity of 
meaning in the fifth of his letters: 
La divine tenebre est 1'inaccessible lumiere oü Dieu 
est dit habiter. 
Elle est invisible a cause de sa clarte transcendante, 
et eile est inaccessible ä cause de 1'eminence de sa 
suressentielle effusion de lumiere. 
(0 eclos yVd OS.: EGTl TO änpda1TOV ýwS )CV W KaTO1KE1V Ö 
6sös acyETal 
Kai aOPaTW ycOVT1 Sia TI1V vlTspexOUGav 
avoTnTä Kai ä7TpOcn Tw Tw aUTU) Siä Tnv 
vicpßoaiv iris 1Trepoväioü 4wTOXucias). 87 
Vanneste notes that the term yvö4os("darkness") occurs only seven times 
in the Dionysian Corpus, and he records only a single instance of it 
in the Be Divinis Nominibus (VII, 2). 88 Here, as in Letter V, it is 
associated with the negative vocabulary which denotes the inapplicab- 
ility of finite concepts to God, and thus with the 
ürcp- terminology 
which makes explicit the connotations of excess rather than deficiency 
which underlie the negative mode - Tä KaTä OTEpnßly Xc IJEVa; E7 
i AEOÜ, 
Kai Ta evavtia UTIEPOX1KÜS voo6vTai"89 Vanneste puts the point well: 
I1 ne s'agit donc pas uniquement de deux realites 
contrastantes: le lumineux et l'obscure. Chacune des deux 
realites revetira, ä son tour, une signification 'eminente' 
pour exprimer la realite qui depasse tout 1'emane: le Trans- 
cendant sera designe par l'obscur, en tant que negation divine 
et par le lumineux, en tant que designe par un mot compose aver 
ÜTIEP. Des lors, outre le sens habituel d'un attribut positif - 
au niveau de la yvmots et de l'oucia - la lumiere et 1'obscurite 
acquierent un sens eminent pour exprimer une meme realite trans- 
cendante. Ainsi, 1'Obscur transcendant et le Lumineux eminent 
coincideront. 90 
The Dionysian Corpus thus affirms the imputation of "darkness" 
to God. "Darkness" is also, however, by inference, a metaphor for the 
condition of unknowing which is the culmination of the mystic way and 
the soul's initiation into unitive awareness. The use of yv6 os in 
log 
this context derives from the reference in Exodus 20.21, and Ps. - 
Dionysius recapitulates the narrative of Poses' experience on Sinai 
and the traditional exegesis of the episode in relation to the mystic 
way at the end of the first chapter of the De Mystica Theologia. 91 
God is encountered mystically, he writes, by those who 
... leave behind them 
(äroaiunrävovai) all divine enlightenments 
(8cia 4Ta) and voices (r''Xovs) and heavenly utterances (Xoyovs 
oüpavious) and plunge into the Darkness (CIS Töv yvoýov 
ClaSuouevols) where truly dwells (oü OVTOS eoTlV), as saith the 
Scripture (ws. T& aöyiä nnoiv), that One Which is beyond all 
things (o ffavTmv eTreKetva). For not without reason is the 
blessed Moses bidden first to undergo purification himself 
(&TroKaOapOnvai) and then to separate himself from those who 
have not undergone it; and after all purification (ä1roKäOapoty) 
hears the many-voiced trumpets and sees many lights flash forth 
with pure and diverse-streaming rays, and then stands separate 
from the multitudes and with the chosen priests presses forward 
to the topmost pinnacle of the Divine Ascent. Nevertheless he 
meets not with God Himself (oü (JUyylvcTat Tw 6ew), 
ýyet 
he beholds 
(Ocwpci) - not Him indeed (for He is invisible) (obK a'TOv 
(0c 0eaTos ydp)) - but the place wherein He dwells 
(Tov 
TOTrov ob 
ecTi) 
... His incomprehensible presence 
(11 uffep 
7räaav 
eirivoiav 
aüTOÜ TrapovQia)... plunges the true initiate into the Darkness 
of Unknowing (eis thy yvc ov Tns äyvwa{as eio6üVC1 Thy OVTws 
pIUQTlKÖV). wherein he renounces all the apprehensions of his 
understanding (äTrouvci 7rä(Jas T? s yvw6TtKäs &VTiXrjftis) and is 
enwrapped in that which is wholly intangible and invisible 
(Ev TW ffapfav &Va4ei Kai 
äopäTU) 
yiyVETal 
L 
). /2 
It has already been noted, 
93 however, that the biblical narrative does 
not dominate Ps. -Dionysius' account of the mystic way either conceptu- 
ally or linguistically, and the contrast in this respect with Gregory 
of Nyssa's mystical treatise, the Life of Moses, is stark. It rather 
serves Ps. -Dionysius' purpose, as a scheme for denoting the abandonment 
of sensual and intellectual knowledge, the process of aDhairesis, which 
is the basis of his mystical theology. Thus, in the first paragraph 
of the De Mystica Theologia, the biblical concept of entry into the 
darkness which surrounds the divine (yvc ov) is associated with the 
notion of initiation into ultimate silence (atyns) which Ps. -Dionysius 
derived from the mystery religions94 - both terminologies have equal 
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status as a means of formulating the conditions of union with the 
transcendent. Ps. -Dionysius' treatment of the Exodus narrative is 
also highly selective. The relevant events occupy chapters 19-24 of 
the O. T. book; the Be I4ystica Theologia, however, includes only such 
details as give substance to the mystical theory which it expounds. 
Ps. -Dionysius' interpretation of the episode also deviates from the 
traditional exegesis in certain essential respects. Traditionally, 
the account of Hoses' preparations for sight of God was held to 
signify the purgative phase of the contemplative way: Ps. -Dionysius, 
however, deflects attention from its moral or ascetic aspects, and 
elicits a meaning from the text which confirms his theory of aphairesis 
and is consistent with the emphasis of the Corpus as a whole on the 
rejection of finite modes of knowledge as a way to awareness of the 
transcendent. The text of Exod. 20.21 itself, as Vanneste has indicated, 
is cited with two significant variations: the normal reading is 
öMcßvßns Se CifXOev eis Tvy4 ov oü nv 0 BEos - Ps. -Dionysius, 
however, substitutes ö 7Tc VTU V 6reKeiva( "that One Which is beyond all 
things") for the simple title "God" (ö Oros) of the original version, 
and the mystery term c'tci c60ai (lit. "to penetrate") for the non- 
committal verb eiariXOcv (lit. "he entered"). 
95 The first modification 
reasserts the centrality of the principle of divine transcendence and 
makes explicit the connexion between this proposition and the biblical 
concept of yvS4os; the second affirms that the same circumstance 
equates mystery symbolism with biblical models as exemplifying the 
pattern and establishing the vocabulary of the mystic way. - 
"Darkness" in the Dionysian Corpus, therefore, signifies both the 
notion of divine transcendence and, as an extension of this, the cond- 
ition of unknowing with regard to finite concepts which enables the 
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soul to apprehend God unitively. It denotes both the location and 
the manner of mystical awareness. Thus, whatever may be inferred 
concerning Ps. -Dionysius' own mystical experience, it is clear that 
the term "darkness" is used in his writings without intent to convey 
anything of the actuality of mystical experience. H. -C Puech has 
already noted that Ps. -Dionysius only refers to Yvö¢os in the context 
of the Moses narrative: he comments, 
... Denys paralt au fond indifferent ä une traduction, ou a une transcription, de l'experience mystique sur le registre 
de la luminosite ou sur celuý de 1'obscurite. L'equation qui 
ouvre la Lettre V: 'la Nuee9 divine est la Lumiere inaccessible 
0u Dieu est dit habiter', semble decisive. Pais il ya mieux: 
la description de Th. Myst. I, 3, oü intervient la Nuee, a un 
parallele dans un d'eveloppement de D. N., VII, 3,872B. Mais 
ici plus d'image obscure. Toute se passe dans la seule lumiere: In 
'Et il y a, ä 1'inverse (par opposition a la demarche cataphatique)la 
inconnaissance tres divine de Dieu, celle qui se fait par uncon- 
naissance (di äyvwcrias), selon l'union superieure ä 1'intelligence, 
lorsque l'intelligence, s'etant eloignee de tous lea etres, ensuite 
s'etant egalement detachee de soi, est unie aux rayons supra- 
lumineux (Tals ülrep¢aEaty &Krlalv), de lä et lä illuminee d'en 
haut dans 1'insondable abime de la Sagesse'. I1 resulte au moins 
de cette confrontation que 1'obscurite nest pas un element con- 
stitutif de l'ascension mystique. Si la Tenebre s'etait vraiment 
imposee ä Denys dans l'experience meme de l'union, il n'aurait 
pas manque d'en faire partout et toujours la condition permanente, 
l'etape necessaire du processus qu'il analyse ici et lä. Si la 
Nuee est ici absente et lä presente, 1'origine en doit titre 
cherchee ailleurs que dens une experience. 97 
The term "darkness" is, indeed, part of the biblical vocabulary which 
Ps. -Dionysius employed to express his mystical theology: he observes 
its technical status and establishes its logical accountability within 
its biblical framework. It is not, as Puech maintains, fundamental to 
his theology. Logically, it is the equivalent of transcendent light, 
and outside the context of the Moses narrative, Ps. -Dionysius habitually 
describes union with God as an encounter with the "light" - emphasizing 
the transcendent character of this light by the use of negative epithets. 
Thus he writes in Ch. V of the De Divinis Nominibus: 
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... the soul, becoming Godlike 
(oeoeidns), meets in the blind 
embraces of an incomprehensible union (di'EVwocros &yvworai) 
the Rays of the unapproachable light (t äTröolTOV ýýs). 
9 
Both concepts are interlinked in the powerful invocation which opens 
the De P-Iystica Theologia: 
Guide us to the topmost height of mystic lore which 
exceedeth light and more than exceedeth knowledge (i6Uvov gpas 
6A Tnv Tdv pUGT. KZV Xoy wv 
üTVEpäYvm6TOV Kai bUEp4an Kai 
aKpOTaTnv KOpUýnV), where the simple, absolute and unchangeable 
mysteries of heavenly truth (a)TpCnTa Tns OEOaoyias uu6Trpta) 
lie hidden in the dazzling obscurity of the secret Silence 
(KaT. TOV 
61TEpýWTOV kyKEKäXUTrTal 
TnS KpUýLOPUUTOU Uiy s YVOýov 
)' 
outshining all brilliance (TO 
lTEp4aVEGTaTOV ü1rEpatPTr9VTa) with 
the intensity of their darkness (ev TZ UKOTEIVOTaTW)o9 
The paradoxical mode of this paragraph is the linguistic counterpart 
of the proposition that the divine exceeds natural processes of cog- 
nition and their associated terminology. It reaffirms that "light" 
and "darkness" exist as contraries only on a conceptual level and the 
opposition ceases to have meaning where the reality they designate is 
held to transcend differentiation. By his use of paradox, Ps. -Dionysius 
attempts to frustrate the dualism which language entails, yet which is 
fundamentally at odds with the notion of a transcendent God and with 
the theory of mystic union. 
The paradox of "luminous darkness", moreover, also affirms Ps. - 
Dionysius' contention that the unitive experience is essentially 
cognitive. Its effect depends partly on the inherent potency of the 
terms - their evocation of a positive if unimaginable condition as 
the goal of the process of aphairesis - and partly on the traditional 
associations of the symbol of "light" with the state of intellectual 
and spiritual enlightenment. Flore importantly, however, the simultan- 
eously negative and affirmative implications of the paradox - the 
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hypothesis that "transcendent. light" is effectively "not-light" and 
hence equivalent to "darkness" - are formally related to Ps. -Dionysius' 
theory that mystic awareness of God is "knowledge" or "vision" in a 
transcendent sense - that is, "not-knowledge! " and "not-vision" in the 
normal sense of the terms. The two passages which best illustrate 
the point have been alluded to in whole or in part before, but merit 
reproducing in full to substantiate the present argument. The first 
is the opening of Ch. II of the De Mystica Theologia: 
Unto this Darkness which is beyond Light (TÖv 
ü1epýWTOV... 
Yv4ov) we pray that we may come, and may attain unto vision 
(icEiv) through the loss of sight and knowledge (Si' ä6Acn'as 
Kai &yvwßias), and-that in ceasing thus to see or to know (Tö 
Un iSsiv pn ivtvat) we may learn to know (yvMvai) that which 
is beyond all perception and understanding (TO veep Aeav KCl 
Yvm"oly) (for this emptying of our faculties is true sight and 
100 knowledge) (TOUTO yap EQTi TÖ OVTWS iSEiV Kai YVwvat). 
. art Tö 
älröotTOV 4ms. ) oü Dieu est dit habiter. 
Elle est invisible (äopdm) ä cause de sa clarte 
transcendante (Ti V üTrepeXovoav 4avOTrnTa) , 
et eile est inaccessible (äirpo(IiTw) ä cause de 
1'eminence de sa suressentielle ef'usion de lumiere 
(TT1S U7repoUQiov 4WTOXUOias). 
Tous ceux-lä y penetrent (ev TOUTw yivcTal) qui meritent 
de connaitre (-yvwvai) et de voir (' c) Dieu; 
et precisement, par le fait du non-voir (aüTw Tý 
un bpav) et du non-connaitre (ands yivuaKElvY, ils 
arrivent vraiment dans ce qui est au-del, de toute 
vue et connaissance(CV T% UIrep OpaCiv Kai 
yvwaty yiyvouevos). 10 
The second passage is the first section of Letter V, To Dorothy: 
La divine tenebre est 1'inaccessible lumiere (o Aeios yvoýos 
kart TO älydcn TOV 4ms .) oü Dieu est dit habiter. Elle est invisible (äopdm) ä cause de sa clarte 
transcendante (Týv üTTEpEXovoav 4avOTT]Ta) 
, 
et eile est inaccessible (äirpoßiTw) ä cause de 
1'eminence de sa suressentielle ef'usion de lumiere 
(TTjs UirepOUQioU 4UJTOXUQias). 
Tous ceux-lä y penetrent (ev TOUTU yivcTat) qui meritent 
de connaitre (yvwvai) et de voir (ideiv) Dieu; 
et precisement, par le fait du non-voir (aüTw Tý 
im bpav) et du non-connaitre (ands yuu aKElvY, ils 
arrivent vraiment daps ce qui est au-del, de toute 
vue et connaissance(CV T% UIrep OpaCiv Kai 
yvwaty yiyvOuevos). 10 
The logical symmetry of the passages is precise. Both insist on the 
cognitive nature of mystic union, yet dissociate perception of this 
order from natural processes of cognition and maintain its resistance> 
to expression in conceptual language. Ps. -Dionysius, it has been 
noted, holds that the soul's ultimate union with God is achieved through 
ecstasy, and the paradoxical mode reflects the non-rationality of the 
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ecstatic state. He seems to suggest further, however, that the soul's 
final union with God is effected through a special faculty - the 
attainment of knowledge through unknowing, that is, is defined as 
knowledge "according to the soul's highest faculty" (Kara TO KpCITTOV). 
Ps. -Dionysius's use of this phrase in two key passages which describe 
unitive knowledge suggests that he regarded it as a technical expression 
denoting a specifically mystical faculty of the human soul: it occurs 
in the first chapter of the De Mystica Theologia, where Ps. -Dionysius 
refers to the soul as being "united by his highest faculty (KaTa' Tö 
Kpc TTOV) to Him that is wholly"Unknowable", 102 and again in Letter I, 
To Gaius, which ends, 
Et 1'inconnaissance totale (7TavTEans äyvWOtä) selon un 
mode meilleur (KaTä TO KPElTTOV ), est une connaissance 
(yvwais) de Celui. qui est au-delä de tout ce qui est connu 
(TOO OITE nC'L? VTa Tä ylVWcyKOU£Va). 1O3 
Ps. -Dionysius does not, however, seem to develop the point beyond 
statements of this kind, but they seem to confirm that he envisaged 
mystical knowledge as remaining essentially intellectual, though at a 
level transcending finite modes of intellection, and the mystical 
faculty as a transcendent form of intellect. 
IV. Conclusion 
It has been suggested that Ps. -Dionysius drew on the vocabulary 
and system of linguistic formulae which Gregory of Nyssa had already 
harnessed to contemplative theology as a means of formulating his own 
mystical theory. Clearly, however, he developed them independently, 
subjecting them to logical analysis and classifying them, according 
to their biblical origin, as one of the possible coherent terminologies 
appropriate to the expression of mystical theology. His treatment of 
the concept of "luminous darkness" provides an interesting example of 
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his method. The paradox of uffep(kaTov... yvo4ov ("Darkness which 
is beyond Light") recalls the concept of Xauirpös yvc os ("luminous 
darkness") in Gregory of Nyssa: the two phrases derive from the same 
biblical allusion and correspond grammatically. Ps. -Dionysius, 
however, does not use the expression except with specific reference 
to the Exodus narrative, nor does he follow Gregory's example of 
constructing comparable phrases on the same oxymoronic model ("sober 
inebriation", "wakeful sleep", for example) to denote other aspects 
of the mystical state. He substitutes 
ü1repýWTov, 
moreover, for 
Gregory's adjective Xaunrpös: he is not satisfied, that is, with the 
simple oxymoron as a means of embodying the notion of divine transc- 
endence. Thus he qualifies it by the further paradox implicit in the 
prefix nrep-, insisting that God is not light in any conceptual sense, 
and hence in one sense not light at all. Paradox qualifies paradox, 
and the language imitates the divine itself in receding before human 
efforts to comprehend and articulate its nature. The closest approx- 
imation to the divine is thus silence, as Ps. -Dionysius maintains in 
the third chapter of the De Mystica Theologia: 
... plunging into the Darkness 
(ei(jSüvovres yvc ov) which is 
above the intellect we shall find ourselves reduced not merely 
to brevity of speech (ob ßpaxuaoyiav) but to absolute dumbness 
both of speech (iXoyi(yv 1ravTeX? ) and thought (('xvonoiav). 104 
Ps. -Dionysius insists on the abandonment of discursive modes, which 
are inherently divisive and involve the contemplative in the process 
of time, since God is held to transcend all distinction, space and 
time, and the soul's approach to union with God is a reversion to 
singleness. 
It is perhaps fairest, however, to conclude this study of the 
language of the Dionysian Corpus by emphasizing the adroitness with 
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which the author manipulates his medium in order to achieve an 
accurate verbal representation of his analysis of the rationale of 
mystical theology. Fairest, because such an assessment seems to take 
account of both the virtues and the deficiencies of his method. It 
is true that Ps. -Dionysius rarely evinces the same fine responsiveness 
to the evocative power of words which distinguishes Gregory of Nyssa's 
work. Neither does his vocabulary on the whole have the concreteness 
and immediacy of Gregory's terminology - partly because the method and 
purpose of the Dionysian Corpus are essentially dialectic, and partly 
because the texts are not exegetical. They lack the scope and density 
which the wealth of biblical allusion impresses on Gregory's work. 
Further, they lack the peculiarly powerful personal appeal which 
Gregory achieves for his treatises through his association of the 
soul's contemplative experience with its sacramental life within the 
church. The way of aphairesis, in the Dionysian Corpus, is not 
tempered by a theology which in some sense engages the emotional and 
sensual life of the initiate. In comparison with Gregory's mystical 
vocabulary, therefore, Ps. -Dionysius' language is limited and austere. 
On the other hand, however, the very concentration of Dionysian language 
sharpens its clarity and precision. Its logical accountability, its 
well-defined function and the exactitude with which its ideological 
frame of reference is described are better calculated to control the 
reader's response and ensure proper interpretation than Gregory's 
loosely evocative style. 
It may be that something of the richness and vitality of Gregory's 
writing was lost in Ps. -Dionysius' assimilation of some of the principles 
of his mystical theology. Ps. -Dionysius, however, consolidated and 
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systematized mystical theory and language, and ensured, both through 
his assumed apostolic status and his authoritative prose style, that 
negative mystical theology was absorbed into Western Christianity 
during the following centuries. 
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CHAPTER III 
LATIN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE DE P"TYSTICA THEOLOGIA: a study of 
the translation of Dionysian mystical vocabulary and of developments 
in the interpretation of Dionysian theology which influenced the 
English version, the'Deonise Hid Diuinite. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the works of Ps. -Dionysius 
were accessible to scholars in the West at a comparatively early date, 
albeit only in their original Greek form. Apart from appeals to the 
authority of the Dionysian tracts at the Council of Constantinople in 
533 and later at the Lateran Council of 649, their author was known to St. 
Gregory as "antiquus et venerabilis pater", 
1 despite the fact that 
Gregory, like most theologians of his era, was himself unfamiliar with 
the Greek language and is thus unlikely to have known the texts at 
first hand. It also seems that a manuscript of the Dionysian Corpus 
was sent from Rome to Paris in about 758, as a gift from Pope Paul I 
to Pepin le Bref, though nothing more than an epistolary record of 
this event remains. 
2 The history of the systematic absorption of 
Dionysian theology into Western thought effectively dates from the 
ninth century and the presentation of a manuscript of the treatises 
to Louis le Debonnaire by Michel le Begue, Emperor of Constantinople, 
in 827. Surviving documents provide very precise information concerning 
the acquisition and subsequent fate of this manuscript, still extant 
and identified by P. G. Thery, O. P., as M. S. Paris B. N. gr. 437. It was 
received at Compiegne in September 827 and deposited at the Abbey of 
Saint-Denis, Paris, on the 8th of the following October, where it was 
translated for the first time into Latin by the Abbot Hilduin on the 
instructions of Charles le Chauve. Abbot Hilduin's was thus the fore- 
runner of the series of Latin versions of the Corpus which, during the 
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succeeding centuries, in conjunction with multiple glosses and 
commentaries on the texts, endeavoured to clarify Dionysian theology 
and disseminate it among as a wide an audience of European scholars 
as possible. 3 
The work of P. Thery and, more recently, of H. F. Dondaine has 
done much to elucidate the extremely complex situation regarding the 
numerous manuscripts of the Latin Corpus as well as to estimate the 
nature and extent of the individual achievements of the authors of 
the various versions. The scope of the present thesis, however, cannot 
accommodate any significant incursion into this vast and highly special- 
ized field of research. It has seemed expedient to consider the tran- 
sition of Dionysian mystical language from Greek to Latin in detail in 
respect only of the vocabulary of the De NNystica Theologia, both because 
this text is the primary source of the thought and expression charact- 
eristicof negative theology for the author of the Cloud of Unknowing 
in common with other writers in the Dionysian mystical tradition, and, 
perhaps more importantly, because it constitutes a direct link with the 
English author: it is generally accepted that he translated the text 
into the vernacular in order, as he claims in his brief prologue, to 
corroborate the doctrines which he puts forward in the Cloud itself. 
4 
Further, the most pragmatic and economic method of documenting this 
linguistic transition has been to treat it retrospectively in relation 
to the terminology of the English text, accepting the obvious limit- 
ations of a procedure which can take satisfactory account of only the 
immediate Latin sources of the Deonise Hid Diuinite - the Sarracenus 
and Gallus versions of the text, that is - and inevitably fails to 
devote sufficient attention to the handling of the Greek vocabulary 
in the earlier Latin versions of the De MMlystica Theologia. 
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This narrowly linguistic discussion of the De Mystica Theologia 
must, however, be prefaced by a summary description of the various 
Latin translations of the Dionysian Corpus which date from the medieval 
period: namely, the ninth century versions of Hilduin and Scot Erigena, 
and those compiled by Sarracenus, Thomas Gallus and Robert Grosseteste 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 5 That no fewer than five 
distinct renderings of these treatises should have been produced in 
Europe between the ninth and thirteenth centuries testifies to the 
high regard in which they were held, in particular among continental 
scholars. It seems to indicate, moreover, that the apparently consid- 
erable scholarly demand for intelligible working texts of Ps. -Dionysius 
was not adequately met by the pioneering versions of the first trans- 
lators and continued to stimulate new efforts to refine the existing 
Latin Corpus. 
I. Latin versions of the De Mystica Theologia compiled 
between the ninth and thirteenth centuries 
The state of Greek scholarship over the period in question 
inevitably has some bearing on this last assumption concerning the 
persistent need for Latin versions of the texts. It is difficult to 
assess with any certainty the situation obtaining in the ninth century 
when the manuscript gift of Michel le Segue was received in the West, 
though many of the deficiencies of the Hilduin version and the large 
component of transliterated Greek words in its vocabulary may be 
attributed to the translator's limited knowledge of the Greek language 
and the evident tentativeness with which he handles the medium. 
6 The 
text of Erigena's translation contains a similarly high proportion of 
Greek terminology-among the Greek words preserved in the De Mystica 
Theologia alone are such key terms . as "theosophiae", "kataphaskein", 
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"apophaskein", "gnostica" and "organum" - and P. Thery entertains 
the possibility that its author, like Hilduin, was only imperfectly 
conversant with Greek. 
7 His suggestion seems to find support in 
Cappuyns' pessimistic assessment of the condition of Greek scholarship 
in the ninth century and his proposal that, at least prior to 851, 
Erigena was unexceptional in possessing nothing more than a rudimentary 
working knowledge of the language 
8 His rise to preeminence as a Greek 
scholar, according to Cappuyns, coincided with his undertaking to 
translate the Dionysian Corpus at the request of Charles le Chauve, 
and his mastery of Greek increased only as the project advanced. It 
is certain, however, that Erigena became one of the foremost Greek 
scholars of his age, and this circumstance lends force to other evidence 
which implies a need to look further than the question of his proficiency 
in the Greek language to account completely for the hellenic bias of 
Erigena's translation. 
The Erigena Translation (Vetus translatio or Versio Dionysii) 
Both Cappuyns and Thery admit contemporary scholarly taste for 
insinuating Greek phrases into Latin compositions, as a means of parading 
erudition, as a significant factor in determining Erigena's practice in 
his Dionysian translations. 9 Rather more to Erigena's credit, however, 
was his sensitivity to the inherent difficulties of the Dionysian 
treatises and his recognition of their distance, ideologically and 
spiritually as well as linguistically, from his own age. He describes 
the Corpus in these terms: 
Opus valde, ut opinamur, anfractuosum, longeque a modernis 
sensibus remotum, multis invium, paucis apertam, non propter 
antiquitatem, verum etiam caelestium altitudinem mysteriorum. 
10 
It seems to have been these considerations which above all dictated 
his method as a translator: he opted for close adherence to the text 
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of his original, transposing not only the vocabulary but also the 
syntax of the Greek into his own version, aiming in this way to rep- 
roduce the text as faithfully as possible as a means of minimizing 
the dangers, inevitably attendant on the process of translation, of 
distorting the original meaning and thus compounding the already 
formidable obscurities of the Greek Corpus. He is, he goes on to 
insist in his preface, a translator and not a commentator, and he is 
eager to defend the scrupulous precision with which he has accomplished 
his undertaking against potential critics of his text: 
Sin vero obscuram minusque apertam praedictae interpretationis 
senem iudicaverit, videat me interpretem huius operis esse, non 
expositorem. Ubi valde pertimesco ne forte culpam infidi inter- 
pretis incurram. At si auf superflua quaedam superadiecta esse, 
auf de integritate graecae constructionis quaedam deesse arbitratus 
fuerit, recurrat ad codicem graecum, ende ego interpretatus sum; 
ibi fortassis inveniet itane est necne. 11 
Interestingly, his method is in some respects comparable with that of 
Robert Grosseteste, who, some four centuries later and with the benefit 
of the translations of his predecessors Erigena and Sarracenus as well 
as additional manuscripts of the Greek Corpus, endeavoured to achieve 
the same literal accuracy in his rendering of the texts. 
12 
The advantages of this procedure need not be dwelt on, but it also 
entails problems which neither translator was completely successful in 
resolving. The literalness of the translation, for example, in both 
instances involved the imposition of an alien idiom on the Latin language, 
which impeded the fluency of the Latin versions and tended to mask the 
sense of the texts. Thery comments on this aspect of Brigena's work, 
Scot... a fait effort pour traduire le vocabulaire dionysien, 
l'ossature de la pensee, si on peut s'exprimer ainsi; mais les 
articulations, 1'element vital que la. syntaxe communique ä cette 
pensee, ont ete sacrifiees. Scot n'etait sans doute pas suffisam- 
ment helleniste pour reussir cette operation difficile: transposer 
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en une autre langue la vie d'une langue originale. 
13 
I"breover, it is undoubtedly the case, as Thery implies here, that 
the limitations of Erigena's ability to execute his project all too 
frequently exacerbated the drawbacks of his method of translation 
itself and thwarted his purpose of clarifying the obscurities of the 
Corpus. Thdry notes unintelligible passages of the Versio Dionysii 
which are attributable to Erigena's imperfect grasp of Greek syntax - 
his tendency to confuse grammatical parts, his uncertain handling of 
prepositions and recurrent failure to distinguish verbs from sub- 
stantives. Indeed, in evaluating Erigena's achievement in the Versio 
Dionysii, it is necessary to recognize not only its magnitude and 
positive value, but also its serious shortcomings. Cappuyns takes 
account of both considerations: 
Ä considerer daps son ensemble l'oeuvre d'Erigene traducteur, 
on ne manque pas d'etre frappe par une reelle richesse, une 
reelle fermete du vocabulaire, voire de la terminologie phil- 
osophique, laquelle contribua grandement d'ailleurs a constituer 
le langage technique des penseurs medievaux. 14 Si cependant 
nous regardons de plus pres, bien des lacunes et des imperfections: 
il ya trop de mots mal coupes... trop de confusions entre termes 
graphiquement ou phonetiquement voisins... trop d'interpretations 
fautives ou approximatives surtout ... il ya aussi trop de 
fluctuation et de variete daps les traductions successives d'un 
me me terme ... et trop de mots grecques conserves tels quels dans 
le texte latin (une cinquantaine pour le seul Denys). 15 
With specific regard to the hellenic bias of Erigena's translation, 
Thery contributes a further general observation concerning both the 
extent and the nature of his achievement: 
Tres obscure dans une multitude de details, par suite dune 
mauvaise lecture du manuscrit original, et dune connaissance 
imparfaite de la langue grecque, la version de Scot a par contre 
le merite de mettre en relief les grandeslignes de la doctrine 
dionysienne... 
The claim is an important one. The justification for it is considered 
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more fully by Rene Roques in his article "Traduction ou interpretation? 
Breves remarques sur Jean Scot traducteur de Denys". 16 Roques demon- 
strates the extent to which Erigena - despite the firm assertions of 
his preface - inevitably interprets as well as translates the Greek 
Corpus, since he is himself a philosopher and theologianand anxious, 
moreover, to prove a large measure of agreement between the quasi- 
apostolic author and his own theories. He stresses Erigena's concern 
to accentuate the broad outlines of Dionysian theology and, like Thery, 
records his notable success in this undertaking. 
... Jean Scot, qui disposait de la traduction d'Hilduin, et qui, 
grammaticalement et philologiquement parlant, est parfois moins 
heureux que lui, marque n&moins un progres tres sensible dann 
1'intelligence des grands themes et des grandes notions dionysi- 
ennes qu'il n'aborde plus seulement en grammairien, mais en 
theologien-philosophe soucieux de coherence doctrinale. 17 
In particular, he singles out Erigena's achievement in explicating 
the central Dionysian concept of the negative and affirmative ways 
which had clearly eluded Hilduin's grasp: 
Hilduin n'a pas reconnu l'opposition apophase - cataphase, 
et, en consequence, il ne semble pas avoir correctement compris 
Popposition dionysienne entre theologie negative et theologie 
affirmative. Si, en effet, Kcztc axis et KaTa4äGKw sont justement 
traduits par 'professio', 'affirmatio', 'affirmare', 'predicare', 
en revanche äTö4aais et äTro4äßKw sont habituellement rendus par 
'sentencia' et 'dicere', deux termes qui n'impliquent pas, de soi, 
l'idee essentielle de. negativite inheerente aux deux termes grecs. 
Or ici, les. traductions de Jean Scot sont irreprochables: 
KaTä#aats et KaTawäaKw sont traduits par 'affirmatio', 'intentio', 
'affirmare', et &76 ants et &Toýä6Kw par 'negatio', 'depulsio', 
'negare', 'depellere'. lS 
The caveat that Erigena perhaps exaggerated Ps. -Dionysius' distinctions 
to reinforce his own philosophical position does not detract from his 
contribution to the transmission of Dionysian theology and the develop- 
ment of a Latin vocabulary answerable to its large demands. 
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Thery's assessment of Erigena's overall achievement resumes, 
I1 ya plus: avec la version de Scot, on conserve 1'impression 
qu'on ne trouvera plus dans aucune autre version, d'etre en 
contact avec une pensee exotique. Par son souci de litteralite, 
et aussi par la timidite que lui donne sa connaissance incomplete 
du grecque qui ne lui permet pas de s'ecarter du texte original, 
Scot nous a donne un Denys grec: ce qui constitue souvent une 
garantie de fidelite... Dans l'ensemble des traductions, celle 
de Scot est comme un pont; le Denys quelle presente - tout en 
devenant accessible dans l'ensemble au x penseurs occidentaux - 
a conserve tout ce qu'il lui etait possible de sa saveur orientale. 
19 
This estimate of Erigena's Versio Dionysii places it historically 
in relation to the other medieval translations of the Greek Corpus; it 
also, however, aptly summarizes the principal grounds for dissatisfaction 
with the text in the twelfth century. Undoubtedly, Erigena's preser- 
vation of the vocabulary and idiom of the Greek original was a major 
stumbling block to scholars in a period when, it seems generally agreed, 
Greek studies were in decline outside Italy and Sicily, rendering 
Erigena's translation almost as impenetrable to scholars as the Greek 
Corpus itself. The poor condition of Greek scholarship, which Thery 
traces to a variety of economic, geographical and political causes, 
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was apparently instrumental in preparing the way for a new version of 
the Corpus in two important respects. Firstly, as has been suggested, 
it disqualified Erigena's text from fulfilling the manifest need among 
theologians and philosophers unfamilar with Greek for an intelligible 
Latin version of the Dionysian treatises; and secondly, the widespread 
ignorance of Greek set severe limits to the scope of scholarship - curbs 
which impelled scholars to look increasingly to the hellenic world as 
a potential source of fresh ideas and, in particular, drew attention 
to the known but barely accessible and still wholly untapped resources 
of the Dionysian Corpus. 21 
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The Sarracenus Translation (Nova translatio) 
The immediate background to the Sarracenus version of the Greek 
Corpus (completed c1167) can be determined yet more precisely. The 
prologue to his commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy (probably dating 
from c1140) is, in the first instance, extremely revealing and merits 
quoting at length: 
Inter Scriptores ecclesiasticos primum locum post apostolos 
ariopagita dyonisius sicu± tempore ita, eciam theologice sapiencie 
doctrina et auctoritate possidere creditur quippe quiet ab eisdem 
apostolis eorumque auditoribus uberius edoctus, valde ultra ceteros 
de supercelestibus est locutus, cuius scripta vel litteratura 
sentenciarum pondere usque adeo sunt gravia ut pre nimia diffic- 
ultate intelligendi vix legantur ab aliquo. Quibus et interpres 
minus quam oportuisset, ut arbitror, eruditus; non parum obscurit- 
atis superaddidit. In quorum explanacione librorum doctiores 
audire tacendo pocius vellem si fieri posset. Sed quia nec 
expositor nec didascalus apud nos reperitur qui hos edisserat 
et fructuousissima eorum scientia velut absconditum parum auf 
nichil utilitatis humanis usibus afferre videtur; interim de 
primo qui de angelica inscribitur Ierarchia quod Dominus dederit, 
nunc brevius nunc aliquantulum prolixius et aliquotiens quasi 
excedendo qualicumque sermone loquamur, ut si quis erudicior 
inde tractare voluerit, reseratam aliquatenus teneat viam. Sed 
ne aliter quam nostri maiores incipiamus sapere, ex dictis 
sanctorum inserere decrevimus et cetera prout senserimus Deo 
auctore proferre de nostro... 22 
It is interesting to note here Sarracenus' endorsement of the traditional 
ascription of the Greek Corpus to the convert of St. Paul, established 
by the ninth century Vita Dionysii of Abbot Hilduin. More important in 
the present context, however, is his echoing of Erigena's complaints 
about the intrinsic difficulties of the Dionysian treatises - with the 
addition of his own opinion that the earlier translator did more to 
augment than to resolve them. The consequence, as Sarracenus sees it, 
is that texts of immeasurable value to contemporary scholarship are 
unavoidably neglected, because there is neither "expositer nec didascalus" 
who is able to expound them on the basis of the unintelligible Versio 
Dionysii. 23 
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The pressing need in the twelfth century was therefore for a 
comprehensible Latin text of the Dionysian Corpus, and philosophers 
and theologians turned predictably to Sarracenus as the foremost 
Greek scholar of his day - "comme 
a un linguiste non comme 'a un 
penseur", as Thery puts it. 
24 The immediate stimulus seems, however, 
to have come from the philosopher and personal friend of Sarracenus, 
John of Salisbury. The evidence for this proposition is a letter 
from Sarracenus to John of Salisbury (probably written before 1116), 
which announces the completion of his revision of the Celestial 
Hierarchy and clearly intimates that he had been commissioned to 
provide his correspondent with an intelligible working text of Ps. - 
Dionysius. 25 John of Salisbury, it seems, was typical of scholars 
of his day in possessing only a rudimentary knowledge of Greek, 
certainly inadequate to surmount. the difficulties of E'rigena's Versio 
Dionysii. It is significant that while he apparently owned texts of 
the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and the Celestial Hierarchy, he cites 
Ps. -Dionysius only once in his Metalogicon (Bk. II, ch. XX). 
The project began, Theery suggests, as nothing more than an attempt 
to make the existing Latin Corpus serviceable to scholars, primarily 
by means of an extensive commentary on the text. It soon became 
apparent, however, that this object could only be effectively achieved 
through a complete revision of Erigena's translation. 
The principles on which Sarracenus based his translation differed 
widely from those of Erigena. An extract from his letter to John of 
Salisbury which prefaces the Celestial Hierarchy delineates some of 
the problems he encountered with the texts and indicates some of the 
criteria governing his practice as a translator: 
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Fateor tarnen elegantias me dictorum eruditissimi et disertissimi 
viri, oratione latinae exprimere nequivisse. Nam apud Graecos 
quedam compositiones inveniuntur, quibus eleganter et proprie res 
sipnificantur, apud Latinos autem eaedem res duabus auf pluribus 
dictionibus ineleganter et improprie et quandoque insufficienter 
designantur. Ad commendationem etiam alicujus personae vel alterius 
rei, pulchre, articuli apud eos repetuntur, et per eosdem articulos 
multae orationes sibi invicem perpolite connectuntur. Taceo de 
insigni constructione participiorum et infinitorum articulis 
conjunctorum. Hujusmodi autem elegantiae apud Latinos nequeunt 
inveniri. Contingit etiam quod si dictiones eo ordine quo sunt 
posite transferantur, auf difficulter intelligantur, auf aliam 
sententiam facere videantur. Eapropter, ubi congruum duxi, dictionum 
ordinem conservavi; alicubi vero propter faciliorem intellectum 
ordinen) commutavi; ubi vero Graecis dictionibus aequipollentes 
Latinas non reperi, vel locutionem a Latinorum idiomate discrepare 
comperi; vel Graecas dictiones detorsi, vel de sensu auctoris quoad 
potui et ut potui, Latinas dictionibus designavi. Saepe autem ubi 
duas vel tres dictiones Latinas pro. una Graeca posui, eas quasi unam 
conjunxi: non quod unam dictionem ex his esse vellem, sed ut planior 
intellectus fieret et quantum elegantiae ex inopia Latinae locutionis 
tractatus iste perderet, appareret. 
Sarracenus registers here his sense of the poverty of the Latin language 
by comparison with Greek26 and outlines some of the difficulties involved 
in accommodating syntactical features of one language in the idiom of 
another. He specifies, for example, the problems of rendering Greek 
compound terms and expressions preceded by the article, and he is 
particularly insistent on the impracticability of adhering strictly 
to the word order of the original. In this respect, he differs radic- 
ally from both Hilduin and Erigena, rejecting their cautious literalism 
in favour of a freer and more interpretative method of tranalation. 27 
He is more concerned to transmit the sense of the Dionysian treatises 
intact than to preserve verbal accuracy at the expense of the meaning, 
and is appreciably more flexible in his handling of both the material 
of his original and the languages with which he operates. 
Little has yet been said concerning the manuscript sources of the 
Greek Corpus on which the various Latin versions of the texts were 
based, though clearly their role in determining the content and 
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character of the translations was decisive. The point is particularly 
apposite here, since Sarracenus' use of a base manuscript which was 
representative of a textual tradition different from that from which 
the earlier versions derive is among the key factors distinguishing 
his translation from those of Hilduin and rigena. 
P. Thery's deduction that the first two versions depend on the 
same manuscript - that presented to Louis by Michel le Begue and- 
identified as MS Paris B. N. grec 437 - seems to have won universal 
assent. 
28 It is also certain that the considerable paleographical 
and textual problems which Hilduin and Erigena encountered with this 
manuscript gave rise to many of the obscurities promulgated in their 
own renderings-of the Dionysian treatises. MS 437 is written in 
uncial script, with no separation of words and few accents; 29 and its 
major textual errors which are reproduced in the Hilduin and Erigena 
versions include, for example, confusion of passages as important as 
that in the Celestial Hierarchy Ch. II which deals with the relative 
merits of applying negative and positive language to God. The correct 
reading is only restored by Sarracenus, who is able to verify the text 
of Erigena against his orm. more accurate base manuscript. 30 
In spite of its manifest inadequacies, however, MS 437 exercised 
indirect but nevertheless widespread influence on Dionysian scholarship 
in the Middle Ages. As the basis for Erigena's translation of the 
Greek Corpus, it was the primary source of Dionysian theology for the 
Latin text which effectively held the field alone during three centuries 
and figured largely in the compilation of the Sarracenus version which 
eventually superseded it. It has already been noted that the other 
translation dependent on it, that of Abbot Hilduin, seems not to have 
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circulated outside the Abbey of Saint-Denis, and indeed, the evidence 
suggests that the Greek manuscript was itself confined to the Abbey 
and was never transcribed during the medieval period. Thery, in his 
classification of the early manuscripts of the Greek Corpus, isolates 
MS 437 as the sole example of its type; by contrast, he cites a total 
of thirty seven manuscripts dating from the ninth to the twelfth cen- 
turies which he assigns to the second "Roman" or "anastasien" group 
of manuscripts. 31 
The two categories of manuscript are distinguished principally 
on two grounds: by variant readings32 and by the inclusion of the 
prologue and marginal scholia popularly attributed to Maximus in 
manuscripts belonging to the second group. These scholia are in fact 
the work of two distinct authors - Johannes Scythopolitanus Scholasticus 
(who wrote pre 530) and Maximus the Confessor (1.662), 33 but from an 
early date they were confused under one name of Maximus and were even 
gradually assimilated into the Latin manuscript tradition of the Corpus 
itself. Dondaine gives a detailed account of this process, which began 
in 875 with the attempt of Anastasius the Librarian to amend some of 
the grosser errors of the Versio Dionysii. Anastasius' work on the 
Corpus in no respect constituted a new translation of the texts, but 
his adverse criticisms of Erigena's 'barbarous' text, as he terms it, 
which he lists outspokenly in a letter to Charles le Chauve dated 875, 
are interesting, in the first instance because they anticipate many of 
Sarracenus' objections to the earlier translation. The full text of 
the letter, "Inter cetera studia", is printed in P. L., XX11,1025-1030, 
but its main drift is conveniently summarized by Thery in his article, 
"Documents concernant Jean Sarrazin": 
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il s'etait colle, disait-il, au litteralisme le plus complet, 
par crainte de trahir la pens6e dionysienne. Ii n'avait pas 
recu suffisamment de dons intellectuels pour evoluer ä 1'aise 
etsavec elegance dans ces doctrines mystiques du Pseudo-Denys, 
et il avait arrive ceci: que Scot mandate pour traduire_Denys, 
avait besoin lui-meme d'etre traduit: 'Unde factum est, ut 
tantum virum, qui per se quoniam intima_et ardua quaeque utriusque 
philosophiae penetralia rimari proposuit, perplexus nostris 
intellectibus videbatur, intra cujusdam labyrinthi difficilia 
irretiret, et in antris profundioribus invisibiliorem quodammodo 
collocaret, et uem interpretaturum susceperatýadhuc redderet 
interpretandum. 4 
Anastasius' dissatisfaction with the Versio Dionysii did not, as in 
the case of Sarracenus, issue in a complete revision of Erigena's 
translation, but his efforts to improve the text through the introduction 
of the explanatory scholia into the Latin tradition undoubtedly made a 
considerable impact on the evolution of the Corpus. He verified the 
text of Erigena against what his letter to Charles le Chauve describes 
as a special manuscript of the Dionysian treatises -a manuscript which, 
like that put to similar use by Sarracenus three centuries later, must 
clearly have belonged to Thery's second category. 35 Further, it seems 
that it must have been a text of Erigena revised in this way by 
Anastasius and almost certainly by Erigena himself which Sarracenus 
consulted extensively in compiling his own version of the Corpus. 36 
Anastasius' amendments to the Versio Dionysii, therefore, and his 
admission of the scholia to the medieval Latin Corpus represented a 
considerable advance in the progress towards achieving an intelligible 
working text of the Pseudo-Dionysian tracts. On the one hand, as has 
been suggested, this process involved the utilization of more accurate, 
legible and annotated manuscripts to rectify the errors which were 
occasioned by MS 437. On the other hand, however, it required a 
succession of individual translators and commentators applying varying 
methods of translation to evolve a comprehensible text - which, as the 
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foregoing discussion has urged, essentially meant a latinized text. 
In both respects, the version of Sarracenus was pivotal: exploiting 
the additional manuscript resources which had not been available to 
his predecessor as a means of correcting Erigena's text, Sarracenus 
also set about systematically latinizing the Versio Dionysii. This 
entailed, firstly, the substitution of properly Latin terms for the 
transliterated Greek vocabulary of the Erigena text: "contemplatio" 
replaces "theoria" (e. g. E. H., Ch. II) and "apparitiones" or "visiones" 
occur where Erigena retains "theophanis" (e. g. D. N., Ch. X). Sarracenus 
allows Greek terminology only where, as in the case of "mysticus", 
the word had already become thoroughly assimilated into the Latin 
language. 37 
The latinization of the text is not, however, restricted to the 
vocabulary but extends to the philosophical bias of Erigena's Dionysian 
translations. Marguerite Techert is among scholars who emphasize the 
neoplatonic orientation of Erigena's own philosophy. In her article, 
"Le Plotinisme dans le Systeme de Jean Scot Erigene", she argues that 
Erigena's philosophy - which she identifies as "un plotinisme mal deguise 
sous ses idees theologiques'- - may depend directly on Plotinus, 
and she classifies the mysticism of both writers as fundamentally 
"intellectualiste". 38 Sarracenus, as Thery demonstrates, undertakes 
to align the Dionysian Corpus - insofar as his role as translator 
permits - with the traditional Christianity of the Western Church for 
which his text was compiled: 
Jean Sarrazin, avec une attention qui ne s'est jamais dementi, 
meme pas une Beule fois, scrute dans la version de Scot 
Erigene, 
tout ce qui pourrait rappeler une parente quelconque du 'Corpus 
dionysiacum' avec les mysteres orientaux. Le terme grec_'ieron', 
rendu chez Scot par 'sacrum' est traduit invariablement chez 
Sarrazin par 'sanctum' ... Sarrazin ne veut pas non plus admettre 
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dans sa revision le terme 'arcanum', qu'il traduit de plusieurs 
facons: tantöt par 'ineffabile' (N. D.,. Ch. I, ed. Opera Dionysii 
Carth., Tournai, 1902, t. XV1, p. 351,27), täntot par 'non dicibile' 
ibid., p. 351,29)... La rigeur que nous. constatons tout au long 
de cette revision. de Jean Sarrazin, est une preuve incontestable 
que nous nous trouvons en face dune intention veritable, d'un 
souci voulu. Jean Sarrazin consciemment et volontairement, s'est 
applique, dans. sa revision de Scot Erigene, ä supprimer des ecrits 
de Denis le caractere grec et oriental que Scot precisement lui 
avait conserve, sans doute, d'ailleurs, par insuffisance dans le 
maniement de la langue grecque. Avec Sarrazin, Denys devient 
fondamentalement latin, c'est-ä-dire que dans la mesure oü il 
devient latin, il cesse d! etre lui-meme. 39 
Clearly, this process of dehellenizing the content of the Dionysian 
treatises demanded additional linguistic changes in order to eliminate 
verbal connotations which might run counter to orthodox Christian 
theology. Sarracenus seems to have concentrated in particular on 
those aspects of Erigena's translation which might invite pantheistic 
or agnostic interpretations. Thus, for example, he substitute's 
"ignotum" for Erigena's "incognoscibile" as a translation of Ps. - 
Dionysius' ayvwoTOV. Similarly, he avoids such phrases as "omne 
invisibile" or "omne intelligible" as they are applied to God in, for 
example, Erigena's rendering of De Divinis Nominibus, Ch. II, preferring 
the qualified negative expression, "perfecte non intelligibile". In 
both instances, he rejects terminology which implicitly precludes all 
possibility of intellectual knowledge of God and thus leaves the text 
open to interpretation in terms of Christian doctrine on the divine 
infusion of knowledge through grace. Moreover, as Thery indicates, 
Erigena's translation of cis by "in"din conjunction with his consistent 
use of "unitas" as the equivalent of Greek evwals, offers further scope 
for misconstruction: 
Cette traduction de Eis par 'in' est constante chez Scot Erigene et contribuera quelque peu ä donner ä son travail une 
saveur pantheiste. Cette tendance panth4iste - au moins 
verbale - est renforcee par la traduction de 
Evwols. Scot 
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rend toujours ce terme grec par 'unitas': 'interpretatio 
igitur hierarchiae est, ad Deum, quantum_possibile similitudo 
et unitas' (P. L. t. CXX11, _col. 
1044C): QKOTrOS 
OUV i£papXias 
L6T1V, 11 TTPOS A£ÖV, WS EýiKTÖV, qýOj10i'waiS Kai £VGl6ls (P. Ci., 
t. III, col. 165A). Sarrazintraduira evwais par 'unitio' et 
£is. par 'ad'... dans 1'4tude de cette version du_Xlle siecle. 
Sarrazin_corrigeait ainsi -a dessein tres probablement - la 
tendance philologique panth'iste de la traduction de Scot. 
40 
Thomas Gallus: the Extractio and the Explanatio 
It was principally at the hands of Thomas Gallus, first Abbot 
of the Victorine house at Vercelli (t 1246), however, that Sarracenus' 
latinizatiön of the Dionysian Corpus and his project to establish 
beyond question its total accord with orthodox Christian theology 
was finally brought to full effect. Gallus' work on the Dionysian 
texts is difficult to classify. He is, as Chatillon emphasizes in 
his "Chronique" of the Victorine school, primarily an exegete: 
41 his 
corpus includes three commentaries on the Canticle of Canticles, 
glosses and an extensive commentary (the Explanation on the Dionysian 
tracts, as well as the influential Extractio of the treatises. 
42 
Although the writer and thirteenth century prior of the Carthusian 
house of Meyriat, Hugh of Balma, refers to this last text as the 
"tercia translatio" of the Greek Corpus, 
43 his description is not 
strictly accurate. The Extractio is neither simple translation nor 
commentary, though it incorporates important characteristics of each. 
To these, Gallus contributes an intensely personal response to the 
Dionysian texts and a sense that he has himself experienced the reality 
of the mystical consciousness to which they refer. Further, his treat- 
ment of the texts reflects both the practicality and the sensitivity 
of a pastor concerned for the spiritual needs of those under his 
direction. Thery assesses it in the following terms: 
C'est au fond son experience personelle acquise dans ses 
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longues meditations que Thomas Gallus veut nous presenter 
dans son Extractio. Ii cherche avant tout ä degager les 
lignes essentielles de la pensee de Denys, ä presenter cette 
quintessence comme un donne imm6diatement assimilable, et 
assimilable sans grand effort. D'oü s'il ya necessite, pour 
atteindre ce but, d'abr6ger certains textes afin d'en mieux 
souligner 1'idee centrale, il faudra parfois aussi, en d'autres 
cas, donnerquelques developpements pour eclairer la doctrine. 
Quelques chapitres auront l'aspect d'une paraphrase, mais le 
plus souvent l'oeuvre du victorir)4se pr6sentera comme un 
Compendium, comme une Extractio. 4 
With remarkable penetration, Gallus pruned away all the excessive 
complexities of Dionysian theology to produce a version of the treatises 
impressive both for its intelligibility and its immediacy. Th6ry also 
notes his astuteness in anticipating the potential dangers for the 
would-be contemplative in failing to reconcile the Dionysian doctrine 
of divine transcendence with the Church's injunction to worship God: 
he thus appends his own comment to the text of Sarracenus which affirms 
the compatibility of the two aspects of Christian devotion: 
sed oportet laudare eam sicut excellentem, segregatam ab omni 
auditu et motu vita, phantasia, opinione, nomine, verbo, 
deliberatione, intellectu, substantia, statione, fine, infinitate, 
et ab omni"eo quod mente concipitur et generaliter ab omnibus 
existentibus. Ne tarnen ab ejus laude cessetur. 45 
Gallus gives his own account of the genesis of the Extractio in 
his preface to the work. The passage merits quoting in full: 
Quum in libris magni Dionysii Areopagitae geminam experirer 
difficultatem, unam stili, alteram sententiae: ne tam pretiosos 
thesauros sapientiae duplex spelunca sepeliret, studui quadam 
compendiosa extractione sensum quem in ipsis libris (quibus 
vigilis! quo'labore! ) per annos viginti conceperam, stilo communi 
exprimere, prout sententia videbatur permittere, aliqua inter- 
serens dilucidationis gratia, non valde prolixa. 
Porro ad exhauriendam sententiae profunditatem, postillas 
pro parte tractavi (vita comite diligentius completurus, ipso 
adspirante qui revelat profunda de tenebris) utcumque novae 
translationi principaliter innitens. Ultrum autem haec opuscula 
supervacua sint, an utilia, discernere poterit qui eadem cum 
textu librorum istorum et explationibus eorumdem, sive Anastasii 
ad regem Carolum, sive aliis, diligenter contulerit; quamvis 
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arbitrer hujus doctrinae, et maxime Mystica theologiae medullas, 
mortalium neminem audiendo, legendo, studendo, percipere, nisi 
intus doceatur ab unctione. Nemo autem rideat donee perlegerit: 
quia ex omnium istorum librorum collatione sciet singulorum 
intelligentiam. In quibus omnibus per totum fulgent sapientiae 
radii de utroque Testamento per apostolum (nisi fallor) evulsi, 
sicut apparet per. totam seriem. Conjunct 'm itaque semper 
legantur purus textus et ista extractio. 40 
Gallus' preface makes clear that the Extractio ti: as not conceived as 
a critical text of the Dionysian Corpus but was intended for use in 
conjunction with such a text. He makes specific reference to the 
"novae translationi" of Sarracenus, which was the basis for his own 
version, though it seems likely that he also consulted the Erigena 
translation and possibly drew on biblical concordances. 47 He did 
not use a Greek manuscript of the treatises - indeed, the evidence 
of his treatment of Greek terms and an admission in his commentary 
on the Celestial Hierarchy go to prove that he knew no more than the 
rudiments of the Greek language. 48 He readily acknowledges, moreover, 
the difficulties which he himself encountered in his reading of Ps. - 
Dionysius, both from the inherent complexities of the texts and from 
the style in which they were presented in the existing Latin Corpus. 
Interestingly, it is again the desire to produce an intelligible text, 
to publish what Gallus terms the hidden treasures of Dionysian theology, 
which instigates the new version of the Corpus; but in this instance, 
the end is achieved through 'intelligent selection from the complete 
texts, the incorporation of brief explanatory comments on their 
meaning, and by the adoption of the easily comprehensible "stilo 
communi". Gallus cultivates an altogether less abstract mode of 
expression in his Extractio than was characteristic of the earlier 
translations: 49 he wrote, as Walsh emphasizes, for the devoted rather 
than the highly educated, 50 and in this, as well as in his constant 
preoccupation with the contemplative life and with its most advanced 
137 
stages in particular, Walsh identifies traits which typify Gallus' 
writings as a whole. 
51 His works are, in fact, remarkable for their 
unity of theme and purpose, and his singling out of the De Nystica 
Theologia, the Dionysian treatise which bears most strongly on the 
theory of contemplation, in the preface to his Extractio, is repres- 
entative of the importance which Gallus consistently attaches to the 
text. 
The immediacy of Gallus' concern with the spiritual life, however, 
and his insistence on the super-rational character of unitive contem- 
plation have often earned him the label "anti-intellectual". Thus, 
Thery; 
... il n'existe aucune incertitude sur la pensee de Thomas 
Gallus: l'union ä Dieu n'est possible qu'au delä des donnees 
rationnelles, et de nos conceptions intellectuelles. C'est 
lä un point sur lequel l'abbe de Verceil ne cesse d'insister; 
et cette insistance nous revele le fond de sa personnalite. 
Comme nous le verrons plus tard, c'est par son anti-intellectu- 
alisme affirme avec force et sans arret, que Thomas Gallus 
etendra son influence sur le mouvement mystique du moyen äge. 
52 
Walsh is, nevertheless, surely right to stress that Gallus' convictions 
as to the super-rational character of mystic union do not constitute a 
total repudiation of the value of the human intellect, but rather set 
strict limits to its effectiveness in the sphere of unitive contemplation. 53 
He writes: 
It is true, of course, that he considers all knowledge as 
worthless compared with the heavenly wisdom which is the 
unitive knowledge of God, but he never decries secular learn- 
ing in the round terms of, say, Richard of St. Victor. He will 
say, at the end of his treatise on the name of Jesus, 'Nos 
miseri innumeras scripturas et innumera percurrimus volumina, 
cum in uno nomine Jhesus totius religionis forma et totius 
sanctitatis norma scribatur; ' (Oleum effusum super nomen tuum, 
ccl92v2)and he will imply in-his preface to the Explanation of 
the Angelic Hierarchy, that the less erudite in profane letters 
are better off in the long run, because they are more apt to take 
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for granted the limits of merely human investigation... 
But this has always been the attitude of saintly scholars, 
from Augustine to Pasteur; and of those who, with St. Paul, 
realise that the foolishness of God is wiser than men. 54 
Gallus' principal concern, indeed, is to elucidate the Dionysian texts 
by accentuating their continuity with scriptural tradition. Walsh 
again summarizes Gallus' approach to the Dionysian Corpus: 
he sees Denis not as a neo-platonist, but as the disciple of 
St. Paul; and he will make a point of saying that the Dionysian 
corpus belongs to the unwritten tradition of the apostolic 
doctrine: that wisdom of the profounder Scriptures which St. 
Paul expounded to the perfect. 'This is the reason for Thomas' 
extraordinary pre-occupation with the Canticle of Canticles; 
traditionally, it treats of the contemplation of the perfect 
- the supreme wisdom of Solomon. Hence he sees in the writings 
of the Areopagite the apostolic theory of that loving union 
between the Spouse and the contemplative soul, of which the 
Canticle is the practical demonstration. 55 
Thus, in the third of his commentaries on the Canticle, Gallus writes: 
Theoricam huiusmodi superintellectualis sapientie scribit 
(Dionyasius), sicut possibile est scribi, inlibello qui 
scribitur de Mystic-Theologia. In hoc autem libro, scilicet 
Cantica Canticorum, Salomon tradit practicam eiusdem Mistice 
Theologie, ut patet per totius libri seriem. 56 
The frequent inclusion of biblical texts to expound or corroborate 
passages of the Dionysian Corpus, which is characteristic of Gallus' 
treatment of the texts, is thus motivated by a profound belief in the 
intimacy of their relation to one another and their fundamental identity 
of meaning. 57 It is this core of belief which, operating within the 
freer form of "extractio" or "explanatio", makes of Gallus' synthesis 
between the platonist heritage of Dionysian theology and the tradition 
of Western Christianity something altogether more pervasive and con- 
vincing than it was open to Sarracenus., in his restrictive role of 
translator of the Corpus, to achieve. 58 
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Influence of Gallus on the Dionysian tradition on the continent 
and in England _ 
It seems hardly surprising, therefore, in view of its conciseness, 
lucidity and readability, and its accommodation of the apparently alien 
facets of Dionysian ideology to received patterns of Christian belief, 
that Gallus' Extractio attained enormous and rapid popularity and, as 
was noted above, even usurped the function of formal translations of 
the Dionysian treatises. In authoritative manuscripts of the Latin 
Corpus which came out of the University of Paris in the thirteenth 
century, it is given equal prominence with the extensively glossed 
and commentated Vetus translatio of Erigena and Nova translatio of 
Sarracenus. 59 As regards the circulation of the remaining works of 
Gallus, M. T. D'Alverny, in an article entitled "Le Second Commentaire 
de Thomas Gallus Abbe de Verceil sur le Cantique des Cantiques", 
suggests that they were initially popular with the Franciscan order 
and subsequently gained ground in the Carthusian houses on the continent 
from the latter part of the fourteenth century. 
60 Turning to the 
contemporary situation in England, D'. Alverny confirms the importance 
of Gallus for the English author of the Cloud of Unknowing and adds: 
Remarquions ä ce propos que les bibliotheques anglaises sont 
relativement plus riches en manuscrits de Thomas Gallus que 
les francaises, oil les explorations du P. Thery n'ont fourni 
jusqu'ici qu'une maigre recolte. La diffusion de ces ouvrages 
en Angleterre est sans doute en relation avec 1'histoire 
temporelle de l'abbaye Saint-Andre de Verceil, que les liens 
etroits unissaient ä l'abbaye de Chesterton au diocese d'Ely. 
Le revenu des biens de ce dernier monastere avait en effet ete 
accorde par le roi Henri au cardinal Guala Bicchieri, pour lui 
permettre cue fonder en Italie du Nord un nouveau couvent de 
Victorins. b1 
Walsh discusses the question of Gallus' impact on English spirit- 
uality in greater detail. He claims a special reputation for Gallus 
in England from the middle of the thirteenth century, and reiterates 
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D'Alverny's contention that English libraries were well stocked with 
copies of his works. He goes on, 
... we know that the London Charterhouse showed a special 
interest in the teaching of Vercellensis, linking it with that 
of the Cloud. In addition to all this, the Abbot of Vercelli 
had very close personal relations with England. He was the 
intimate friend of the Franciscý, n Adam Marsh, and of Robert 
Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. 62 
Walsh's association of Gallus' works with the English Carthusians 
interestingly reinforces D'Alverny's observations as to their popularity 
in Carthusian houses on the continent; his proposed connection between 
Gallus, the English Carthusians and the Cloud of Unknowing is, moreover, 
corroborated by a further circumstance which also puts them in close 
touch with the continental branch of the Carthusian order. The link 
is through Hugh of Balma, the thirteenth prior of the Charterhouse of 
T"Zeyriat (1289-1304) and author of the influential mystical treatise 
known variously as the Viae Syon Lugent, the De Triplici Via and the 
De Mystica Theologia. 63 Balma's work depends heavily on Gallus, 
particularly in respect of its teaching on the super-rational character 
of mystic union. Thery writes, 
... Hugues de Balma, qui cherche lui-meme la base de son anti- 
intellectualisme dans les ecrits dionysiens de Thomas Gallus. 
La seconde partie du De triplici via, veritable commentaire de 
la Theologie Mystique de Denys, s'inspire essentiellement de 
11abbe de Verceil. De ce dernier, Hugues de Balma connait 1' 
Extractio, qu'il appelle ... 'tercia translacio'... 
T"Igme quand Hugues de Balma ne cite pas textuellement Thomas 
Gallus, on s'apercoit qu'il a sous les yeux l'Extractio. Comme 
ce dernier, il dit forti conatu mentis, 'inspectrix divjnnae 
gratiae', et il lui emprunte bien d'autres expressions. 
4 
It seems, moreover, that the author of the Cloud was familiar with the 
Viae Syon Lugent, and indeed, an extract from Balma's text appears with 
the Cloud and the Book of Privy Counselling in MS Douce 262 (f. 119a, 
'Exposicio Super Quedam Verba Libri Beati Dionisij De Mistica Theologia') 
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- the Dionysian manuscript produced at the London Charterhouse 
(f. la 'Liber domus Salutacionis matris dei prope londinium ordinis 
Carthusiensis') and annotated by James Grenehalgh. The implications 
of this for the Cloud of Unknowing will, however, be considered in 
detail in the course of this thesis. 
Unquestionably, therefore, Thomas Gallus was largely instrumental 
in ensuring the assimilation of Dionysian theology into the mainstream 
of Christian tradition in the West - both at first hand and through 
other writers who absorbed and subsequently transmitted his influence. 
But it has to be stressed that before this fusion of what were in many 
respects alien philosophies could be effected, it was necessary for 
the Dionysian Corpus to undergo considerable transformation: it had 
to be latinized -a process which required not only its language but 
also its entire ideology to be forced into manifest conformity with 
Western religious literature. The elements of neoplatonist thought 
which featured in the Greek original had to be muted, and where there 
was room for doubt as to the strict Christian orthodoxy of what Ps. - 
Dionysius wrote, the text was made to bear an unequivocally Christian 
interpretation and, in the later stages of the process, expounded in 
the light of biblical texts credited with identical meaning. It is 
certain, however, that by the end of the thirteenth century, a latin 
Corpus of Dionysian tracts which was intelligible and furnished with 
extensive and sophisticated critical apparatus had been made accessible 
to scholars in the West, and Dionysian theology was becoming widely 
received into medieval spirituality. 
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II. Deonise Hid Diuinite: a fourteenth century 
English version of the De rlystica Theologia. 
The method and characteristics of the translation and a survey of 
its general vocabulary 
The grounds for assuming the Deonise Hid Diuinite to be the work 
of the fourteenth century writer of the Cloud of Unknowing seem unas- 
sailable and the ascription of the text to him has long gone unchallenged. 
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Its interest for the present thesis is therefore twofold. The question 
of authorship aside, it is of considerable importance in the first 
instance as marking the final phase in the transmission of Dionysian 
mystical theology and language from Greek, through Latin, to the English 
vernacular. And secondly, as a seminal text in the acknowledged Cloud 
Corpus, it is invaluable for what it reveals of the author's attitude 
to the theology which dominates his major work as well as to the two 
languages with which he deals in the process of translation. 
On the first of these points it is possible to speak with some 
assurance, since the precise English equivalents of the Greek and Latin 
mystical terminology may be identified by means of parallel texts. 
This procedure, however, generates other problems which demand more 
tentative solutions, involving not only the author's attitude to his 
material and linguistic media but also some estimate of the verbal 
resources of English as compared with Latin at the date of the trans- 
lation. Undoubtedly, Latin was still the universally accepted and 
therefore richer and more sophisticated vehicle for theology and 
philosophical discussion in the fourteenth century, and it is debatable 
how far the limitations of the English language determined the character 
of the vernacular translation and whether, indeed, they occasioned 
any modification to the substance of the original. 
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In considering these issues, it is impracticable to treat the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite as comprehensively here as Prof. Hodgson in her 
introduction to the text, nor has it been found necessary to challenge 
many of her general conclusions about the work. It has seemed advis- 
able to confine attention to the key components of the Dionysian 
mystical vocabulary, making reference to the qualities of the trans- 
lation as a whole only where they have a direct bearing on this 
particular aspect of the text. Some overlap with Prof. Hodgson's 
work is, of course, unavoidable, but the following reappraisal of 
certain elements of the diction of the Deonise Hid Diuinite seems 
warranted not only by its distinct focus but also by the publication 
of the Middle English Dictionary66 (still uncompleted), which supplies 
additional relevant information unavailable to Prof. Hodgson. 
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It 
has not, however, been thought necessary to re-examine the extant 
manuscripts of the various Latin texts which the English translator 
drew on, and printed sources have therefore been used throughout. 
The Latin sources of the Deonise Hid Diuinite are indicated in 
the translator's prologue to his text: 
}gis writyng at next foloweý is be Inglische of a book at 
Seynte Denys wrote vnto Thimothe, be whiche is clepid in Latyn 
tonge Mistica Theologia. Of be whiche book, for-bi at it is 
mad minde in be 70 chapter of a book wretin before (be whiche 
is clepid be Cloude of Vnknowing) how at Denis sentence wol 
cleerli afferme al at is wretyn in at same book: berfore, 
in translacioun of it, I haue not onliche folowed be nakid lettre 
of be text, bot for to declare be hardnes of it, I haue moche 
folowed be sentence of the Abbot of Seinte Victore, a noble &a 
worbi expositour of bis same book. (D. H. D. 2/3-12) 
Prof. Hodgson agrees with an earlier editor of the Deonise Hid Diuinite, 
Dom Justin McCann, in interpreting these references to mean the trans- 
lation of Sarracenus ("be nakid lettre of ýe text "), supplemented by 
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explanatory works by Thomas Gallus ("be Abbot of Seinte Victor") - 
the Explanatio, the Gloss and, above all, the Extractio. The trans- 
lator's use of his sources will be discussed in detail below, but 
what they reveal in general of his purpose in producing a vernacular 
text of the De Mystica Theologia is worthy of comment here. Clearly, 
he is much more in sympathy with Gallus than with the earlier translators 
of the Dionysian Corpus in so far as he sets aside the restraints of 
literal translation in order to compile a text which minimizes difficulty 
of meaning as well as of language. His intention, he stresses, is to 
provide a lucid and comprehensible text which will in turn be useful 
to its recipient in illuminating the theology of the Cloud of Unknowing. 
Thus, differing in method from some of his predecessors, the English 
author nevertheless concurs with them all in seeking to evolve a 
functional text of Ps. -Dionysius. To be functional, however, in the 
period up to and including the thirteenth century, the Dionysian 
Corpus had to be progressively latinized in order to accommodate a 
scholarly audience thoroughly conversant with Latin though scarcely 
familiar with Greek. The Deonise Hid Diuinite, on the contrary, 
unlike any of its antecedents, makes its appeal through its use of 
the vernacular. The explanation for this striking departure from 
tradition does not seem to lie in the non-availability of Latin texts 
of Ps. -Dionysius in England during the fourteenth century. It has 
already been noted that manuscripts reflecting the. high degree of 
sophistication which the Latin Corpus had attained on the continent 
by the thirteenth century were undoubtedly current in , ngland, 
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and 
it is to be presumed that Latin texts of Ps. -Dionysius and the accom- 
panying extensive critical apparatus would have been accessible to the 
prospective audience of the Deonise Hid Diuinite as much as to its 
author. Perhaps, therefore, it was precisely because the English 
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text was not intended primarily for scholars that the use of the 
vernacular was indispensable in order to make Dionysian theology 
available in a form which would be intelligible to its reader. 
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The Deonise Hid Diuinite is an impressive achievement, remarkable 
not only for its fluency and competence as an autonomous piece of 
vernacular prose but also for the lucid account it gives of innately 
complex source material. Its comparative emancipation from the Latin 
texts on which it draws is apparent both in the flexibility with which 
it supplements and culls matter from its various sources as well as 
in the facility with which it seems in general to preserve the native 
idiom of English prose. Thus, in the following example, the translator 
adheres closely to the sense of his original whilst at the same time 
successfully adapting the Latin syntax and incorporating his own ex- 
planatory glosses on the difficulties of Ps. -Dionysius' trinitarian 
theology:. 
... how be li3tes of goodnes wonyng 
in be herte borionid oute 
of at inmaterial, & at only good in hymself & of hymseif; & 
how at in bis wonyng in hymself by onheed of substaunce, & in 
hemself by trinite of persones, & in hem togeders wib an euen 
euerlastyng borionyng, bei dwellyn stille vnpassyngliche. 
(D. H. D. III, 7/17-21). 
The Sarracenus text of the same passage reads, 
quomodo ex immateriali et simplici bono in corde manentia 
bonitatis pullulaverunt lumina; et quomodo a mansione in ipso 
et in se ipsis et in se invicem coaeterna ullulatione perman- 
serunt inegressibilia. (Chev. pp 585-6). 
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His success is not, however, universal. In other instances his 
more slavish retention of Latin constructions is at odds with the 
English idiom and consequently produces cumbersome linguistic hybrids. 
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The Latin word "secundum", for example, as it occurs in such phrases 
as "secundum quantitatem descensus" (Sarracenus, Chev. p. 590) and 
"ipsum cognoscunt secundum quod ipse est" (Extractio. Chev. p. 712) 
is consistently rendered literally by the English translator as 
"after"; the English equivalents thus read, correctly but awkwardly, 
"after lie quantitee of descendyng" (8/16-17) and "knowen hym after 
at he is" (10/11). 
The second of these phrases, indeed, illustrates the difficulty 
of generalizing about the translator's treatment of the two-languages 
with which he was concerned since, though it exactly reproduces the 
Latin syntax, its vocabulary is entirely English. In the matter of 
diction as with syntax, the text gives the overall impression of 
relying on predominantly native resources, though the translator shows 
no marked reluctance to extend his vocabulary by including Latinate 
terms. How far this effect may be traced to a conscious preference 
for the vernacular on the part of the translator or how far it merely 
reflects the range of vocabulary at his disposal is, however, open to 
question. It may therefore be useful to give brief consideration to 
the diction of the text as a whole before focussing attention on the 
mystical component of the vocabulary. 
The M. E. D. is, of course, an asset to a linguistic survey of 
this kind, though evidence based entirely on its authority may in no 
sense be regarded as conclusive. In the first instance, it cannot 
be assumed to be either comprehensive or infallible; 71 moreover, 
even if it were possible to date the Cloud Corpus with absolute 
certainty any more precisely than the second half of the fourteenth 
century, there can be no assurance that its author was familiar-with 
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vocabulary which the N. E. D. records incidence of in the language 
prior to this period. With these reservations, however, it is never- 
theless feasible to combine material from the N. E. D. with evidence 
drawn from the remaining treatises in the Cloud group in order to 
attempt an analysis of the vocabulary of the Deonise Hid Diuinite. 72 
There are, further, possible objections to the method of considering 
individual words in isolation from the larger sentence structures in 
which they occur and from the context of the translation as a whole. 
The danger of distorting the evidence cannot, perhaps, be entirely 
avoided in the present general survey of the vocabulary of the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite, but the drawbacks of the method have been compensated 
for, it is hoped, in the discussion of the translator's specifically 
mystical vocabulary which follows the table of parallel translations. 
The diction of the English text may be divided into four broad 
categories. The first of these comprises those instances in which the 
translator seems to have opted for conspicuously vernacular vocabulary 
where obvious latinate alternatives, usually closer to the wording of 
his original, were almost certainly available to him. 
73 To this 
category belong such examples as, 
"clensid" (4/28) O. E. D. records references to "purgation" 
(Lat. mundari) and its derivatives (usually in Wicliffite 
texts) pre-1400.74 There is no incidence 
of the word in the Cl. Corpus, where the 
usual term is "clense": e. g. Cl. 84/3, 
94/10 & 11,131 /8; Ben. Min. 43%5,14 & 
15; Disc. Sp. 90/21. Disc. SD. also has 
"wasschin awey" (91/11) and in a similar 
context "schriue" (88/2 & 11,89/11 etc. ). 
"euerlastyng" (2/14) The accepted equivalent of Lat. "aeternus" (Lat. aeternus) from 1225, but "eternal" is recorded quite 
frequently from the late fourteenth century 
(M. E. D. includes a variety of references 
from the Canterbury Tales). 
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"licnes" (9/31) O. E. D. includes numerous references to 
(Lat. similitudo) "similitude" pre-1400. 
"schorte" (4/17) M. E. D. records "bref" from the early 
"schortyng" (8/14) fourteenth century, though "brefnes" 
(Lat. brevis) is only cited from the early fifteenth. 
Cl. Corpus invariably has derivatives 
of "schort": e. g. Cl. 75/5,17/15; 
P. P. 48/15. It is worth noting, however, 
that "schortyng" has the sense of "lack" 
rather than "brevity" in D. H. D. 8/14. 
"wisdom" (2/16) O. E. D. has a variety of references to 
at. sapientia) "sapience" pre-1400 (including Piers 
Plowman and the Prioress's Tale). 
"Sapienciam" is again translated "bis 
onyng wisdom" in P. C. 145/15-16. 
"binges at fallyn to"(9/13) The English phrase circumvents the 
(Lat. accidentia) equivalent "accident", though (in the 
sense of "something that happens or 
occurs", "a fortuitous happening") 
N. E. D. records several pre-1400 occur- 
rences of the word (e. g. Trevisa's 
Barth. and Chaucer's House of Fame). 
The Cloud author himself uses the word 
in Cl. 976,93/1 & 2, but the reference 
in Disc. St. 64/11-12 to "tribulaciouns 
at fallen to a soule" is closely com- 
parable to this passage in D. H. D. 
The second category is also made up of vernacular elements in 
the vocabulary of the Deonise Hid Diuinite, but is distinguished from 
the first by the apparent lack of ready and unambiguous latinate 
alternatives already current in the English language. It includes, 
"betue" (3/17,4/32) The term is traditional in devotional 
(Lat. radium) contexts. O. E. D. cites only one pre- 
1400 incidence of "ray" (i. e. Pearl, 160), 
which would suggest that the word was 
known if not widely used in English at 
this date. 
"being binges" (3/23 & 33) M. E. D. records "existence" only from the 
(Lat. existentia) early fifteenth century (e. g. Lydgate's 
Troy Book). 
"eendes &teermes" (4/23) "Extremitas" is rare in fourteenth century 
(Lat. extremitas) English and the M. E. D. only records it from 
very late in the period (i. e. two references 
to Gower's Confessio Amantis and one to 
Trevisa's Barth. ). 
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"Faderheed" (7/16) 
(Lat. paternitas) 
"fer" (9/5) 
(Lat. remotissimus) 
"flowyng" (9/19) 
(Lat. flux) 
"menes" (7/1 & 3,9/30) 
(Lat. media) 
"merk" (8/25 & 28) 
(Lat. designare) 
O. E. D. has no record of "paternity" 
before the fifteenth century. 
O. E. D. has no record of "remote" before 
the fifteenth century. 
M. E. D. entry suggests that "flux" was 
only current as a medical term in the 
late fourteenth century. 
"Media" is only recorded in a comparable 
sense from the late sixteenth or early 
seventeenth century. 
M. E. D. contains few examples of "designate", 
and its earliest record is from Trevisa's 
Barth. (a 1398). 
"maken streite') (8/11 & 20) M. E. D. records only the past participle 
(Lat. contrahitur) form "contracted" (in the sense of "drawn 
up", "shrunken"), and this not before the 
mid. fifteenth century. 
"places" (7/32) M. E. D. cites "local" only as a medical 
cf. "steedlynes"(9/15) term in the fourteenth century. Disc. Sp. 
(Lat. localitas) (85/3) has a reference to "be steed of 
God". 
The third and fourth categories cover the considerable latinate 
component in the diction of the Deonise Hid Diuinite. To the third 
belong those words which were possibly introduced into the vernacular 
by the translator of this text himself or at least made one of their 
earliest appearances in the language in his works. It includes: 
"accordyng" (2/17 & 8/31) The M. E. D. 's seven citations from the 
(8/31 Lat. congruentius) Cl. Corpus are among the earliest recorded 
occurrences of the word. 
"formaciouns" (3/34) Not recorded in this sense in M. E. D. 
(Lat. formationes) 
"auoidyng" (5/22) The gerundive form is rare. M. E. D. 
(Lat. vacatione) cites various Wicliffite references from 
the early fifteenth century, and most 
references to "auoiden" date from this 
period. 
"enournements" (7/33) Rare. The earliest recorded examples 
(Lat. ornatus) in M. E. D. are from the Wicliffite Bible 
of 1382. 
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"sensible" (6/21,7/30,9/17) O. E. D. records "sense" and its 
(7/30 & 9/17 Lat. sensibilus) derivatives with a comparable sign- 
cf. "sensibilite" (9/15) ificance only from the sixteenth 
(Lat. sensuum tangibilitas) century. It occurs relatively freq- 
uently, however, in the Cl. Corpus 
(e. g. Cl. 9/8,16/17; P. C. 168/15 & 
19,16971 , 
6,10 & 15; P. P. 54/6). In 
D. H. D. 3/4-5, however, the translator 
renders "omnia sensibilia" as "alle 
}goo binges, be whiche mowe be knowen 
wib any of bi fyue bodely wittes without- 
fora", and "sensus" by "bodely wittes" 
in 3/2. The phrases "bodely wittes" 
and "goostly wittes" are, in fact, 
counterbalanced throughout this section 
of the text (3/1-9) which expands greatly 
on the Latin original, and are coupled 
elsewhere in the Cl. Corpus (e. g. P. C. 
152/3-4). It may be that the translator . 
's 
instinct for symmetry occasioned the use 
of "bodely wittes" first and foremost 
as a match for the phrase "goostly wittes" 
- the dependence on vernacular vocabulary 
in this case is essential to render the 
Latin expression "intellectuales oper- 
ationes" intelligible. He may, on the 
other hand, have been sufficiently un- 
certain of the total comprehensibility 
of the word "sensible" to prefer the 
clarity of vernacular terms in a passage 
so fundamental to his mystical theology. 
It is notable that "operationes" is here 
translated "worchinges"(3/4), though the 
O. E. D. records "operation" in English 
from the late fourteenth century. 
"Worthing" seems, however, to be the 
normal term for the Cloud author: e. g. 
P. C. 145/3,27 & 36. 
The fourth category comprises the extensive body of latinate 
terminology, which, so far as it is possible to determine with any 
certainty, was apparently already current in English during the four- 
teenth century. 75 Many such terms formed a staple part of the vocabulary 
of contemporary religious prose: 
"affecyoun" (2/26) N. E. D. 's many citations of this word in (Lat. affectionem) a devotional context include examples 
from Rolle and Hilton. It occurs freq- 
uently in the Cl. Corpus: e. g. P. P: 
54/6,59/1 etc. 
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"assoilid" (5/11) M. E. D. records from c1275. 
(Lat. absolvitur) 
"borionid" (7/18) N. E. D. records from 1350. Most of the 
(Lat. pullulaverunt) citations are taken from devotional 
texts, and many from Wicliffite writings. 
"cleertes" (2/24) M. E. D. records from 1330. 
(Lat. claritatibus) 
"concupisence" (9/16) Recorded from the second half of the 
(Lat. concupiscentiae) fourteenth century (including one 
citation from Hilton's Of Angels' Song). 
"contemplacioun" (5/4) Current from 1230. M. E. D. includes 
(Lat. contemplatur) references from Ancrene Wisse, Rolle's 
English Psalter, Parson's Tale. 
"contricyon" (3/1) M. E. D. records from 1350 (e. g. Parson's 
(Lat. contritione) Tale, Cursor Mundi, Pearl). It also 
occurs in Cl. 32/2. 
"enditing" (8/15) Recorded from the late fourteenth century 
(Lat. sermo) (e. g. Wicliffite Bible of 1382, Canterbury 
Tales - Retraction). 
"experience" (5/20) In common usage from the late fourteenth 
century. It appears elsewhere in the Cl. 
Corpus: Cl. 35/2; P. C. 170/8 & 14; Disc. 
St. 64/6,68/20,7-67-6. 
"fantastik ymaginatiue" Both words are recorded, often in con- 
(3/35) junction with one another from the late 
fourteenth century (e. g. Knight's Tale, 
Trevisa's Barth). "Fantasie" and 
"ymaginacioun" occur together in Cl. 
22/16-17. 
"figures" (3/32) In common usage from the late fourteenth 
(Lat. figurant) century. "Figured" occurs in Cl. 12/13. 
"Figura", however, is rendered by the 
vernacular "schap" in D. H. D. 9/14. 
"frenesiees" (7/33) Relatively common from the late four- 
(Lat. furores) teenth century. M. E. D. citations again 
include Hilton's Of Angels' Song. The 
word also occurs in Cl. 23/7 and 49/17, 
where it relates to the experiences of 
false contemplatives. 
"inspirid" (2/19) The word is recorded in this sense from 
the late fourteenth century - usually 
associated with the Scriptures. 
"multitude" (4/33) The many fourteenth century references 
(Lat. multis (Sarracenus) include Rolle's English Psalter and the 
multitudione (Extractio)) Wicliffite Bible of 1382. It also occurs 
in Ben. Min. 45/8 . 
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"presensce" (5/9) 
(Lat. praesentia) 
"subieccioun" (5/7) 
(Lat. subjectas) 
Fourteenth century references include 
Rolle's English Psalter and the Ayenbite 
of Inwite. It also occurs in P. P. 54/6. 
Fourteenth century references include the 
Pricke of Conscience, Trevisa's Barth, and 
the Wicliffite Bible. 
"temporal" (9/19) Recorded from late fourteenth century, 
(Lat. temporalem) e. g. in Wiclif's works. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the text of D. H. D. includes 
the explanatory gloss "bi proces of tymes", 
which suggests that the translator may have 
doubted its universal comprehensibility. 
He uses a similar device in P. C. 135/18-19 
'... mental wil)inne enditid bi bou3t or 
vocale wibouten by pronounsyng of worde". 
It seems appropriate at this point to restate Prof. Hodgson's 
general observations concerning the vocabulary of the Cloud Corpus: 
... these treatises, too, are part of the great intellectual 
and literary activity which produced the poetry of Chaucer, 
Langland, and Gower, the theological work of Wyclif, and the 
Wycliffite translations of the Bible. Like them, these treatises 
introduce late Latin or late French forms (e. g. "formaciouns", 
"passibilite"), and enrich the language with borrowings of abstract 
terms of philosophy and theology... 
It seems certain that the author of these treatises was using 
a language fresh and up to date. Like his great contemporaries, 
however, he made good use of the terms which the heritage of 
vernacular devotional literature richly provided. 76 
As Prof. Hodgson's introduction to the Deonise Hid Diuinite insists, 
the translator clearly exploits to the full the resources and character- 
istic assets of the English language, both in terms of its capacity for 
absorbing foreign vocabulary and also by capitalising on native methods 
of increasing the word-stock by compounding and by utilizing prefixes 
and suffixes. The considerable latinate component of the vocabulary 
demonstrates, moreover, that chauvinism had no part in his respect for 
the vernacular and that, if the translation was directed at an audience 
unfamilar with Latin, it was certainly not intended for the ignorant 
or simple minded. Here the foregoing categorization of the vocabulary 
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of the Deonise Hid Diuinite, though necessarily tentative and in 
some respects arbitrary, nevertheless serves as a useful guide to 
the translator's attitude to the two languages with which he worked. 
While he was undoubtedly not shy of introducing new words into the 
language where occasion demanded, it also appears that the majority 
of his latinate diction was already to some extent current in the 
religious literature of the period and that, where the use of latinate 
terminology promised to be a source of ambiguity, he was ready to 
anticipate the difficulty by incorporating an English gloss on the 
term (as in the case of "temporal" (9/19)) or by paraphrasing the 
text of his original (e. g. 3/1-9,9/13). Similarly, he frequently 
opts for totally vernacular vocabulary where an obvious latinate 
alternative was available to him, and often rejects the convenient 
method of supplying the deficiencies of English by anglicizing the 
vocabulary of his Latin sources. Indeed, he seems to prefer even 
awkward vernacular expressions to imported terms which might have 
enhanced the grace and fluency of his translation while impeding 
its sense: e. g. his consistent translation of "existential' by "being 
I)inges", and his rendering of "contrahitur" (8/11 & 20) by "maken 
streit" . Intelligibility seems in all things to have governed his 
practice as a translator. 
It is in this context that the author's handling of the mystical 
vocabulary of the De Nystica Theologia must be appreciated, since 
while this specialised terminology inevitably made unique demands on 
the language into which he was translating, it is nevertheless subject 
to the same conditions relative to the resources of English and the 
attitude of the translator as the text as a whole. In the following 
discussion, the vocabulary which merits particular attention will be 
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introduced in tabular form for ease of reference and important 
points will then be isolated for detailed comment. The mystical 
terminology of the 1)eonise Hid Diuinite has been classified according 
to individual words or by diverse expressions of a single idea as 
appropriate to the circumstances. In some cases, where a technical 
term of the Latin sources is avoided by the English translator, the 
various ways in which it is rendered have been grouped under one 
heading. Important instances in which the translator either omits 
material from his sources or modifies it significantly have also been 
recorded. 
The mystical vocabulary of the Deonise Hid Diuinite and its sources. 
Abouen munde 
3/16-17 bou schalt be drawen up abouen mynde in affeccioun 
S. 569 sursum ageris 
Ex. 569 sursumageris 
(cf. Gloss 272B "elevaberis", but there appears to be some 
conflation with 272A "consurge per principalem affectionem ad 
Dei unitionem", which corresponds to 3/10) &vaX6rjßn77 
5/10-11 and setteb hym abouen be natureel teermes of hymself 
S. 576-7 intelligibilibus summitatibus sanctissimorum locorum ejus 
superveniens 
Tals vofTais äKPOTnßi Twv aylw1Twv allTO; TO1TWV LT16a-reüovßa 
5/24 knowyng abouen myride 
S. 578 super mentem cognoscens 
Ex. 578 super intellectum et mentem ünep vouV ytvcu'6Kmv 
8/12-13 (fie derknes at is) abouen mynde 
S. 589 (caliginem quae eat) super mentem 
Ex. 589-90 (tractamus de divina incomprehensibilitate quae eat) 
super mentem 
(Tbv) {prep voüv(... yvo¢ov ) 
Occurs in interpolations in 2/25,2/25-6 "wig affecyon abouen mynde" (though introductory summary to Gloss 269B contains "uniri Deo per 
superintellectualem cognitionem et affectionem sui"), 4/3,6/28. 
Affirmation 
4/1 sette 
S. 571 ponere 
Ex. 571 attribuunt (which also covers 'afferme' in 4/2) 
TiOývai 
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10/17 set 
S.. & Ex. 601 ponimus 
TIOEj1EV 
10 16 (affermingly) set 
S.. 601 positiones facientes 
Ex. 601 ponimus 
Interpolation of 'affermingly' 
10/16 "deniingly do awey" 
TaS e'QEls... 1TOlOUVTES- 
possibly by analogy with 
8/27 set 
S. 592 affirmationem ... ponere 
Ex. 592 attribuamus 
KaTä*aaty ... T1O Val 
6/34 settyng oure affermynges 
S. 581 ponebamus 
Ex. 581 positione 
(cf. Gloss 277A "affirmatione vel positione") 
ýT1Oeuev 
-- 
4/2 settynges 
S. 571 positiones 
0 eßet s 
8/25 settyng 
S. 592 ponentes 
Ex. 592 positionem 
6Eßi. v cf. 8/26,10/15 & 10/21, in which S. 
also has "positio". 
7/14 set wi'p preisyng 
S. 584 maxime propria affirmativae theologiae laudavimus... dicitur 
Ex. 584 maxime usi sumus affirmationibus sive positionibus in 
laudibus divinis 
ýf. Gloss 278A"maxime affirmationibus usi sumus, sive positionibus 
in divinis laudibus") 
Ta KUP1CTaTa Tns KaTUýaTlKps OEoXoylas UpvraajEV... AEYCTaI 
4/2 afferme 
S. 571 affirmare 
KaTa4ä6KElV 
4/8 affermynges 
S. & Ex. 571 affirmationibus 
KaTaýäocoiv cf. 7/10 & 7/12 
6/33 afferminges 
S. 581 positiones 
Ex. 581 affirmationem 
e&eaty cf. 4/11 
8/22-3 affirmatyue deuinitee 
S. 591 ponentes divinas positiones 
Ex. 591 positiones 
6¬ voi Täs Aeias 6Eci js 
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7/24 affermyngliche preisid 
S. 586 hypotyposibus laudantur 
UTTOTUTfw6ElS UpVnTal 
Interpolations in 7/25-6 ("affermyngliche set & preisid") and 7/29 
("affermyngliche set wib preising") by analogy with surrounding 
passages. "Afferme" and "affermyng" also occur in two expanded 
passages where they are coupled with "denie" (10/18-19 and 10122). 
Note that "affirme" also occurs in the sense of "confirm" in 2/8 
Derk 
2/19 derke inspirid spekynges 
S. 565 mysticorum eloquiorum 
Ex. 566 profunda mysteria Scripturarum 
plUOT l K(V AOY ((I)V 
2/22 derkyst 
S. 566 in obscurissimo 
Ex. 566 in summa invisibilitate 
cKOTE1VOTäTW 
t 
2/20 derknes 
S. & Ex. 566 caliginem 
yvöýov 
3/17 derknes 
S. 568 ad supersubstantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium 
Ex. 569 ad supersubstantialem radium divinae incomprehensibilitatis 
7rPOS TTIV 
UlTcpOU6lOV 
TOO OciOU aKOTOUS 
tKTlVOC 
3/24 derknes 
S. & Ex. 570 tenebras 
QKOTOS 
4/25 derknes 
S. & Ex. 574 caliginem 
yvö4ov 
5/17-18 be derknes of vnknowyng, be whiche derknes is vereliche hid 
S. 577 ad caliginem ignorantiae intrat, quae caligo vere est mystica 
Ex. 577 et intrat ad caliginem ignorantiae, id est, unitur 
incomprehensibilitati divinae quarr non penetrat intelligentia 
EIS TOV YVOýOV TTS cyvwaias ELQÖUVEl TOV OVTWS )UUOTIKOV 
5/27 derknes 
S. & Ex. 579 caligine 
yv6gov 
7/7 derknes 
S. 582 & Ex. 583 caliginem 
yvöýov 
812-13 (entren into) be derknes (bat is abouen mynde) 
S. 589-90 caliginem (quae est super mentem introeuntes) 
Ex. 589-90 (ubi tractamus de divina incomprehensibilitate quae est 
suier mentem) 
(eis TöV ll1TEp vouv eio6üvovTES) yvö4ov 
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10/14 derknes 
S. 600 tenebrae 
Ex. 600 tenebrae (a lumine deficientes) 
GKOTOS 
Excess 
S. 568 excessu tui ipsius 
Ex. 568 to ipsum et omnia per mentis excessum nullo inferiori 
retinaculo praepeditustranscenderis 
T1) ... £CIUTOU ... £KGTc c3C1 
3/13 be ouerpassyng of Eiself 
Ex. 601 excessus ipsius 
S., 601 excessus 
n uiiEpoXn 
10/21-22 his not-vnderstondable ouerpassyng 
Ex. 570 excedunt 
S. 570 super istos sunt 
WEEP TOUTOU5 Cl lV 
3/26 ben abouen 
Ex. 572 excedit 
S., 571-2 super, (privationes) esse 
UUEp (TOIs UTEpT)6£l s) Etval 
4/9 be abouen 
Ex. 573 qui per mentis excessum 
S. 573 transeunt 
Sta6aivouai 
4/21 be which passen abouen 
Ex. 576 excedit 
S. 576 excedenti 
v1epeXOVT1 
5/7 passyng abouen 
S. 594 & 597. Headings to Chs. IV &V include "secundum excessum" 
K(X8'_v7TepoXnv). Omitted from D. H. D. 
The following examples from Ex. are omitted from D. H. D.: 
Ch. II (corresponds to D. H. D. 5/27-29) 
"In hac superlucenti caligine precamur nos constitui et per mentis 
excessum (ubi intellectus neque videt neque aliquo modo cognoscit) 
superintellectualiter cognoscere Deum per intellectualis cognitionis 
remotionem... " (579) 
Ch. III (corresponds to D. H. D. 8/12-15) 
"Unde et in praesenti libro (ubi tractamus de divina incomprehensib- 
ilitate quae est super mentem) incurremus non solum brevitatem verborum 
sed et perfectam irrationabilitatem et imprudentiam, id est rationis 
et prudentiae incomparabilem excessum". (589-90) 
Ch. III (corresponds to D. H. D. 8/17-21) 
"hic autem ab inferioribus ad superiora conscendens, secundum mensuram 
ascensionis contrahitur, et cum ad mentis excessum perventum fuerit, 
tunc deficit omnino sermo et mentis et corporis, neque restat menti 
nisi uniri Verbo ineffabili et aeterno". (591) 
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Note, however, the comparable phrase in D. H. D. 4/15-16: 
in bis he was rauischid to beholde abouen kynde 
S. 572 illud supernaturaliter intendens 
Ex. 572 idem Apostolus supernaturaliter intendit 
EKE1VO UTCp4uws EVvoriaas 
Hid, Privy (otherwise than as 'Mystical') 
S. 566 cooperta sunt secundum supersplendentem occulte docti 
silentii caliginem 
Ex. 566 clausa et abscondita 
(cf. Gloss 270C "clausae et absconditae": the introductory summary 
also includes 269B "clausa vel occulta'. 
OTC TOV U EpýWTOV &rKEK(XXU7rTc1l T? iS KpUý1OVUOTOU UIYT S YV'OV 
4'W hoaerºcL and hºd 
2/22 priuely 
Interpolation 
2/29 hid deuinite 
Interpolation 
6/23,6/27 hid 
Both occur in lengthy Ch. II expansion. No very precise equivalents 
in the Latin versions, though S. includes 580 "occulti" (KPv4iou) 
and 581 "occultam" (ä, roKcKpuu1EVOV). Ex. 581 refers to removal of 
material "quae occultant et cooperiunt et videri prohibent illam 
puram imaginem", which will reveal the image "quae prius latebat 
in occulto" (cf. Gloss 276E-C. Both passages are close to 6/23). 
7/7-8 priueliche hid 
S. 583 & Ex. 583-4 occultatam 
anoKpWIT6 icvov 
Know, Understand 
3/3-4 vnderstondable worchinges 
S. & Ex. 567 intellectuales operationes 
Tas VOEpcfs 
EVEpyclcts 
3/4-5 be whiche mowe be knowen wi}) any of bi fyue bodely Wittes 
without-forte 
S. & Ex, 567ýomnia sensibilia 
TravTa a1(F 6rl Ta 
3/6 be whiche mow be knowen by bi goostly wittes wibinne-fort 
S. 567 & Ex. 568 intelligibilia Zu 
3/10 vnderstonde 
S. 568 sicut est possibile 
Ex. 568 sicut est tibi possibile 
WS EýIKTOV 
3/11 in a maner at is }you woste neuer how 
S. & Ex. 568 ignote 
ayvwoTws 
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3/12 abouen ... al maner knowyng 
S. & Ex. 568 super omnem ... cognitionem 
uTrep Träßav ... yvwaiv 
3/15-16 al ping at may be knowen by be propre fourme in pi 
knowyng 
Interpolated expansion 
3/21 knowing ... knowable 
Interpolation not in S., but corresponding to Ex. 569 "eos qui 
secundum philosophiam mundanam cognitioni existentium ad obtinendam 
Dei cognitionem et veram sapientiam firmiter innituntur". 
3/24 knowen 
S. 569 scire 
E16EVai 
3/25 knowwryng whiche is after hemself. 
S. 569 secundum i, p sos est cognitione 
TV KaO aUTOÜS yVWaE1 
3/31 knowing 
Corresponds Ex. 570 figurant 
4/3 at is abouen al knowyng 
Interpolated expansion 
4/18 vnderstondyng 
S. 573 intellectum 
Ex. 573 intellectu 
vönoty 
5/2 vnderstondyng 
Interpolated expansion 
5/9 binkyng 
S. 576 cogitationem 
e7rivotav 
5/10 vnderstondynges 
S. 576 intelligibilibus 
Tals VOTTats 
5/12 vnderstondable worching mi3tes 
Corresponds Ex. 577 speculativae intelligibiles 
5/18 al knowable knowing 
S. 577 in qua claudit omnes cognitivas susceptiones 
Ex. 577 omnes comprehensivas cognitiones 
Kaý öv &Tioppvc Tfäoas T 
XS 
yVWOT 1 Käs 
&VT 
V XTjftl s. 
5/20-21 not hauyng felyng ne binkyng of no beyng ping 
S. 578 omnino autem ignoto 
Ex. 577-8 ab omnibus (et quasi a se ipso) segregatur 
TM TTaVTC)WS ÖE a VWcT(0 
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5/22 in auoidyng of al knowyng 
S. 578 vacatione omnis cognitionis 
Ex. 578 intellectualiter ignoto 
TTIS Träarjs yvciiacwS 
ävcvcpyrIoia 
L. 
5/23-4 knoweb noting 
S. 578 eo quod nihil cognoscit 
Ex. 578 eo quod intellectualem cognitionem derelinquit 
Tw u96EV YiVWQKEIV 
1. 
5/24 knowyng abouen mynde 
S. 578 super mentem cognoscens 
Ex. 578 super intellectum et mentem Deum cognoscit 
unep vovv ytvw'6Kmv 
5/28 knowe 
S--579 cognoscere 
yvwvai 
5/29 knowyng - 
S, 
-579 
cognitionem 
yvwQ tv 
6/3 wost; 6/10 & 18 vnderstondyng; 6/30 in a mauer 
at is vnknowen how vnto alle 
Expansions 
7/5 knowe at vnknowyng 
S. 582 cognoscamus illam ignorantiam 
Ex. 582 co noscamus divinam incomprehensibilitatem 
yvýJpcv CKEiVrly Tnv &yvwßiav 
7/6 knowable mi3tes 
S. 582 omnibus noscibilibus 
Ex. 582 quae possunt dici vel cogitari 
TINv Tro ITaVTWV TWV yVWGTWV 
7/27-8 vnderstondable (namynges of God) 
S. 587 alia intelligibilis (sunt Deinominationis) 
Ex. 587. aliis intelligibilibus (Dei nominationibus) 
Tns vorTns (kGTt Aewvupias) 
8/11-12 vnderstondyng 
S. 589 intelligibilium 
NN 
TWV vofTfilv 
8/25 vnderstondable binges; 8126 alle vnderstondyng 
8/29 vnderstondable 
Explanatory interpolations 
8/34 (repeated in 8/35) vnderstondyng 
S. 593 intelligitur 
Ex. 
N594 
intelligi 
VO£1Ta1 
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9/11 lacken... vnderstondyng 
S. 594 sine mente 
Ex. 594 carens ... mente 
avov s 
912 vnderstonding 
Ex. 594 intelligent 
9/23 vnderstondable 
S. 597 intelligibilium 
(cf. Gloss 281B) 
TWV vonTWv 
9/26 vnderstondable 
Interpolation 
9/28 vnderstondyng... vnderstonding 
S. 597 & Ex. 597-8 intellectum... intellectus 
vönQty ... vor ns 
9/29 vnderstonden 
S. & Ex. 598 intelligitur 
VOCTTat 
10/5 vnderstondable 
S. 599 intelligibilis 
Ex. 599 intelligibiliter 
VOfT1 
10/6 kunnyng 
S. & Ex. 599 scientia 
LIT IGTTiun 
10/7 vnderstonde 
S. 599 videmus 
Ex. 599 intelligimus 
7 s1Sevai 
10/8 knowen of us 
S. 599 & Ex. 600 cognitum a nobis 
TWV Y1jilV ... QUVcyvw6jlEVw) 
10/10 knowen 
Corresponds S. & Ex. 600 existentia 
6vra 
10/11 knowen 
S. & Ex. 600 cognoscunt 
Yivcc6Kei 
10/11 knowi}) 
S. & Ex. 600 cognoscit 
ylVWQKEL 
10/13 vnderstondyng 
S. 600 ratio ipsius 
Ex. 600 rationalis investigatio 
Xdyos a? Trjs 
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10/14 knowyng 
S. & Ex. 600 cognito 
yvwals 
10/18 vnderstondable; 10/21 not-vnderstondable; 
10/22 vn-vnderstondably 
Explanatory interpolations. 
Mystical. Mystery 
Title Deonise Hid Diuinite 
S. 565 De Mystica Theologia 
Tis 6 6eios yvdýos 
2/19 derke inspirid spekynges 
S. 565 mysticorum eloquiorum 
Ex. 566 profunda mysteria Scripturarum 
pUUTIKWV AOYiWV 
(Approximates to both e. g. 's 
in 2/19) 
2/19 pryue binges of deuinytee 
S. 566 theologiae mysteria 
Tns Ocoaoyias uuaTnpla 
2/32 blynde beholdynges 
S. 567 mysticas visiones 
Ex. 567 mysticarum contemplationum 
Ta pUcTlKä 8eäuaTa 
3/26 ýe godliche techynges of bees priuetees 
S. 570 divinae doctrinae mysteriorum 
ai OE-al uu6Taywyiai 
5/17-18 ýe whiche derknes is vereliche hid 
S. 577 quae caligo vere est mystica 
Ex. 577 id est, unitur incomprehensibilitati divinae quarr non 
penetrat intelligentia: quae vere est omnium clausiva et in se 
claudit et secretissime celat omnes comprehensivas cognitiones, 
tamquam in prima omnium causa 
yVd OV... TÖV 6VTWS 11U(STlKÖV 
7/5-6 be whiche is wallid aboute from al knowable mi3tes in alle 
bees being binges 
S. 582 ab omnibus noscibilibus in omnibus existentibus circumvelatam 
Ex. 582 cognoscamus divinam incomprehensibilitatem latentem sub 
mrsticis velis omnium existentium quae possunt dici vel cogitari 
TrW UnO 1TaVTWV TWV YVWGTWV EV Iraßl TOTS 0661 ITEPTKEKaXUPIEVfV 
Ne ration 
41; denye 
S. 571 negare 
Ex. 571 removent 
änoýäßKety 
4/7 deniinges 
S. & Ex. 571 negationes 
-ras &no¢äoels 
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6/33 deniinges 
S. 581 ablationes 
Ex. 582 ablationem 
TäS äýaip¬acis 
9/25-6 oure deniinges & oure doinges awey 
Ex. 597 negationes 
7/10 deniing (adj. 
S. 584 negativae 
&TroýaTlKat 
10/2 denyinges 
Ex. 598 negationes 
10/16 deniingly do awey 
S. 601 ablationes facientes 
Ex. 601 negando auferimus 
6. ýatpecYEts rrotoüvres 
7/2 repeats "deniinges" from 6/33 in an expanded phrase. 
10/19 interpolates "denie", coupled with "afferme". The section from 
6/32-7/8 also balances "deniinges" and "afferminges". 
In 10/23, "deniinge" possibly corresponds to Ex. 602"absoluti". 
4/11 doyng awey 
S. 572 ablationem 
Ex. 572 negatione 
&ýaipcoty 
8/29 doyng awey 
S. 592 auferentes 
Ex. 592 ablationem 
äßa i poüvras 
10/21 doyng awey 
S. & Ex. 601 ablationem 
&4aipeoiv cf. 5/30 & 10/16 
4/9 doyng awey (of pees beyng or beable binges) 
S. 571 privationes 
Ex. 572 negationem 
Tas CYTEpTIGEls 
7/4-5 do awey 
S. & Ex. 582 auferimus 
ä*atpoüuEV cf. 8/30,10/18 
8/33 do awey 
Ex. 593 removetur 
"Do awey" occurs in various interpolations: 2/29-30,3/18,5/32,6/27-8. 
9/4 put awey 
Ex. 594 auferimus 
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9/13 remowe 
Ex. 594 removemus 
8/23-4 negatyue (deuinitee) 
S. 591 divinam ablationem 
Ex. 591 ablationes 
Tns esias &ýatpe6Ews 
3/1 forsake 
S. & Ex. 567 derelinque 
ä, roXEITre cf. 4/24 
5/22 auoidyng 
S. 578 vacatione 
Ex. 578 intellectualiter ignoto 
avcvcpynaia 
L 
The lengthy expansion in Ch. II includes "voide awey" 6/8; 
"pare awey" 6/26; "doyng awey" 6/27-8. The equivalent passage in 
S. 580-581 includes "auferentes" (Etatpoüvres) and "ablatione" 
(&4atpcaci); Ex. 580-581 includes "auferunt (exteriores partes)" 
and "ablationem"; Gloss 276B includes "removent (exteriores partes 
materiae grossiores", which seems to correspond to 6/8 "voide awey 
alle ýe outward partyes"; "pare awey" seems to be original. 
Negative vocabulary 
2/14 vnbigonne 
Interpolation 
2/23 inuisible 
S. 566 invisibili 
aopaTW 
2/23 vngropable 
S. 566 impalpabili 
&vci4 c 
3/19 vnwise 
S. & Ex. 569 indoctorum 
auvfm V 
"invisibilitate" occurs in Ex. 566 in 
this context, but the precise equivalent 
is the expansion in Ex-567 "ubi neque 
ratio investigando palpat neque intell- 
igentia contemplando considerat". 
cf. 3/27 
4/21 vnclene 
S. 573 immunda 
ývayrj 
5/19 inuisible 
S. 577 invisibili 
&0pUrw 
5/19 vngropable 
S. 577 non-palpabili 
äva#Ei 
Ex. 577 neque ratio investigat 
neque intellectus speculatur 
6/13 (nakyd), vnmaad, & vnbigonne kynde 
Interpolations cf. 6/29 
6/20 vnnoumerable cf. 6/25 
Interpolation 
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7/18 inmaterial 
S. & Ex. 585 imateriali 
&üaou 
7/21 vnpassyngliche 
S. 586 inegressibilia 
äv6K4OITrjTa 
8/14 vnresonabiltee 
S. & Ex. 590 irrationabilitatem 
äaöyiav 
8/21 vnspekable 
S. &-Ex. 591 ineffabili 
&ý0 'KTW 
1. 
9/16 inordynacioun 
S. & Ex. 595 inordinationem 
&Tc (au 
9/17 vnmi3tfulnes 
S. 595 neque impotens est 
Ex. 595 invaletudinem 
OUTS &ÖUVauÖS cats 
9/31 (ne licnes), ne vnlicnes 
S. & Ex. 598 (neque similitudo) neque dissimilitudo 
(OUTS 
0110lOTflS) Ti aVOj1OtOTTlS 
1020 wi'ýoutyn comparison; 10/21 not-vnderstondable; 
10/22 vn-vnderstondabely 
Explanatory expansions 
Ex. makes extensive use of negative terminology in its expansions on 
the text of the original, and especially in its first chapter. D. H. D. 
does not imitate this. 
e. g. Ch. I includes incomprehensibiliter 566,570 
invariabilia 566 
inaccessibilem 566 
inaudibiliter 566 
invisibilitate 566 
incomprehensibilitate 566 
incomprehensibilitatis 569 
incomprehensibilitatem 570 
incomparabiliter 572 
incomprehensibilitati 574,577 
invisibilis 575 
Some negative forms from the Greek original, constructed on the 
traditional model of stem with negating prefix, had already been 
superseded in the Latin versions of the text and the English translation 
retains these later forms: 
e. g. 8/21 withouten voice 
S. 591 sine voce 
Ex. 591 deficit omnino sermo 
It wvo s 
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9/4 withoutyn substaunce 
S. 594 sine substantia 
Ex. 594 non substantiatum 
avovcto s 
D. H. D. in some instances omits negative terms preserved in its 
sources: 
1. Omits S. 566 ubi simplicia et absoluta et inconvertibilia 
theologiae mysteria (Corresponds 2/19) 
Tä äirX Kai &7r6XUTa Kal a)TpCTTa Tns Asoaoyias UußTrjpta 
2. S. 568 ignote 
ayvweTws 
3/11 in a maner bat is }, ou woste neuer how 
3. S. 568 (Etenim excessu tui ipsius et omnium) irretentibili et 
absoluto munde 
,., 
&OXETW Kai 
1TfOAÜTW 
3/12-18 Expanded omitting negatives 
4. S. 570 impias 
ä6ewv 
3/34 wickyd 
5. S. 575 (invisibili. s est enim) 
(&OEaTos yap) 
5/5 for he may not be seen by at i3e 
6. S. 578 omnino autem ignoto 
Tm 7favTcXws Se äyvcwuTi 
5/20-21 not hauying felyng ne binkyng of no beyng. ping 
7. S. 579 per non-videre et per ignorare 
Kai 61 &6AE tas Kat ayvwßias 
5/27-28 bi nou3t seeyng & vnknowyng 
8. S. & Ex. 590 imprudentiam 
avorlotav 
8/14 madnes 
9. S. 594 Ch. IV neque sine substantia est neque sine vita, 
neque sine ratione neque sine mente ... 
010T£ avovotos CUTiV OUTS aCwos, OUTE CAOyos ouT£ avows """ 
Note that the English translator prefers to follow the less 
repetitively negative version of Gallus in this chapter. 
Souereyn 
2/15 souereyn - substancyal 
S. & Ex. 565 supersubstantialis 
ünr£poüot¬ cf. 3/17,5/31,7/7,7/22 
3/22-3 souereyn - substancyaly 
S. & Ex. 569 supersubstantialiter 
nrcpouoiws cf. 4/19,5/30 
2/15 souereyn Goddesse 
S. & Ex. 565 superdea 
UIrep6E£ 
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216 souereyn Good 
S. & Ex. 565 superbona 
U1TEp&yaO E 
2/18 souereyn-vnknowen 
S. 565 superignotum 
Ex. 565 superignotus 
UIrCPaYVWGTOV 
2/18 souereyn-schinyng 
S. 565 supersplendentem 
Ex. 565 supersplendens 
üircpon of. 2/20, though the Greek has ü7TEP TOV 
5/27 souereyn-schining 
S. & Ex. 579 superlucenti 
U1r£pýWTOV 
2/21 souereyn-clerest 
P. & Ex. 566 superclarissimum 
U1TEpýaVEUTaTOV 
2/21 souereynly (for to schine) 
S. & Ex. 566 supersplendere 
5ircpa&pTrovTa 
2/23 souereynli (fulfillyng) 
S. 567 superimplentem 
Ex. 567 et desursum superinfluentem mentibus superintellectualiter 
unitis superpulchras claritates 
U7TCPTWX lpOUVTa 
3/31 souereynliche (set abouen) 
S. 570 superpositam 
Ex. 570 superposita 
ü1rcpKEtpEVnv 
4/5 souereinly (beyng abouen) 
S. & Ex. 571 superexistente 
v1rCpoUßn 
5/10 souereynly 
Interpolation 
Omissions of Latin "super-" vocabulary 
4/19 set abouen 
S. & Ex. 573 superposita 
C UlrCpKEiucVnv 
2/23-4 ful fayre cleertees 
S. 567 superpulchris claritatibus 
Ex. See above (2/23) 
TWV 61TEPK XWV &yaaiWV 
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4/15 in bis he was rauischid to beholde 
S. 572 illud supernaturaliter intendens 
Ex. 572 idem Apostolus supernaturaliter 
EKEivo uirepýuWs evvorjoas 
4/22 comyn abouen 
S. 573 superveniunt 
Ex. 573 superant 
Sir p6aivouai 
5/10-11 setteb hym abouen 
S. 577 superveniens 
eni6aTeüoußa 
Symbolic 
7 28-9 be Gadering of Deuine Sentence 
S. & Ex. 587 symbolica ... theologia 
Tn auubo; Xuji 6eoXoYia cf. 8/8-9 
abouen kynde 
intendit 
8/3-4 & what ober sensible formes at on any maner in Holy 
Scripture ben applied vnto God. 
S. 588 et quaecumque aliae sanctae formationes compositae 
Bunt symbolicae Deiformationes 
Ex. 588 et sic de al-iiscompositis formationibus Deo 
attributis in libro de Symbolica theologia 
Kai öcai äaaal rps 6up6oaIKns eißt OEOTVMrlas tep(Traa(ITO1 popýc, )aels" 
Gallus' account of the symbolic value of Scripture is omitted from 
the first paragraph of D. H. D., Ch. I: 
Ex. 565-6 "in quo Verbo profunda mysteria Scripturarum aeternaliter 
et incomprehensibiliter sunt clausa et abscondita et in arte 
simplicissima coarctata et a verborum sive symbolorum involucris 
absoluta et omnino invariabilia". 
Theology 
Title Deonise Hid Diuinite 
S. 565 De Mystica Theologia 
Tis 6 6e1os os 
2/19-20 alle be pryue binges of deuinytee 
S. 566 theologiae mysteria 
Ex. 566 profunda mysteria Scripturarum 
TO O¬oAoyias puart; pia 
4/13-14 Cristes deuinitee, it is bode moche and it is leest 
S. 572 et multam theologiam esse et minimam 
Ex. 572 Theologiam et prolixam esse et coarctatam 
Kai TroAA v Ocoaoyiav etvai Ka\ OAaX(aT1V 
7/10 4lhiche bookes ben of aferming & whiche of deniing diuinitee 
S. 584 Quae sunt affirmativae theologiae,. quae negativae 
T{VES Ot KaTaýaTlKCLl OEOaoylal, T{VES al aTTO4aTlKal 
7/11 bookes of deuinitee 
S. 584 theologicis hypotyposibus 
TaIS OEOAoylKalS U7roTUn(6£6l 
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7/12 affermyng deuinitee 
S. 584 affirmativae theologiae 
Tits KaTa4aTlKrjs OEoXoyias 
7/28-9 Gadering of Deuine Sentence 
S. & Ex. 587 symbolica ... theologia 
Tn oup6oXlKn Oeoaoyia 
8/22-3 affirmatyue deuinitee 
S. 591 divinas positiones 
Ex. 591 positiones 
TÖCS OElaS e£QEls 
8/23-4 negatyue deuinitee 
S. 591 divinam ablationem 
Ex. 591 ablationes 
TfS AEias &4atpEcEwS 
"Deuinitee" occurs in interpolations in 2/29,5/4 & 6/32 
7/16-17 omits S. 585 quid vult monstrare Spiritus theologia 
Ti ßoüaETat drIaoüv n Toü lIvsüuaTOS OEOaoyia 
7/24 in boo two bookes 
S. 586 in theologicis hypotyposibus 
Ex. 586 et alia plura ibi tractavimus juxta expressa 
Scripturae testimonia 
KaTL, ThS OEOXOYuK&s 
ÜTfoTlflrt"6ElS 
Union, Unity 
3/11 to be onid with hym 
S. 568 ad ejus unitionem 
Ex. 568 ad unitionem Dei 
. Li , rpOS TfV CVW 1V 
5/22-3 he. is knittyd vnto hym on be best maner 
S. 578 secundum melius unitus 
Ex. See below (5/18-24) 
KCLTa TO KPElTTOV 
EVOÜIIEVOS 
5/26 How we schul be onid to be cause of al 
S. 579 Quomodo oportet (et) uniri, (et hymnos reponere) omnium 
causae 
IIws 6Ei (Kai) sv4UaOa1, (Ka\ üuvous ävaTlOevat) Tw TrävTwv aiTicw 
8/21 knittid 
S. 591 totus unietur ineffabili 
Ex. 591 uniri Verbo. ineffabili et aeterno 
öaos evmerjacTal Tw ä 6E&KTw 
106 vnitee 
S. & Ex. 599 unitas 
ev öT fps 
10/15 knittyngly to sey 
S. 601 universaliter 
Ex. 601 omnino 
Kaeo'Äou 
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6/18 "knittyd" and 7/19-20 "onheed of substaunce" are interpolations. 
D. H. D. omits the following technical accounts of the nature of mystic 
union from the Extractio: 
Ex. 567"et desursum superinfluentem mentibus superintellectualiter 
unitis superpulchras claritates^. 
Ex. 574 (corresponds 4/25) 
"et intrant in caliginem, id est, uniuntur incomprehensibilitati 
divinae" . 
Ex. 577 (corresponds 5/15-17) 
"... Moyses post praedicta separatur ab his qui Dei locum secum 
viderant et subtrahitur ipsis visis et intrat ad caliginem ignorantiae, 
id est, unitur incomprehensibilitati divinae quarr non penetrat 
intelligentia". 
Ex. 577-8 (corresponds 5/18-24) 
"Et per eam omnis unitus Deo (qui est super omnia) constituitur in 
excellentia quam neque ratio investigat neque intellectus speculatur; 
et ab omnibus et quasi a se ipso segregatur, et per unitionem 
dilectionis (quae effectiva est verae cognitionis) unitur Deo 
intellectualiter ignoto, cognitione multo meliori quarr sit cognitio 
intellectualis, et in eo quod intellectualem cognitionem derelinquit 
super intellectum et mentem Deum cognoscit". 
Ex. 582 (corresponds 7/5) 
"ut non sub velis creaturarum, sed. per unionem ad ipsam, cognoscamus 
divinam incomprehensibilitatem... " 
Unknow 
2/18 souereyn-vnknowen 
S. 565 superignotum 
Ex. 565 superignotus 
)TrepäyVWcrrov 
5/17 (De derknes of) vnknowyng 
S. & Ex. 577 (caliginem) ignorantiae 
(TÖV yvc ov) Trjs &yvwatas 
5/22 in auoidyng of al knowyng at is algates vnknowen 
S. 578 omnino autem ignoto, vacatione omnis cognitionis 
Ex. 578 unitur Deo intellectualiter ignoto 
Tnv 7avTCX6,3s Sc ayvwarw TT S iraorrs yvwaems avevepynata 
5/27-28 (bi nou3t seeyng &) vnknowyng 
S. 579 (per non-videre et) ignorare 
Ex. 579-580 superintellectualiter cognoscere Deum per intellectualis 
cognitionis remotionem), qui est super omnem visionem et cognitionem 
61' &6aegtas Käi &yvwcrtas" 
5/29 in dis same not se & not knowe 
S. 580 in ipso non videre et non cognoscere DTÖ 
Tb un tSeiv prrSe yvwvat 
6/29-30 in a maner at is vnknowen how unto alle 
Interpolation. 
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7/5 (cleerlicle knowe bat) vnknowyng 
S. 582 (revelate cognoscamus i11am) ignorantiam 
Ex. 582 (cognoscamus divinam) incomprehensibilitatem 
&TreptKaXITrTws yvmuev Keivnv Tnv rnv äYvw6iav 
While the volume and diversity of the material considered here 
necessarily discourage generalized inferences, it is nevertheless 
immediately apparent that the English text lacks the varied, often 
technical theological vocabulary of its Latin counterparts. The 
Deonise Hid Diuinite seems to reproduce Dionysian doctrines in an 
altogether simpler, more readily accessible form than the previous 
Latin versions of the text. How far this effect was specifically 
cultivated by the translator, however, or whether it was involuntarily 
determined by the limited resources of the English language is less 
certain and must be accounted for differently according to individual 
examples. 
Symbolic. It is rarely possible to settle the question conclusively 
on available lexicographical evidence alone. The O. E. D., for example, 
has no record of the word "symbolic" before the seventeenth century, 
and its unfamiliarity to the translator may explain his circumlocutions 
in 7/28-9 and 8/8-9 where the Latin versions include "symbolical, in 
the title of a non-extant Ps. -Dionysian treatise. 
78 Neither is there 
any incidence of the word elsewhere in the Cloud Corpus. On the other 
hand, however, the translator's avoidance of the term in every other 
context in which it occurs in the Latin versions and, more particularly, 
his omission of Gallus' extremely precise account of the principles of 
symbolic theology in chapter III of the Extractio - 
In symbolica autem theologia tractavimus transumptiones 
vocabulorum rerum sensibilium ad designandum anagogice 
invisibilia divina (587) - 
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which corresponds to the brief and less specialized description in 
the Deonise Hid Diuinite 7/28-30, may indicate some unwillingness on 
the part of the English writer to dwell on doctrinal technicalities 
of this kind. 
Affirmation and Negation. This does not seem to have been the case 
in respect of the vocabulary applied to the procedures of affirmative 
and negative theology. Indeed, the evidence tends to suggest that 
the vernacular lacked the range of appropriate synonyms which existed 
in Latin, and the pioneering character of the Deonise Hid Diuinite in 
the field of vernacular translations of Ps. -Dionysius deprived the 
English translator of established precedents for the distinctive 
terminology which had evolved in Greek and Latin in conjunction with 
Dionysian mystical theology. The translator uses only two root words 
to express the idea of "affirmative": these are "rette", which 
usually renders derivatives of Latin "ponere" and also corresponds 
to most incidences of the cognate noun "positio", and "afferme", which 
usually translates Latin "affirmare": exceptions to this rule occur 
in 8/22-3, for example, where "affirmatyue" corresponds to S. "ponentes 
... positiones" 
(Ex. "positiones"), and 7/14, where the translator uses 
"set" where all his sources have parts of "affirmo". In both these 
usages the translator places some strain on the resources of English. 
The O. E. D. does not record "posit" before the seventeenth century, and 
while "sette" as the precise vernacular equivalent of Latin "ponere" 
was in common usage in the fourteenth century, the O. E. D. has no 
examples of it as corresponding to "ponere" with the particular con- 
ceptual rather than physical sense of "attribute, affirm"79 which the 
translator requires it to carry here. The English word seems to be 
loaded with a meaning which it cannot altogether conveniently bear 
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and which lacks confirmation outside the context in which it occurs. 
The translator may himself have been aware of the need to reinforce 
the meaning he gives to "set" in the Deonise Hid Diuinite: in several 
instances he corroborates the sense of "affirm" by coupling "set" 
with "affermyngliche" (6/16,7/25-6,7/29. cf. also 6/34). His use 
of "afferme" is much more successful and seems to have found tacit 
approval in the continued currency of the term while "sette", in the 
sense of "affirm", remains exclusive to this text. The M. E. D. cites 
a number of examples of "afferme" from the late fourteenth century, 
though the earliest reference is to the Wicliffite Bible of 1382. 
This suggests, therefore, that if the translator of Deonise Hid 
Diuinite did not himself introduce the term into the language, he 
was certainly among the first English writers to make significant 
use of it. Again, however, he intensifies the normal connotations 
of the word to give it an absolute sense which, though essential in 
the context of this work, is apparently unparallelled in other documents 
of the period. Moreover, it is interesting that the translator himself 
does not employ this specialized vocabulary outside the Deonise Hid 
Diuinite in his original compositions. "Sette" occurs nowhere in 
the Cloud Corpus with a comparable meaning, and with the exception of 
the example of "aferme" in Cloud 125/14, where it has the sense of 
"confirm" as in the present text 2/8, the only usage which is at all 
similar is in Discrecioun of Stirings 63/18-19, "I dar not lene to my 
conseite, affermyng it for fast trewe". Elsewhere, in contexts where 
he might have been expected to draw on the vocabulary of the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite, as, for example, in Privy Counselling 143/17-30, where 
he is considering the names which are applicable to God, he uses the 
neutral term "sey": 
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... or what obey soche Bing at bou sey of God: al it is 
hid & enstorid in bis litil worde is. (P. C. 143/25-6). 
A like pattern emerges in respect of the vocabulary which describes 
the procedure of negation. The two principal means of expression are 
"deny", which translates every example of "negare", and, most commonly, 
"do awey", which in general corresponds to Latin "ablatio" and "auferre". 80 
"Ablatio" is, however, also rendered by "deniinges" (6/33) and by 
"negatyue deuinitee" (8/23-4), and conversely, "do awey" also translates 
"removetur" (8/33) and "privationes" (4/9). In a few isolated instances, 
"remowe", "forsake", "auoidynge" and "put awey" serve the same function, 
and the lengthy interpolation in Chapter II introduces the variant forms 
of "voide awey"(6/8) and "pare awey" (6/26). 
It seems strange, in view of the linguistic resourcefulness 
shown in these last examples, that the translator should have opted 
in the majority of instances for the colourless, even rather cumbersome 
phrase "do awey". He may perhaps have preferred simple accuracy and clarity 
to stylistic elegance. It is in any case apparent that he adapted 
basic elements of the established vernacular vocabulary to supply what 
seems to have been a deficiency in English theological terminology. 
The M. E. D. cites only one anglicized form of Latin "ablatio", which 
comes from the late fifteenth century Revelations of St. Bridget, 
and the earliest reference to "negaciourl' inthe sense of "a negative 
assertion" is from c. 1425 in the Orcherd of Syon 140/7, "Petir aftir 
be trespas of negacioun, or diniynge, be whiche he did to my cone, 
he wepte ful bittirly", where the inclusion of "diniynge" as a gloss 
on "negacioun" may imply that the author considered the term insuffic- 
iently familiar to stand without explanation. "Negatif", in the sense 
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of "a negative statement about ideas or sensory impressions, a 
negative classification", is first instanced in Walton's Boethius 
c. 1450 (1410): "So he (the soul) devideý bea negatyue And afterwardes 
be affirmatyue", and in related senses and as an adjective or adverb 
only from the early fifteenth century. Examples of "privation" in 
English before 1400 seem to have been extremely rare: the O. E. D. cites 
the mid fourteenth century Pricke of Conscience and, in a different, 
specifically scientific context, Trevisa's Barth. (1398). If, however, 
the translator refrained from importing technical Latinate terms which 
might have obscured the meaning of the text, he does not seem to have 
hesitated to use a variety of up-to-date words which appear to have 
become accepted into common usage only in the late fourteenth or even 
early fifteenth century - words such as "auoidyng", 
81 "denie" (first 
recorded in the Wicliffite Bible of 1384, where it corresponds to 
Latin "nego"), and "negatiue". There are Wicliffite references to 
"remove" from the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and this is 
in fact the usual expression for the negative process in the Cloud 
itself (e. g. 47/13,48/2,77/8 and 91/11). "Denie" occurs nowhere 
else in the Corpus. 
Intellection. A fourth sphere in which the vernacular seems to have 
been impoverished by comparison with Latin, not only in terms of exact 
synonyms but also in respect of a spectrum of vocabulary capable of 
conveying fine distinctions between different modes of intellectual 
perception, is that of "vnderstondyng" and "knowyng". The English 
translation normally has "vnderstonde"82 and its derivatives where 
the Latin versions read "intelligo", "intelligibilis" and even 
"intellectualis", 83 but they also correspond to "mente" (9/11) and 
"rationalis investigatio" (1013). 84 "Knowe" usually renders Latin 
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"cognoscere" and "cognitio", but it also represents a variety of 
other terms, including "scire" (3/24) and "comprehensivas". 85 The 
translator uses three alternative words in comparable contexts, all 
of them uncompromisingly vernacular: "woste (neuer)" (3/11) corresponds 
to the traditional term of negative theology, "ignote" (Gk. äyvW'6Tws), 
as does "(ne) ýinkyng" (5/21). "ýinkyng" also renders "cogitatio" 
(5/9), and "kunnyng" (10/6) is used for Latin "scientia". 
The available evidence suggests that the translator unless he was 
prepared to augment the existing resources of English, had little choice 
but to employ vernacular terminology here. The N. E. D. records "intellectual" 
and "intellectualiche" only in Trevisa's translation of Bartholomew 
during the fourteenth century, and the words do not seem to have become 
current in English prior to the mid fifteenth century. "Cognicioun" 
and "cognisaunce" both date from the fifteenth century, as does "cog- 
itacioun", with the exception of one isolated occurrence in the Ancrene 
Wisse. "Intelligible", however, may conceivably have been known to the 
translator as an accepted English term, since in addition to Trevisas's 
Barth., the M. E. D. also lists an example of the word in the Wicliffite 
Bible of 1382 -a source of many verbal analogies for the Cloud Corpus. 
Characteristically, however, the translator shows a marked reluctance 
to compensate for the deficiencies of English in this area by introd- 
ucing anglicized forms of Latin terminology. 86 
Unknowing. The opposite concept, that of "vnknowyng", is usually 
expressed by "ignotus" or "ignorantia" in the Latin versions of the 
De Mystica Theologia which the English translator follows. 
87 The use 
of "vnknowyng" for both terms in the English text is invariable, though 
the word "ignoraunce" was undoubtedly familiar to the translator. It 
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occurs relatively frequently in the Cloud Corpus (eg,. Cl. 5/20,51/5 & 6), 
where it is often synonymous with the, for this author, more usual term 
of "vnknowyng" (e. g. C1.43/20,50/8; P. C. 147/28,159/16; P. P. 52/8; 
Disc. Sp. 85/17,88/8). The M. E. D. also provides copious evidence of 
the currency of the noun "ignoraunce" from the early thirteenth century, 
and the adjectival form "unknown", too, was widely used throughout the 
medieval period. As Professor Hodgson comments in her note to Deonise 
Hid Diuinite 5/17, the term "vnknowyng" was also in use outside the 
Cloud Corpus during the fourteenth century; it occurs in Wiclif's 
works and in the Pricke of Conscience. In these examples, however, 
it only carries its normal meaning of "ignorance"; it is not recorded 
with the specialized sense of "ceasing to know" which is often its 
force in these treatises before Sydney's Arcadia (c. 1586). 
It. seems, therefore, that in this instance the translator adhered 
closely to native word forms - although he applied them in an altogether 
original and dynamic sense - and opted to exclude the more obvious and 
precise equivalent of Latin "ignorantia", "ignoraunce", a word which 
was already wholly assimilated into the English vocabulary and thus, 
presumably, readily comprehensible to his prospective audience. He 
seems, in fact, to have wilfully exploited the construction itself of 
the word "vnknowe" as the blander term "ignoraunce" could not be 
exploited, in order to accentuate his contention that if unitive 
awareness of God could only be achieved through the process of negation, 
this was paradoxically an active and even, as he stresses in other 
contexts, a strenuous process. The coinage "vnbe" in Privy Counselling 
157/4 is exactly similar in composition and effect. 
88 Further, by 
insisting, as he does in 5/22 and 7/5, that the "knowyng" of God 
achieved through loving union with Him is a condition of "vnknowyng" 
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with respect to the normal human cognitive faculties, he reinforces 
verbally the paradox which is conveyed by sense alone in the Latin, 
and emphasizes the essential non-rationality of the mystic state - 
a point which is formally articulated in Ch. III of the text: 
... whan we entren into ýe derknes at is abouen mynde, 
we schul not onliche fynde ýe schortyng of wordes, bot as 
it were a madnes &a parfite vnresonabiltee of alle at we 
seyn. (8/12-15). - 
His His fondness for this particular verbal paradox is apparent from its 
recurrence in various forms in Cloud and Privy Counselling: 
... to comprehende al him by loue, be whiche is incomprehensible 
to alle create knowable mi3t. (Cloud 18/18-19); 
... & herfore it was at Seynte Denis seyde: 'die moste goodly 
knowyng of God is pat, be whiche is knowyn bi_vnknowyng' (Cloud 
125/10-12) ; 
bis is be cloude of vnknowyng; bis is at priue loue put: in 
purete of spirit; is is be Arke of be Testament. is is 
Denis deuinite, his wisdom & his drewry, his li3ty derknes 
& his vnknowyn kunnynges. (P. C. 154/15-18) 
These last two examples are of particular interest in that they 
illustrate how closely the paradox of "unknown knowledge" was specif- 
ically associated in the author's mind with mystical theology as it 
was defined by Ps. -Dionysius. The second, moreover, which couples 
this with the related Dionysian paradox of "li3ty derknes" (the 
"souereyn-schinyng derknes" ("supersplendentem ... caliginem") of 
the prayer which prefaces the text of Deonise Hid Diuinite) and 
focusses on these as the nucleus of Dionysian mysticism, clearly 
indicates what it was that, for this author, was of primary importance 
in the teaching of the De Mystica Theologia, and highlights his 
acceptance of paradox as being among the most appropriate means of 
formulating linguistically the Dionysian doctrine of divine trans- 
cendence. 
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It has been noted that although the translator of the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite modifies the meaning of the word to answer the demands 
of his text, "vnknowyng" already formed part of the English vocabulary. 
It is entirely vernacular both in its components and in its construction, 
which comprises verbal stem qualified by the negating prefix "vn-11. 
In this respect, however, the native habit of word formation precisely 
coincides with one of the: methods characteristic of both Greek and 
Latin, and the word "vnknowyng" is not only equivalent in meaning to 
Gk. äyVucTOS, Latin "ignotus", but it exactly reproduces their com- 
position. The English expression, therefore, can be seen to preserve 
the verbal model which had developed through Greek and Latin in close 
association with negative mystical theology so as to become part of 
its traditional technical vocabulary. The English author's use of the 
term, in fact, which is at once creative and staunchly traditional, 
bears out Wolfgang Riehle's observation that English mysticism in 
general is characterized by a blend of individuality and conservatism. 
He notes in this connexion that, as in the case of "vnknowyng", many 
key components of the vocabulary of the English contemplative writers 
are direct translations from Latin sources: 
Überhaupt müssen die neue volkssprachliche Mystik und die 
eine lange Tradition aufweisende lateinische Mystik in einem 
engen Verhältnis zueinander gesehen werden. Denn bei ihrem 
Bemühen um den sprachlichen Ausdruck der mystischen Thematik 
orientieren sich die volkssprachlichen Texte an den in der 
lateinischen Mystik gefundenen Ausdrucksformen, und nicht 
selten ihre mystischen Termini direkte Übertragungen lateinischer 
Ausdrücke in die Volkssprache. 89 
Negative vocabulary. Many other elements in the diction of the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite conform to the pattern of stem qualified by a 
negating prefix, which is at once totally vernacular and wholly in 
accordance with Greek and Latin negative mystical terminology: 
90 
180 
"vngropable" (2/23,5/19), "vnwise" (3/17 and 27), "vnpassyngliche" 
(7/21), "vnresonabiltee" (8/14), "vnspekable" (8/21), "vnmi3tfulnes" 
(9/17) and "vnlicnes" (9/31). The first syllable in each example 
corresponds to the Greek negating prefix '. -'and its various Latin 
equivalents, and in many cases - those, for instance, of "vngropable", 
"vnpassyngliche", "vnresonabiltee" and "vnmi3tfulnes" - the translator 
seems to have exploited the resources already available to him in the 
vernacular to create new words on the traditional pattern. 91 In a 
few cases, (e. g. "inmaterial" (7/18), "inuisible" (2/23,5/19), and 
"inordynacioun" (9/16)), 92 he simply reproduced Latin negative vocab- 
ulary in anglicized form without substituting English equivalents for 
either or both elements of the words as in the above examples. In 
general, however, he made the Dionysian negative terminology totally 
his own, to the extent that he incorporated it in expanded or inter- 
polated passages for which there is no precedent in the Latin versions 
of the text: e. g. "vnbigonne" (2/14,6/13 and 29) and "vnmaad" (6/13 
and 29), 93 and as the examples cited here from the Corpus as a whole 
demonstrate , he employed it confidently though not liberally in 
works of his own composition. 
Where the Latin versions express negative concepts otherwise 
than by words constructed on this traditional model, however, the 
English text usually concurs with their practice: e. g. "withouten 
voice" (8/21), "withoutyn substaunce" (9/4) and "nou3t seeyng" (5/28). 
Similarly, in the final sentence of the treatise, where the translator 
enlarges quite freely on the Extractio version, he combines both 
methods of expressing negative concepts. In this respect, the English 
author continues the trend away from the stark uniformity and invar- 
iability of Ps. -Dionysius' negative terminology which his Latin 
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predecessors had already instituted: corresponding to the three 
examples cited above (8/21,9/4 and 5/28), for example, the Greek 
original has ä4wvos, avoüatos and ä6aeipias. 
Equally the English translator does not follow Gallus' lead in 
accentuating the negative bias of the work with frequent interpolations 
of negative vocabulary. 94 Nor, in those passages where the principal 
source of his translation is the Sarracenus text, does he consistently 
take account of every negative phrase which the Latin version includes, 95 
or reproduce without exception the traditional construction of the 
original Latin terms. 96 His softening of the bald catalogue of 
Dionysian negatives in Sarracenus' version of Ch. iv, 97 and his 
emphasis, which echoes Gallus', on their significance for the contem- 
plative way is also striking. 98 In his translation and his original 
works alike, the English author is sparing in his application of the 
technical negative vocabulary of Dionysian mystical theology. 
"Super-" vocabulary. The Latin "super-" vocabulary (Gk. üirsp -) 
closely resembles the negative terminology both in composition and in 
its implication that finite concepts cannot be ascribed to a trans- 
cendent God, and it is similarly treated by the English translator. 
He customarily reproduces the Latin formation of stem qualified by a 
prefix which defines the sense in which God may be said to possess 
finite attributes, though on occasions he also substitutes an adjective 
or verb + adverb construction for the Latin compounds. In either case, 
he consistently renders Latin "super-" by "souereyn-" or its adverbial 
form "souereinly", and as with the negative vocabulary, so here he 
rarely circumvents the "super-" terms where they occur in his sources. 
Equally, he does not follow the precedent set by Gallus of adding to 
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the "un£p-" terminology of the original text. One exception to this 
general rule appears in 4/15-16, where the translator substitutes 
the significantly different phrase, "in is he was rauischid to 
beholde abouen kynde", for the Latin version "illud supernaturaliter 
intendens"; the possible importance of this variation, which is clearly, 
more than verbal, will be considered below. 99 
The adjective "souerein" is, of course, Latinate and not Teutonic 
in origin, but it was already in accepted English usage by the second 
half of the fourteenth century. The O. E. D. has various references 
to it in the sense of "excelling, supreme, paramount" prior to 1400, 
including citations from Chaucer's Man of Law's Tale and the Pricke 
of Conscience. As an adjective qualifying "good" (the equivalent of 
Latin "summum bonum"), it appears in both Rolle and Wiclif. Walter 
Hilton includes "souereyn sobfastnes, souereyn goodnes... " in his 
account of appropriate descriptions of God in Ch. 32 of Scale, Book II. 
The Cloud author himself uses the term in this sense relatively 
frequently in his original works: e. g. Cloud 2/3,74/13; P. C. 169/19; 
P. P. 51/20; Disc. St. 75/19; Disc. Sp. 88/7; Ben. Min. 31/10. In 
Deonise Hid Diuinite, however, the term seems to be invested with 
a peculiar, exclusive meaning which is barely parallelled in the 
other texts in the group. The nearest equivalent is in Cloud 18/11-12, 
where the author refers to the "souerein desirable ... be whiche is 
God", and the allusion to "be souereynest wisdom of his Godhead" 
(47/11-12) is perhaps also comparable. 
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The prefix 'souereyn-', 
however, does not properly possess the negative connotations of the 
Dionysian terminology: the "souereyn-" vocabulary denotes only the 
superlative degree to which God possesses finite attributes, whereas 
the üncp_(Itsuper-") vocabulary suggests that God possesses such 
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attributes to excess, and therefore, in a real sense, does not 
possess them in any way which it is within man's power to comprehend. 
The nearer vernacular equivalent for Latin "super-", in this respect, 
would be the prefix "ouer-". It is interesting, indeed, that where 
the English author employs the idea in his original compositions, he 
substitutes the native form "ouer-" for the latinate "souereyn-" when 
he refers to "je oueraboundaunt loue ... of God in himself" in Cloud 
40/15. 
However, while the author treats'the "super-" terminology lingu- 
istically in the same way as its negative counterpart - namely, by 
adapting the resources available to him in contemporary English to 
produce a compound which is at once strikingly individual and yet, 
in terms of its construction, in total accord with the traditions of 
Dionysian mystical language - he nevertheless seems to discriminate 
between-them in his relative willingness to apply them outside the 
context from which they originate. It may be that this is simply a 
just reflection of the dominant themes of the Cloud Corpus, since 
negative language is more apt to describe the conditions under which 
a soul might achieve unitive knowledge of the transcendent God -a 
subject which consistently preoccupies the author of these. texts - 
than the more abstract and speculative "super-" terminology. It is 
also conceivable, however, that the English author, ruled as in all 
things by his concern to convey his teaching in an accessible and 
readily assimilable fashion, regarded the "super-" vocabulary as 
esoteric and technical to a degree which curtailed its usefulness 
outside the context which occasioned it. Perhaps, too, he found the 
rather cerebral and high-sounding prose which the proliferation of 
such epithets tends to foster a potential obstacle to the clear 
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spiritual understanding of his readership. 
Darkness. The conscious preservation of the traditional character- 
istics of Dionysian mystical vocabulary in these two instances makes 
it accordingly less easy to account for the translator's lack of 
precision in rendering the concepts of "cloud" and "darkness" as 
they occur in the De rlystica Theologia. Both Latin sources of the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite consistently differentiate Gk. yvö'os from 
OKÖTOS, translating the former by "caligo" and the latter by "tenebrae", 101 
thus insisting on the distinction between "cloud" and "darkness" which 
goes back to the Moses narrative in Exodus, though, it has been argued 
in Ch. II of this thesis, Ps. -Dionysius himself does not seem to have 
acknowledged the distinction; he rather interprets the biblical darkness 
as representing the state wherein finite concepts and modes of knowledge 
are finally negated which is the term of the process of aphairesis. 102 
Interestingly, the English author's version seems to embody the sense 
of the Greek text more precisely, in that "derknes" or the adjective 
"derk" render both the terms which occur in the Latin sources. As in 
the original text of Ps. -Dionysius, the biblical allusion is effectively 
submerged - though, as the translator almost certainly did not draw on. 
a Greek text, it is difficult to account for his practice satisfactor- 
ily. He may have been concerned to preserve the clarity and simplicity 
of his translation, since the evidence of the M. E. D. certainly tends 
to suggest that he would neither have been ignorant of the distinction 
nor lacking in the verbal resources to reproduce it in his English 
version of the text. The entry for "mist" seems to indicate that it 
was the received equivalent of Lat. "caligo" (or "nubilium") by the 
second half of the fourteenth century. The Wicliffite Bible of 1384, 
for example, translates Acts 13.11 as "Anoon a myst (Lat. Caligo) fel 
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down on hym and derknesse (Lat. tenebrae)". Similarly, under "misti" 
(adj. l), the M. E. D. has further examples from the same source in 
which the word corresponds to derivatives of "caligo" and "nubilium". 
In the second sense of "misti" listed by the M. E. D., "open to symbol- 
ical or spiritiial interpretation; figurative", the English word seems 
to represent Lat. "mysticus" (e. g. (1440) Promptorium Parvulorum 340: 
"Mysty, or prevey to mannys wytte: Misticus"), which is also rendered 
by the-English translator as "derke" in 2/19.103 The entry for "derk", 
however, confirms the meaning which it supports in the Deonise Hid 
Diuinite from other sources: e. g. (a1398) Trev. Barth. 11b/a: "Alle 
bodilich hinges at bei I seid of god hauet figuratif mistik and derk 
menynge"; Ibid. 14b/b: "fiese wordes beý ful trewe, and passiý alle men 
touchinge ýe durk & mistik menynge ýerof". But as the example from 
Acts 13.11 quoted above suggests, in its principal non-metaphorical 
sense the English term "derknes" seems to have been the received equiv- 
alent of Latin "tenebrae" - an inference which is corroborated by the 
definition which the M. E. D. cites from Promptorium Parvulorum 119: 
"Derke or merke: Tenebrosus, obscurus. i104 
While the Deonise Hid Diuinite translates both "caligo" and 
"tenebrae" as "derknes", however, and omits any reference to "cloud", 
its author uses both terms apparently synonymously in his major 
treatise, the Cloud of Unknowing. Indeed, as the title of this work 
suggests, he even shows some preference for "cloud" as a metaphor for 
the divine transcendence. He couples both metaphors without comment 
on many occasions, as, for example, in 28/18-19, where he alludes to 
"j, is cloude & dis derknes abouen fee", but the most revealing passage 
in this connexion is the attempted explanation of his figurative 
language which occurs in Ch. IV, 23/20-24: 
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For when I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of knowyng; as 
alle at ping at Sou knowest not, or elles }gat Sou hast 
for3etyn, it is derk to bee, for bou seest it not wib bi 
goostly i3e. & for }gis skile it is not clepid a cloude of 
be eire, bot a cloude of vnknowyng, at is bitwix bee & bi 
God. 
The ethos of the passage is entirely Dionysian, but comparison with 
the author's indiscriminate rendering of "caligo" and "tenebrae" in 
the Deonise Hid Diuinite may indicate that he drew on secondary sources 
of Dionysian theology in addition to the De Mystica Theologia itself. 105 
Mystical. It has been noted that in 2/19, the adjective "derke" 
corresponds. to Lat. "mysticus" in the phrase "derke inspirid spekynges" 
which renders the "mysticorum eloquiorum" of the original text. The 
currency of the English epithet in this sense has already been indicated, 
yet it might be remarked that if lexicographical evidence suggests that 
the English translator was not eccentric in his choice of vocabulary, 
he clearly handles the phrase as a whole in a peculiar, rather oblique 
fashion. It seems, in fact, designed to periphrase or circumvent the 
word "mystical", which is the obvious translation for the text of the 
original. In this respect, his treatment of the phrase is not without 
parallel. "Mysticus" is translated by the vernacular term "hid" in 
the title and in 5/18,106 and where the word occurs in an explanatory 
interpolation in Gallus' Extractio which corresponds to Deonise Hid 
Diuinite 7/5-6, the English translator abides by the version of 
Sarracenus which does not contain the term. Perhaps the most inter- 
esting instance of apparent evasion of the word, however, is in 2/32, 
where the translator substitutes the paradoxical phrase "blynde 
beholdynges" for Sarracenus "mysticas visiones". The English phrase 
is clearly constructed on the paradoxical model traditionally associ- 
ated with Dionysian mysticism, and is the counterpart in both form 
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and meaning of the concept of unknown knowledge. The translator thus 
replaces one technical expression of Dionysian theology with another 
equally technical, and it is perhaps surprising that he seems to favour 
the more esoteric phrase which evokes metaphorically what the Latin 
source states without ambiguity. 
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The reasons for this procedure on the part of the translator are 
difficult to determine. Like "derke", the adjective "hid" is Teutonic 
in origin and readily comprehensible. It occurs relatively frequently 
in the Deonise Hid Diuinite - once in a passage interpolated by the 
translator (2/29), and elsewhere it is used interchangeably with 
"priue", the two words corresponding indiscriminately to a variety 
of Latin terms of equivalent meaning (2/20,6/23,6/27,7/7-8). 
"Priue" itself, though Latinate rather than Teutonic in its derivation, 
was wholly assimilated into the vernacular by the thirteenth century 
and shares with "derke" and "hid" the merit of simplicity and immediate 
intelligibility. 108 It may be, however, that the translator - again 
seemingly unwilling to import Latin terms gratuitously where English 
could furnish an adequate alternative-was bound by the poverty of the 
English vocabulary in this area as much as by his desire to produce 
an unambiguous text. The derivatives of two of the Latin words which 
carry the sense "hidden" in this text, "occult" and "abscond", only 
became absorbed into the English language in the post-medieval era. 
"Closen" is listed in the M. E. D. (paragraphs 11a and b cover the mean- 
ing of "hide, conceal, keep secret"), but with the exception of one 
isolated reference to the early fourteenth century Shoreham Poems, 
the only citations are from the very late fourteenth or early fifteenth 
century. 
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The word "mistely", however, occurs twice elsewhere in the 
Cloud Corpus: in Privy Counselling 144/25 and Discrecioun of Stirings 
75/18, and although these particular incidences are not recorded in 
the M. E. D., the examples of the word (in the sense of "figuratively, 
symbolically, allegorically, mystically") which the dictionary does 
incorporate indicate the currency of the word, in theological texts 
at least, from the late fourteenth century. The entry includes two 
citations from both the first Wicliffite Bible and from works attrib- 
uted to Walter Hilton, the Scale of Perfection and the Qui Habitat. 
In its adjectival form, "mystical" is not instanced before 1500, but 
there are several examples of "mystik", drawn mainly from the Wicliffite 
Bibles and Trevisa's translation of Bartholomew. The examples from 
the Wicliffite Bibles show "mystik" as rendering Latin "mystical", 
and the citations from Trevisa show the adjective in accepted usage 
alongside the various synonyms for it which occur in the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite: "mystik & dirk vndirstondinge" (8a/b); "figuratif, 
mistik & dym & derke tokenynges" (78b/a); "mystyk and priue binges" 
(157a/b). It seems, therefore, that in this last instance at least, 
the translator systematically substituted familiar and unequivocal 
vernacular terms for a Latinate word which would have preserved the 
text of the original more closely and seems to have been accepted if 
not widely used in late fourteenth century English -a word, indeed, 
which he himself was occasionally willing to employ in his own original 
compositions. It may be that he was wary of the term, perhaps consid- 
ering it insufficiently current or free from ambiguity to be used in 
the context of a translation whose principal object was intelligibility, 
or perhaps he thought it dangerously esoteric and open to misconstruction. 
Either of these reasons may likewise go some way to explaining his 
comparable treatment of the Latin term "mysteria", which he also 
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translates by "pryue binges" and "priuetees" in 2/19 and 3/26, although 
in this case there is some evidence to suggest that there may have been 
some uncertainty as to its precise meaning in the fourteenth century. 
Various references from the Wicliffite Bible, for example, where 
"misteri" is the unvarying equivalent of Latin "mysterium", guardedly 
incorporate "priuyte" as an explanatory gloss on the Latinate term: 
e. g. W. Bible(l) Mat. 13.11 "For to Sou it is 3ouen for to knowe the 
mysterie, or priuyte (L. mysteria) of the kyngdam of heuenes"; ibid. 
2 Thes. 2.7; also Trevisa Barth. 325b/a"... misterie and priuete... " 
(L. mysterium). It may have been to avoid possible misunderstanding 
that the English text resorts to simpler vernacular alternatives, 
though clearly something of the richness and precision of the Latin 
vocabulary is sacrificed in the English version. 
Theology. Similar inferences may perhaps be drawn from the English 
author's use of the term "deuinytee". It occurs in the translation 
with three distinct senses: 
1. "theology" (e. g. in the title of the text, 2/19,7/10 etc). 
This is its principal meaning, in which it corresponds to 
Latin "theologia". It also has this sense in other texts 
of the Cloud group, though incidences of the word are com- 
paratively rare: e. g. Cloud 30/14; Pistle of Preier 55/20-21; 
in Privy Counselling 154T1_7, where it is used in connexion 
with this particular treatise, it has the specialized sense 
often implicit here of "mystical theology" 
2. "Godhead" (e. g. 4/13) 
3. In 8/22-3 and 8/23-4, it is qualified by "affirmatyue" and 
"negatyue", and is glossed by Prof. Hodgson as "positive-" 
and "negative statements made about God". 
The M. E. D. confirms the currency of the term "deuinytee" with 
the meaning it most commonly supports in this text ("theology; 
knowledge or learning in divine matters or in Scripture") from the 
early fourteenth century, and the references include a passage from 
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Scale Bk. I, ch. 24, which is a near contemporary of the Cloud Corpus. 
What is perhaps surprising, however, in view of the translator's 
avoidance of the word "theology" (the anglicized form of the "theologia" 
of his Latin sources) is the evidence of the O. E. D., which seems to 
indicate that the word was in accepted English usage by the latter 
part of the fourteenth century. Piers Plowman A. X1 136 and Chaucer's 
Parson's Tale 969 are cited as examples. The reasons for the apparent 
avoidance of the term by the English author are difficult to ascertain. 
He may perhaps have appreciated the flexibility of the term "deuinytee", 
which combines the senses of Godhead and the study of religious science: 
the ambiguity of the title of the text is particularly suggestive. 
In effect, however, his rather conservative preference for the term 
"deuinytee" which, though Latinate in origin, had been longer and more 
thoroughly absorbed into the vernacular, undoubtedly tends to simplify 
and clarify the English text, and incidentally serves to minimise the 
technical aspect of the Dionysian vocabulary. Indeed, it often seems 
the case that the English translator shuns terms whose very status in 
the received technical vocabulary of theology preempts individual 
usage and dulls the challenge which individual incidences present to 
the reader's understanding, and here, perhaps, he is similarly con- 
cerned to avoid a word too redolent of the schools in order to fore- 
stall its tendency to evoke scholastic principles and habits of 
thought. These factors may indeed have had some force in determining 
the translator's choice of vocabulary, since the various instances in 
which the English version significantly modifies the text of the 
original (notably, "bookes of deuinitee" (7/11) which renders 
Sarracenus "theologicis hypotyposibus", and the even looser trans- 
lation of the same phrase by "too two bookes" in 7/24; 
110 and secondly, 
the substitution of the title "Gadering of Deuine Sentence" (7/28-9)- 
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or its variant form "Gaderid Book of Deuine Sentence" (8/8-9) for the 
non-extant treatise by Ps. -Dionysius referred to in all the Latin 
versions of the text as the Symbolica Theologia1 
11)- 
are clearly 
calculated to expound as well as translate the terms of the original 
Latin text, and even go some way to elucidate the points of doctrine 
which they express. 
Union, Unity. The. terminology which pertains to the unitive exper- 
ience itself is undoubtedly the most specialized and sensitive in the 
language of the De Mystica Theologia. In the Latin sources, the allied 
concepts of "union" and "unity" are rendered by "unire", "unitio" and 
"unitas". The related anglicized form, "vnitee", however, occurs only 
once in the English text (10/6), where it corresponds to Lat. "unitas" 
and denotes a possible attribute of God, "unity". Elsewhere, and in 
his independent additions to the text, the translator opts for the 
simple vernacular terms "onid" and "knyttyd" to express the idea of 
union in both its technical mystical and more generalized senses. 
Thus, the bond between soul and body is described by the term "knittyd" 
in 6/18, and even the notion of unity is expressed as "onheed" in its 
only other occurrence in the text, where the translator incorporates 
the phrase "onheed of substaunce"in his expanded account of the mystery 
of the. Trinity in 7/19-20. The translator's preference for vernacular 
vocabulary here seems to be equally marked in the Cloud corpus as a 
whole: e. g. Cloud 107/3,108/20-21; P. C. 136/24. In P. C. 139/13-14, 
the two terms favoured in the Deonise Hid Diuinite are again associ- 
ated in the description of the unitive condition of the soul, "knittid 
& onid in grace & in spirit to ýe precious beyng of God in himself 
only as he is". The words are similarly linked and connected with 
the highest contemplative state in Cloud 32/15-16, where mystic union 
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is defined as being "... knit to God in spirite, & in oneheed of 
loue". 112 
That the use of vernacular vocabulary here is a matter of prefer- 
ence rather than necessity seems implied by the single incidence of 
"vnitee" and confirmed by the evidence of the O. E. D., which records 
the word from the early fourteenth century. Two of the first examples, 
presumably antedating the Deonise Hid Diuinite by some half a century 
(Cursor Mundi 6342, "his wandes takens persons thre, And an-fald Godd 
in vnite"; Spec. Gy. Warw. 492, "Wid ýe fader, and wid ýe sone, And 
wid to holi gost in vnite") include the word "vnite" in a context 
identical to that in which the later text has the vernacular compound 
"onheed" (`7/19-20). As Riehle notes, however, by far the most common 
equivalents for parts of "unire" in the vernacular religious literature 
of the period derive from "on", and the author of the Cloud Corpus seems 
to have valued the immediacy and easy intelligibility of the germanic 
vocabulary. 
113 Where he includes "vnitee" - Extractio "neque unum, 
neque unitas", D. H. D. 10/ 6 "ne on, ne vnitee" - it is perhaps because 
in this context to have used the vernacular compound "onheed", which 
corresponds precisely to the Latin form "unitas", contiguous to "on", 
might not have made the distinct claims which the Latin text proposes 
here concerning the nature of the Godhead sufficiently clear to an 
audience less well versed in the technicalities of theological 
language than the translator himself. The English author is con- 
sistently careful to avoid fettering his text with excessive technic- 
alities of either terminology or doctrine, and it is noteworthy in 
relation to his treatment of the vocabulary pertaining to mystic 
union that he also excludes from his translation the more specialized 
theoretical accounts of its nature which are incorporated in the 
193 
Extractio. 114 The inclusion of the term "vnitee", however, which 
the examples cited from the O. E. D. show to have been in accepted 
usage to denote the oneness of the three persons of the Trinity, 
demonstrates the concern of the translator to preserve the technical 
accuracy of his text whilst adapting his vocabulary to the comprehension 
of his disciple - an end, in this case, best served by the retention 
of the latinate form. In other instances, however, and particularly 
where the translator is concerned with the experience of contemplative 
union rather than the ontological concept of unity, the germanic terms 
fulfil the same function. In 3/11, for example, the phrase "to be onid 
with hym" exactly reproduces the sense of Lat. "unitio", which occurs 
in the texts of both Sarracenus and Gallus. This example is, in fact, 
particularly interesting, since his Latin sources significantly modify 
the text of the original and the. early translation by Erigena at this 
point. The reading of the Greek, irPös T1V 
EvwclV 
, is more accurately 
rendered by Erigena's term "unitas". 115 The alteration to "unitio" 
by the later translators is representative of their systematic attempts 
to bring Dionysian theology unquestionably into line with orthodox 
Christian doctrine on the sense in which the soul may be said to 
achieve union with God. By his choice, of terminology, therefore, the 
English translator - unconsciously, perhaps, but nonetheless effectively 
- confirms the later interpretation and continues the trend which made 
the text of Ps. -Dionysius at once more accessible to the Western Church 
and more consistent with its dogma. 
Excess, Above mind. The vocabulary which defines the nature of the 
unitive experience itself and the conditions in which it obtains 
was listed above under two headings, "excess" and "abouen mynde" 
(pp. 155 and158-9), though the terms are closely interconnected and, 
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except for a preliminary account of their relations to the Latin 
sources, cannot be adequately discussed in isolation from one another. 
The English text does not reproduce the Latin term "excesses", 
but substitutes synonymous phrases of vernacular origin where the 
word occurs in its sources. In 3/13 and 10/21-2, the translator 
introduces the compound "ouerpassyng", and the verb "excedere" is 
represented either by "be abouen" (3/26,4/9) or the variant "pass 
abouen" (4/21,5/7). 116 The M. E. D., however, provides evidence of 
the currency of the anglicized form of the Latin noun in theological 
texts from the late fourteenth century. The earliest recorded occur- 
rences of the word in the relevant sense of "rapture, ecstasy etc. " 
are from the Wjcliffite Bible of 1382, Ps. 30.1: "The salm of Dauid 
for the ecces of mynd"; ibid. 30.23: "I forsothe seide in exces of my 
mynde (L. excessu mentis mea), I am cast aferr fro the face of thin 
e3en"; and from the Wicliffite Bible of 1384, Deeds 11.5: "I sy3 in 
excess of my soule a visioun". The references also include one from 
Privy Counselling, where the English author himself incorporates the 
word in a recollection of Richard of St. Victor's Benjamin Minor: 
"By be whiche Beniamyn ben vnderstonden alle boo at in excesse of 
loue ben rauischid abouen mynde, be prophete seiing bus: Ibi 
Beniamyn adolescentulus in mentis excessu. at is to sey: 'per is 
Beniamyn, a Song childe, in excesse of mynde'. " (P. C. 150/19-23). 
Here, as in the example quoted from the earlier Wicliffite Bible, 
the English phrase "excesse of mynde" corresponds to Latin "excessu 
mentis", and it is supplemented by the expanded explanatory version, 
"rauischid abouen mynde", which, the text affirms, obtains "in excesse 
of loue". 117 This second form of the phrase is nearly echoed in 
Deonise Hid Diuinite 4/15-16, where the Apostle Bartholomew is said 
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to have been "... rauischid to beholde abouen kynde. 11118 Indeed, 
the Middle English translation is particularly interesting at this 
point, since it modifies the phraseology though not the sense of the 
text of Sarracenus ("illud supernaturaliter intendens"), substituting 
vocabulary which was already current in English religious literature 
and which this author himself associated specifically with the trad- 
itional Dionysian theory of mystical union. The term "rauischid" is, 
in fact, his most common epithet for the soul's sudden accession to 
the state of ecstasy in the Cloud Corpus as a whole, and it is often 
directly linked with the biblical types of the contemplative, Moses 
and Benjamin. Translating the same text from Ps. 68.27 in the Stodye 
of Wysdome 46/10-14, for example, he reiterates "rauesching" where his 
most natural choice would have been "excesse": 
... be tyme at bi mynde be rauischid abouen itself ... in 
be beholdyng of God & godly binges. So at it be fulfillid 
in Pee at is wretyn in be psalme: 'Ibi Beniamyn adol(es)centulus 
in mentis excessu'. at is: 'Pere is Beniamyn, de 3onge childe, in 
rauesching of mynde'. 119 
It occurs again in a similar context earlier in the same treatise, 
45/6-9: 
For whi in what tyrne at a soule is rauischid abouen hymself 
by habundaunce of desires &a greet multytude of loue, so at 
it is enflawmyd with be li3t of be Godheed, sekirly an dy3eb 
al mans reson..., 
in Cloud 47/18-19: 
... so hi3e rauischid in contemplacion & loue of be 
Godheed..., 
and in the descriptive title of Cloud ch. 71(12/4-5), 
bat som may not come to fele be perfeccion of bis werk bot 
in tyme of rauisching, & som mowe haue it when bei wil, in 
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be comoun state of mans soule. 
Comparable examples may also be cited from the Pistle of Preier 53/ 
19-20 and 58/24-59/1, and its precise significance is defined in the 
body of Cloud ch. 71, where the author explains his distinctions between 
the different orders of contemplative experience: 
For som ber ben at wiboutyn moche & longe goostly exersise 
mowe not com berto: & Sit it schal be bot ful seeldom, & in 
special callyng of oure Lorde, at bei schul fele be perfeccion 
of bis werk: be whiche callyng is clepid rauishing. (Cloud. 126/7- 
10 20 
In all these instances, emphasis is on the essentially non- 
rational character of the unitive experience - the mind and soul are 
momentarily rapt "abouen" themselves, the Cloud author repeatedly 
insists. His terminology here recalls the various equivalents for 
Lat. "excedere" and "excessus" in the Deonise Hid Diuinite ("be abouen", 
"passen abouen", "ouerpassyng" etc. ). The phrase "abouen mynde" itself 
occurs relatively frequently in the English translation and in only 
two cases (5/24 and 8/13), it should be noted, is it an exact rendering 
of "super mentem" in the Latin sources. In four other examples (2/25, 
2/25-6,4/3,6/28) it is an interpolation, and in the remaining two 
instances (3/16-17 and, in slightly variant form, 5/10-11) it represents 
an important departure from the Latin original. Where both the Extractio 
and Sarracenus have "sursumageris", the corresponding passage in the 
English text reads "you schalt be drawen up abouen mynde in affeccioun" 
(3/16-17): the qualifying phrase "in affeccioun" possibly takes up a 
hint from Gallus' Gloss, which here stresses the primacy of love in 
the contemplative ascent, but "abouen mynde" is apparently a gratuitous 
interpolation on the part of the translator. 121 Similarly, with the 
expression "and setteb hym abouen pe natureel teermes of hymself"(5/10-11), 
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the translator shows some license in his treatment of his sources, 
in order, it seems, to accentuate his own individual interpretation 
of the Dionysian theory of unitive knowledge: the Latin source at 
this point has, "... monstratur intelligibilibus summitatibus sanct- 
issimorum locorum ejus superveniens". 
The frequency and consistency with which the translator applies 
the phrase "abouen mynde" in the Deonise Hid Diuinite suggests, there- 
fore, that it had for him a technical sense descriptive of the character 
of mystic union, 122 and this seems to be substantiated by his accounts 
of the experience in other works of the Corpus where he had none of 
the obligations of a translator to inhibit him. In ch. 8 of the Cloud, 
for example, he specifies the location of the unitive experience: 
Bot in ýe hi3er partie of contemplatiue liif, a man is abouen 
himself & under his God. Abouen himself he is, for whi he 
purpose} him to wynne_t)eder bi grace, wheýer he may not come 
bi kynde; at is to sey, to be knit to God in spirite, & in 
oneheed of loue & acordaunce of wille. (Cloud 32/12-16) 
Later, in chs. 62-7, which have as their immediate source Richard of 
St. Victor's Benjamin Minor but derive ultimately from the De Trinitate 
of St. Augustine, the author includes a detailed analysis of the 
faculties of the soul which serves as a gloss on this assertion. 
He recognizes five spiritual faculties which are divided into two 
categories: mind, reason and will are labelled principal faculties, 
and imagination and sensuality comprise the secondary category. Of 
the foremost of these, mind, he says, 
Mynde is soche a mi tcin itself, at properly to speke & 
in maner it worchel) noL itself. Bot reson & wille, fei ben 
two worching mi3tes, & so is ymaginacion & sensualite also. 
& alle bees foure mi3tes & beire werkes mynde conteneb & 
comprehendel in itself. & on non oiler wise it is seide at 
mynde worcheb, bot 3if soche a comprehencion be a werke. (Cloud 115/9-14 
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The concept of mind, therefore, is held to encompass all natural 
human faculties of perception and intellection. Thus, in insisting 
that the unitive experience takes place "abouen mynde", the English 
author dissociates the contemplative act from the normal processes 
of cognition. The contemplative is properly "abouen himself" for 
the duration of his mystical experience. More precisely, in the 
Cloud author's terminology, the contemplative transcends all finite 
modes of knowledge and enters into the "first... " or "souereyn poynte 
of be spirite" where he apprehends God in an ecstasy of love. He 
describes this condition in Privy Counselling 16919 as a "goostly 
onyng to his loue in be souereyn poynte of bi spirite". 123 
III. Apex mentis: the background to the Cloud author's unitive theology. 
Here, however, it is necessary to diverge from the predominantly 
linguistic approach to the Deonise Hid Diuinite which has so far been 
adopted to examine the ideological relationship of the text to its 
Latin sources. Clearly where the translator deviates from his sources 
in order to emphasize that the unitive experience takes place "abouen 
mynd", his motivation must be theological rather than linguistic. 
The precise background to this aspect of the English translation may, 
therefore, best be determined by ascertaining the debt of its author's 
theory of mystical knowledge, as it is defined here and in the Corpus 
as a whole, not only to the immediate textual sources of the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite, but perhaps also to other works in the Dionysian mystical 
tradition. 
The use of the phrase "be souereyn poynte of be spirite" is, in 
fact, itself evidence that the Cloud author was aware of the theological 
controversy concerning the spiritual faculty whereby the soul might 
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achieve contemplative union, which persisted throughout the thirteenth 
century, and that although he did not actively enter into the debate, 
his views on the question were firmly decided. The English expression 
corresponds to the Latin phrase "apex mentis" (Gk. TO ävw'T(XTOV PEPOS) 
- one of the terms designating the mystical faculty which became prom- 
inent in the vocabulary of the medieval schools. Its history is traced 
by Prof. Dr. Endre von Ivanka in his article "Apex Mentis. Wanderung 
und Wandlung eines stoischen Terminismus". 124 The term originated in 
Stoic philosophy, where it denoted the single faculty of the soul from 
which all others were held to derive. It was principally through Origen, 
in whose works elements of Stoicism merge and interact with the different 
traditions of Christian and Platonist ideology, that the concept became 
absorbed into the mainstream of Christian thought. His impact on 
Gregory of Nyssa's negative mystical theology was decisive in this 
respect, since it seems to have been through Gregory's mediating 
influence that the Stoic notion was assimilated by Ps. -Dionysius and 
so far developed by him as to form the basis of a contemplative theory 
which alienated mystical apprehension of God from the sphere of the 
senses and intellect. 
The tradition of mystical theology which Ps. -Dionysius fostered 
on this premise was thus, von Ivanka insists, distinct in origin from 
that which had its roots in Platonist philosophy. This parallel 
tradition was grounded in the assumption that the soul and the One 
were intrinsically alike in kind. Not admitting the radical disjunction 
between human nature and the Divine posited by the Dionysian school, 
Platonism therefore conceived of the ascent to contemplative awareness 
as one continuous process demanding successive purifications of the 
intellect until the soul regained its pristine condition and thereby 
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its inherent capacity to apprehend the One. Eternal vision of the 
One was hence an extension of earthly vision, differing from it in 
degree but not in essence. In its development through Plotinus and 
St. Augustine, the Platonist position inevitably underwent considerable 
modification - most importantly through the recognition of love as a 
mode of knowledge and of divine grace as a necessary precondition for 
unitive comprehension. Continuity and the efficacy of the purified 
intellect, however, remained characteristic principles of the August- 
inian concept of the contemplative way. 
It would, of course, be misleading to suggest that these two 
traditions of mystical theology were generated and developed in entire 
isolation one from the other. While they occupied different ground in 
respect of their teaching on the mystical faculty, many of their sources 
were held in common, and some reciprocal influence was, moreover, 
wholly predictable at the hands of medieval religious writers for 
whom both formed part of the authoritative heritage of contemplative 
theology. In particular, the Stoic theory of apex mentis and its 
related terminology were, from the thirteenth-century, recurrently 
associated with the Augustinian notion of ratio superior, which 
derives principally from Plotinus and finds no echo in the Dionysian 
Corpus. The point is convincingly urged by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., 
in his article "Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior: the Historical 
Background". 125 The key text for St. Augustine's account of the 
faculties of the soul is the De Trinitate, Book XII. Here Augustine 
divides mind into two parts, the higher and the lower; of these, the 
lower is capable of attaining only to scientia, discursive knowledge, 
while the higher is gifted with the potential to achieve sapientia, 
the wisdom of contemplation. 
126 The distinction between the two orders 
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of knowledge is summarized by Mulligan: 
Sapientia is the virtue proper to the upper part - the part 
which is itself an image of God and whose primary function is 
the contemplation of the divine reasons. 'Quantumcumque se 
extendent in id quod aeternum est', St. Augustine states, 'tanto 
magis inde formatur ad imaginem Dei... ' (XII, 7: P. L. 42,1004). 
There is no possibility whatsoever of the lower part of the reason 
ever acquiring sapientia, for wisdom excludes the type of sense 
knowledge with which the lower part is related. 127 
It is interesting, however, as Mulligan goes on to suggest, that St. 
Augustine may himself have been influenced by the Stoic concept of 
cz 
fY£uov1KOV, since in Book XII, 8, he too refers to the faculty of the 
soul able to achieve contemplative union as "principale mentis humanae" 
(P. L. 42,1044). 128 
In spite of these interchanges, the broad distinctions between 
the contemplative theory of the Stoic and Platonist schools nevertheless 
remained clearly discernible in the mystical literature of the medieval 
period. The Platonist tradition as it was developed by St. Augustine 
found its natural successors among the Victorines, and was principally 
consolidated and classified by Richard of St. Victor in his enormously 
influential works of mystical theology, the Benjamin Minor, Benjamin 
Major and De IV Gradibus Violentate Caritatis. Richard consistently 
emphasizes the continuity of the contemplative ascent, and although 
he affirms the transcendence of reason as a precondition for the 
attainment of union, his concept of the unitive experience itself is not 
anoetic, but involves the operation of the intelligentia. The Victorine 
position is discussed in some detail in the first appendix to this 
chapter, since it has a bearing on the Cloud of Unknowing in two 
important respects: in the first instance, the process of interaction 
between the two principal traditions of mystical theology which has 
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already been outlined is very much at work in this text, where elements 
of the Augustinian and Victorine theories concerning the faculties of 
the soul are integrated with what, it is hoped to demonstrate, is an 
essentially Dionysian concept of the nature of unitive knowledge. 
Secondly, the prolific work on the Dionysian Corpus by the Victorine 
abbot Thomas Gallus, which contributed so largely to the development 
of medieval contemplative theory in general and was particularly 
influential on both the text of the Deonise Hid Diuinite and the 
Cloud author's wider interpretation of Dionysian mystical theology, 
was written against a background of Augustinian principles which Gallus 
inherited from his Victorine masters,. Hugh and Richard. 
Thomas Gallus: the development of the theory of synderesis. 
A full estimate of Gallus' contemplative theology is given in 
Walsh's doctoral thesis, 'Sapientia Christianorum'. The Doctrine of 
Thomas Gallus, Abbot of Vercelli on Contemplation, and only its major 
precepts can be summarized here. 
Gallus' writings are characteristically Victorine in respect of 
their preoccupation with classifying the contemplative ascent and 
close psychological analysis of the soul at the different stages of 
its progress to union. His categories, however, are based on the 
Dionysian theory of the celestial hierarchy. The most detailed 
exposition of the hierarchic principle occurs in an extract from the 
non-extant Commentary on Isaias which is preserved in Ch. X of the 
Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy. 129 The nine orders of angels 
are here divided into three groups, which are associated with the 
three domains or mansions of the hierarchy of the mind. Differenti- 
ating the three categories, Gallus writes, 
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Primus autem modus precipue consistit in pulcro et claro, 
et hiis delectatur et naturaliter inquesitivus et veritatis; 
secundus in dulci et suavi, et facit desiderativum bonitatis. 
Primus dicitur intellectus, secundus affectus. Uterque in 
prima mansione oritur, in secunda proficit, in tertia perficitur. 
Uterque in prima videtur sola naturalia et naturaliter operari, 
licet illuminante gratia adiuvetur; in secunda co-operari gratie 
illuminati et adiuvanti; in tertia, illuminari et portari a pura 
gratia. 130 
The three mansions are respectively the domains of nature, nature 
assisted by grace, and grace alone. In the two preliminary stages of 
the contemplative ascent, the mind is occupied with objects within the 
scope of the natural human cognitive faculties and both its intellectual 
and affective powers (impelled, as Gallus consistently reaffirms, by 
the will ("liberum arbitrium")) are engaged. The third and highest 
mansion, where only grace is operative, is the province of synderesis. 
Walsh conveniently summarizes its divisions: 
'Sola gratia: 
quibus elevatur 
mens supra se: 
et omnes scripturas 
supergressa, 
unitur Deo in 
sapientia'. 
1ST HIERARCHY THIRD MANSION 
SERAPHIM The perfection of union 
('Unitio') in the apex affectus - 
scintilla synderesis. 
CHERUBIM The perfection of intellectual 
('Revelatio') knowledge by infused illum- 
ination. Consummation of 
the apex intellectus 
attracti. 
THRONES The reception of infused 
('Susceptio') graces and the divine 
attraction of the intellect 
and affection. 31 
This third mansion is, moreover, identified with the Augustinian 
concept of ratio superior - the spiritual faculty which is capable 
of attaining mystic union: 
Tertia et summa mansio pro tabulato habet superiorem vim anime, 
id est synderesim sive superioris partis vires ... 
132 
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Gallus' theory of unitive knowledge is thus born out of the 
interaction of the Augustinian and Dionysian traditions of mystical 
theology. He inherits principally from Hugh and Richard the pre- 
occupation with the relative functions of the intellectual and affective 
faculties of cognition in the ascent to contemplation. Like them, 
Gallus affirms the ultimate primacy of love: 
Sed iterum indubitanter arbitramur affectum inestimabiliter 
profundius et sublimius a Domino in ipsum Deum trahi quam 
intellectum, quia, viz. lus diligent quarr 'investigare' vel 
intelligere sufficiant. 
133 
Equally, his emphasis on the centrality of Christ is characteristically 
Victorine: Christ is identified as the sum of the Dionysian hierarchies, 
and this introduces a strong element of devotion to all levels of the 
contemplative ascent. 134 It is the outpouring of divine love issuing 
in the Incarnation which, for Gallus, determines that the proper response 
of the contemplative should be one of reciprocal ecstatic love. This, 
too, is the basis for his constant association of the De Mystica 
Theologia with the Canticle of Canticles: the theory of contemplation 
which the Dionysian text propounds is, he insists, complemented by the 
practical account of love in action which the Canticle embodies: 
He owes, however, to Dionysian mystical tradition the tendency 
to divorce the faculty of unitive awareness from all preceding modes 
of knowledge. During the preliminary stages of the contemplative 
ascent the intellectual and loving powers are held to function simul- 
taneously. Gallus insists that both are in real terms faculties of 
cognition, and distinguishes them by analogy with the senses: the 
intellectual power, like the senses of sight and hearing, apprehends 
its object without being intimately affected by it. Knowledge through 
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love, however, is profoundly experiential and, as with the senses of 
taste, touch and smell, involves contact between the perceiver and the 
perceived. 135 The intellectual faculty reaches its term - the apex 
intellectus - at the penultimate cherubim stage of the contemplative 
ascent, but the affective power which predominates throughout the 
progress to union, remains operative to the final seraphim stage. 136 
The unitive experience is thus achieved through the power of love, in 
the apex affectus. In both the apex intellectus and the apex affectus, 
which Gallus locates in the third mansion, the domain of synderesis, 
the purely natural faculties of knowledge and love as they operate in 
respect of created phenomena are superseded through grace; here the 
soul apprehends God ecstatically in unitive wisdom - sapientia, 
knowledge-in-love, rather than discursive knowledge which is scientia - 
in excessum mentis. In his commentary on the fourth chapter of the 
De Divinis Nominibus, for example, he says of the experience of union 
in the apex affectus: 
... Unde iste amor dicitur extaticus vel extasim faciens, quia 
elevat appicem affectionis super omnem intellectualem cognitionem. 
Per istum amorem excedunt perfecti, et dicuntur rapi in excessum 
mentis: Cor. vc sive mente excedimus Deo:... In isto amore 
fundatur portio Marie que non auferetur ad ea, - Luc. xg- quia 
caritas nunquam excidit - Cor. Xiii d; et hec portio est sapientia 
Christianorum, quarr tractat (M 93 rl) magnus Dionisius Areopagita 
in mistica theologia, que incomparabiliter excedit ens et unum at 
omnem sapientiam intellectualem, sicut in expositione illius libri 
ante annos x declaravimus. Huius practica tractatur in canticis, 
sicut super eundem librum tractavimus. 137 
Gallus' concept of the unitive experience is thus emphatically super- 
intellectual, and in his Spectacula Contemplationis he underlines his 
divergence in this respect from traditional Victorine contemplative 
theory as it was formulated by Richard, which envisages union through 
the higher function of the intellect, the intelligentia: 138 
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Contemplacio est, secundum Priorem Richardum, libera mentis 
perspicacia in sapiencie spactacula cum ammiracione suspensa, 
haec est descriptio contemplacionis intellectualis, intra mentis 
excessum. Superintellectualis vero et unitiva, que est summum 
exercicium tam hominum quarr angelorum, secundum quod scribi potest, 
continetur in mistica theologia, que est sa ientiae Christianorum, 
quam apostolis loquebatur inter perfectos. 1)9 
He upholds the Dionysian principle of divine unknowability, and stresses 
that God is fundamentally incomprehensible to men - even at the seraphim 
stage of the contemplative ascent - and angels alike. Thus, in his 
Commentary on Isaias, he states, 
I 
Illi vero fervores fulgidi seu fulgores fervidi quos 
experitur affectus, nee potest comprehendere vel estimare 
intellectus, ordinem seraphym constituunt; nee se possunt 
angelici ordines ultra istum extendere, quia non potest divina 
plenitudo aliquo sublimiori modo angelis vel hominibus 
innotescere. 140 
But - and here he tempers Dionysian theology in its original form - 
he consistently affirms the cognitive power of love, and hence he 
proposes that while there cannot be intellectual knowledge of the 
Godhead, He is nevertheless accessible to the face-to-face and ever 
increasing knowledge-in-love which is anticipated in the contemplative 
experience and fulfilled in the beatific vision of the men and angels. 
Thus, commenting on the Dionysian injunction "Videre et cognoscere" 
(in the translation of Sarracenus), Gallus interprets sight and 
knowledge of God as an awareness of the divine presence which obtains 
in complete independence of the intellect: 
Videre et cognoscere: id est, presencialiter cognoscere. 
Visus siquidem pro quolibet sensu ponitur ... Ipsa intellectualis 
cognicionis remocio quodammodo inducit ad superintellectualem 
cognicionem. 141 
Similarly, the Dionysian concept of unknown knowledge becomes, for 
Gallus, a fulness of knowledge-in-love. Some of the key texts which 
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substantiate this point are assembled and commented on by Father 
Walsh: 
If the soul, at the summit of contemplation, enters the cloud, 
and knows only by unknowing, this is because the object of the 
intellect is being. So Thomas dutifully repeats the Dionysian 
metaphysic. But Denis is St. Paul's disciple: hence the Divine 
darkness is the scriptural darkness - which Thomas finds more 
congenial. For Christ is the light which shines in this darkness 
- 'tenebrae sicut meridies', 'nox illuminata mea in deliciis 
meus'. It is the scriptural fact, the scriptural paradox, to 
which he returns so often; on the one hand 'videmus nunc per 
speculum in aenigmate': on the other 'qui diligit me, ei 
manifestabo me ipsum'. 
'Dicendum quod quamdiu Deiformis anima dependentiam habeat 
a propris corpore, non poterit Deum immediate contemplari'. 
Here is the difference between the summit of contemplation and 
the beatific vision - that in patria there is clear comprehension. 
For some of his contemporaries, the clear teaching of Denis is 
the absolute unknowability of the Divine essence; and certainly 
this was the view of John Scot Erigena. But Thomas never has 
any doubts on the matter. Though the Angels and the Blessed 
cannot penetrate the profundity of the Infinite Wisdom, they 
see God face to face: 
'Verum tarnen et angeli et anime primam stolam accipientes, 
Deum in propria speciccontemplatur, et comprehendunt facie ad 
faciem; sed infinitatem divine profunditatis et altitudinis sola 
penetrat omnipotens sapientia. Sicut nos solem corporeum in 
propria specie videmus, sed penetrare non sufficimus; quamvis 
iustius visionis ad illam non sit digna comparatio'. (D. N. cl). 
In the beatific vision, that is, knowledge-in-love still has primacy, 
and knowledge according to the intellect is superseded. Even the 
angels themselves do not proceed beyond those 'loving splendours' 
which the deified soul experiences in the seraphim mentis: 
... 'erimus participantes intelligibilibus luminis datione 
ipsius', quoad claxam contemplätionem stole anime eius et ipsius 
divinitatis; et hoc dupliciter, sc., mente et unitione gue est 
super mentem, Unde ait, 'mente impassabile' - per stolam suam: 
'immateriali' - per naturam etiam glorificatam; et 'unitione' 
que est 'super mentem' capiente divina altius guam mens, quia 
unit animum plenitudini toti desirabili et nulla proportione 
intelligibili. Habet enim ipsa unitio experientiarn superintel- 
lectualem, et in via et in patria. 'Ignotus', quia superintel- 
lectualibus, sicut dicit mistica theologia Ib 'ignote consurge' 
etc; 'immissionibus superclarorum radiorum': ad quos, tanquam 
in infinitum super nos collocatos, non valemus ascendere; sed 
divina bonitas, quasi se deponendo, nobis immittit, et radicos 
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infiniti et incomprehensibilis splendoris specie sue ingignit; 
et hoc fiet 'immitatione supercelestium mentium' angelorum: 
sc., 'diviniore', id est, magis nos assimilante. Deo et plenius 
nos deificante quarr cognito intellectualis, etiam per speciem'. 
(D. N. cI) 
This is perhaps the clearest exposition in all Thomas' writings 
of the way in which he interprets the Dionysian darkness. Only 
God can comprehend the depths of his own wisdom - the excessive 
brightness dazzles and blinds all other intelligences. But by 
the 'marvellous miracle of love' the Divine Goodness adapts itself 
to the affection of the soul which leaves herself to go out to it; 
and there in the darkness - in the excess of mind, the overpassing 
of the intellect; and there is the union, there is the comprehension 
'all to the full'; there is the manifestation of Christ, who is the 
power of God and the Wisdom of God - in this love which is poured 
out by the Spirit of God - 'qui diligit me'. 
142 
As Walsh intimates, Gallus' reappraisal of the Dionysian concept of 
unitive knowledge has significant implications for language. It entails 
a reinterpretation of the Dionysian image of divine darkness: Gallus, 
indeed, follows the earlier translators and commentators on the De 
Mystica Theologia in embedding the Dionysian concept of darkness 
firmly within the scriptural context of the Moses narrative. He 
reaffirms the biblical association, by identifying this darkness with 
the mystical night of the Canticle. Thus the term 'darkness' no longer 
has a purely logical status, as denoting God's transcendence of finite 
concepts and intellectual knowledge. Nor, again as in the original 
scheme of Ps. -Dionysius, does it denote excess of light in a predom- 
inantly conceptual sense. It is true that Ps. -Dionysius' theory of 
mystical union - the soul's encounter with God in the darkness of 
unknowing, which is identified as an excess of divine light - allows 
that the unitive state is in some sense cognitive, an apprehension of 
the light: it is suggested, moreover, that the mystical experience is 
to be achieved by a special unitive faculty - KaT1 TO KP£LTTOV 
Evoüu£vos. 143 
For Gallus, however, mystical darkness represents the transcendent 
light in which the soul experiences union with God through love and 
is infused with the wisdom, sapientia Christianorum, which supersedes 
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intellectual modes of knowledge. Indeed, the negative dialectic of 
Dionysian theology as a whole does not dominate Gallus' works; 
characteristically, he exploits it to argue the inaccessibility of 
God to the powers of human reason, but'it is everywhere qualified by 
the positive devotional language which describes the soul's loving 
aspirations to union and is appropriate to the degree of knowledge- 
in-love which complements the soul's progress to unitive awareness. 
Clearly, therefore, Gallus formulated his own theory of mystical 
knowledge, which attempts to resolve the questions concerning the 
cognitive element in the unitive experience which exercized theologians 
of both the Augustinian and Dionysian schools. He also evolved an 
effective definition of the traditional notion of the scintilla 
synderesis - the unitive impulse whereby the soul ascends to God as 
swiftly and directly as a spark shooting from fire. 144 The scintilla 
as an image loosely designating the unitive faculty was widely current, 
and Gallus introduced needed precision into this area of contemplative 
theology by establishing the distinction between synderesis and its 
spark: 
Scintilla siquidem apicis affectualis, que est principalis et 
pura participacio divine bonitatis, que fluit de veritate in 
ymaginem, ab omni inferioritate ineffabiliter separata; et 
quasi in vitam divinam transiens, quodam modo ineffabili 
deificatur. 145 
Here Gallus describes the momentary experience of full deifying 
union - which may cut across the normal hierarchic progression of 
the soul to-the third mansion, the domain of synderesis, where God's 
presence is felt in an ecstasy of love - when the soul briefly passes 
out of itself through the intervention of divine grace and is granted 
a foretaste of the beatific vision which is its ultimate goal. 
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Von Ivanka, assessing Gallus' unitive theology in his article 
"Apex Mentis", detects some blurring of the functions of knowledge 
and love at the highest levels of the mystic ascent: 
Das Verhntnis der beiden seelischen Grundkräfte, des theoricus 
intellectus und des principalis affectus, wird ganz im Sinne 
Wilhelms von St. Thierry so gedacht, daß sie auf ihrem Gipfel 
in der Anschauung Gottes ineinander verschmelien. 146 
Whilst there seems no reason to infer any uncertainty or inconsistency 
here on Gallus' part - and this is especially true of his most mature 
works - von Ivanka rightly emphasizes the cognitive element in Gallus' 
theory of union in the affection. For Gallus, the affection is itself 
a faculty of knowledge and union in the apex affectus is a fulfilment 
of knowledge-in-love. 147 There is, of course, a clear distinction 
between the natural functions of knowledge and love as they operate 
in the course of the contemplative ascent and their role in the third 
mansion of synderesis, but it is equally apparent that Gallus pre- 
supposes some continuity between the natural and super-natural modes 
of cognition, and, indeed, that the natural are-the-necessary foundation 
for the super-natural faculties whereby God is ultimately apprehended. 
Thus the concept of apex mentis, the unitive faculty, can only be 
understood against a background of the Dionysian progress through 
the hierarchies of the mind, although it is in some sense dissociated 
from the preceding ascent. Walsh, moreover, argues further that the 
intellectual faculty itself is necessarily reenergised following its 
transcendence at the cherubim stage of the ascent (the apex intellectus) 
through the power of unitive love: 
For love is the first movement of the man who is restored in 
Christ; a human love which dilates the heart even as it purifies 
the mind; which never ceases to be human even when it is divinised; 
and if it is to be fed by a knowledge which falls away as the love 
211 
reaches a pitch of intensity which is perfect, and is yet 
capable of indefinite expansion, that same unitive love will 
revitalize the understanding and the will, perfecting their 
natural operations, and even their natural functions. 
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Hugh of Balma: the isolation of the mystical faculty and the 
unitive way. 
It is because of this element of interdependence and continuity 
between the natural and supernatural modes of knowledge in Gallus' 
theology that von Ivanka regards his isolation of the mystical faculty 
as incomplete. He credits instead the Viae Syon Lugent of the Carthusian 
Hugh of Balma -a work firmly committed to the negative mystical tradition 
and heavily influenced by Gallus' interpretation of Dionysian theology - 
with the achievement of the formal dissociation of knowledge in the 
apex mentis from all other modes and faculties of cognition: 
Worauf es ihm besonders ankommt, was er am meisten betont, 
ist da3 der Weg zur mystischen Erkenntnis Gottes nicht fiber das 
denkende Erkennen führt (selbst nicht in dem Sinne, daß dieses 
auf seiner Höhe, bei seiner Vollendung, in die liebende Anschauung 
übergehen könnte), sondern von allem Anfang an einen anderen Weg 
zu Gott neben dem Erkennen bedeutet. Er sagt ausdrücklich: 'Licet 
in humanis primo oporteat intelligere quarr affici' (das, augustin- 
ische Prinzip: 'quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto 
potest' (De Trin. XI, 1), wird hier ausdrücklich negiert, bzw. 
auf alles, was nicht Gott ist, eingeschränkt), 'in vera tarnen 
et experimentali cognitione divinorum oportet primum sentire per 
amorem quam ipsum Deum qui sentitur intelligendo cogitare. Ergo 
oportet consurgere per amorem, ut ex isto statu cognitionis in 
ipsa mente vera cognitio relinquatur' - ja das Ausschließen jeder 
gedanklichen Tätigkeit, von allem Anfang an, ist eine Vorbedingung 
der mystischen Erkenntnis. Nur die Liebe selbst, ohne jede 
Erkenntnis, hat sich hier zu ihrem Ziel zu erheben... 149 
Hugh of Balma, von Ivanka argues, conceives of the contemplative ascent 
in purely experiential terms as a single autonomous movement of love, 
culminating in loving knowledge of the Divine Essence. The way of love 
proceeds, according to Hugh, without regard to the intellect. He thus 
took to an uncompromising conclusion the theory of contemplative union 
in an ecstasy of love which Gallus had evolved from his grounding in 
the Dionysian and Victorine traditions of mystical theology but which 
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still reserved a role for the intellect in both the ascent to 
loving union and thereafter in the unitive experience itself. 
The Viae Syon Lugent is organized around the threefold division 
of the contemplative way into the purgative, illuminative and unitive 
stages, and the whole is supplemented by a debate in the scholastic 
manner, the Quaestio Unica, which presents the theoretical basis for 
the practical account of contemplation which comprises the body of the 
treatise. 15° The three major sections of the text are also associated 
with the traditional classification of contemplatives as "incipientes", 
"proficientes" and "perfecti", 151 and, under the influence of St. Bernard's 
sermons on the Canticle, with the successive kisses of the feet, hands 
and mouth which are interpreted as denoting the three stages leading to 
union with the Divine Spouse. 152 
The evidence of the many extant fifteenth century manuscripts of 
the Viae Syon Lugent testifies to its widespread popularity and influence 
on the continent - particularly among the Carthusians. In England, 
however, it does not seem to have enjoyed such currency. P. S. Jolliffe, 
in his article "Two Middle English Tracts on the Contemplative Life", 
records only two extant manuscripts of English provenance which incorporate 
the text (MSS Trinity CollegeCambridge B. 14.25 and Caius College) 
Cambridge 353153) and notes that Syon Abbey had the treatise in MS. 
M. 116.154 Michael G. Sargent's article, "The Transmission by the 
English Carthusians of some late Medieval Spiritual Writings", 155 adds 
a further two manuscripts to this list: Douai Bibliotheque Municipale 
MS 396 and Doiice I-IS 262, which contains only part of the section on 
the unitive way, under the heading Exposicio_super guedam verba libri beati 
Dionisii de Mystica Theologia. 156 Both these manuscripts are Carthusian 
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products: the Douai MS was written by J. London of Sheen, 157 and 
Douce 262 -a compilation of Dionysian texts, which also includes the 
Cloud of Unknowing, the Book of Privy Counselling and the De Seotem 
Gradibus Contemplacionis of Thomas Gallus - was the work of William 
Tregoo3e (+1514) and Andrew Boorde of the London Charterhouse and was 
annotated by James Grenehalgh. 158 Extracts from the Viae Syon Lugent, 
combined with passages from English mystical treatises - which include 
the only known borrowings from the Cloud Corpus - comprise the related 
texts Of Actyfe Lyfe & Contemplatyfe Declaracion and Via ad Contemplac- 
ionem which occur in the Carthusian manuscripts BM Add. PISS 37049 
(ff 87b-89b) and 37790 (ff 234a-236a) respectively, and are printed 
and discussed in Jolliffe's article. It is interesting to note here 
that manuscript evidence points to a tendency to associate the Cloud 
Corpus with the Viae Syon Lugent in Carthusian circles during the later 
Middle Ages. The possible implications of this for the provenance of 
the English texts will be assessed in the concluding chapter. Here, 
however, the doctrinal grounds for considering Hugh as a probable 
intermediary in the transmission of Dionysian theology between Gallus 
and the Cloud will be the focus of attention. 
Hugh cannot be regarded as a significant innovator in the field 
of mystical language. Clearly the linguistic tradition which had 
grown up in conjunction with Dionysian negative theology was already 
firmly established, and Hugh accordingly reproduces its characteristic 
patterns and adopts the Latin terminology of the later translations of 
the Greek Corpus. The following description of unitive awareness which 
occurs in the third section of the text is representative of his practice; 
Sapientia, est dignissima Dei cognito, per ignorantiam cognita, 
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secundum vnionem, quae est supra mentem, quando mens ab 
omnibus aliis recedens, postea seipsam dimittens vnita est 
super splendentibus radiis inscrutabili, & profundo sapientiae 
spl &lore illuminata. (669 Col. I B). 
He draws less on the "super-" vocabulary of the Dionysian Corpus, 
however, than on its negative and paradoxical forms - inevitably so, 
perhaps, since his principal concern is with the conditions under which 
the soul achieves union with the transcendent God rather than with the 
philosophy of divine transcendence itself. 
In general, indeed, Hugh's is the latinized, thoroughly 
Christianized Ps. -Dionysius of the later translators and commentators. 
He is particularly and pervasively influenced by Thomas Gallus' inter- 
pretation of Dionysian theology. Both give prominence, for example, 
to the sapientia Christianorum which is the highest achievement of 
the contemplative, and they agree in identifying this with the part 
which Mary chose: 
haec sapientia quae est omnia.. portio Mariae, quae amoris 
dilecti igne succensa ardebat desiderio. (679 Col. IIE). 
Similarly, Hugh echoes Gallus' association of the De Mystica Theologia 
with the Canticle; commenting on Ps. -Dionysius' injunction to his 
disciple Timothy, "Consurge ignote... ", Hugh turns to the Canticle 
for its practical application of the Dionysian theory of ascent through 
unknowing: 
Vnde ista consurrectio, quae per ignorantiam dicitur, nihil 
aliud est, nisi immediate moueri per ardorem amoris sine omnis 
creaturae speculo, absque breuia cogitatione, sine etiam motu 
intelligentiae concomitante: vt solus affectus tangat, & in 
ipso actuali exercitio nihil cognoscat speculatiua cognitio, 
& ille est oculus, quo sponsus in canticis ä sponsa dicitur 
vulnerari. (679 Col. I C-D) 
215 
Through this bringing to bear of the Canticle on Dionysian theology, 
moreover, Hugh clearly endorses Gallus' interpretation of the unknown 
knowledge of the De Mystica Theologia as anexperiential knowledge of 
God whose medium is love. Gallus' distinction between the affective 
and intellectual powers of the soul is also fundamental to Hugh's 
theology, and it is perhaps in respect of his emphasis on the primacy 
of the loving power in the ascent to contemplative union that Gallus 
influenced the development of Hugh's theory of the unitive faculty 
most profoundly. Thus, commenting on a passage from the De Divinis 
Nominibus VII where Ps. -Dionysius celebrates the Sovereign Wisdom, 
the "sapientiam excedentem", as the source and possessor of all the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Hugh writes, 
vbi per sapietiam, & cognitionem completa vtriusque potentiae 
perfectio denotatur affectione, scilicet & intellectione. 
Ipsam enim vocat irrationabilid, quia nee ipsam ratio apprehendit, 
nee ratione inuestigando vtitur: amentem etiam vocat, id est, 
sine mente, & sine intellectu, quia nee ipsa in suo exercitio 
vtitur intellectu, quia vsque ad tarn summam cognition' intellectus 
peruenire non sufficit: stultam etiam vocat, quia sine vsu 
omnimodae intelligentiae in affectu ista sapientia consurgit, 
quarr nulla intelligentia penitus appreh6dit. (679 Col. II B-C) 
Here Hugh differentiates wisdom, sapientia, from knowledge, cognitio. 
The latter is within the scope of the human intellectual powers, but 
sapientia, the unitive wisdom which God alone imparts, is accessible 
only through the superior loving power and denotes a loving awareness 
of God which transcends the discursive knowledge achieved through the 
intellect. 
The Viae Syon Lugent, it has been noted, restates the traditional 
threefold division of the contemplative way. Hugh summarizes the 
distinctions between the different stages in his Prologue to the text: 
Triplex est igitur via ista ad Deum, scilicet purgatiua, qua 
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mens ad discendam veram sapientiam disponitur. Secunda vero 
illuminatiua dicitur, qua mens cogitando ad amoris inflammationem 
accenditur. Tertia vnitiua, qua mens super omnem intellectum, 
rationem, & intelligentiam ý solo Deo sursum actu dirigitur. 
(658, col. I E) 
To enter the unitive way, Hugh insists, the soul must slough off all 
intellectual activities. Equally, however, Hugh's account of the 
progress to union allocates some function to the intellectual faculties 
in the preliminary stages of the ascent. Some assessment of the relation- 
ship of the purgative and illuminative to the unitive ways is therefore 
needed to reconcile this definition with Hugh's claim to have isolated 
the mystical faculty and defined the unitive way as the way of love 
alone. 
Hugh echoes Gallus and anticipates the author of the Cloud Corpus 
in condemning what his Prologue labels "inutilibus curiositatibus" 
(658 Col I A); he compares the scholarly urge to excel in diverse 
branches of science to the Israelites' veneration of false idols, 
since it can only obstruct the acquisition of true wisdom. It is, 
however, the function of the purgative and illuminative stages to 
prepare the soul for its flight to loving union with God, and here it 
must be schooled to exploit but at last transcend the intellect's 
power to promote unitive awareness.. Hugh insists that at this level 
the intellect is a necessary stimulus to love, since the soul is not 
yet sufficiently experienced in the way of love to proceed to union 
unassisted. Recommending the need for anagogical study of scripture 
at the illuminative stage, Hugh argues, 
Quia adhuc mens proficiens est indisposita, ad hoc, quod 
expedite feratur affectionibus anagogicis in dilectum, oportet 
quod primo aliquantulum meditatur eomodo, quo dictum est; vt 
per cogitationem preuiam aliquantulum incipiat scintillando 
affici in ilium, in quem in tertio statu sine omni cogitatione 
217 
concomitante, vel praeuia, quotiescumque vult sine obstaculo 
sursum eleuatur. Ad quam expeditionem cum perfecte poterit 
attingere, omnis ab ipsa sapientia in sua consurrectione 
cogitatio, vel meditatio abscindetur; quia cogitatio ibi non 
est, nisi vt per ipsam affectio accendatur. Sic ergo vsualiter 
per meditationem praedictam proficiat: primo sicut dictum est, 
proprietatem vocabuli ad sensum anagogicum transferat; postea 
illud ad amorem reducat; tertio, quod in ipso Deo afficiatur. 
(668 Col. I B-C) 
The contemplative is similarly directed to study creation as a means 
of discovering its creator; to attain a receptive state of perfect 
humility by meditating on personal sin and on the goodness of God - 
particularly as manifested in the Passion - to practise aspirations 
to God through prayer, in order to earn special grace to aid its 
progress to loving union. The second chapter, which focusses on the 
illuminative way, is largely taken up with an anagogical analysis of 
the petitions of the Lord's Prayer which teaches the soul this exercise. 159 
It also comprises a formal account of the moral basis for the contemp- 
lative way, which follows the Dionysian principle of hierarchic ascent 
as it was developed by Thomas Gallus. Ultimately, however, the effect 
of meditation on subjects inferior to God is to dissipate the soul's 
effort and distract it from its single desire for union; the intercourse 
with the body weighs down the soul which of itself tends naturally to 
God. Hugh compares the soul's attempt to find God through creation 
with the Bride's futile search for her Beloved in the night when the 
darkness obscures Him (Cant. 3). 160 In the purgative and illuminative 
ways, the soul is purified and the intellect enlightened. Far from 
dismissing this stage of the ascent, Hugh consistently emphasizes its 
difficulties and the need to exert every effort to bring it to good 
effect. 161 But he stresses that the principal function of the spiritual 
exercises undertaken at this level is to stimulate the love which will 
carry the soul to union where the intellect cannot penetrate. 
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In his demarcation of the purgative and illuminative ways, Hugh 
therefore recognizes the soul's ability to achieve a kind of speculative 
contemplation, "contemplatio speculatiua" (681 Col. I A-B), through the 
exercize of its natural affective and intellectual powers. 162 In this 
sphere thought activates and anticipates love. By contrast, Hugh denies 
any preceding or accompanying movement of the intellect once the soul has 
entered the way of union: 
... per cogitationem preuiam aliquantulum incipiat scintillando 
affici in illum, in quem in tertio statu sine omni cogitatione 
concomitante, vel praeuia, quotiescumque vult sine obstaculo 
sursum eleuatur. (668 Col. I B). 
This is the claim which Hugh systematically substantiates in the 
Quaestio Unica. 163 He first presents the case for presuming knowledge 
to be the necessary forerunner of love. One of his principal authorities 
for this is St. Augustine: 
Item Augustinus: Inuisa possumus diligere, incognita autem 
nequaquam: ergo primo oportet ratiocinando, vel intellectualiter 
cogitando cognoscere, antequam affectu amoris aliquod diligatur: 
cogitatio igitur affectionem amoris necessario praecedit. 
(683 Col I B-C), 
and corroborates the point by references to Psalm 39.3, De Divinis 
Nominibus VII and the Dionysian theory of the hierarchies. Hugh 
himself endorses this argument insofar as perception of natural phenomena 
is concerned. Where, however, the soul's object transcends its intell- 
ectual capacity and can only be experienced through mystical union - 
the situation which Ps. -Dionysius describes in the De Mystica Theologia 
- he insists that the natural order of cognition is reversed. Love must 
here precede knowledge, and whatever intellectual enlightenment is then 
granted to the soul necessarily derives from its loving adhesion to God. 
Returning to the Dionysian concept of the angelic hierarchy as it was 
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interpreted by Gallus, Hugh reaffirms that the seraphim are closer 
to God than the cherubim - the potentia amandi is nearer than the 
potentia intellectus - and it is the seraphim who transmit their 
immediate affective knowledge of God to the secondary order of 
cherubim. 164 Hence, 
Cum ergo solus amor faciat animam appropinquare ad Deum per 
sui extensionem: igitur inquantum mens amat attentius, intantum 
fonti luminis appropinquat, & per consequens inquantum propinquior 
est fonti luminis per amorem, intantum plus intellectus illuminatur 
ab eo per cognitionem. Primo igitur in diuinis est ardendo amare, 
quam intelligendo cognoscere. (684 Col. II D). 
Hugh's contemplative theology is thus profoundly experiential. Its 
watchword is the text of Psalm 33.9, where the soul is invited to taste 
God before it enjoys sight of Him: 
Item Psalmista: Gustate & videte, &c. Cum igitur gustare affectum 
respiciat amoris, videre autem intellectus cogitationem, vel 
meditationem: ergo primo oportet motu amoris consurgere, quarr 
occultissimum Deum intellectualiter cogitando cognoscere. Nam 
haec est regula generalis in mystica Theologia, quod primo oportet 
habere practicam, quam theoricam, id est, vsum exercitij in corde, 
quam ipsius rei, vel eorum quae dicuntur habere notitiam. 
(684 Col. I D-E). 
The corollary of this is that in unitive theology, unlike other 
sciences, experience must precede verbal formulation and vicarious 
knowledge through contemplative literature, for, he claims, 
Haec enim sapientia in hoc differt ab omnibus aliis scientiis, 
quia in hac primo oportet vsum habere in seipso, qua/ verba 
intelligere, & practica hic praecedit theoricam. In alijs 
scientijs necesse est, primo verba intelligere, quam quae 
addiscitur, scientia habeatur. (658 Col. IIE- 659 Col. I A). 
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The unitive way, as Hugh interprets it, has two phases. His 
classification derives from the opening chapter of the De Mystica 
Theologia, where Ps. -Dionysius urges his disciple to abandon finally 
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everything pertaining to the senses or intellect and enter completely 
into the way of unknowing; 
et, sicut est possibile, ignote consurge ad ejus unitionem qui 
est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem. Etenim excessu tui 
ipsius et omnium irretentibili et absoluto munde, ad supersub- 
stantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, cuncta auferens et a cunctis 
absolutus sursum ageris. (S. 568-569) 
With this as the framework for his contemplative theory and terminology, 
Hugh formulates his own unitive theology in commenting at length on the 
De Mystica Theologia in the third chapter of the Viae Syon Lugent: 
... per amorem ardentissimum disponente, ardentissime facit in 
dilectum suis extensionibus sursum actiuis consurgere: quae 
Mystica Theologia tradita in apice affectiuae consurgit, quae 
consurrectio ignorata, vel per ignorantiam dicitur, vt remoto 
omnis imaginationis, rationis, intellectus, vel intelligentiae 
exercitio, per vnitionem ardentissimi amoris id sentiat in 
praesenti, quod intelligentia capere non sufficit: immo quod 
potius est, omnis speculatiua cognitio totaliter ignorat. 
(679 Col. I E- II A). 
He reiterates his identification of the way of unknowing as the way 
of love. The soul, having once broken free from the restraining 
influences of the senses and intellect and entered into the way of 
love, now operates above itself in the apex affectus where the stimulus 
of thought is superfluous. Hugh consistently differentiates the 
faculty of unitive love from the love which stirs the soul in the 
earlier stages of the contemplative ascent: 
... per amorem excessiuum cogentem limites transcendere 
naturales, ipsi vnitur ecstatica amoris consurrectione, ä 
quo primordialiter exiuit... (669 Col. II A). 
Unitive love is essentially ecstatic and deifying: Hugh distinguishes 
it from the natural power of the affection by the intensity of the 
language which he applies to it - it is the apex affectus, "amor", 
"desiderium", "ardentissimus". He stresses the difficulties which 
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the novice in the mystic way experiences in learning to exercize its 
faculty of unitive love. It must practise loving aspirations to union 
until its love, which is still imperfect and relapses repeatedly after 
momentarily nearing its object, is capable of sustaining contemplation 
of the divine: 
Item mens beata continuo, & indiuisibili exercitio in ipso summo 
bono veluti aeterno dulcore afficitur, haec tarnen modo interscalari, 
& interciso in ipsum consurgit, cuius motus rectissime est ad instar 
emissionis sideris scintillantis, si illae emissiones ex libera 
voluntate procederent: quia illi motus anagogici Bunt quasi 
subitanei, vt statim post consurrectionem mens infra seipsam 
inferius prolabatur, iterum et iterum consurgit, & iterum infra 
seipsam cadit. (670 Col. I A-B). 
Et per istam diuturniorum motuum anagogicorum cösurrectionem, 
magis ac magis affectus exteditur, & quasi quibusdam flämeis 
scintillis mens purgatur efficacius. (682 Col. I B). 
It must also now exert itself to stifle not only all intellectual 
speculations on the divine mysteries, but even the inherent tendency 
of the intelligence to apprehend the object of the affection: 
totaliter oculü intellectus rescindere oportet, quia in ipsa 
consurrectione semper vult illud appreh4dere, ad quod tendit 
affectio. Vnde, maxima aduersatio in ista consurrectione est 
vehemens inhaerentia intellectus cum affectu, quam tarnen 
rescindere necesse est per magna exercitium. (681 Col I C). 
The soul at this stage, though assisted by divine grace, principally 
effects its own ascent: this is reflected in the active mood of 
"consurge". But its capacity to achieve union is necessarily limited 
and for this reason, Hugh affirms, Ps. -Dionysius qualifies his injunction 
with "sicut est possible". In the second phase of the unitive way, 
however, the Holy Spirit intervenes; the loving impulse is purified 
and the work which the soul began is divinely perfected. The pattern 
agrees with Gallus' account of the progressive dominance of grace in 
the contemplative way. The soul is at last passively raised to con- 
templative awareness - hence the use of the passive voice in "sursum 
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ageris": 
Vnde primo dicit: 'Consurge ignote': & post hoc dicit: 
'Sursum ageris'. quasi diceret, quod in principio exercitij 
consurrectionum anagogicarum affectus apex cum difficultate 
cösurgit, sed per amorem excessiuum ipsius supra se, & per 
efficaciorem purgationem quasi sine difficultate ad libitum 
consurgit, & motuü agilitate mirabiliter leuigatur: vt licet 
in ipso motu anagogico natura, & amor pariter concurrat, tarnen 
efficacius iam remotis impedirn tis, & exinde maiori immissione 
desuper adueniente, multo plus ardor amoris, quam vigor affectus 
naturalis facilitatem: et agilitatem motuum incomparabiliter 
operetur. & hoc est quod dicebatur, 'Cuncta auferens, etc.... 
(682 Col. I C). 
The soul now aspires spontaneously, quicker than thought ('mira 
velocitate motuum citius etia quam cogitare valeat ratione' 681 Col. 
1 E) and almost at will to the unitive experience which is proper to 
the perfect: 
vt quotiescumque vult, moueatur ardentissime in Deum: sic etiam, 
vt orans affectionum desiderio in metis affectu quantum possibile 
eat in via, sic attente exoret, ac si ipsum videret facie ad faciem. 
(681 Col. II D). 
Hugh, therefore, conceives of mystical union as the culmination 
of the way of love - the end of the practice of loving aspirations to 
which he applies the traditional term "extensio": 
mes... se extendit in ardore motuum vnionem dilecti desiderans. 
(676 Col. II D). 
It takes place in the apex affectus, where the soul is infused with 
divine wisdom which transcends the sphere of the intellect: 
Vnde tota ista sapientia in hoc solo perficitur, vt ipsa 
affectiua in suo supremo apice constituta, per abscisionem 
totius intellectualis operationis nihil aliud, quarr soli Deo 
vniri desiderat. (681 Col. II C-D). 
Hugh follows Gallus in identifying this with the scintilla synderesis 
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as the faculty for mystical knowledge: 
... principalis affectio: & ipsa est scintilla synderesis... (680 Col. I D). 
Indeed, the image of the spark epitomizes for Hugh the action of the 
loving aspirations which progressively unite the soul to God: 
... quando ista vis animae suprema, quae est apex affectus, 
tägitur ab igne amoris, illo motu & tactu scintillat affectus 
aspirando in Deü.. (686 Col. II E). 
He affirms, moreover, that the impulse of love which propels the 
contemplative to union in this life continues into the afterlife, and 
that unitive wisdom here anticipates the beatific vision in which the 
Blessed experience the divine presence throughout eternity. This, he 
claims, is the significance of the fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer: 
Petit etiam 'hodie', hoc est, in praesenti vita, ratione 
aeternitatis, quae est simplex, & vnica, quae in amore viuentibus 
incipit in praesenti vita: quia amor ille quo sponsus in vita ista 
diligitur, idem est numero cum illo, quo in aeternitate gloriae 
gubernatori omnium vnietur. (665 Col. I D). 
Hugh, therefore, maintains the autonomy of the way of love. Unlike 
Gallus, he insists that, from its inception, it is completely dissociated 
from the intellect. He emphasizes the purely affective experiential 
character of unitive awareness: 
... per vnitionem ardentissimi amoris id sentiat in praesenti, 
quod intelligentia capere non sufficit. (679 Col. IE- II A). 
Through love, the soul achieves immediate experience of the unknowable 
being of God in a state of intellectual ignorance or unknowing, when 
the noetic powers are superseded. This experience is identified as 
the wisdom of. Christians which Paul preached to his disciple Dionysius 
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and which only God himself, without intermediary, imparts to the 
soul: 
Sapientia, est dignissima Dei cognitio, per ignorantiam cognita, 
secundum vnionem, quae est supra mentem, quando mens ab omnibus 
aliis recedens, postea seipsam dimittens vnita est super splend- 
entibus radiis inscrutabili, & profundo sapientiae spledore 
illuminata... 
Consurrectio ergo per vnitiui amoris affectiones flammigeras, 
supra omne officium intellectus in supremo affectiuae apice 
constituta, ipsa est sapientia intenta ad praesens, quae idem 
est quod Mystica Theologia, qua ipsa mens ignita, linguis 
affectionum occultissime dilectum alloquitur, quae non alicuius 
mortalis industria referatur, sed solum diuina miseratione 
seipsam manifeste prodit... (669 Col. I B-C). 
Hugh reaffirms the inaccessibility of the unitive experience to 
intellectual comprehension and thus to linguistic formulation, and 
reproduces the traditional Dionysian terminology which reflects both 
the actuality of the experience and its essential ineffability. He 
nevertheless stresses that the beatific vision is complete, face-to- 
face - 
Item mens glorificata in ipso, cuius pulchritudinem facie 
ad faciem contemplatur, ardentissima vnitione coniungitur. 
(670 Col. I B) - 
and accentuates the cognitive nature of the experience of loving union. 
He suggests, moreover, that this experiential, indefinable knowledge- 
in-love which is the fullness of unitive wisdom and obtains independ- 
ently of the intellectual faculty, is in some way complemented by an 
enlightenment of the higher function of the intellect, the intelligentia, 
following the soul's loving union with God. Hugh is scrupulous in his 
insistence that neither the intellect nor even the intelligentia have 
any role in the unitive way itself: he affirms that love, and not, as 
in Victorine theology, the intelligentia, 166 is, the medium of unitive 
knowledge; 
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Vnde ista consurrectio, quae per ignorantiam dicitur, nihil 
aliud est, nisi immediate moueri per ardorem amoris sine omnis 
creaturae speculo, absque breuia cogitatione, sine etiam motu 
intelligentiae concomitante: vt solus affectus tangat, & in ipso 
actuali exercitio nihil cognoscat speculatiua cognitio, & ille 
est oculus, quo sponsus in canticis ä sponsa dicitur vulnerari. 
(679 Col. I C-D). 
Other passages already quoted demonstrate the same distinction of the 
noetic faculties and equally categoric denial of their involvement in 
the unitive process: 679 Col. II B-C, 167 for example, differentiates 
between ratio, mens, intellectus and intelligentia, and 659 Col. I E168 
again distinguishes intellectus, ratio and intelligentia. In the unitive 
condition, however, the natural order whereby knowledge precedes love 
is reversed, and the soul receives a kind of knowledge which is 
further refined and deepened in the beatific vision: 
... & licet ibi Sint cognitio simul & dilectio, tarnen cognitio 
naturaliter praecedit dilectionem. Sed mens haec huic cösurrectioni 
actualiter intendens, prout est hic intentio, omnis rationis, & 
intelligentiae suis motibus radicitus rescindit officia. Nam 
intellectus ex comunicatione carnis corruptae, phantasiis est 
admixtus; ideo debet in consurrectione amoris amoueri; sed in 
patria purgabitur, in qua carnis corruptio deponetur, ideo per 
solam affectus igniti consurrectionem erigitur, quia ibi affectiua 
intelligentia incomparabiliter praexcellit, vt iam cito probatur. 
(670 Col. I B-C). 
Hugh's fullest account of this aspect of his contemplative theology 
occurs towards the end of the Viae Syon Lugent, where he is commenting 
on the De Mystica Theologia. He reiterates that just as the natural 
affection is purified and mysteriously transformed into the love which 
is the instrument of unitive knowledge, so the intellect is in turn 
purified through the fire of love and enabled to receive illumination 
in its higher function, the intelligentia: 
... dum tantum_humana scientia speculatiua repletur, in 
comparatione illius sapientiae quae est per supersplendentes 
diuinos radios, quasi quadam obtebrante caligine obfuscatur. 
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Sed & illud verbuni vltimum non tantum de agiliori consurrectione 
est, sed de cognitione suprema ipsius intelligentiae quia secundum 
sapietiam beati Dionysij, illa sola vera est cognitio de diuinis, 
qug experimAali notitia sursum actiuae consurrectionis 
relinquitur. Vnde diuina miseratione secundum. quod competit, 
cosurgenti hoc accidit, vt quando mens per multorum teporum 
curricula aspirauit, vt suum dilectum intimius sibi coniuncta 
ardentiori vinculo amoris c6stringeret, ad modicum prout capax 
est, prout fit in raptu, visio beata cöceditur, maxime cum ab 
irretentibili, & absoluto sit müda, & erigitur tunt ad diuinarum 
tenebrarum radiü, scilicet lumen diuinae incomprehensibilitatis; 
quae ibi vocatur tenebra, secundum quod in epistola dicitur ad 
Timotheum sic: Diuina caligo lumen est inaccessibile, in qua 
habitare Deus dicitur, & inuisibilis quidem existens propter 
excedentem claritatem, &c. Vnde sapietia illa est immediate ante 
cognitionem raptus, & sic diutiüs aspiräti ä dilecto dicitur. 
Amice ascede superius. Vnde primo dicitur: 'Consurge, & ibi 
sursum ageris': quia in consurrectione vnitiue sapientiae natura 
operatur & gratia: in ista autem suprema operatione intelligentiae 
sola gratia eleuans immediatissime operatur, quantum ad ipsam 
eleuationem raptus, prout mens sic in corpore erigitur, vt ä 
sensibus corporis sequestretur, cum in ista vltima intelligentiae 
eleuatione tam intellectiua quam affectiua potissime officium 
consummatum, non per modum patiendi, sed agendi actum suum 
obtineant. (682 Col. ID- II A). 
Hugh affirms here that the intelligentia is enlightened in rapt vision, 
for which the soul is primed by its loving adhesion to God and which is 
granted in proportion to its so acquired capacity to apprehend God. Both 
the affective and cognitive powers have their final consummation in this 
experience. This form of knowledge, Hugh insists, is superior to all 
natural modes of cognition: it differs from them in that it is infused 
through the sole operation of divine grace while the mind remains passive, 
and also in that it is not discursive, empirical or speculative. Knowledge 
of the latter kind, by contrast, can only: limit and darken the mind. 
Hugh distinguishes darkness of this order - which is ignorance - from 
the concept of divine darkness, which is a darkness of excess, and 
represents God's transcendence of finite modes of knowledge. He thus 
describes the infusion of unitive knowledge in terms of spiritual 
enlightenment by the radiance of God - "diuinis fulgoribusillustretur": 
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Sapientia est Dei diuinissima cognitio per ignorantiam 
cognita, & non tantum praeclarior, immo etiam est vniversalior 
& vtilior alijs scientijs, cognitionibus, & apprehensionibus 
dicitur. Quae non tantum affectum supra se erigit, & amöre 
ecstatico perfecte mit sponso altissimo creaturam, sed insuper 
intantum eleuat intellectum, vt multo plus omni prudentia & 
cognitione diuinis fulgoribus illustretur, quam aliquo ingenij 
exercitio valeat obtineri. (679 Col. II A-B). 
One of the major problems of Hugh's theology, however, is the uncertain 
relationship of this mode of knowledge to its natural counterpart. The 
discontinuity between the unitive way and the preparatory purgative and 
illuminative phases, and the denial of any function for the intellect in 
the ascent to union and its attainment involves an awkward suspension of 
the intelligentia until it is reenergised following the unitive experience. 
Hugh is similarly unspecific as to the nature of the awareness which is 
possible through the intelligentia: he dissociates its operations from 
those of the intellect, yet recognizes the one as a higher function of 
the other; he leaves in doubt, moreover, how the soul understands and 
articulates its own rapturous experience - as he suggests that it does 
in 682 Col. II A- through the intelligentia if its operations cannot 
be evaluated in terms of the intellect. 
169 His interpretation of the 
Dionysian imagery of darkness and light as a metaphor for the soul's 
unitive knowledge of God, however, owes much to Gallus. Though Hugh's 
contemplative theology contradicts Gallus' assignment of a necessary 
role to the intellect in the ascent to union, both authors infer that 
the mystical encounter with God which Ps. -Dionysius locates in the dark 
cloud of unknowing is at once a fullness of experiential knowledge-in-love 
and that it involves a kind of enlightenment in the intelligentia -a 
claim which takes up the suggestion in the Dionysian Corpus that the 
soul's union with God in the darkness which represents His excessive 
brilliance is in some sense cognitive, but reinterprets knowledge of 
this order as being experiential and purely affective. 
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IV. The Cloud Corpus and its contemplative theory. 
Turning, then, to the Cloud Corpus, there are many points of 
similarity between the English writer's contemplative theory and the 
interpretation of Dionysian theology which evolved through Gallus and 
Hugh of Balma. Walsh cites various examples where agreement on 
fundamental doctrines and close verbal resemblances suggest that Gallus' 
mediating influence on the Cloud author extended beyond the translation 
of the Deonise Hid Diuinite itself. Clearly, the English author is 
largely dependent on Gallus for his identification and labelling of 
the soul's principal cognitive faculties as the "louyng mi3t" and the 
"knowyng mi3t" and for his affirmation of the primacy of love in the 
contemplative way: 
Bot sib alle resonable creatures, aungel & man, hab in hem, 
ilchone by hemself, o principal worching mi3t, be whiche is 
clepid a knowable mi3t, & anober principal worching mi3t, be 
whiche is clepid a louyng mi3t: of be whiche two mi3tes, to be 
first, be whiche is a knowyng mi3t, God, at is be maker of hem, 
is euermore incomprehensible; & to be secound, be whiche is be 
louyng mi3t, in ilch one diuersly he is al comprehensible at be 
fulle, in so mochel at o louyng soule only in itself, by vertewe 
of loue, schuld comprehende in it hym at is sufficient at be 
fulle -& mochel more, wipoute comparison - to fille alle be soules 
& aungelles at euer may be. & bis is be eendles merueilous miracle 
of loue, be whiche schal neuer take eende; for euer schal he do it, 
& neuer schal he seese for to do it. (Cloud 18/22-19/12). 
The passage is strongly reminiscent of the text of Gallus' Commentary 
on Isaias 6 which was quoted and discussed above, 
170 and it is tempting, 
as Walsh concedes, to deduce that the Cloud author was familiar with 
Gallus' treatise - possibly in the complete form which no longer 
survives. 
171 His conjecture is, in fact, supported by comparison of 
a slightly later passage from the Latin work, 
... Quasi ergo totum Dei affectu suscipitur, et ab intellectu 
excluditur, 17 2 
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with the sixth chapter of the Cloud, 
For whi he may wel be loued, bot not bou3t. By loue may he 
be getyn & holden; bot bi pou3t neiDer. (Cloud 26/3-5). 
Here the precise correspondence in thought and expression - notably the 
echo of "suscipitur" in the English image "getyn & holden" - is further 
accentuated by the remarkable similarity in the crisp, antithetical 
rhythm of the prose which in both cases reinforces the argument. 
Walsh also comments on the recurrence in Privy Counselling of the 
notion stressed by Gallus that the ecstasy of love through which the 
soul comes to experience God's presence is a response to the outpouring 
of divine love which took form in the Incarnation: 
... }gis listi slei3t worching, be whiche in itself is be hei3 
wisdom of be Godheed graciousli descendyng into mans soule, 
knitting it & onyng it vnto himself in goostly slei3t & rudence 177 of spirit... (P. C. 145/3-6). 
Both authors lay similar stress on the arduousness of the preliminary 
stages of the contemplative ascent before this ecstasy is attained. 
The Cloud author consistently refers to this preparatory process as 
"werk", and Walsh observes of Gallus that, 
Unlike St. Augustine, Thomas seldom speaks of the 'otium 
contemplationis'; it is essentially the 'negotium sapientiae', 
always involving intense interior activity - even at its most 
passive. 174 
The process is technically known as extensio: according to Gallus, it 
is the "precipuum mentis exercitium" which, in the first chapter of 
his commentary on the De Divinis Nominibus, he claims is variously 
termed 
... ascensiones... excessus, extensionis.. o consurrectionis, 
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immissionis, elevationis super mentem... suspensionis... 
175 
It is interesting, therefore, that the English author's alternative 
expressions for the contemplative effort are parallelled in this list. 
In Cloud 611-2, for example, 
& whoso wile be a parfite dissiple of oure Lordes, him behouib 
streyne up his spirite in bis werk goostly, 
the compound "streyne up" closely reproduces the term "extensio" 
itself. 176 More strikingly, the use of "heng up" in such contexts 
as Cloud 4615-17, 
& berfore sche heng up hir lone & hir longing desire in bis 
cloude of unknowing, & lernid hir to loue a ping be whiche 
sche mi3t not se cleerly in pis liif bi li3t of vnderstondyng 
in hir reson... 
is reminiscent of the metaphorical application of "suspensio" which 
Gallus records here. Indeed, the Cloud as a whole embodies Gallus' 
precept that the soul cannot receive direction in the mystic way 
beyond the level of contemplation which the soul acquires largely 
through its own efforts. Walsh aptly comments, 
'Working' or 'work', is the name given to extension by the 
author of the Cloud of Unknowing, which is really a treatise 
on this 'chief contemplative exercise'. 177 
Inevitably, however, while in some cases it seems certain that 
the Cloud author's debt was to Gallus himself, the considerable overlap 
between Gallus' theology and that of his disciple Hugh often obscures 
the precise source of derivative elements in the English texts. The 
extent to which Hugh was demonstrably a direct influence on the Cloud 
Corpus and not merely its counterpart as a milestone in the evolution 
of the Dionysian mystical tradition may, therefore, best be determined 
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by establishing the closest affinities of the English works in respect 
of their unitive theology - the area in which the most significant 
divergences between Gallus and Hugh occur. 
The Cloud of Unknowing and its companion treatise, the Book of 
Privy Counselling differ in form and conception from their principal 
sources of theology, and present correspondingly distinct and often 
more intractable problems of interpretation than their superficially 
more complex antecedents. Both texts are compiled in the first instance 
as personal letters of direction in the contemplative life. They are 
practically orientated to the spiritual needs and capacity of their 
recipient, and accordingly lack any systematic attempt to propound a 
complete coherent theological schema. Indeed, while their achievement 
in introducing Dionysian mystical theology in readily assimilable form 
to a vernacular audience is remarkable, they make and have little claim 
to be considered as significantly innovatory texts in respect of the 
theory of contemplation. Their author has clearly read widely and 
discriminatingly in the field of mystical literature, and his grasp 
of the key issues dividing the main schools of mystical thought, and 
his awareness of his own standpoint in relation to them, seem sure. 
He uses his knowledge allusively, however, and with regard first and 
foremost to his prospective readership. There are difficulties, as 
a result, in piecing together the methodical account of his mystical 
theology which the author himself declines to include in his treatises. 
The impetus for the contemplative ascent, the Cloud author, like 
Gallus, insists, comes from the will. He identifies it in the fourth 
chapter as "be principal worching mi3t of bi soule" (18/4), and later 
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impresses on his disciple the fundamental need to direct his will into 
the unitive way of love: 
& ýerfore lene meekly to }gis blinde steryng of loue in in herte. 
I mene not in ýi bodily herte, bot in JA goostly herte, De whiche 
is Di wil. (Cloud 94/19-21)178 
Characteristically, the English texts include no formal detailed 
exposition of the stages which comprise the contemplative life, though 
they manifestly assume the traditional threefold division into the 
purgative, illuminative and contemplative ways. The divisions of the 
religious life enumerated in Ch. 8 of Cloud - 
be lower party of actiue liif stondel in good & honeste bodily 
werkes of mercy & of charite. be hier party of actiue liif & 
be lower party of contemplatiue liif lip in goodly goostly, 
meditacions, & besy beholding - vnto a mans owne wrechidnes 
wib sorow & contricion, vnto be Passion of Crist & of his 
seruauntes wil) pite & compassion, & vnto be wonderful 3iftes, 
kyndnes, & werkes of God in alle his creatures, bodili & 
goostly, wiý bankyng & preising. Bot be hi3er partye of 
contemplacion (as it may be had here) hongeb al holy in }gis 
derknes & in }gis cloude of vnknowyng, wib a louyng steryng 
&a blinde beholdyng vnto be nakid beyng of God himself only. 
(Cloud 31/21-32/8) - 
derive from the conflated traditions of Augustinian and Dionysian 
theology, 179 though the concept of the highest stage and the terminology 
which describes it are wholly Dionysian. It is notable, moreover, that 
the English author tends to blur the proper distinctions between outward 
modes of life within the Church (active or contemplative) with their 
attendant activities and obligations, and the inner states attained by 
diverse men living the Christian life (the "biginners", "profiters" and 
"parfite" alluded to in Cloud, ch. 35) or experienced by a single man 
at the various stages of his spiritual development. The scheme of a 
continuous progress to unitive awareness with three distinguishable 
phases is nevertheless fundamental to the texts, and the Cloud author 
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associates specific devotional exercises with each phase. He assumes 
that his disciple is already well advanced in spiritual perfection, and 
therefore dwells comparatively little on the spiritual and intellectual 
purifications which belong to the initial stage of the contemplative 
ascent. He concentrates more on the activities of prayer and meditation 
on personal sin and the divine goodness whereby the soul progresses into 
the illuminative way. His insistence that these exercises cannot be 
prolonged beyond the intermediate stage is, however, unwavering: thus, 
Neuerbeles menes Der ben in be whiche a contemplatiif prentys 
schuld be ocupyed, be whiche ben beese; Lesson, Neditacion, & 
Oryson. Or elles to in vnderstonding }gei mowe be clepid: 
Redyng, Dinkyng & Preiing. Of Deese bre bou schalt fynde wretyn 
in anober book of anober mans werk moche betyr ben I can teile 
bee; & berfore: it nedeb not here to teile bee of be qualitees of 
hem. Bot Dis may I teile Dee: Deese }ire ben so couplid togedir, 
at vnto hem at ben biginners & profiters - bot not to hem at 
be parfit, 3e, as it may be here - Dinkyng may not goodly be getyn 
wiboutyn reding or heryng comyng before... Ne preier may not goodly 
be getyn in bigynners & profiters wiboutyn binkyng comyng bifore. 
(Cloud 71/11-72/2). 
Similarly, he reminds his disciple at the end of Privy Counselling, 
an it is speedful to J)ee sumtyme for to cees of }gees queinte 
meditacions & bees sotyle ymaginacions of I)e qualitees of pi 
beyng & of Goddes, & of Iie werken of I)iself & of God (in j)e whiche 
bi wittes han ben fed & wil) De whiche 13ou hast ben led from 
wordlines & bodelines to at abilnes of grace at you arte inne) 
& for to lerne how }you schalt be ocupied goostly in felyng of 
biself & of God, whom }? ou hast lernid so wel before by benkyng 
& ymagenyng of 3oure doynges. (E-. C. 170/15-23). 
The transition from the illuminative to the contemplative way, "from 
wordlines" - the term is particularly apt, since the shift from the 
finite to the infinite is also a repudiation of the describable in 
order to experience what cannot be expressed - "& bodelines to: ýat 
abilnes of grace at bou arte inne", is elsewhere defined with the 
same disregard for schematic precision as a progression from pre- 
occupation with the humanity of Christ to contemplation of His divinity. 
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The passage from Privy Counselling continues, 
Ensaumple of Dis schewid Criste in. bis liif. For whi, 3if 
it so had ben at Der had ben none hier perfeccion in is liif 
bot in beholdyng & in louyng of his manheed, I trowe at he 
wolde not an haue assendid vnto heuen whiles Dis woreld had 
lastid, ne wibdrawen his bodely presence from his specyal louers 
in erbe. Eot for }per was an hier perfeccion, be whiche man may 
haue in bis liif (bat is to sey, a pure goostli felyng in be 
love of his Godheed) berfore he seide to his disciples, be whiche 
grocheden to forgo his bodely presence (as bou doost in partie & 
in ma. ner to forgo bi corious meditacions & ti queinte sotyle 
wittes) at it was speedful to hem at he went bodely fro hem. 
(P. C. 170/24 - 171/6). 
Thus Mary, the type of the contemplative, sat at Christ's feet listening 
to "be souereynest wisdom of his Godheed lappid in be derk wordes of his 
Manheed" (Cloud 47/11-12), and attention to the physical presence of 
Christ and his actual words, which give intellectually intelligible 
form to his spiritual meaning, is explicitly associated with "be secound 
party of actyue liif & be first of contemplatyue liif" (Cloud 47/10-11). 
Again in the Book of Privy Counselling, the author draws on the trad- 
itional exegesis of the Gospels to demonstrate that the humanity of 
Christ is the sole doorway to his divinity: 
Ego sum ostium. Per me si quis introierit, saluabitur; 
et siue egredietur siue ingredietur, pascua inueniet. Qui vero 
non intrat per ostium sed assendit aliunde, ipse fur est et latro. 
(John 10.9). at is to bin vnderstondyng as 3if he seide }pus 
acordyng to oure mater: 'I at am almi3ty by my Godheed & may 
leuefuly as porter late in whom I wol, & bi what wey at I wol, 
Sit, for I wol at }per be a comoun pleyne wey & an open entre 
to alle at wolen come, so at none be excusid by vnknowyng of 
be wey, I haue clobid me in be comoun kynde of man, & maad me 
so opyn at I am be dore by my manheed, & whoso entreb by me 
he schal be saaf. (P. C. 159/9-18). 186 
The Cloud author thus agrees with both Gallus and Hugh in his 
demarcation and characterisation of the three principal phases of the 
contemplative way. He also seems to concur in assigning the roles of 
divine grace and man's natural faculties in the ascent to union. Unlike 
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Gallus, who proposes a formal scheme in which the purgative, 
illuminative and contemplative ways are respectively the domains in 
which nature, nature and grace, and grace alone operate, the English 
writer includes relatively little systematic account of this aspect of 
his contemplative theology. In Privy Counselling, however, which is 
explicitly the most advanced of his spiritual treatises and rewards 
the maturity of his disciple with some of the deepest insights into 
his theory of mystical knowledge, he states, 
So bat, in binges actyue, mans clergie & his kyndely kunnyng 
schal principaly abounde as in worching, God gracyously consentyng, 
wib bees }ire witnes (i. e. 'Scripture, counseil & comoun custum of 
kynde & degre, eelde & conpleccyon') aprouid. & skilfuly, for alle 
binges actyue ben benebe & vnder be wisdam of man. Bot in binges 
contemplatyue be hei3est wisdom at may be in man (as man) is fer 
put vnder, at God be be principal in worching, & man bot only 
consenter & suffrer. (P. C. 163/5-11). 
Here again, the distinctions between outward modes of living and inner 
spiritual states are blurred, and the author takes account of only the 
two broad categories of active and contemplative in which he had earlier 
recognized three divisions, but his concept of the unitive way wherein 
the soul's own efforts are initially assisted and progressively super- 
seded by the operation of divine grace corresponds exactly with the 
pattern established by Gallus. and Hugh. Gallus had also warned of the 
arduousness of the preliminary stages of the mystic way, but the English 
author is perhaps closer to Hugh in the vehemence with which he repeatedly 
insists on this aspect of his spiritual direction. Certainly the Cloud 
does not devote space equal to the columns which Hugh gives over to 
describing the various exercises which advance the soul in contemplation 
in the first chapter of the Viae Syon Lugent. Nor is Hugh's work the 
only possible source for the devotional practices which the Cloud author 
recommends, though their agreement in this area is apparent. Both 
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writers stress the need to acquire true humility, for example, and 
advocate meditation on personal sin, on divine goodness and on the 
Passion, in order to bring the soul to a state of grace in which mortal 
sin is unthinkable. 181 The most arresting similarity, however, is the 
echo of Hugh's terminology in the much-acclaimed vigorous metaphorical 
language which describes the strenuous process of rejecting worldly 
concerns in the English text. The Cloud author reaffirms Hugh's 
contention - which itself recalls Ps. -Dionysius' caution to Timothy 
in the opening chapter of the De Mystica Theologia - 
Quod quia ita derelinquere est difficile, ideo concertatione, 
& forti conatu mentis ista resecari iubentur. (681 Col. I B). 
Parallels between the English and Latin texts include: 
quia tunc in vilipensionem omnia sub suis pedibus cöculcantur. 
(671 Col. I E), 
Soche a proude, corious witte behoueb algates be born doun & 
stifly troden doun vnder fote (Cloud 22/19-20), 
bou schalt step abouen it (i. e. all consideration of "be kyndnes 
& be wor}, ines of God in special") stalwor-ýly, bot listely... 
(Cloud 26/8-9), 
Sekirly bis trauayle is al in tredyng doun of be mynde of alle 
be creatures at euer God maad... (Cloud 61/22-23) 
bou schalt stalworDly step abouen it (i. e. all thought, memory 
of sin etc. ) wib a feruent steryng of loue, & treed hem down 
vnder bi fete. (Cloud 66/4-5) etc.; 182 
oculü intellectus rescindere oportet, quia in ipsa consurrectione 
semper vult illud apprehedere, ad quod tendit affectio. Vnde, 
maxima aduersatio in ista consurrectione est vehemens 
inhaerentia intellectus cum affectu, quam tarnen rescindere necesse 
est per magnü 'exercitium (681 Col. I C), 
Ad quarr expeditionem cum perfecte poterit attingere, omnis ab 
ipsa sapientia in sua consurrectione cogitatio, vel meditatio 
abscindetur (668 Col. I B), 
cf. similar uses of ! 'rescindere" (680 Col. I B, 670 Col. I B) etc., 
"resecare" (681 Col. I B), and "abscisio" (681 Col. II C-D), 
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Be blynde in bis tyme, & schere awey couetyse of knowyng, for it 
wil more let bee an help bee. (Cloud 70/17-18). 
The unitive way, by constrast, is commonly denoted by the passive 
voice in the works of Hugh, Gallus and the Cloud author alike, reflecting 
the receptive condition in which they hold the soul to be acted upon at 
this level by divine grace. In general, however, it is arguable that 
the Cloud author's account of the three phases of the contemplative 
life is more akin to Hugh's treatment of its divisions than to the more 
complex classification established by Gallus from which Hugh's version 
was itself distilled. Gallus subdivides the ascent into nine stages, 
each defined in detail and associated with the Dionysian theory of the 
celestial hierarchy. The English writer rarely indulges in the kind of 
minute analysis of contemplative psychology which characterizes Victorine 
theology as a whole - though, as his recapitulation of the divisions of 
the spiritual faculties in Cloud chs. 62-66 illustrates, he readily 
anchors his theology on the formal definitions which the Victorines 
assembled as the groundwork of contemplative theory. 
The Cloud author, it has already been noted, adopts Gallus' 
division of the principal cognitive faculties of the soul into the 
knowing and loving powers, and like him emphasizes the primacy of love 
in bringing about union above mind, in the sovereign point of the spirit. 
Hugh of Balma's unitive theology rests upon identical premises - but it 
remains to be established whether the Cloud author's classification of 
the contemplative way implies a single continuous process of ascent in 
which, as for Gallus, the knowing and loving powers are progressively 
stigmatized and transformed to become the instruments of ecstatic union, 
or whether, like Hugh, he isolates the mystical faculty and the unitive 
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way from the procedures which prepare the soul to enter it. 
The influence of the Victorine school is perhaps discernible in 
the English writer's concern to specify the role of the intellect in 
the contemplative ascent. Whereas Hugh, in his uncompromising insistence 
on the purely affective character of mystic union, had tended to under- 
state the involvement of the intellect, the Cloud author is perceptibly 
anxious to concede its proper function and to avoid the charge of dis- 
missing any faculty of man's divinely created being. 
183 In Cloud ch. 8, 
for example, he identifies the thoughts of personal sin and the Passion 
which interrupt the inexperienced soul's concentration on God as, 
... a scharp &a clere beholding of bi kindely witte, preentid 
in bi reson wibinne in jbi Soule. & where you askist me berof 
wheber it be good or iuel: I sey at it behoueb algates be good 
in his kynde, for whi it is a beme of be licnes of God. Bot be 
vse berof may be bobe good & iuel. (Cloud 30/3-s). 
Similarly, in the Book of Privy Counselling, he qualifies his denial 
of the efficacy of meditation in the unitive way by immediately reaffirming 
the need to apply the intellect in the preliminary stages of the contem- 
plative life. He seems both eager to forestall a potentially disastrous 
misconception on the part of his disciple, and sensitive to possible 
misinterpretation of his own standpoint which put him at odds with the 
devotional piety of the contemporary Church: 
Neuerbeles Sit ben bees faire meditacions be trewest wey at 
a synner may haue in his begynnyng to be goostly felyng of himself 
& of God. & me wolde henk at it were inpossible to mans vnder- 
stondyng - of al God may do what he wil - at a synner schuld 
com to be restful in be goostly felyng of himself & of God, bot 
3if he first sawe & felt by ymaginacion & meditacion be bodely 
doynges of hymself & of God, & berto sorowed for at at were 
to sorowen, & maad joie for at at were to joien. & whoso comet 
not in bi bis weye, he comet) not trewly... (L. C. 158/17-25)- 
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He is nonetheless adamant, however, in restricting the legitimate 
exercise of the intellect to the novice in contemplation. In the 
paragraph which immediately precedes the above extract, he challenges 
his reader, 
&, I preie bee, how schuldest bou com to bis worching by be 
vse of pi wittys ? Sekirly neuer; ne Sit by iii faire wise, bi 
sotyle & 'i queinte ymaginacions & meditacions, 3e, of bei be 
of bi wrechid leuyng, be Passion of Criste, be ioies of oure 
Lady, or of alle be seintes & aungelles of heuen, or Sit of eny 
qualite or sotilte or condicion at perteyniD to be beyng of 
1, iself or of God. Sekirly me had leuer haue soche a nakid blynde 
felyng of myself as I touchid before... & rater it schuld breke 
myn herte in teres for lackyng of felyng of God & for be peinful 
biriin of myself, & kyndil my desire in loue & desiryng after be 
felyng of God, an alle be sotyle & be queynte ymaginacions or 
meditacions at man kan teile or. may fynde wretyn in book, be bei 
neuer so holy ne schewe bei neuer so feire to be sotyle i3e of Di 
corious witte. (P. C. 157/27 - 158/16). 
The epithets which the Cloud author here applies to the intellect and 
the imagination, moreover, betray an instinctive mistrust of them for 
their seductive power over the contemplative. He recognizes the 
ambivalence of their capacity for stimulating the soul, and elsewhere 
refers to the promptings of a "proude, coryous & an ymaginatiif witte" 
(Cloud 22/18-19) which distract the contemplative from his goal, and 
cautions the soul far advanced in contemplation to desist from, 
besines of biself in corious seching & ransakyng wilb bi goostly 
wittis amonges eny of be qualitees at longin not only to be 
beyng of biself bot also to . 
13e beyng of God. (P. C. 143/13-16). 
Like Hugh, who condemns "inutilibus curiositatibus" at all levels, 
the Cloud author is uncompromisingly opposed to "coryouste of witte" 
(Cloud 73/12,986), whether it is directed towards the kind of 
speculative knowledge which is wholly antithetical to the mystic way, 
or whether its object would have been a proper theme for meditation 
at a less advanced stage of the ascent. At the highest level, 
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meditation can only dissipate the contemplative effort; the contrast 
with its efficacy in recollecting the spiritual and mental faculties 
in the preliminary stages of the contemplative way is presented in 
the seventh chapter of Cloud: 
For parauenture he wil bryng to bi winde diuerse ful feire & 
wonderful pointes of his kyndnes, & sey at he is ful swete & 
ful louyng, ful gracious & ful mercyful. & 3if })ou wilt here him, 
he coueitep no beter; for at be last he wil bus jangle euer more 
& more til he bring bee lower to be mynde of his Passion. & }sere 
wol he tat be see be wonderful kyndnes of God; & if you here him, 
he kepeý no beter. For Bone after he wil lat }gee see in olde 
wrechid leuing; & parauenture, in seing & pinkyng berof, he wil 
bryng to iii mynde sow place at bou hast wonid in before Dis 
tyme. So at at be last, er euer wite kou, bou schalt be scaterid 
iou wost neuer where. be cause of bis scateryng is at bou herddist 
him first wilfuly, answeredist him, resceiuedist him & letest him 
allone. (Cloud 27/3-14). 184 
The English author seems, moreover, to echo Hugh's distinction between 
the discursive activities of the intellect and its natural tendency to 
apprehend whatever object the loving power desires - both impulses which 
must be suppressed in the unitive way. 185 After setting precise limits 
to the usefulness of the exercise of meditation, the Cloud author thus 
goes on to warn his disciple of this second and more insidious danger 
from the intellect at the beginning of chapter 9: 
And berfore be scharp steryng of bin vnderstondyng, at wile 
alweis prees apon bee when }you settest }gee to bis blynd werk, 
behoueb alweys be born dour... (Cloud 33/17-19). 
Clearly, therefore, the Cloud author insists unflinchingly on the 
super-intellectual character of mystic union. The unitive experience 
is held to be purely affective: now the soul, like Mary, attends to 
the 
souereynest wisdom of his Godheed lappid in be derk wordes of 
his I4anheed: beder beheeld sche wi}? al be loue of hir hert. 
(Cloud 47/11-13). 
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For both Hugh and the Cloud author, the unitive way is characterized 
by the soul's concentration of its entire being, its core of pure love, 
on the corresponding essence of the Being of God Himself. Hugh's 
description, 
nec ibi gratia, nec gloria vel dismissio poenae, vel aliquid aliud 
requiritur istis desiderijs sursum actiuae consurrectionis, sed 
ipse Bolus cui soli propter se in conculcatione vehementiü 
desiderioru mens vniri aspirat... (681 Col. II C) 
is closely parallelled in the Cloud author's least inhibited definitions 
of the unitive way, which occur in Privy Counselling - the work in which 
he makes few concessions to the inexperience of his disciple, but shares 
with him his most profound convictions as with an equal in contemplation: 
& loke at noting leue in iii worching mynde bot a nakid entent 
streching into God, not clobid in any specyal bou3t of God in 
hymself, how. he is in himself or in any of his werkes, bot only 
at he is as he is. (P. C. 135/19-22) 
at bi bou3t be nakid & bi felyng noting defoulid, & bou, nakidly 
as }you arte, wit be touching of grace be priuely fed in Pi felyng 
only wit) hym as he is; bot blyndly & in partie, as it may be-here 
in }gis liif, }gat ti longing desire be euermore worching. (P. C. 136/26-29) 
.. for }gis nobil nou3tnyng of itself in verrey meeknes & bis hy3e 
allyng of God in parfite charite, it deserueb to haue God (in whose 
loue it is deeply drenchid in ful & in fynal forsakyng of itself as 
nou3t or lesse, 3if lesse my3t be) mi3tely, wisely & goodly 
sokouryng it & kepyng it & defendyng it fro alle aduersitees, 
bodyly & goostly, wiboutyn besynes or trauayle, rewarde or 
auisement of itself? (P. C. 149/13-19) 
Further, the Cloud author seems to endorse Hugh's thesis that the 
loving faculty alone is engaged in the unitive way, and that this way 
is isolated from the preparatory phases in which the affection cooperates 
with the intellect to propel the soul into the way of pure love. 
186 
The English writer does not imitate Hugh's methodical account of the 
principles of his unitive theology. Unsystematically, however, and 
with regard primarily to the practical needs of his disciple, he 
reaffirms the major grounds on which Hugh distinguishes the unitive way. 
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His claim that Mary, the type of the contemplative, 
... lernid hir to loue a Bing be whiche. sche mi3t not se cleerly 
in dis liif bi li3t of vnderstondyng in hir reson, ne Sit uerely 
fele in swetnes of loue in hir affeccion. (Cloud 46/16-18) 
restates the proposition which Hugh argues in the Quaestio Unica and 
which is the basis of his contemplative theory - namely, that the 
hypothesis that love necessarily succeeds knowledge (a fundamental tenet 
of Augustinian theology and subsequently propounded by the Victorines) 
holds good only outside the third way: the order is inevitably reversed 
when the soul enters the way of union. Equally, the inference that the 
love which unites the soul to God is distinct from natural affection - 
and this, presumably, includes the affection which meditation on the 
divine goodness stimulates during the illuminative phase of the con- 
templative ascent - seems to concur with Hugh's dissociation of the 
faculty of unitive love from all antecedent modes of cognition. 187 
The English author's placing of meditation in relation to the 
unitive way also coincides with Hugh's theory. It is the principal 
exercise which, with rare exceptions, prepares the soul for union: so 
much is demonstrated by the passage from Privy Counselling 158/17-25 
cited above. 188 In the same context, however, the writer also underlines 
that meditation is not of itself an integral part of the unitive way 
(ibid. 157/27 - 158/ 16). Similarly, in an analogous passage from the 
Cloud, the author again isolates the procedures of the unitive way from 
the exercises which equip the soul to enter it: 
... in bis werk men schul use no menes, ne 3it men mowe not com 
berto wil) menes. Alle good menes hangen upon it, & it on no mene; 
ne no mene may lede berto. Here byginnit be fiue & britty chapitre. 
Neuerbeles menes ter ben in be whiche a contemplatiif prentys 
schuld be ocupyed, be whiche ben beese; Lesson, Meditacion, & 
Oryson... (Cloud 71/7-13). 
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The segregation of the unitive way here is indisputable: no "means" 
may initiate union, yet the novice in contemplation is recommended 
various "means" or exercises to further his progress in the contemplative 
way. The apparent inconsistency here is only satisfactorily resolved 
if the unitive way is assumed to be independent of the preparatory 
stages and to operate according to entirely autonomous laws. It is, 
the Cloud author repeatedly insists, the way of love alone: 
ierfore, what tyme at bou purposest bee to bis werk, & felest 
bi grace at bou arte clepid of God, lift an up in herte vnto 
God wib a meek steryng of loue. (Cloud 28/3-5) 
Lift up in herte vnto God wib a meek, steryng of loue; & 
mene himself, & none of his goodes. (Cloud 163-4) 
In both these extracts, the author seems to be urging his disciple to 
a new undertaking, a redirection of his will for union into an untried 
course of love. Interestingly, his use of metaphors to describe this 
process of loving extension - the most important of Dionysian origin 
and assembled, as has been noted, by Gallus - seems to be most closely 
related to their application in the Viae Syon Lugent. Passages such as, 
& whoso wile be a parfite dissiple of oure Lordes, him behouiý 
streyne up his spirite in }gis werk goostly... (Cloud 61/1-2) 
& loke at noting leue in bi worching mynde bot a nakid entent 
streching into God, not clobid in any specyal bou3t of-God in 
hymself, how he is in himself or in any of his werkes, bot only 
at he is as he is. (P. C.. 135/19-22) 
lift an up in herte vnto God wil) a meek steryng of loue... 
for it suffiseb inou3 a naked entent directe vnto God, wiDouten 
any oiler cause }yen himself. (Cloud 28/4-9) 
seem to recall most vividly Hugh's descriptions of the unitive ascent: 
extensio amoris in Deum per amoris desideriü (658 Col. I C) 
mks... se extendit in ardore motuum vnionem dilecti desiderans 
(676 Col. II D) 
amor extensiuus deificans (681 Col. I B) 
directa tendentia suiipsius ad Deum delectatur (680 Col. I B) - 
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though there is a convincing precedent for the examples from both 
Cloud 28/4-9 and Viae Syon Lugent 680 Col. IB in the second chapter 
of Gallus' commentary on the De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, where he is 
discussing the proposition,. "dilectio est primus motus secundum mentem": 
... id est, inter. motus mentales, 'ad divina', id est per quam 
mens directe in Deum tendit et ad ipsius unionem extenditur. 
Summus enim apex affectionis secundum Deum unibilis et ad ipsum 
diligendum habilis, primum motum in Deum directe et quasi 
perpendiculariter a sua summitate sursum dirigit in desideratum, 
sed intellectualiter ignotam et inattingibilem pergere nesciunt. 189 
Like Hugh, moreover, the Cloud author also emphasizes that the same 
loving impulse--which, through the intervention of divine grace, progress- 
ively unites the soul to God in this life is prolonged thereafter into 
eternity. The unitive way thus culminates in the beatific vision - the 
whole is a single, independent movement of love. The Cloud author's 
assertion, 
For whi at parfite steryng of loue at byginne]? here is euen 
in noumbre wiý at at schal last wibouten ende in be blis of 
heuen; for al is bot one. (Cloud 52/21-23), 
parallels Hugh's claim, 
... amor ille quo sponsus in vita ista diligitur, idem est 
numero cum illo, quo in aeternitate gloriae gubernatori omnium 
vnietur (665 Col. I D), 
and the corollary in both cases is that the soul is deified through 
grace, first in its mystic union with God and eternally in the state 
of beatitude. Hugh's reference to unitive love as "amor extensiuus 
deificans" (681 Col. I B), is taken up in the Cloud author's account 
of the unitive way, 
only bi his mercy wil)outen ýi desert arte maad a God in grace, 
onyd wiD him in spirit witouten departyng, bote here &*in blis 
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of heuen wibouten any eende. (Cloud 12o/16-19) 
The Cloud of Unknowing, it has already been suggested, is principally 
concerned with directing the disciple in the loving extension of his 
being to God. The author primes his pupil by urging him to refine his 
love, to focus it narrowly on God and to make it more agile in the 
impulses which unite it directly to God, by processes which parallel 
the loving aspirations in which Hugh instructs his audience: the utterance 
of ejaculatory prayers, 19° for example, and the concentration of the 
soul's entire unitive purpose in simple single words such as "God", 
"sin" or "love". 191 In this way, the loving impulse is disencumbered 
of the bodily influences,. which restrain it and so enflamed with the 
desire for union that it flies instantaneously to God. The Cloud 
author's image for this flight - that of a spark shooting up from a 
fire -'is at the heart of his unitive theology: 
& berfore take kepe to bis werk & to be merueylous maner of 
it wibinne in bi soule. For 3if it be trewlich conceyued, it 
is bot a sodeyn steryng, & as it were vnauisid, speedly springing 
unto God as sparcle fro be cole. & it is merueylous to noumbre be 
sterynges at may be in one oure wrou3t in a soule at is disposid 
to bis werk. & Sit, in o steryng of alle beese, he may haue sodenly 
& parfitely for3eten alle create ping. Bot fast after iche steryng, 
for corupcion of be flesche, it fallet doun a3ein to som bou3t or 
to some done or vndone dede. Bot what ýerof? For fast after, it 
rise} a3en as sodenly as it did bifore. (Cloud 225-14) 
It may perhaps be claimed that the specific reference to a coal fire 
typifies the author's efforts to bring the abstractions of theology 
and theological language firmly within the grasp of readers who lacked 
expertise in Latin religious literature. The image of the spark 
nevertheless clearly derives from the traditional concept of the 
scintilla synderesis - formally defined by Thomas Gallus as the soul's 
unitive faculty which takes flight to God once the soul has transcended 
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its natural powers and established itself in the ecstatic third way, 
the domain of synderesis itself. Prof. Hodgson's note on this passage 
of the Cloud cites less precise uses of the image by Richard of St. 
Victor and Walter Hilton for comparison: 
of. Benj. Maj. V. 6 (col. 175): 'recte itaque illa mentis in 
superna elevatio, quae ex fervore dilectionis oritur, fumo, ni 
fallor, comparatur'; Scale of Perfection, ii. 42, p. 371: 'the 
soul is turned then all into fire of love, and therefore every 
word it privily prayeth is like to a sparkle springing out of a 
fire... '; ibid. i, 25, P"44: prayer is 'likened to a fire which 
of its own kind leaveth the lowness of the earth and always 
styeth up into the air'. 
Wolfgang Riehle assesses the significance of the concept in English 
contemplative literature in general in his article, "Der Seelengrund 
in der englischen Mystik des Mittelalters im Vergleich zur deutschen". 192 
He observes that the notion of the scintilla occurs only in generalised 
form (e. g. Walter Hilton, Of Mixed Life: "vre lord had sent in to in 
herte a luytel sparkel of his blessed fuire at is himself"). 193 
The term "synteresis", he notes appears in only one English text - 
The Charter of the Abbey of the Holy Ghost. 194 The word itself, it is 
true, does not occur in the Cloud Corpus - though its absence is perhaps 
to be expected, since the Cloud author has been shown to avoid highly 
technical latinate theological vocabulary where its inclusion might be 
a source of ambiguity. It is nevertheless apparent that the image of 
the "spark" - the exact vernacular equivalent of Lat. "scintilla" - is 
here applied with complete technical accuracy to the impulse which lifts 
the soul from its natural progress in the unitive way and momentarily 
fuses it with God. The Cloud author, it has been submitted, follows 
Hugh of Balma in isolating the unitive way of love from the preparatory 
phases of purgation and illumination: and it seems, further, that he not 
only uses the image of the "spark" in a technical sense, but that he 
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also discriminates between the different interpretations which his 
sources had put on the notion, and that it is again Hugh rather than 
Gallus who provides the closest analogue for his particular application 
of the image. Both authors incorporate it in the scheme of the soul's 
loving aspirations to God. Comparable passages from the Viae Syon 
Lugent are 
quando ista vis animae suprema, quae est apex affectus, 
gitur r ab igne amoris, illo motu & tactu scintillat affectus ä 
aspirando in Des. (686 Col. II E) 
and 670 Col. I A-B, where the image is of a sparkling star rather than 
a fire: 
Item mens beata continuo, & indiuisibili exercitio in ipso summo 
bono veluti aeterno dulcore afficitur, haec tarnen modo interscalari, 
& interciso in ipsum consurgit, cuius motus rectissime est ad instar 
emissionis sideris scintillantis, si illae emissiones ex libera 
voluntate procederent: quia illi motus anagogici sunt quasi subitanei, 
vt statim post consurrectionem mens infra seipsam inferius 
prolabatur, iterum & iterum consurgit, & iterum infra seipsam 
cadit. 195 
The soul which has exceeded its power of ordinary love and entered into 
the apex affectus, where it exercises its unitive love in aspirations 
to God, fleetingly achieves its purpose through impulses which ascend 
to God like sparks. The pattern of alternate momentary union and sudden 
plummeting to the normal human condition is, for both authors, fundamental 
to the unitive way. Both also measure the soul's movements against an 
imaginary scale of self, calculating whether the soul is above, equal 
with, or below itself in its progress to union. 
196 It seems, indeed, 
that while Father Walsh rightly comments that the English author's 
phrase for the location of the unitive experience, "the sovereign point 
of the spirit", is an "excellent rendering" of Gallus' expression, the 
"summus apex affectualis", 197 the significance which he attaches to it 
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is closer to Hugh's interpretation of the same terminology in 
passages such as this from 686 Col. II E. 198 
It is appropriate, at this juncture, to return to the starting 
point of this discussion in the Deonise Hid Diuinite which insists, 
often independently of its immediate sources, that the unitive experience 
takes place "abouen mynde". The English phrase renders its Latin sources 
precisely on only two occasions (5/24,8/13), it will be remembered; 
in four other instances it is an interpolation (2/25,2/25-6,4/3 and 
6128), and in 3/16-17 and (in the variant form "abouen kynde") 4/16 the 
text of the sources is expanded or modified to accommodate this specific 
concept of the nature and location of mystic union. It remains to be 
established, however - in the light of the foregoing discussion which 
has aimed to set the cryptic theology of the Deonise Hid Diuinite in 
the wider context of the Cloud Corpus and the author's intermediary 
sources of Dionysian theology - what kind of experience and what order 
of knowledge are implied in the descriptive phrase "abouen mynde". 
This in turn involves broadening the scope of the earlier analysis 
of the translation, which concentrated primarily on its linguistic 
aspect, to consider the sense in which the author's terminology, his 
interpolation of material which does not feature in his immediate 
sources, and his movement between the various Latin versions of the 
text, combine to divulge the translator's own interpretation of the 
matter which he transmits. 
Ch. 14 of the Cloud, in which the author impresses on his 
disciple the need to attain perfect meekness, incorporates a concise 
definition of four distinct modes of knowledge: 
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& ýerfore swink & swete in al at you canst & mayst, for to 
gete bee a trewe knowyng &a feling of tiiself a wreche as lbou 
arte. &f an I trowe at sone after at }you schalt haue a trewe 
knowyng & a_felyng of God as he is; not as he is in hymself, for 
That may no man do bot himself, ne Sit as I)ou schalt do in blisse 
bote body & soule togeders; bot as he is possible, & as he vouched 
saaf to be knowen & felid of a meek soule leuyng in is deedly body. 
(Cloud 42/1-7) 
Three of these - self-knowledge, contemplative knowledge and beatific 
knowledge - are within the capacity of man; the fourth - God's knowledge 
of His own Being - is beyond human conception. The text is concerned 
primarily with the first two categories of knowledge, though the second 
in some sense includes the third, since the state of beatitude is held 
to be an extension and fulfilment of the unitive experience. The category 
of self-knowledge, for the Cloud author's purposes, is also broad enough 
to embrace knowledge of all that has to do with creation. In ch. 70, 
he takes account of the necessary distinction between the cognitive 
processes in which the senses have a part and transmit responses to be 
interpreted by the intellect, and those which relate to abstractions; 
but each has affinities with the other in that they pertain to created 
phenomena, and. they are alike antithetical to apprehension of God: 
For kyndely bei (i. e. the 'bodely wittes') ben ordeynid at 
with hem men schuld haue: knowyng of alle outward bodely binges, 
& on no wise by hem com to be knowing of gostely binges. I mene 
bi beire werkes. 
By beire failinges we may, as bus: when we rede or here speke 
of sum certeyn binges, & berto conceyue at oure outward wittys 
kon not teile us bi no qualitee what boo binges ben, an we mowe 
be verely certefied at boo binges ben goostly binges, & not 
bodely binges. 
" On bis same maner goostly it farib in oure goostly wittys, 
when we trauailen aboute be knowyng of God himself. For haue 
a man neuer so moche goostly vnderstondyng in knowyng of alle 
maad goostly binges, Sit may he neuer bi be werk of his vnder- 
stondyng com to be knowyng of an vnmaad goostly ping, be whiche 
is nou3t bot God. Bot by be failyng it may; for whi at ping 
at it failib in is noting elles bot only God. & herfore it was 
at Seynte Denis seyde: 'De moste goodly knowyng of God is bat, 
be whiche is knowyn bi vnknowyng'. (Cloud 124/16-125/12) 
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The distinction between knowledge according to the first and second 
categories rests, therefore, upon their object - whether it is not - 
God or God. The activity of thought belongs exclusively to the first 
category: 
For of alle oiler creatures & beire werkes - 3e, & of ýe werkes 
of God self - may a man j? orou grace haue fulheed of knowing, & 
wel to kon ýinke on hem; bot of God himself can no man hinke. & 
berfore I wole leue al at ping at I can pink, & chese to my 
loue at ping }gat I cannot pink. For whi he may wel be loued, 
bot not bou3t. By loue may he be getyn & holden; bot bi out 
neiber. (Cloud 25/18 - 26/5) 
The Cloud author warns his disciple repeatedly and urgently against 
involving the intellectual faculty in his desire for union: 
& ýerfore for Goddes loue beware in bis werk, & trauayle not in 
bi wittes ne in in ymaginacion on no wise. For I teile bee 
trewly, it may not be comen to by trauaile in beim; & berfore 
leue beim & worche not wiP heim. (Cloud 23/9-12) 
The intellectual faculty is linked to creation through the intermediaries 
of sense and imagination, and therefore cannot comprehend the transcendent 
being of God. It is only the loving power which has access to a kind of 
knowledge of God. 
Love is thus identified as a cognitive faculty by the Cloud author, 
and the notion of "comprehension" as a result takes on two contradictory 
meanings in his work. They are differentiated in the fourth chapter 
of the Cloud: 
For he (i. e. God) is euen mete to oure soule by mesuring of 
his Godheed; & oure soule euen mete unto him bi woriines of oure 
creacion to his ymage & to his licnes. & he by himself wibouten 
moo, & none bot he, is sufficient at be fulle, & mochel more, to 
fulfille be wille, & be desire of oure soule. & oure soule, bi 
vertewe of }gis reformyng grace, is mad sufficient at be fulle to 
comprehende al him by loue, be whiche is incomprehensible to alle 
create knowable mi3t, as is aungel & mans soule. (I mene by beire 
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knowyng & not by beire louyng, & ýerfore I clepe hem in dis 
caas knowable mi3tes). (Cloud 18/13-21) 
"Comprehension", as it refers to the soul's unitive awareness of God 
through love, operates as a metaphor. It describes an experience which 
is essentially inexpressible since it exceeds man's power to conceive 
of it, and does so by relating it to the kind of comprehension which 
is reached through the natural cognitive processes. In so far as it 
is possible to define the experience, the Cloud author succeeds by 
identifying the respects in which it both is and is not akin to these 
processes. He further qualifies it by specifying the conditions under 
which it obtains. It is dictated7in the first instance, by the fact of 
divine transcendence, which is absolute and unalterable and precludes 
knowledge of God's being through man's normal faculties of cognition. 
God can therefore only be apprehended when these faculties are in 
abeyance. This is conveyed through the associated imagery of darkness 
and cloud. Interestingly, the Cloud author seems to subordinate their 
connexion with the tradition of biblical exegesisywhich interprets them 
as images of the soul's experience once it has cut itself loose from 
finite objects, to the logical status which they occupy in the Dionysian 
Corpus. They function as vehicles for metaphysical propositions rather 
than as evocations of contemplative psychology: their negative connotations 
express both God's relation to the finite as exceeding its scope and its 
language, and also the abnegation of natural modes of knowledge which 
His transcendence implicitly demands of the soul seeking union with Him. 
The Cloud author is clearly disturbed by the nature of imagery itself, 
which operates by anchoring the meaning it conveys within the known 
and finite, but he is pragmatist enough to recognize its efficacy in 
appealing to his reader's understanding in spiritual matters by way 
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of his experience of the natural world. As early as the fourth 
chapter of the text, therefore, he analyses the imagery of darkness 
and cloud with characteristic concern to forestall any possible mis- 
reading of their significance on the part of his pupil, in a passage 
which compromises between exploiting and rejecting the physical overtones 
of his terminology: 
& wene not, for I clepe it a derknes or a cloude, at it 
be any cloude congelid of be humours at fleen in be ayre, ne 
3it any derknes soche as is in in house on ni3tes, when iii 
candel is oute. For soche a derknes & soche a cloude maist 
}you ymagin wib coriouste of witte, for to bere before in i3en 
in be li3test day of somer; & also a3enswarde in be derkist ni3t 
of wynter bou mayst ymagin a clere schinyng li3t. Lat be soche 
falsheed; I mene not bus. For when I sey derknes, I mene a 
lackyng of knowyng; as alle at ping bat. bou knowest not, or 
elles at tou hast for etyn, it is derk to bee, for bou seest 
it not wib iii goostly i3e. & for pis skile it is not clepid a 
cloude of be eire, bot a cloude of vnknowyng, at is bitwix bee 
& bi God. (Cloud 23/13-24) 
The imagery of darkness and cloud refers not, therefore, to a transitional 
phase in the contemplative's experience which precedes his initiation 
into full awareness, but to the persisting state of intellectual and 
sensual oblivion in which alone the contemplative may experience the 
transcendent being of God through the cognitive power of love. 200 
The author insists, 
For o Bing I teile bee: at ber was neuer Sit pure creature 
in bis liif, ne neuer Sit schal be, so hie rauischid in con- 
templacion & loue of be Godheed, at ber ne is euermore a hi3e 
&a wonderful cloude of vnknowyng bitwix him & his God. In bis 
cloude it was at Marye was ocupied wib many a preue loue put. 
(Cloud 47/17-21) 
The disciple is urged to "wone & worche" ceaselessly in the cloud of 
unknowing, 201 and repeatedly cautioned against anticipating release 
from the darkness and cloud, since it is only in a condition of 
ignorance according to natural modes of knowing that true knowledge 
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of God is to be found: 
Lette not berfore, bot trauayle Merin tyl bou fele lyst. 
For at to first tyme when you dost it, tou fyndest bot a derknes, 
& as it were a cloude of vnknowyng, tou wost neuer what, sauying 
at }you felist in ti wille a nakid entent vnto God. ºis derknes 
& }gis cloude is, howsoeuer tou dost, bitwix bee & ti God, & lettet 
tee at tou maist not see him cleerly by li3t of vnderstonding in 
bi reson, ne fele him in swetnes of loue in in affeccion. & 
terfore schap }gee to bide in is derknes as longe as }you maist, 
euermore criing after him at tou louest; for 3if euer schalt 
tou feie him or see him, as it may be here, it behouejý alweis 
be in }gis cloude & in is derknes. (Cloud 16/19-17/9 )202 
In figurative terms equal to the imagery of darkness and cloud,, the 
disciple's impulse to unitive awareness is to be "nakid" or "blynde". 
Each word functions as a negative of deprivation, denoting the abandonment 
of self and knowledge by way of the senses and intellect which is a 
condition of affective knowledge of God. The perfected impulse of 
unitive love is described in the Book of Privy Counselling: 
& in bis tyme is }ii loue bobe chaste & parfite. In bis tyme 
it is at bou bote seest bi God & bi loue, & nakidly felist hym 
also bi goostly onyng to his loue in be souereyn poynte of bi 
spirit, as he is in hymself, bot blyndely, as it may be here, 
vtterly spoylid of biself & nakidly clobed in hymself as he is, 
vnclobed & not lappid in any of bees sensible felynges (be bei 
neuer so sweet ne so holy) bat mowen falle in bis liif. Bot in 
purete of spirit propirly & parfitely he is parceyuid & felt in 
himself as he his, fer lengid fro any fantasye or fals opinion 
at may falle in }gis liif. (P. C. 169/17-26)203 
The Cloud author's application of the imagery of blindness, in fact, 
has close parallels in the Viae Syon Lugent. Hugh insists here that 
the eye of the intellect should be blind - "intellectiuus oculus 
totaliter excaecatur" (681 Col. I D) - for the soul to undertake the 
unitive way of love. 204 It is interesting, moreover, that the English 
author introduces the concept of "blynde beholdynges" into his trans- 
lation of the De Mystica Theologia, deviating strikingly from his 
Latin sources which read "mysticas visiones" (S) or "mysticarum 
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contemplationum" (Ex. ) at this point. 205 By substituting his own 
phrase for the text of his sources, the Cloud author is clearly 
superimposing his personal interpretation of unitive theology on the 
text of the De Mystica Theologia and integrating Dionysian principles 
in the purest form in which they reached him with the tempered Dionysianism 
which he had received primarily through Thomas Gallus and Hugh of Baima, 
and which he expounded in his own original compositions. 
A further condition of the soul's attainment of unitive wisdom, 
according to the Cloud author, is the intercession of divine grace. 
It operates on two levels. In the first instance, it is through grace 
that God adapts his transcendent being to the cognitive power of the 
soul's faculty of love, and secondly, it is only by God's gracious 
permission that the soul has the capacity to apprehend Him through love. 
Both ideas are accommodated in the passage from Cloud Ch. 4 (18/13-21) 
quoted in full above, whose measured cadence confirms the sense of the 
mutual compatibility of the soul and God: 
For he is euen mete to oure soule by mesuring of his Godheed; 
& oure soule euen mete unto him bi wor, ines of oure creacion to 
his ymage & to his licnes... 206 
Many parallel passages from the Cloud Corpus support the insistence 
here on the centrality of grace: it is the cornerstone for the soul's 
ascent to the sovereign point of the spirit, where the soul knows God 
through loving union with Him. Thus, in the "hi3er partie of contem- 
platiue liif", the author maintains, 
... a man is abouen himself & vnder his God. Abouen himself he is, for whi he purposed him to Wynne jeder bi grace, whe, er he 
may not com bi kynde; jat is to sey, to be knit to God in spirite, 
& in oneheed of loue & acordaunce of wile. (Cloud 32/12-16) 
255 
Interpolations in the text of the Latin sources of the Deonise Hid 
Diuinite, moreover, reaffirm the author's adherence to this point of 
doctrine where it effectively qualifies the Dionysian theory of knowledge 
through unknowing. The Dionysian concept of the negative way is 
materially altered by the introduction of the conditional phrase "in 
}gis grace" in, for example, 3/10-12 - 
loke at tou rise wig me in Dis grace, in a maner at is Dou 
woste neuer how, to be onid with hym at is abouen alle substaunces 
and al maner knowyng - 
and the inclusion of "by ýe steryng of grace" in the invitation to 
Timothy to embark on the unitive way which opens the text (2/31-2) 
makes the entire exercise which it advocates dependent on the inter- 
vention of grace. The translator may, however, have been influenced 
by Gallus in this last example: the Extractio here incorporates the 
clause "sic cooperare radio divino" (567), and the Gloss reads "sic 
cooperante divino radio" (272A). It seems certain, indeed, that 
whether or not the English author was directly indebted to Gallus in 
this particular instance, he owes the emphasis which he gives here and 
in his work as a whole to the role of grace in the contemplative way 
first and foremost to Gallus' interpretation of Dionysian theology. 
The influence of Gallus is equally apparent in Hugh of Balma's 
emphasis on the need for grace in the contemplative way. 
207 
The English translator's insistence on the distinctions between 
intellectual knowledge and the unitive knowledge which the contemplative 
achieves through the fulfilment of these conditions, is expressed 
through the interpolation of explanatory glosses on the De Mystica 
Theologia which also argue the impact of the interpretations of Gallus 
and Balma on his approach to Dionysian theology. Three interpolations 
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to the Latin text of Sarracenus specifically identify unitive awareness 
according to Ps. -Dionysius as knowledge-in-love: Moses' entry into the 
darkness of Sinai is thus defined as an act of love ("... Moyses in 
syngulertee of affeccioun was departid from bees beforeseyde chosen 
preestes, & entrid by hymself be derknes of vnknowyng" (D. H. D. 5/15-17)); 208 
God is said to reveal Himself only to those who imitate Moses and "entren 
wit affeccioun into derknes, where verely he is" (D. H. D. 4/25); and the 
opening prayer for the work of the text to be accomplished in the writer 
stipulates that this is to be achieved through unitive love (9-erfore 
wij affeccyon abouen munde as I may, I desire to purchase hem vnto me 
wi i bis preier" (D. H. D. 2/25-7)). 209 Similarly, the translator overlays 
Ps. -Dionysius' account of the transcendence of God with his own version, 
which restricts God's impenetrability more precisely to intellectual 
cognition by his creatures; the description of Moses' attainment of 
"be hi3enes of be godliche assenciouns", the culmination of knowledge 
according to the affirmative method, is thus suffixed by the explanatory 
clause, "be whiche is be teermes & be bounder of mans vnderstondyng, be 
it neuer so holpen wib grace" (D. H. D. 5/1-3), and in an interpolation 
which recalls the assertion in Cloud 18/19-20 that God is impenetrable 
to all intelligent beings by way of their intellect ("... incomprehensible 
to alle create knowable mi3t, as is aungel & mans soule"), he again 
defines these "assenciouns" as the "teermes set vnto man or aungel" 
in D. H. D. 4/22-23. Both Cloud 18/19-20 and D. H. D. 4/22-23 seem, in 
fact, to echo Gallus' claim, already cited, in the Commentary on 
Isaias. 210 
The character of unitive knowledge according to the Cloud author's 
theology, it has been suggested, is defined partly in negative terms 
by denying it the properties of natural modes of cognition. The concept 
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of "vnknowyng" operates in this way, to suggest that the experience 
involves holding the normal functions of the working mind in abeyance. 211 
The disciple is advised, 
& loke at noting leue in bi worching mynde bot a nakid entent 
streching into God, not cloýid in any specyal bou3t of God in 
hymself, how he is in himself or in any of his workes, bot only 
at he is as he is. (P. C. 135/19-22) 
Unitive knowledge does not depend on the rational faculty and is non- 
discursive. The author later reminds his pupil of Richard of St. 
Victor's exegesis of the biblical account of the death of Rachel at 
the birth of her son Benjamin, which he interprets as the death of 
reason with the advent of contemplation (P. C. 150/10-28), and he goes 
on to compare the contemplative state to the physical condition of 
sleep - both are marked by the stilling of the sensual and intellectual 
functions of the body (P. C. 152/3-9). There is an interesting counter- 
part for the notion of "vnknowyng" - which infers a kind of knowledge 
which has none of the characteristics of ordinary knowledge - in the 
Cloud author's suggestion that the contemplative develops a habit of 
thought which is divorced from the deductive processes which naturally 
belong to the activity of thinking: 
Loke up an li3tly & sey to bi Lorde, outer wiP moui or mening 
of hert: 'Pat at I am, Lorde, I offre vnto bee, for tou it aste'. 
& Denk nakidly, pleynly & boistously at Pou arte as Pou arte, 
wiPoutyn any maner of coriouste. (P. C. 136/30-137/3) 
The soul is seen to unite with God in a disembodied consciousness of 
its own essence in relation to the essence of God Himself. 212 In this 
state, it is infused with an experiential knowledge of His being, which 
the Cloud author consistently identifies as wisdom and dissociates from 
knowledge according to the natural faculties of cognition. Interpreting 
Proverbs 3.9-10, he therefore writes, 
258 
... in inward goostly wittis, be whiche bou arte wonte for 
to streine & presse togeders bi diuerse corious meditacions & 
resonable inuestigacions abouten be goostly knowing of God & 
biself in beholding of his qualitiees & of pine, scholen an 
rebounde ful of wyne. By be whiche wine in Holy Scripture is 
verrely & mistely vnderstonden goostly wisdome in verrey con- 
templacion & heia sauour of be Godheed. (P. C. 144/20-26) 
Commenting also on Proverbs 3.13-14, he says, 
be frute of bis worching is hi3e goostly wisdom, sodenly & frely 
riftid of be spirit inly in itself & vnformid, fulfer fro 
fantasie, inpossible to be streinid or to falle vnder be worching 
of naturele witte. (P. C. 145/27-30)213 
Admission to divine wisdom is also one of the gifts which distinguish 
the contemplative: 
a soule ... so frely fastnyd & foundid in be feib, so fully mekid 
in nou3tnyng of itself & so louely led & fed in be loue of oure 
Lorde, wib ful knowing & felyng of his almi tyheed, his vnwetyn 
wisdom & his glorious goodnes. P. C. 149/6-10) 
This concept of wisdom as the culmination of the unitive way is 
clearly derived from Dionysian theology as it was interpreted by Thomas 
Gallus. The prominence which Gallus gives to sapientia is echoed, even 
exaggerated, by Hugh of Balma in the Viae Syon Lugent. The third 
chapter of this work deals at length with the notion, maintaining 
that wisdom is the source of discretion in all that pertains to the 
spiritual life, and that its possessor has the key to the mysteries 
into which he is initiated by the De Mystica Theologia. The precise 
origin of the Cloud author's concept of unitive wisdom - if indeed it 
is to be found in either of the two writers exclusively - is difficult 
to ascertain, since there is so much apparent coincidence in the theories 
of Balma and Gallus. In interpretation, however, the Cloud author's 
unitive theology has been seen to resemble most closely that of Balma, 
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and a further circumstance sanctions the concentration on Balma for 
detailed comparison with the- English author here: it is, that it is a 
section of the important third chapter of the Viae Syon Lugent which is 
included in MS Douce 262 with the Cloud and Privy Counselling. Perhaps, 
therefore, the sixteenth century Carthusian compiler of this manuscript 
himself saw grounds for linking Hugh's theology with that of the Cloud 
author in this particular respect. 
For both Hugh and the Cloud author, privilege of whatever kind - 
intellectual, social, or religious - has no bearing on the attainment 
of contemplative knowledge. Hugh's insistence that unitive wisdom is 
in the gift of God alone, to be bestowed wherever He wills - 
... vt omnes sapientes mundi confutet, cum simplex vetula, vel 
rusticus pascualis ad istius sapientiae consurrectionem perfecte 
possit attingere, dum tarnen modo praedicto se praeparet, quod 
nulla praehabita scientia, vel mortali industria apprehendit 
(681 Col. II A) - 
is matched by the Cloud author's disclaimer against those of intellectual 
pretensions who complain of the excessive difficulties of his theology: 
bis is litil maistrie for to pink, 3if it were bodyn to be 
lewdist man or womman at leui}i in be comounist wit of kynde in 
}gis liif, as me benkib. & berfore softely, mornyngly & smylingly 
I merueyle me somtyme whan I here sum men sey (I mene not simple 
lewid men & wommen, bot clerkes (& men) of grete kunnyng) at my 
writyng to bee & to oiler is so harde & so hei3, & so curious & so 
queinte, at vnnebes it may be conceiuid of be sotelist clerk or 
wittid man or worrinan in Dis liif, as bei seyn. Bot to bees men 
most I answere & sey at it is moche worbi to be sorowid, & of 
God & his louers to be mercyfuly scornid & bitterly reprouid, }gat 
now bees dayes not only a fewe folkes, bot generaly ni3hond alle 
(bot jif it be one or two in a contrey of be specyal chosen of 
God) ben so bleendid in here coryous kunnyng of clergie & of kynde 
at be trewe conceite of bis li3t werk, borow be whiche be boistousest 
mans soule or wommans in bis liif is verely in louely meeknes onyd 
to God in parfite charite, may no more, ne 3it so moche, be conceyuid 
of hem in sobfastnes of spirit, for her blyndnes & here corioustee, 
}yen may be kunnyng of je grettest clerk in scole of a ong child at 
his A. B. C. (p. C. 137/4-22) 213a. 
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Hugh's contention that wisdom is received solely and directly from 
God, 214 and that the soul's capacity for knowledge of Him is both 
divinely created and augmented as God imparts Himself more fully in 
response to the soul's growing love of Him, is also reproduced by the 
Cloud author: 
in quantum plus affectus de theoricis eloquiis, scilicet diuinis 
influitionibus, quibus mens cum dilecto garrula iucüdatur, recipit, 
in tantý Deus solus in mente intimius se immittit, vt ipse qui est 
vera sapientia, per diuiniores radios praeclarius cognoscatur 
(681 Col. II E) 
Were bou verrely meek bou schuldest fele of bis werk as I sey: at 
God 3euij) it frely wibouten any desert. be condicion of bis werk 
is'soche, at be presence berof ablij? a soule for to haue it & for 
to fele it. & at abilnes may no soule haue wiboutyn it. be abilnes 
to bis werk is onyd to be selue werk, wiboutyn departyng; so at 
whoso felip bis werk is abil perto, & elles none; (Cloud 69/22-70/4) 
The Cloud author writes with more general reference to the unitive 
experience, however, and the form of the passage is in this instance 
much more strongly reminiscent of Gallus' discourse on the same theme 
in the fourth chapter of his explanation of the De Divinis Nominibus. 215 
The infusion of divine wisdom at last takes place when the soul 
has abandoned knowledge according to the senses and intellect and 
entered through love into the highest point of the soul, which is its 
faculty for mystic union. The Cloud author's promise to his disciple, 
... 3if }you wilt holde bee besily, as bou maist by grace, euermore 
contynowly in be first poynte of pi spirit, offring up vnto God 
at nakid blynde felyng of in owne beyng, be which. I clepe be 
first of bi frutes, sekir be }you at be toter hynder ende of 
Sala. mons lesson schal be ful verrely fulfillid as he hoteb, 
wibouten besines of biself in corious seching & ransakyng wit 
pi goostly wittis amonges eny of be qualitees at longin not 
only to be beyng of }iiself bot also to be beyng of God 
(P. C. 143/8-16), 
recalls Hugh's proposition, 
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Vnde tota ista sapientia in hoc solo perficitur, vt ipsa 
affectiua in suo supremo apice constituta, per abscisionem totius 
intellectualis operationis nihil aliud, quarr soli Deo vniri 
desiderat. (681 Col. II C-D) 
Consurrectio ergo per vnitiui amoris affectiones flammigeras, 
supra omne officium intellectus in supremo affectiuae apice 
constituta, ipsa est sapientia intenta ad praesens quae idem est 
quod Mystica Theologia... (669 Col. I C) 
It has also been demonstrated that unitive knowledge, for both authors, 
is distinct from and superior to discursive knowledge, though the 
remarkable degree of coincidence in their views is worth reaffirming 
by comparison of similar passages on this subject from the Viae Syon 
Lugent and the Cloud Corpus. Hugh of Balma's assertion that meditation, 
even if its theme is the highest mystery of the Trinity, is still inferior 
to the contemplative wisdom which Mary cultivated - 
Ista ergo speculatio inter speculatiuas contemplationes 
excellentissima relinqui iubetur: non quia bona non sit & nobilis, 
sed quia est alia superior apprehensio in mente humana, per quam 
solam excellentissime supremus spirituum attingatur, quae sola 
optima portio Mariae dicitur (681 Col. I A) - 
is closely parallelled in the Cloud author's recommendation of contem- 
plation, here too identified as the best part chosen by Mary, above all 
forms of meditation: 
Wepe you neuer so moche for sorow of bi sinnes or of be Passion 
of Criste, or haue bou neuer so moche mynde of be ioies of heuen, 
what may it do to bee? Sekirly moche good, moche helpe, moche 
profite, & moche grace wol it gete bee; bot in comparison of bis 
blinde steryng of loue, it is bot a litil at it doj, or may do, 
wibouten bis. Dis bi itself is be best partye of Mary, wi, outen 
bees oiler. (Cloud 39/4-10). 
The similarity is still more striking between Hugh's affirmation that 
contemplative knowledge is the only true knowledge in, for example, 
679 Col. II C-D - 
Mysticas enim visiones appellat ipse Dionysius in tota philosophia 
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sua, quae transcendit omnis entis considerationes, quando 
intellectiua cognoscit ex ipso affectu precedente, nee e contra, 
& ista est verissima, et certitudinalis cognitio ab omni errore, 
& opinione, & phantastica deceptione penitus elongata216 - 
and the Cloud author's equally strongly worded preference in the 
following passages: 
& here mowe men schortly conceyue be maner of bis worching, 
& cleerly knowe at it is fer fro any fantasie, or any fals 
ymaginacion, or queynte opinion; be whiche ben brou3t in, not 
by soche a deuoute &a meek blynde stering of loue, bot by a 
proude, coryous & an ymaginatiif Witte. (Cloud 22/15-19) 
For whi loue may reche to God in bis liif, bot not knowing. 
& al be whiles at be soule wonib in bis deedly body, euermore 
is be scharpnes of oure vnderstonding in beholding of alle 
goostly binges, bot most specialy of God, medelid wil) sum maner 
of fantasie; for be whiche oure werk schuld be vnclene, & bot 
if more wonder were, it schuld lede us into moche errour. 
(Cloud 33/11-16) 217 
The English text here reproduces not only the sense but also the 
vocabulary of the Viae Syon Lugent, and the echo of Balma's use of 
the image of distance in the phrase "ab omni... phantastica deceptione 
penitus elongata" in the Cloud author'. s "fer fro any fantasie" is 
particularly marked. 
There is nevertheless no inconsistency in the allowance which 
both Hugh and the Cloud author make for enlightenment of the intellect 
once the unitive state has been achieved - an enlightenment which is 
consequent upon the higher apprehension of God which is wisdom, but 
not, as in the case of Gallus, integral to it. Hugh writes of the 
effect of divine wisdom, 
... specialiter intellectum mortificat, & soli diuinae 
influentiae se submittit (682 Col. I A) 
Quae non tantum affectum supra se erigit, & amore ecstatico 
perfecte vnit sponso altissimo creaturam, sed insuper intantum 
eleuat intellectum, vt multo plus omni prudentia, et cognitione 
diuinis fulgoribus illustretur, quam aliquo ingenij exercitio 
valeat obtineri. (679 Col. II A-B) 
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The same assumption apparently underlies the Cloud author's assertion 
in the Pistle of Preier that the unitive experience - though itself 
essentially affective rather than noetic - still induces a degree of 
intellectual illumination which exceeds any knowledge accessible to 
the soul in its natural condition: 
for 3if I schal more heilich spekin in declaring of my mening 
of be perfeccioun & of be mede of is reuerent affeccioun, I 
say at a soule, touched in affeccioun bi be sensible presence 
of God as he is in hymself & in a parfite soule, & illumind in 
be reson by be clere beme of euerlastyng li3t, be whiche is God, 
for to se and for to fele be louelines of God in himself, hal) 
for at tyme and for at moment lost alle be mynde of. any good 
deed or of any kindnes at euer God did to him in bis liif; so 
at cause for to loue God fore feleb he or see} he none in at 
tyme oiler an his God. (P. P. 54/3-12) 
The passage is intensely affirmative in its identification of God as 
light. The author reuses the traditional metaphor of light, and confers 
on it an absolute value, which gives it almost nominal force, as an 
approximate statement of the nature of God Himself, independently of 
His relationship to creation. 218 In this, it corresponds precisely 
to the concept of divine darkness, which implies that only denying 
God the attribute of light as man comprehends and expresses it can 
fully convey the sense in which God is truly light. It is excess of 
light, the Cloud author maintains, which blinds the soul when it first 
enters the unitive way: 
Lat be }gis eueriwhere & dis ou3t, in comparison of is 
(no3where & bis) nou3t. Reche }? ee neuer 3if ýi wittys kon no 
skyle of dis nou3t; for whi I loue it moche ýe betir. It is 
so worbi a ping in itself at bei kon no skyle Derapon. bis 
nou3t may betir be felt ben seen; for it is ful blynde & ful 
derk to hem at han bot lityl while lokid berapon. NeuerDeles, 
3if I schal soýlier sey, a soule is more bleendid in felyng of 
it for habundaunce of goostly li3t, }yen for any derknes or wantyng 
of bodely li3tte. (Cloud 122/6-13) 
Clearly, the metaphor of divine darkness has the same logical function 
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for both the Cloud author and Ps. -Dionysius, as denoting, paradoxically, 
excess of light - the "souereyn-schinyng derknes" (D. H. D. 2/20), 
"supersplendentem... caliginem" (S. 566), of the invocation to Wisdom 
which introduces the De Mystica Theologia. For the English author, the 
corollary of the concept of God as light is that a real infusion of 
intellectual knowledge takes place once the soul has achieved the 
unitive state, though the natural activities of the senses and intellect 
have had no part in bringing it to this condition. 219 Ps. -Dionysius' 
application of the metaphor of light in the De PMystica Theologia also 
admits this construction. In both the cited passages from Cloud and 
the Pistle of Preier, however, the actuality and immediacy of the 
contemplative's knowledge of God stands in relief against its back- 
ground of negation. The author describes it in experiential terms, 
and the sense of touch seems to provide his closest analogy for the 
soul's direct encounter with God. The soul knows God through feeling 
his presence - it is as if the Cloud author seeks to convey the 
unimaginable extent of such knowledge and its transcendence of natural 
cognitive experiences by suggesting that knowledge-in-love has both 
the intensity and immediacy of sensory knowledge, and the insight of 
intellectual cognition. There is nothing of this in the Dionysian 
Corpus. 
The metaphor of feeling is used in a technical sense to describe 
the unitive experience throughout the Cloud Corpus. In ch. 4 of the 
Cloud, for example, the author advises his pupil, 
Bot seker be bou at cleer si3t schal neuer man haue here in 
j)is liif; bot be felyng mowe men haue borow grace whan God 
vouched saaf. (Cloud 34/17-19) 
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He warns that concentration on anything less than God, 
... makib bee in as moche more vnable. to fele in experience 
be frute of his loue. (Cloud 351-2) 
Comparison with other extracts cited in the discussion of unitive 
wisdom (P. C. 143/8-16,145/27-30,149/6-10, Cloud 69/22-70/7, for 
example) suggests, indeed, that the author's concept of the experience 
was allied to particular biblical texts and to the imagery of sense 
and fruition which they employ. The extent to which these ideas seem 
to have become integral to his thought is illustrated by his substit- 
ution of his own definition of contemplative union in the Deonise Hid 
Diuinite 5/19-20 - 
he is maad in a maner at is inuisible & vngropable for to fele 
in experience be presence of hym at is abouen alle binges - 
which accentuates its experiential character, for the more metaphysical 
descriptions which appear in his sources: 
et in non-palpabili omnino et invisibili fit, omnis existens 
ejus qui est super omnia, (S. 577) 
Et per eam omnis unitus Deo (qui est super omnia) constituitur 
in excellentia quam neque ratio investigat neque intellectus 
speculatur. (Ex. 577) 
The Cloud author's profoundly experiential account of contemplative 
union also has close affinities with that of Balma, and there are 
parallels in their application of sense imagery. Hugh's definition 
evolves from his theory - largely derived from Gallus - that the way 
to wisdom is via the affection, whereas the intellect is conducive to 
discursive knowledge alone: 
Item Psalmista: Gustate & videte, &c. Cum igitur gustare affectum 
respiciat amoris, videre. autem intellectus cogitationem, vel 
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meditationem: ergo primo oportet motu amoris consurgere, quam 
occultissimum Deum intellectualiter cogitando cognoscere. Nam 
haec est regula generalis in mystica Theologia, quod primo oportet 
habere practicam, quam theoricam, id est, vsum exercitij in corde, 
quam ipsius rei, vel eorum quae dicuntur habere notitiam. 
(684 Col. I D-E)220 
Like Hugh, the Cloud author distinguishes intellectual from affective 
cognition, and, in the following examples, similarly associates the former 
with the sense of sight, while reserving the senses of taste and touch, 
which involve a more intimate relation between subject and object, as 
metaphors for the direct encounter between the soul and God which takes 
place in the experience of union. Thus Mary, he claims, 
lernid hir to loue a ping ýe whiche sehe mi3t not se cleerly in Dis 
liif bi li3t of vnderstondyng in hir reson, ne Sit uerely fele in 
swetnes of loue in hir affeccion. (Cloud 46/16-18) 
The disciple is likewise warned to expect a total disorientation on first 
entering into the darkness of unknowing, when 
... you maist not see him 
(i. e. God) cleerly by 1'3t of vnderstonding 
in ýi reson, ne fele him in swetnes of loue in in affeccion 
(Cloud 17/4-5), 
until he learns to feel and see as the unitive way demands. The promise 
of a foretaste of eternal beatitude in the contemplative experience draws 
on the same imagery: 
And berfore who so were refourmyd by grace bus to continow in 
keping of be sterynges of be wille, schuld neuer be in bis liif - 
as he may not be wibouten bees sterynges in kynde - wibouten som 
taast of be eendles swetnes; & in be blisse of heuen withouten be 
fulle food. (Cloud 19/14-18) 
The cognitive nature of the unitive experience is also expressed, however, 
through a different application of the imagery of sight. In Cloud ch. 26, 
for example, the author encourages his disciple with the prospect that 
God might intervene in his striving for union to permit him a brief 
anticipatory glimpse of his ultimate goal: 
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an wil he sumtyme parauenture seend oute a betue of goostly li3t, 
peersyng bis cloude of vnknowing at is bitwix bee & hym, & schewe 
bee sum of his priuete, be whiche man may not, ne kan not, speke, an 
schalt }you fele tine affection enflaumid wib be fiire of his loue, fer 22 
more ben I kan teile bee, or may, or wile, at bis tyme. (Cloud 62/14-19) 
Here the Cloud author again associates the infusion of unitive knowledge 
with the sensuous recognition of presence through touch, but he also intro- 
duces the analogy of sight for the soul's initiation into the mysteries of 
God. 222 Thus, in Privy Counselling, he envisages the state of the soul in 
contemplation of God: 
be sely soule may softely sleep & rest in be louely beholdyng of 
God as he is, in ful fedyng & strengping of be goostly kynde ... (P. C. 152/7-9) 
The qualification that such beholding is "blinde", as, for example, in 
Cloud 32/7, reinforces the distinction between vision of this order and 
natural sight - just as the allied paradoxical concept of knowledge through 
unknowing dissociates mystical awareness from its natural counterpart. But 
in both cases the positive element is dominant and affirms the cognitive 
character of the unitive experience. 223 This experience anticipates the 
"cleer si3t" (Cloud 34/17) which the contemplative enjoys once he has 
passed to the state of beatitude which is the fulfilment of his vision 
through mystical union on earth. 
V. Deonise Hid Diuinite: the translator's use of his Latin sources, 
and the text as an expression of his contemplative theology. 
The range of this chapter has clearly been considerable, in 
order to accommodate the diverse factors which had some bearing on 
the transposition of Dionysian negative theology and its associated 
terminology from Greek, through Latin, into English. Its "portmanteau" 
quality has endeavoured to reflect the circumstances which determined 
the eventual character of the Deonise Hid Diuinite: the progressive 
christianisation of the Greek treatise which accompanied its translation 
into Latin and the efforts of successive commentators to make it 
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available and comprehensible to a wider audience; the problems of 
introducing the extraordinary complexities of Dionysian theology to 
a circle of English readers who seem to have been insufficiently at 
ease with Latin, the principal language of theology, to have benefitted 
from existing Latin versions of the De Mystica Theologia and the 
extensive critical apparatus and explanatory literature which it had 
inspired: the allied difficulty of depending on a vernacular which was 
previously untried as a vehicle for the demanding vocabulary of Dionysian 
theology; the translator's imposition of his own interpretation of 
Dionysian principles, shaped by his intelligent reading of secondary 
literature in the Dionysian tradition, on the substance of the text. 
The resulting translation seems in some way to vindicate both the 
contradictory assessments offered by Dom Justin McCann and Prof. Hodgson. 
McCann's comment that, 
The author's Hid Divinity is a free version of the Mystical 
Theology of Denis..., 224 
gives a. just sense of the translator's manipulation of his resources - 
textual and linguistic - to produce a text which gives full expression 
to his personal understanding of Dionysian theology. On the other hand, 
Prof. Hodgson's testimony to the translator's fidelity to the sources 
which he named - 
With few exceptions the Middle English translator follows phrase 
by phrase this sequence of thought. But he tells us that he 
'moche folowed be sentence' of Vercellensis as well as 'be nakid 
lettre' of the Latin text... 
There are comparatively few passages where the Middle English 
translation has added to the Latin versions of Sarracenus or 
Vercellensis, or differs from-them. Apart from the one long 
addition in chapter 2, it follows them carefully, and though it 
may expand to simplify, it omits no link in thought225 
aptly credits him with the translator's proper virtues of accuracy 
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and lucidity. 226 
The English author's observance of the translator's function is, 
indeed, apparent in his selection of material from his sources. It is 
worth stressing that the Deonise Hid Diuinite is closely modelled on 
the version of Sarracerlus - that is, on the nearest to a definitive 
Latin text of Ps. -Dionysius which was available'to the translator - 
and that he introduced modifications drawn from secondary explanatory 
sources only where he is impelled to do so for reasons of a doctrinal 
discrepancy or in the interests of a more immediately comprehensible 
text. Comparison with Gallus' Extractio, for example, brings to light 
many instances of the translator' s reluctance to expand his text with 
further interpretative material from Gallus with which he would 
undoubtedly have been in sympathy - presumably in order to preserve 
the character of a translation and to avoid overburdening the text 
with comment where its meaning is already sufficiently clear. Thus, 
the opening prayer of the Deonise Hid Diuinite incorporates neither 
Gallus' definition of unitive wisdom ("... sapientiae Christianorum, 
quae est optima portio Mariae, cui ancillatur sapientia gentilium 
philosophorum" (Ex. 565)), nor his account. of divine darkness ("... 
caliginem (id est inaccessibilem lucem Verbi quod Pater inaudibiliter 
loquitur)(Ex. 566)); "Quod lumen dicitur a beato Dionysio supersplendens 
occulte dicti silentii caligo. Haec est incomprehensibilitas, quae 
dicitur caligo propter luminis excessionem" (Gloss 271 B)); similarly, 
in D. H. D. 4/25 and 5/17, the translator omits Gallus' qualifications 
of the concepts of "derknes" and "derknes of vnknowyng" - the corresp- 
onding passages in the Extractio read ... caliginem, id est, uniuntur 
incomprehensibilitati divinae" (574) and "caliginem ignorantiae, id 
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est, unitur incomprehensibilitati divinae quam non penetrat 
intelligential' (577) - and his reiteration, in the last example, that 
unitive knowledge "effectiva est verae cognitionis" (578) is also 
missing from the English text. Where there seems to be no overriding 
reason - doctrinal, linguistic, or to elucidate meaning - against 
reproducing the text of Ps. -Dionysius as faithfully as possible, the 
translator consistently retains the readings of Sarracenus in preference 
to Gallus' emendations: thus in D. H. D. 3/11-12, "to be onid with hym 
at is abouen alle substaunces and al maner knowyng", corresponds 
closely to Sarracenus' version, "ad ejus unitionem qui est super omnem 
substantiam et cognitionem" (568), even though Gallus' reading, "ad 
unitionem Dei quae est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem" (568), 
which shifts the emphasis from God's transcendence to the mystical 
character of the unitive experience by making the qualifying clause 
dependent on "union" rather than "God", has more in common with the 
general bias of the Cloud author's work. 
Equally, the English translator's adaptations of the Latin text 
are not always modelled on Gallus' Extractio or Gloss. Sometimes the 
hint comes from Gallus, but the translator draws upon his wider reading 
- often of Gallus himself - in compiling his own version. Ch. I of the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite, for example, reads 
bot verely and cleerly he apperib open, not to alle bot to hem 
only, be whiche passen abouen bode alle vnclene & clene beyng 
binges, and be whiche comyn abouen alle assenciouns of alle holy 
eendes or teermes set vnto man or to aungel (4/20-23), 
where Sarracenus has, 
et solis non-velate et vere apparet his qui et immunda et munda 
transeunt et omnem omnium sanctarum extremitatum ascensum 
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superveniunt... (573), 
and the Extractio expands to, 
et illis solis revelate et vere apparet qui per mentis excessum 
non solum transcendunt sensibilia et imaginabilia sed pure quoque 
intelligibilia, et superant omnem ascensum summorum spectaculorum 
intelligibilium. (573) 
The English version attaches itself closely to the text of Sarracenus 
- the interpolation "and cleerly" reinforces rather than modifies its 
meaning, and the phrase "not to alle bot to hem only" seems calculated 
to interpret Sarracenus' reading "solis non-velate" which Gallus emends 
to "solis revelate". The translator does not reproduce Gallus' inter- 
pretative account of the conditions under which the unitive experience 
takes place. He does, however, take up Gallus' suggestion that contem- 
plative vision transcends the level of the intelligible, and elaborates 
on the text of Sarracenus to emphasize that such vision exceeds the 
natural powers of all intelligent beings - "abouen alle ... teermes 
set vnto man or to aungel". It has already been mooted that the Cloud 
author came to this theory through Gallus, and its particular wording 
here, which recalls Cloud 18/17-21, suggests that the Extractio itself 
was in this case the stimulus rather than the source for the inter- 
polation, while the translator's thorough familiarity with Gallus' 
interpretations of Dionysian theology as a whole was responsible for 
its form. 227 
The influence of Gallus on the Cloud author was clearly pervasive, 
and it is possible that it may also have extended to his prose style. 
Margery M. Morgan' s articles on prose tradition in English religious 
literature of the riddle Ages have demonstrated the existence of such 
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a tradition in works of devotion and meditation. 228 She traces its 
origins to Latin rhetorical prose, but emphasizes that it developed 
in English independently of its sources, though continually fed by 
the inevitable contact which writers of religious prose had with both 
Latin and vernacular literature throughout this period. This tradition 
of "fine writing", 229 Dr. Horgan argues, depended for its effectiveness 
as a vehicle for instruction on the combined use of rhythm, rhyme, 
alliteration, balanced phrasing, exclamation, rhetorical questions 
and changes in pace and tone. It also exploited the immediacy and 
transparency of the native vocabulary and idiom to the same purpose. 
This summary of the characteristics of devotional prose would manifestly 
also do as a brief account of the distinctive features of the Cloud 
author's style, and indeed, he derives much of his strength as a 
writer of vernacular prose from his grounding in this tradition. The 
self-consciousness of the style of A Talkyng of be Loue of God, for 
example, whose prologue reads, 
Men schal fynden lihtliche bis tretys in Cadence. After be 
bigynninge. 3if hit beo riht poynted :& Rymed in sum stude. 
To beo more louesum. to hem at hit reden. God 3iue vs grace. 
so for to rede : at we mowen haue heuene to vre Tiede. Amen230 
anticipates the Cloud author's recognition that the impact of his works 
on the spiritual life of his readers is a function, in part at least, 
of prose style, and his evident cultivation of a fully "utilitarian 
aesthetic". 231 It is easy to hear passages such as the following from 
A Talkyng, 
bis is. at blynde wrecche. at in his owne e3en. weneb him so 
vertuous. & is ful of vices. leeteb him feir and freoly. And 
hat be deueles liknesse. and weneb at he beo witti. and al ful 
of slei3be. And he lokeb on his chaffare. at he is afolte. at 
sold hat dis soule. for stinkynde lustes. And chaunget god for 
to deuel. And heuene. for helle. He halt him ful dou3ti stalworbe 
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& hardi. And al day is ouercomen. of him at hal) no mi3te Forte 
wib stonde be moste wrecche of be world. bat wolde a 3eyn him fihte. 
He letel) him gentil and is be deueles kral..., 232 
behind examples such as this on a similar theme from the Cloud Corpus, 
which complements pungent onomatopoeic vocabulary with a rhythmic and 
heavily alliterated prose, to impress the full horror of sensual self- 
indulgence on the reader: 
for bot 3if it (i. e. be sensualite) be reulyd by grace in be wille, 
for to suffre meekly & in mesure be pyne of be original synne - 
be whiche it felib in absence of needful likyng & in presence of 
speedful groching -& berto also for to streyne it fro luste in 
presence of needful lykyng, & fro lusty plesaunce in absence of 
speedful groching, elles wil it wrechidly & wantounly weltre, as 
a swine in be myre, in be welbes of bis woreld & be foule flessche 
so mochel, at alle oure leuyng schal be more beestly & fleschly 
ben outer manly or goostly. (Cloud 119/2-10) 
It is also true, however, that while the prose style exemplified in 
A Talkyng adapts readily to other moods and didactic purposes, it seems 
in general extravagant by comparison with the prose of the Cloud Corpus 
as a whole, which is overall rather quieter and perhaps better attuned 
to the subtleties of theological debate. 233 Examples have already been 
cited which illustrate that the Cloud author's assumption of ideas 
developed by Gallus, particularly in his explanatory works on the 
Dionysian Corpus, tended also to involve the assimilation of the forms 
in which they were expressed - often because these forms were integral 
to the meaning. It seems, indeed, entirely probable that the English 
author absorbed something of the fluency and flexibility of Gallus' 
style through his extensive reading in Gallus' works. Perhaps the 
process was not wholly conscious, and certainly it would have been- 
smoothed by the similarity in the function of Gallus' aesthetic to 
that which the English author had imbibed from the vernacular prose 
tradition. The comparison is compelling, however, between passages 
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such as this from the Explanacio which is concerned with ch. 4 of the 
De Divinis Nominibus, 
Sicut autem quanto amplius percipitur, tanto ferventius appetitur; 
ita quanto magis desideratur, tanto habundantius hauritur, 234 
and Cloud 70/3-7, 
be abilnes to bis werk is onyd to be selue werk, wiboutyn 
departyng; so at whoso felil bis werk is abil berto, & elles 
none; in so mochel, at wiboutyn bis werk a soule is as it were 
deed, & can not coueite it ne desire it. For as moche as bou 
wylnest it & desirest it, so mochel hast bou of it, & no more ne 
no lesse. 
In both instances, the insistent rhythm of the prose and the counter- 
balancing of phrases which correspond in sense and are linguistically 
of equivalent value, serve to reinforce the theological point that 
desire is one with possession in the contemplative life. 235 It is not 
difficult to suppose, on the evidence of such passages as these, that 
the antithetical habit of thought and expression which is a distinctive 
feature of Gallus' writing became the Cloud author's own through his 
inwardness with Gallus'works. 
Gallus' prose style may perhaps have impressed itself on the 
English text of the De Mystica Theologia in a further important respect. 
This is the inclusion of specific examples, which often give more 
tangible form to the abstract principles of Dionysian theology and 
secure the reader's understanding by referring him to his experience 
of the physical world. In D. H. D. 3/32-3, for example, the translator's 
interpolation of "as stockes or stones", which identifies the precise 
level of creation indicated by "be leest worbi binges of bees beyng 
visible binges", echoes in simpler form the explanatory clause in the 
Extractio, "(scilicet lapidibus et metallis quae inferiora Bunt animatis 
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et animalibus per naturam)" (570). 236 Similarly, the lengthy 
elaboration of the sculpture imagery in ch. II of the Deonise Hid 
Diuinite seems to have been instigated by Gallus, though the inter- 
polation in the English text is on a far larger scale than the 
expansions in either the Extractio or the Gloss. 237 
This last example is evidence, too, of the translator's design 
to bring Dionysian theology within the scope of his audience's under- 
standing by reaffirming its conformity to the traditional dogma of the 
Western Church. The strong platonic associations of the image are 
overlaid by the sustained emphasis on the ascetical procedures of 
Christian mysticism in the English translator's account of its meaning. 238 
Once again, the process of extending the potential readership of the 
Dionysian Corpus through translation can be seen to entail exposition 
and christianisation of its theological principles, and the particular 
influence of Gallus' works on the Latin Corpus, which consistently 
explain Dionysian doctrine in terms of the received biblical texts of 
contemplative theology, is apparent in the English author's freedoms 
with the Sarracenus version of the De Mystica Theologia. 
Even so, the extent of the translator's modification of his Latin 
sources in this instance - it is easily the longest passage of inter- 
polation in the Deonise Hid Diuinite - and the minuteness with which 
he details the techniques of sculpture, are remarkable. He seems con- 
cerned to reassert the relation of the negative way of contemplation 
to the Christian belief in man's creation in the divine image, and to 
emphasize the consequent need for divine grace to complement man's own 
efforts to rediscover this image through contemplation, against the 
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comparatively bald account of the apophatic method of ascent in both 
Sarracenus and Gallus. The passage admirably integrates statements 
of the metaphysical relation of the soul to God, and of man's spiritual 
essence, which is his faculty for unitive knowledge, to his material 
form, with a vivid realization of the sculptor's art - the English 
author, unlike his Latin sources, specifies sculpture in wood, and 
appeals more directly to his reader's understanding by activating his 
visual imagination. His treatment of the image also focusses attention 
on the processes of contemplative prayer by accentuating the parallel 
attempts of the sculptor, "by craft & by instrumentes" (D. H. D. 6/7), 
to bring his image into being. Prof. Hodgson similarly attributes the 
English translator's apparent preference for Gallus' Extractio version 
of the fourth chapter of the De Nystica Theologia over the text of 
Sarracenus to his preoccupation with this aspect of contemplative 
theology: 
He incorporated the fourth chapter in its entirety from 
Vercellensis because it described more directly than the version 
of Sarracenus the mental processes of the contemplative in which 
he was primarily interested. 239 
The same may also be said of the fifth chapter, where the English 
translator adopts Gallus' passages of analysis of contemplative 
procedure: 
... at we tonne a3ein to be hi3est binges bi som menes, & eend 
oure denyirges at binges most hi3e ... 
(D. H. D. 10/1-3) 
... ut ad summa per quaedam media revertamur et in summis 
negationes terminemus. (Ex. 598) 
It is perhaps misleading, however, to suggest, as Prof. Hodgson does 
both in her textual commentary and by her substitution of the fourth 
and fifth chapters of the Extractio for the version of Sarracenus in 
her Latin text of the De Mystica Theologia, printed as Appendix A, 
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that the English author abruptly abandons Sarracenus in favour of 
Gallus from the last paragraph of Ch. III. His practice seems, in 
fact, to be consistent throughout - his translation, that is, is 
based on Sarracenus with necessary supplementary material drawn from 
Gallus. Chs. IV and V of the Deonise Hid Diuinite conform exactly to 
this principle, though their inclusion of expansions inspired by Gallus 
give them overall a superficially closer resemblance to the Extractio 
than to the austere catalogue of Dionysian negative propositions of 
Sarracenus' text. It is significant, for example, that the English 
author does not incorporate the phrase "scilicet homine puro vel angelo" 
which qualifies "aliquo existente" in Extractio 600 (D. H. D. 10/8-9 
"... us, or of any at ben"), as he might have been expected to had 
he been reproducing the text of the Extractio, since, clearly, it 
agrees with his principles and with earlier interpolations from Gallus 
in the Deonise Hid Diuinite. 
The English author's preference for Gallus' emphatically Christian 
interpretation of Dionysian theology is, nevertheless, marked, and this, 
often supported by Gallus' shared aim to produce accurate and effective 
working texts of Ps. -Dionysius, undoubtedly recommends Gallus' explan- 
atory modifications of Sarracenus' version to the translator of the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite. Gallus' influence on the English text of the 
opening prayer to Divine Wisdom (D. H. D. 2/14-27), for example, which 
emphasizes the conditions of man's union with the transcendent God, 
has already been commented on. Similar instances are D. H. D. 3/12-18, 
For whi, borou be ouerpassyng of biself and alle oiler binges, 
and bus makyng biself clene fro al wordly, fleschly, & kyndely 
likyng in in affeccioun, and fro al ping at may be knowen by 
be propre fourme in bi knowyng, bou schalt be drawen up abouen 
mynde in affeccioun to be souereyn-substancyal beme of be god- 
liche derknes, alle binges }pus done awey, 
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where the insistence on the moral as well as intellectual aspects of 
purification derives from Gallus' version, 
ab omni concupiscentia et cura absolutus et purgatus (Ex. 568) 
Etenim cum to ipsum ab omnia alia mundus excesseris, ita quod 
illoque amore non valeas retineri, vel alias impediri, purgatus 
ab ultimis animae phantasiis tam spirituales quam divinas 
operationes postponendo ... (Gloss 272 A-B), 
while Sarracenus reads 
cuncta auferens et a cunctis absolutus sursum ageris (568-9); 
also 3/19-22 and 27-30, where Sarracenus' references to "indocti°(569, 
570), in a passage which warns the reader against divulging the secrets 
of the text to the uninitiated, are interpreted, following Gallus' 
definition in the Gloss, "istos autem dico, qui naturalibus rationibus 
amore existentium innituntur" (272 C), as alluding to, 
bees vnwise men 3it wonyng in her wittys ... alle }goo at ben fastnyd in knowing & in louyng of bees binges at ben knowable 
and harf bigynnyng (3/19-22) 
and 
boo bat ben more vnwise, wonyng 3it not only in here goostly 
wittes of natureel philosophy, bot lowe downe bynebe in her 
bodely wittes, be whiche bei hauen bot in comoun with only 
beestes. (3/27-30). 
The English version also recalls the cautions against transmitting 
the text to any but those committed to the contemplative life which 
hedge the Cloud of Unknowing. 
There are clearly occasions, however, when the versions of both 
Gallus and Sarracenus allude to complexities of doctrine which the 
English author judges inappropriate or perhaps excessively sophisticated 
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for inclusion in his translation. His criteria for omitting material 
from his sources are also those which governed his simplification of 
certain elements of the specialized vocabulary of the De Mystica 
Theologia. His concern throughout is to reconcile textual accuracy 
with the needs of his audience for an accessible and comprehensible 
version of the Dionysian treatise. Not surprisingly, therefore, he 
does not incorporate Gallus' highly technical account of the location, 
above mind, of contemplative union - 
Cujus loci nomine arbitror designari summas et aeternas 
archetypas sive rationes sive exemplaria omnium creaturarum quae 
sunt in Verbo aeterno, quorum intellectuali speculatione Deum 
cognoscamus. Unde dicuntur ejus loca divinissima, quibus nihil 
divinius oculis intellectualibus intuemur. Istae autem sunt 
rationes omnium subjectorum Deo qui cuncta excedit, et per has 
cognitive praesens fit nobis Deus, nobis desuper infundens et 
manifestans principaliores et superiores earumdem rationum quae 
tarnen nobis sunt speculative intelligibiles (Ex. 576) - 
in the concluding paragraph of Ch. I, yet he is certainly not shy of 
the concept in itself, and makes equally precise use of it, though 
couched in simpler terms, throughout his writings. Similarly, he 
reproduces the text of Sarracenus where it claims that God is "boge 
of many wordes & of schorte seiinges" in D. H. D. 4/17 ("et multorum 
sermonum est bona omnium causa et brevium dictionum" (S. 572-3)), but 
does not include the statement which follows it, "simul et irrationabilis" 
(S. 573). 240 The English author undoubtedly accepts that paradox is 
fundamental to the theory and expression of Dionysian theology, 241 but 
he seems consistently to underplay the ontological aspects of the De 
riystica Theologia in order to focus attention on the negative way which 
they command. He is equally unwilling to incorporate Gallus' theoretic 
account of the linguistic principles implied in symbolic theology (D. H. D. 
7/28-8/4), 242 or to encumber the text with repeated reminders of the 
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function of negative language to denote God's excess of finite 
concepts: he thus omits the qualifying phrase "secundum excessurn" from 
Sarracenus' headings to Chs. IV and V, and his description. of the 
"madnes &a parfite vnresonabiltee of alle at we seyn" (D. H. D. 8/14-15), 
which characterises the darkness in which the soul encounters God, is 
not suffixed, as it is in the Extractio, by the explanatory clause 
"id est rationis et prudentiae incomparabilem excessum" (590). It is 
also noteworthy, particularly with respect to the translator's source 
for the last two chapters of the Deonise Hid Diuinite, that the English 
text does not include the fine analysis of doctrine and language which 
Gallus accommodates in the expanded form of the Extractio. In each of 
the following examples, the translator is satisfied with the clarity 
of the simpler text of Sarracenus: 
D. H. D. 9/27 "ne he hal) fantasie" 
S. 597 "neque phantasiam ... habet" 
Ex. 597 "neque habet phantasiam inferiorem auf 
superiorem" 
D. H. D. 10/5 "ne ber is any vnderstondable touching of hym" 
S. 599 "neque tactus est ejus intelligibilis" 
Ex. 599 "neque etiam intelligibiliter tangibilis secundum 
essentiam suam"243 
D. H. D. 10/14 "ne he is derknes, ne he is li3t" 
S. 600 "neque tenebrae, neque lumen" 
Ex. 600 "neque ipse est tenebrae a lumine deficientes 
neque est lumen intelligibile" 
On the other hand, it is possible to cite many instances of the 
translator's own independent additions to the text which clarify and 
reinforce essential points of doctrine. 244 His account of the basic 
principles of positive and negative theology in D. H. D. 4/1-11 is thus 
given substance by the interposition of "bat is abouen al knowyng & 
mynde" (4/3), "ful heia in hymself, departid fro hem alle" (4/6) and 
"in sit of byleue" (4/9): comparable interpolations are "so as it 
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acordeý to ýe perfeccioun of Dis deuinitee" (5/3-4), "And 3it he in 
hymself is abouen bobe alle spekyng and alle vnderstondyng" (8/34-5), 
"ne on any vnderstondable maner afferme him, ne denie him" (10/18-19). 
Often these clauses expand passages of Sarracenus which are perhaps 
so condensed as to elude his readers' understanding - his elaboration 
of his source's account of other works by Ps. -Dionysius in 7/11-24 
seems to serve this purpose - and they are frequently calculated to 
emphasize those points which have most direct and practical bearing 
on the soul's progress in the contemplative life; 245 thus instead of 
referring to the contemplative's disengagement from "visis et videntibus" 
(S. 577), the English author freely interprets the text of Sarracenus 
to mean 
And an he is assoilid bobe fro be vnderstondable worching mi3tes 
of his soule, & fro be obiectes of hem, at is for to sey, alle 
boo binges in be whiche bei worchen. (D. H. D. 5/11-14). 
Conclusion 
Detailed study of the Deonise Hid Diuinite in relation to its 
Latin sources has thus affirmed the intelligence and sensitivity with 
which the translator manipulated the linguistic resources of his 
vernacular and reconciled native with essential latinate forms to 
produce an English version of the De Mystica Theologia which respects 
the integrity of its sources yet meets the need of its audience for an 
accessible and intelligible text of Dionysian theology. Further, the 
investigation of its relation to the remaining works of the Cloud Corpus 
- principally the Cloud itself and the Book of Privy Counselling - and 
to possible intermediary sources of Dionysian theology, has frequently 
given insight into both the author's individual interpretation of that 
theology and the particular sense in which he applied its traditional 
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terminology. The exercise of detailing the Cloud author's treatment 
of language,, as it were, at source, where he confronts the dual problem 
of finding words for a theology which incorporates an explicit denial 
of the ultimate relevance of language - 
As it is now herein bis book, whan we entren into be derknes 
at is abouen mynde, we schul not onliche fynde be schortyng of 
wordes, bot as it were a madnes &a parfite vnresonabiltee of 
alle at we seyn. (D. H. D. 8/12-15) - 
and of inculcating its principles with all possible efficacy, has also 
evinced the fundamentally Dionysian character of the Cloud author's 
attitude to language in general, which both grudges and exploits its 
properties. Perhaps most importantly in terms of future research on 
the Cloud Corpus, however, this chapter has attempted to establish a 
precise theological context for the major works of the group, which 
is arguably the most secure basis from which to approach the persistent 
enigma of the provenance of the texts. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps because the influence of Ps. -Dionysius on the Cloud 
of Unknowing is so conspicuous that many commentators have remarked on 
it as a truism without due consideration of the precise nature and extent 
of the English author's debt. The aim of the present thesis has been 
to compensate for this neglect, and, in concluding, it seems necessary 
to frame the consensus' account of the text rather differently - to 
suggest, that is, that it is not simply influenced by Ps. -Dionysius, 
but that it is essentially a Dionysian work. The difference between the 
two claims is important. The first is unquestionably apt, but also, in 
a sense, unhelpful, since it applies in widely varying degrees and respects 
to a considerable number of texts dating from the later Middle Ages. The 
second, however, is founded on the inference that the impact of Dionysian 
theology on Cloud and the treatises most closely related to it is, by 
contrast, neither superficial nor incidental - that the author's intuition 
of the way of the soul to God, which is the basis of his theology, 
coincides with the apophatic approach urged by Ps. -Dionysius, and his 
contemplative theory is formulated, in consequence, according to Dionysian 
principles. The Cloud author, that is, formally allies himself with the 
Dionysian mystical tradition and couches his own experience of the unitive 
way in the language which had evolved in conjunction with that tradition. 
This is not to say, of course, that his-theology was immune from 
other influences. The Dionysian tradition itself as he received it had 
been considerably tempered iri the transmission: notably, it had assimilated 
significant elements of Victorine and Bernadine spirituality through his 
principal intermediaries, Thomas Gallus and Hugh of Balma. The Cloud 
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author also drew extensively at first hand on the common stock of 
religious literature which was the staple of medieval writers of 
religious prose, whatever their individual bias: the frequency with 
which Prof. Hodgson cites parallels with such authorities as Augustine, 
Bernard, Gregory and Aquinas in her introduction and notes to the texts 
is a measure of the impact - too diffuse to be treated in this context 
- which other theological traditions had on his thought. 
The submission that Cloud and its companion treatises are in 
essence works of Dionysian theology is not weakened by the acknowledgment 
of other contributory influences: it has been formulated on the basis 
of the author's contemplative theory and his appropriation of the 
Dionysian vocabulary associated with it, but it is also implicit in 
the approach to language which conditions his writing as a whole. The 
theological principles which have been shown to underlie the author's 
application of specific mystical terms, that is, impinge on his general 
sense of the function of language and interact with both his didactic 
and literary instincts. The combination produces a distinctive prose, 
which is a flexible and finely adjusted vehicle for his instructional 
purposes, but at the same time mirrors his acute concern with the 
problems of effecting a working compromise between the properties of 
language and the tenets of his theology. 
It seems apt, then, to conclude this historical study of the 
Cloud's mystical vocabulary with an account of some of the broader 
implications of its Dionysian theology for the prose style in which 
it is written. This done, the substance of this research project will 
be complete, but the integrity of the thesis seems to demand a more 
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speculative final section to estimate the significance and possible 
application of its content. The contention that Cloud and the treatises 
most closely related to it are in essence Dionysian works and not merely 
influenced peripherally by principles of Dionysian theology distinguishes 
them from other original works written in the vernacular at about the 
same period. Works in translation are exempt from this comparison, 
of course, and Cloud, indeed, has particularly interesting affinities 
with the English versions of Ruysbroek which will be touched on in the 
course of this chapter. These are circumstances which might have con- 
siderable bearing on tangential issues such as the authorship, provenance 
and circulation of the text, where discussion has often foundered on an 
imprecise assessment of its theological background. 
I. The influence of the Cloud author's mystical theology 
on his approach to language in his original works 
One of the chief strengths of the prose in which Cloud is written 
is that it seems to be created out of the friction between the author 
and his medium. It depends, that is, on the author's keen sensitivity 
to language, which is at once an intellectual appreciation of its 
function and an intuition of its various ways of appealing to the 
reader's understanding. On the one hand, he is sensible of its 
potential to persuade, and prompt to exploit it for didactic ends: 
thus he urges the disciple to curb his sensual faculty, 
elles wil it wrechidly & wantounly weltre, as a swine in be myre, 
in be welbes of }gis woreld & be foule flessche... (Cloud 119/7-9) 
Here the author writes emotively, in order to stimulate repulsion 
against the sin of sensual over indulgence, by an accumulation of 
cloying terms which evoke the grossness of hedonism. On the other 
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hand, however, he is equally aware that the principle operates only 
too well in reverse - that the power of language is double-edged and 
as easily tends to corrupt as to redress. He is chary of its capacity 
for subjugating sense to sound, and early in the second chapter of 
Cloud, for example, his abrupt admonition to the disciple, 
Look up now, weike wreche, & see what you arte. What arte 
}you, & what hast you deserued, bus to be clepid of oure Lorde? 
(Cloud 14/16-17), 
studied as it is, is as much levelled against the tendency of his own 
writing to induce mere auditory or aesthetic satisfaction as it is 
directed against the spiritual inertia of his pupil. 
His innate wariness of the ambivalent power of language is 
reflected in Cloud, as in Deonise Hid Diuinite, in his meticulous 
concern with the precision of his terminology, and also in the repeated 
challenges to his reader's expectations of language which sharpen his 
attention and understanding. Indeed, the vigilance with which the 
author forestalls possible misapprehensions on the part of his reader 
is, at times, almost obsessive, and his preoccupation with language is 
exaggerated by the implications of his theology. But, undoubtedly, the 
Cloud author's equivocal attitude to language has its negative aspect. 
His practice is not uniformly consistent. with his austere theory of 
language. It is questionable, for example, whether the intent to 
reprove the disciple in the passage quoted above (Cloud 119/7-9) fully 
justifies its ostentatiously literary qualities. Fr. Colledge has 
already commented on the virtuosity, the gratuitous display of stylistic 
techniques, as a characteristic weakness of Cloud which is largely 
eradicated in the author's more mature work, the Book of Privy Counsel. 
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The latter, he writes, 
... lacks, too, some of the author's rhetorical devices so 
lavishly displayed in his earlier work: at no time, it has been 
observed, does he show Hilton's love of traditional metaphors, 
but in The Cloud he shows great fondness for jolting, arresting 
colloquialisms which he can only use metaphorically. Such figures 
of speech as 'applying God as a plaster'to one's sick self' are 
not really very helpful, especially when the author then has to 
come back to them and explain them in ordinary theological language, 
but this example is one of only a few to be found in The Book. ' 
It is also true, of course, that Privy Counsel was written for the 
disciple at a more advanced stage of his spiritual development, when 
the author was able to abandon much of the elementary material of Cloud 
and its deliberately captivating style. The philosophical bias of the 
later work - where, as Prof. Hodgson has noted, the author follows the 
De Divinis Nominibus in which°Dionysius expounded at length the meta- 
physical basis of his mystical teaching'2 - is aptly complemented by the 
predominantly intellectual appeal of the prose. 
Perhaps, indeed, it is ungenerous to take the author to task too 
severely for indulging his fascination and dexterity with language beyond 
what seems strictly consistent with his utilitarian concept of its 
function, when his aesthetic sense seems to have shaped some of the 
most impressive didactic passages of his work. The economy of his prose, 
and much of its energy, seem to come from the circumstance that his 
susceptibility to language and the literary possibilities of its prolific 
resources is held in check by his recognition that these are in part 
compliant, in part antithetical, to the demands of his theology. His 
preoccupation with language - and, by extension, the exceptional level 
of attention to its meaning and function which is required of the 
reader - derive, somewhat perversely, from the conviction that God and 
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the experience of mystic union exceed the scope of words. He 
summarizes the dilemma in Privy Counsel: 
& berfore no wondre of I kan not teile bee be worDines of bis 
werk wit) my boystouse beestly tonge. & God forbede at it scholde 
be so defoulid in itself for to be streynid vnder be steringes of 
a fleschly tongell Nay, it may not be, & certes it wil not be, & 
God forbede at I schuld coueyte it! For al at is spokyn of it 
is not it, bot of it. Bot. now, siben we mowe not speke it, lat 
us speke of it, in confusion of proude wittys... (P. C. 153/15-22) 
The need to communicate thus impels him to explore the metaphoric range 
of language. He is forced, in a sense, to strain his verbal creativity, 
to adapt and redefine his terms, as an integral part of the process of 
composition, in order to accommodate his theology. 
It should be noted, however, that two other important factors 
should be taken into account as having influenced his exploratory use 
of the vernacular: the first - that the author was transposing Dionysian 
theology into a largely untried medium - has been discussed in relation 
to the Deonise Hid Diuinite. The second, which will be considered in 
context below, 3 has to do with the general accessibility of the 
vernacular in contrast to Latin, which was its own guarantor of a 
restricted audience. The Cloud author's nervousness of being mis- 
understood seems to have been exacerbated by his recognition that his 
use of English might introduce a complex theology to an audience which 
was intellectually and perhaps spiritually ill-equipped to comprehend 
it. It might even, in view of the theocentric character of his doctrine, 
leave the'author himself open to the charge of heresy. 
4 
But these are secondary concerns. The fundamental conflict is 
between Dionysian mystical theology and language as a medium, and the 
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Cloud author has been shown to have adopted many of the specific terms 
and formulae which had evolved with the Dionysian tradition. His pre- 
occupation with the possibilities and limitations of language is shared 
with other writers of the same school, but it also involves exploring 
the psychology of communication in a way which is highly individualistic 
and has no counterpart in Gallus' or Balma's expositions of Dionysian 
theology and vocabulary. 
The central problem - for the author does indeed see it as such 
- is with the nature of metaphor itself: the transference of terms which 
properly describe one object to an analogous object in a non-literal 
sense. It works, that is, by association, and the Cloud author exploits 
its functions ambitiously as a means of conveying spiritual realities 
which are outside the register of words in their primary sense. Thus 
the unitive experience, which is not reducible to literal terms of 
description, is suggested figuratively through metaphors of darkness 
and cloud, and the Cloud author conscientiously explains how they are 
to be understood: 
& wene not, for I clepe it a derknes or a cloude, at it be 
any cloude congelid of be humours at fleen in be ayre, ne 3it 
any derknes soche as is in in house on ni3tes, when jai candel 
is oute. For soche a derknes & soche a cloude maist }you ymagin 
wib coriouste of witte, for to bere before in i3en in be li3test 
day of somer; & also a3enswarde in be derkist ni3t of wynter bou 
mayst ymagin a clere schinyng li3t. Lat be soche falsheed; I 
mene not bus. For when I sey derknes, I mene a lackyng of 
knowying; as alle at ping at bou knowest not, or elles at 
}you hast for3etyn, it is derk to bee, for }you seest it not wib 
bi goostly i3e. & for bis skile it is not clepid a cloude of be 
eire, bot a cloude of vnknowyng, at is bitwix bee & iii God. 
(Cloud 23/13-24) 
The author begins by establishing the literal meaning of his terms, 
emphasizing their relationship to natural phenomena by the specific 
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and circumstantial quality of his definitions. Because they have 
this physical point of reference, he stresses, the terms convey meaning, 
even in isolation from the phenomena which they describe, by activating 
the visual imagination through memory. In the context of his theology, 
however, the author seeks to suppress the imaginative appeal of his 
vocabulary: he refers it directly to the reader's intelligence, in 
order to induce him, although it seems a contradiction in terms, to 
envisage intellectually a state in which all the natural faculties of 
perception are transcended. 
The Cloud author, then, does not propose to undermine the literal 
sense altogether. On the contrary, he respects that the coherence of 
the figurative sense depends largely on the significance of his terms 
at the literal level. He values language as an efficient vehicle for 
spiritual direction, much as he respects the records of physical 
manifestations of divine power in scripture: 
For we schul not so fede us of be frute at we schul dispise be 
tree; ne so drynke at we schul breke be cuppe when we haue 
dronken. be tre & be cuppe I clepe bis visible miracle, & alle 
semely bodely obseruaunce at is acordyng & not lettyng be werke 
of be spirite. be frute & be drync I clepe be goostly bemening 
of bees visible miracles, & of bees semely bodely obseruaunces, 
as is liftyng up of oure i3en & oure handes vnto heuen. 
(Cloud 107/20-108/4) 
He does, however, attempt to frustrate the normal consequences 
of metaphor, to forestall the impulse to interpret the figurative 
meaning of his terms by way of the literal, which tends to dissipate 
the reader's concentration on his transcendent object in mental images 
of related sense phenomena. Metaphor is inherently divisive, and in 
this sense it is alien to the Cloud author's theology, which affirms 
the integrity of the soul's unitive impulse. In Privy Counsel, he 
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urges the disciple, 
& ýerfore holde fee hole & vnscaterid as for} as you maist bi 
grace... (P. C. 147/15-16). 
The direction of his theology is towards reducing the distinctions 
which normally obtain between perceiver and perceived until, in the 
unitive experience, they cease to exist: the single essence of self 
converges with the essence of God, and the act of experiencing becomes 
one with the object of the experience. Again in Privy Counsel he writes, 
In is tyme it is at bou bote seest bi God & bi loue, & nakidly 
felist hym also bi goostly onyng to his loue in be souereyn poynte 
of bi spirit, as he is in hymself, bot blyndely, as it may be here, 
vtterly spoylid of Diself & nakidly clobed in hymself as he is, 
vnclobed & not lappid in any of bees sensible felynges (be bei 
neuer so sweet ne so holy)bat mowen falle in bis liif. Bot in 
purete of spirit propirly & parfitely he is parceyuid & felt in 
himself as he is, fer lengpid fro any fantasye or fals opinion 
at may falle in is liif. 
is si3t & bis felyng of God, bus in hymself as he is, may no 
more be departyd fro God in hymself (to in vnderstondyng at bus 
felist or }pus seest) ben may be departyd God himself fro his owne 
beyng, be whiche ben bot one bote in substaunce & also in. _kynde. So at as God may not be fro his beyng for onheed in kynde, so 
may not at soule, at bus see} & felit, be fro at ping at he 
bus seed & feleb for onheed in grace. (p. C. 169/17-170/3) 
Here the Cloud author expresses the unitive experience metaphorically 
in terms of "nakedness" and "blindness", but he hedges this description 
with an account couched in less esoteric theological language of the 
precise cognitive processes involved. This too, however, requires 
qualifying, since concepts of sight and feeling have the force of 
metaphor in this context: they are the nearest approximation to the 
soul's unitive experience, that is, which man's cognitive vocabulary 
affords, but they nevertheless imply a distinction between the perceiver 
and the perceived which is wholly at odds with the Cloud author's theory 
of union. 
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The use of words at all in this connexion is thus a compromise 
with the author's need to communicate his mystical theology and, some- 
times, as he acknowledges in Cloud ch. 37, with the soul's urgent 
impulse to express the intensity and immediacy of its spiritual 
experience. It is a compromise because, as the Cloud author emphasizes, 
speech is a physical thing with connotations which are intrinsically 
antithetical to the spiritual realities it here denotes: 
For of al at a Ding be neuer so goostly in itself, neuerbeles 
Sit 3if it schal be spoken of, siren it so is at speche is a 
bodely werk wrou3t wib be tonge, be whiche is an instrument of 
be body, it behoueb alweis be spoken in bodely wordes (Cloud 114/6-9). 
Prof. J. A. Burrow, in his recent article "Fantasy and Language in The 
Cloud of Unknowing", has noted that the Cloud author is making two 
related claims about the nature of language here: 
The phrase 'bodely wordes' has a double meaning here. It refers 
to the fact that language is a physical activity (a "werk wrought 
with the tonge"), and also to the fact that language expresses 
ideas in physical terms ("up", "down", etc. ). 5 
The incompatibility of the physical and the spiritual, which imposes a 
metaphoric function on language in relation to the Cloud author's 
mystical theology, is thus consequent on man's earthly condition. The 
two aspects of man's nature, he reaffirms, will only be reconciled in 
eternity: 
& an we schul be maad so sotyl in body & in soule togeders, at 
we schul be an swiftely where us liste bodely, as we ben now in 
oure lou3te goostly; wheber it be up or doune, on o syde or on 
ober, "bihinde or before. Alle I hope schal an be iliche good, 
as clerkes seyne. Bot now bou mayst not come to heuen not bodely, 
bot goostly. & 3it it schal be so goostly at it schal not be on 
bodely maner: now4er upwardes ne donwardes, ne on o side ne on 
ober, behynde ne before. (Cloud 110/5-13)6 
This restatement of the doctrinal position introduces a discussion 
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of the metaphoric mode which extends over three chapters (chs. 59-61). 
The author is disturbed by the spatial and temporal dimensions which 
language used in this way still retains: they distract the contemplative 
from his concentration on the transcendent and people his mind with 
extraneous ideas which anchor it to the finite. Though in ch. 5, for 
example, he defines the proper contemplative attitude to God and man 
by expressing it as a spatial relationship, he repeatedly cautions the 
disciple against literal interpretation of his terms: 
& wite wel at alle }goo at setten hem to be goostly worchers & 
namely in be werk of Dis book, bat of al bei rede "lifte up" or 
"go in", of al at be werke of bis book be clepid a steryng, 
neuerbeles Sit hem behoueb to haue a ful besy beholdyng, at bis 
steryng streche neiber up bodely ne in bodely, ne it at it be 
any soche steryng as is from o stede to anober. & of al at it 
be sumtyme cleped a rest, neuerbeles Sit bei schul not pink at 
it is any soche rest as is any abidyng in a place wibouten remowing 
berfro. For be perfeccion of is werke is so pure & so goostly in 
itself, at & it be wel & trewly conceyuid, it scal be seen fer 
lengpid fro any steryng & fro any stede. 
& it schuld by sum skyle raker be clepid a sodeyn chaunging 
ben any steedly steryng. For tyme, stede, & body, bees bre schuld 
be for3eten in alle goostly worching. (Cloud 110/14-111/5) 
The spiritual dangers attendant on a narrowly literal-minded approach 
to theological language are graphically described by the Cloud author 
(in chs. 45,52 and 53 especially), who is both appalled by the 
aberration of misguided contemplatives and piqued by their ludicrousness. 
He is equally sceptical of the indiscriminately figurative approach, 
however, and as Prof. Burrow has shown, he avoids blurring distinctions 
between the two modes by exaggerating, where appropriate, the physicality 
of his language: 
Physical images are unavoidable in all human language; but we 
must constantly struggle to keep them distinct from the spiritual 
realities about which they enable us to speak. And that, 
paradoxically, means keeping them physical. It is dangerous to 
' attempt to 'spiritualize' them. 'Ghostly conceits of bodily 
things', we-recall, are among the-fantastic products of the 
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disordered imagination of fallen man. 7 
Yet language acts consecutively as a stimulus to the imagination 
and has protean qualities which run counter to the Cloud author's 
contemplative theory. William Johnston states the problem well in his 
book, The PNysticism of 'The Cloud of Unknowing': 
For words are successive things; they move, causing images and 
concepts to flit across the mind. Hence they intensify the sense 
of time. Contemplative prayer gets away from matter, away from 
time, and 'it is best when it is in pure spirit, without special 
thought or any pronouncing of word' (Cloud 7820-22.8 
The tendency of Dionysian negative theology, conversely, is away from 
multiplicity to singleness: the soul, that is, progressively refines 
its desire until it is concentrated entirely on the essential being of 
God. At the same time, the contemplative works to subdue the various 
sensory and intellectual faculties which divert him with impressions 
of natural phenomena until his consciousness exists only in the "hi3est 
& be souereynest pointe of be spirit" (Cloud 74/12-13) - the metaphor 
used by the Cloud author for the pure substance of the soul which 
encounters the corresponding essence of God in union. The corollary, 
in linguistic terms, is that normal semantic distinctions are finally 
superseded, and words of directly contradictory meaning are equally 
apt to represent a reality which is beyond all contraries. Thus, 
although the Cloud author concedes that there is a certain appropriate- 
ness about representing Christ's departure from earth as an ascent to 
heaven, he insists that adverbs which express varying physical locations 
converge in. meaning when they are applied to an undifferentiated subject: 
For heuen goostly is as nei3 doun as up, & up as doom, bihinde 
as before, before as behynde, on o syde as obey, in so moche at 
whoso had a trewe desire for to be at heuyn, ben at same tyme he were 
in heuen goostly. (Cloud 112/10-13). 
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Equally meaningful, in this context, is thus effectively equally 
meaningless, and the Cloud author acknowledges, in the passage which 
Johnston refers to, that the purest form of contemplative prayer is 
indeed mute. The process of giving it expression is a material 
intrusion in a wholly spiritual activity, not least because speech 
takes place in time and relies on bodily functions. More importantly, 
the introduction of language insinuates an intellectual dimension - 
the correlation between "specyal ýou3t or any pronounsyng of worde" 
(Cloud 78/21-2) is specifically noted - and attaches an analytical 
mode to an experience wherein the normal distinctions between the 
perceiver and the perceived are transcended. 
The instinct of the contemplative is still to find words for his 
experience, and as a palliative the Cloud author recommends him to 
concentrate on single monosyllabic words such as "synne" or "God". 9 
The physical act of pronunciation and the extent to which language 
obtrudes upon his contemplative prayer are thus reduced to a minimum. 
Harther, the Cloud author establishes a connexion between the contemp- 
lative discipline and the economy of these terms: 
I maad no force, of bou haddest now-on-dayes none ober 
meditacions of in owne wrechidnes, ne of be goodnes of God 
-I mene 3if }you fele }gee bus steryd by grace & by counseyl - 
bot soche as bou mayst haue in bis worde SINNE & in bis worde 
GOD, or in soche obey, whiche as be list.; not brekyng ne 
expounyng bees wordes with coryouste of Witte, in beholdyng 
after be qualitees of bees wordes, as bou woldest by at 
beholdyng entrees bi deuocion. I trowe it schuld neuer be 
so in bis caas & in }gis werk. Bot holde hem alle hole beese 
wordes; & mene synne a lump, tou wost neuer what, none oiler 
}ging bot biself. (Cloud 73/7-16). 
The simplicity of the soul's unitive impulse, that is, is mirrored 
linguistically in the monosyllabic form of the words "synne" and "God": 
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as the intellectual and sensual faculties are recollected and the 
soul concentrates a unified desire on the essential being of God, so 
the simplicity of these terms is an artificial thing, the product of 
the compression of the contemplative's entire meaning into a single 
syllable. They resist, by virtue of their brevity, the kind of analysis 
to which more complex sentence structures and even polysyllabic words 
are susceptible because of their composite character. The natural 
propensity of the intellect is to dissect, and the Cloud author insists 
that the non-discursive character of the unitive impulse is a condition 
of its integrity. The contemplative is thus urged to discourage the 
divisive tendency of the intellect by exploiting the synthetic power 
of words such as "synne" and "God". As early as the seventh chapter, 
the author gives a stirring commendation of the efficacy of monosyllabic 
words in focussing the unitive impulse: 
& 3if bee list haue bis entent lappid & foulden in o worde, 
for bou schuldest haue betir holde berapon, take bee bot a litil 
worde of o silable; for so it is betir ben of two, for euer be 
schorter it is, be betir it acordeb wig be werk of be spirite. & 
soche a worde is bis worde GOD or bis worde LOUE. Cheese bee 
wheber bou wil t, or anober as be list: whiche at bee likeb best 
of o silable. & fasten bis worde to in herte, so at it neuer 
go pens for ping at bifalleb. 
bis worde schal be bi scheeld & bi spere, wheber bou ridest 
on pees or on werre. Wil) bis worde bou schalt bete on bis cloude 
& bis derknes abouen bee. Wib bis worde bou schalt smite doun al 
maner bou3t vnder be cloude of for3eting... (Cloud 28/10-20). 
In both cases, however, his sanction of such uses is coupled with 
a warning against expounding the terms: they are to be left "al hole, 
& not broken ne vndon" (Cloud 29/3-4). His caution is not inspired 
solely by his aversion to sophistry. The effect of analysing the words 
is to factorize their meaning, and this thwarts the unifying tendency 
of their monosyllabic form. The Cloud author emphasizes the analogy 
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between this procedure and the activity of meditation, which, it has 
been maintained, has no part in his concept of the unitive way. Both 
are regarded, in relation to his unitive theology, as degenerative 
processes. Thus in the seventh chapter, he insists that although 
meditation on the divine attributes and on personal sin may instigate 
the soul's desire to know God, they ultimately frustrate its progress 
to union: 
For parauenture he wil bryng to bi minde diuerse fulfeire & 
wonderful pointes of his kyndnes, & sey at he is ful swete & 
ful louyng, ful gracious & ful mercyful. & 3if bou wilt here him, 
he coueiteb no beter; for at be last he wil }pus jangle euer more 
& more til he bring bee lower to be mynde of his Passion. & }sere 
wol he lat be see be wonderful kyndnes of God; & if }you here him, 
he kepeý no beter. For sone after he wil lat }gee see in olde 
wrechid leuing; & parauenture, in seing & binkyng Derof, he wil 
bryng to iii mynde som place at bou hast wonid in before bis tyme. 
So at at be last, er euer wite bou, bou schalt be scaterid }you 
wost neuer where. (Cloud 27/3-13). 
The contemplative, that is, relapses into disconcerting memories of 
specific sins instead of focussing on sin as "a lump, tou wost neuer 
what, none oiler ping bot biself" (Cloud 73/15-16). He may cultivate 
this abstract consciousness of the self as a sinful entity which hinders 
the perfect union of the soul with God by simple concentration on the 
word "sin". But language is-a plastic medium: each term is a compound 
of meaning and suggestion, and is liable to seduce the contemplative 
into the kind of analysis which fragments his consciousness. It must 
be kept "hole" (Cloud 29/4,73/15), just as, the Cloud author reiterates, 
the contemplative himself must enter "hole & vnscaterid" into the 
unitive way. 
II. Notes on the history of the Cloud Corpus in manuscript 
The traditional and still largely prevalent view has been that 
the works of the Cloud author achieved immediate and widespread 
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popularity. The earliest authority whose opinion is generally cited on 
this point is D. M. M'Intyre; his article, "Cloud of Unknowing", 
states that the texts "walked up and down at deer rates" during the 
fifteenth century. 1° M'Intyre's assumptions about the circulation 
of the texts had an influential advocate in Prof. Hodgson, whose 
examination of the manuscripts which contain Cloud for her E. E. T. S. 
edition of this and Privy Counselling led her to conclude, 
Judging from their distant relationship to each other, the 
seventeen extant manuscripts must represent only a very small 
proportion of the total number of transcriptions. 11 
Prof. Hodgson's figure of seventeen manuscripts includes two which 
contain Latin versions of Cloud (MSS Pembroke College, Cambridge 221 
and Bodleian 856) and one of the Book of Privy Counselling only 
(MS Cambridge University Library, li. vi. 31). 12 The number of extant 
copies is undoubtedly generous by comparison with the meagre survivals 
of some medieval texts, and it is perhaps not surprising that scholars 
have sometimes taken their existence as a testimony to the widespread 
currency of this author's work during the later middle ages. Dom 
McCann, for example, writes, 
The number of existing ISS certainly points to a considerable 
vogue, 13 
and Dom David Knowles puts forward the same argument in The English 
Mystical Tradition - 
the number of manuscripts, in which the numerous variants and 
contaminations are proof of a long and numerous ancestry, are 
alike witnesses of the immediate and lasting vogue which these 
treatises attained among religious and the devout14 - 
and again in his article, "The Excellence of The Cloud", 
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We know that this body of writings attained a very wide 
popularity in religious circles immediately upon its appearance, 
that it formed the basis for the mystical doctrine of a still 
more popular writer, Walter Hilton, and that it remained until 
the Reformation one of the chief books of formation in contemplative 
houses, and in particular in the London Charterhouse, that nursery 
of martyrs. 15 
More recently, C. S. Nieva, in his study of Cloud, This Transcending 
God, echoes the same inference - "the writing actually received a wide 
circulation"16 - and Wolfgang Riehle is at once more specific in defining 
the notion of "widespread" popularity and more sweeping in his con- 
clusions: he offers the hypothesis that the audience for the text was 
not only considerable among religious but extended to lay communities 
of devout men and women: 
Eine genaue Prüfung dieses Textes zeigt aber, daß der Prolog 
dieses Werkes über den speziellen Adressaten hinaus auch einen 
größeren Kreis von Lesern anvisierte, die als Laien aktiv im 
Leben standen und nicht ihre ganz. Zeit der Kontemplation widmen 
könnten. Daß gerade ein Werk wie die Cloud eine beachtliche 
Verbreitung und hohes Ansehen erlangt hat bezeugt darüber hinaus 
die handschriftlicher Überlieferung. In seinem Traktat be Book 
of Priue Conselling bemerkt der Cloud - Autor ausdriicklich, er 
schreibe zwar speziell für einen bestimmten Leser ("in specyal 
to -Piself" (135/2)) und nicht für ein allgemeines ("general") 
Publikum, habe aber nichts dagegen, wenn sein Buch auch von 
anderen, ähnlich interessierten Leuten gelesen werde. Es kann 
kein Zweifel dariiber bestehen, daE3 oftmals dieselben Werke, die 
primär für ein Kloster - und Einsiedlerpublikum geschrieben wurden, 
zugleich auch für eine noch größere laikale Leserschaft mit 
bestimmt waren. Die Wahl der englischen Sprache legt ja die 
Erweiterung des Publikums geradezu nahe und trug dazu bei, daß 
sich die Grenzen zwischen monastischer und laikaler Leserschicht 
verwischten. 17 
Setting aside for the present the larger issues raised by Riehle's 
theory as to the character and status of the likely audience of Cloud, 
the validity of the premise on which he bases his theory, namely that 
the text circulated widely in manuscript, is by no means certain. 
Indeed, work on the Cloud manuscripts subsequent to Prof. Hodgson's 
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editions - in particular by Dr. A. I. Doyle - and research in tangential 
subjects, combine to tip the scales of argument in favour of the opposite 
supposition. What follows, therefore, is an attempt to assemble infor- 
mation from these various sources in order to estimate its cumulative 
importance for the study of Cloud. The discussion of Cloud in manuscript, 
it should be said, has no pretensions to being original research. Its 
purpose is essentially to explore the possible significance of the work 
of specialists in the field of manuscripts to the drift of this thesis 
- to establish, that is, whether there might be clues to the Cloud's 
provenance in its manuscript history, and whether the actual circumstances 
of its circulation are consistent with the image of the text and its 
likely audience which has emerged from the preceding dissertation. 
Prof. Hodgson, in her discussion of manuscripts in the two volumes 
of her edition of the texts attributed to the Cloud author, discriminates 
between those which contain Cloud and Privy Counselling and those in 
which the less substantial works of the Corpus variously occur. 18 The 
same distinction has been retained here, since it is both convenient 
and corresponds to the usual grouping of the texts in manuscript. 
Prof. Hodgson distinguishes three main categories in the sixteen 
manuscripts which contain Cloud itself on the grounds of variant 
readings and phonology: 
GROUP A 
MS Harleian 674 
I-IS University Library, Cambridge li. vi. 39 
MS Harleian 2373 
GROUP B MS University Library, Cambridge Kk. vi. 26 
MMS Trinity College, Dublin 122 
The third group has one subdivision: 
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MS Royal 17 C XXVI 
GROUP C1 I-IS Royal 17 C XXVII 
MS Royal 17 DV 
MS University College, Oxford 14 
MS Parkminster D. 176 
GROUP C2 MS Bodleian 576 
MS University Library, Cambridge Ff. vi. 41 
MS Douce 262 
Prof. Hodgson posits a common ancester for Group A and for Group B, 
and a possible common ancester for Group C1. Of the Latin versions, 
the text of Methley's translation in MS Pembroke 221 seems to be most 
closely related to those of the Group B manuscripts, whereas the version 
in MS Bodleian 856 seems to be related to the inferior and corrupted 
text of MS Harleian 959. The same manuscript grouping holds good for 
Privy Counselling, and the manuscript in which it occurs alone, MS 
University Library, Cambridge li. vi. 31, seems to have affinities with 
Group C. Prof. Hodgson demurs from singling out any one group as being 
closest to the author's original text and assumes at least one inter- 
mediate manuscript between the original text and the common ancestor 
of each group. She concludes, however, that MS Harl. 674 best represents 
the language of the original: its dialect is that of the north part of 
the central East Midlands. 
Dr. A. I. Doyle's discussion of the same manuscripts in his 
unpublished thesis, A Survey of the Origins and Circulation of 
Theological Writings in English in the 14th, 15th and early 16th 
Centuries, with special reference to the part of the Clergy therein, 
19 
acknowledges a considerable debt to Prof. Hodgson's classification 
and does not challenge it radically. 20 Her inference that the distinct 
manuscript groupings indicate the widespread currency of the texts 
nevertheless loses much of its force in consequence of Dr. Doyle's 
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proposed connexions between her manuscript groups A and C. Where he 
differs from her dating of the manuscripts, it is to narrow the likely 
period of composition. His chronology, therefore, reads: 
XV in. Harl. 674 
XV med. Univ. Coll. 14 
XV med. /ex. Harl. 2373 
Harl. 959 
XV ex. Tr. Coll. 122 
Kk. vi. 26 
Royal 17 DV 
Royal 17 C XXVI 
XVI in. Douce 262 
Bodl. 576 
Park. D. 176 
XVI ex. Royal 17 C XXVII 
XVII ex. Ff. vi. 41 
MS li. vi. 39 is written in a variety of hands dating from the thirteenth 
to fifteenth centuries, and Cloud itself is in a fifteenth century hand. 
MS li. vi. 31 of Privy Counsel is also a fifteenth century manuscript, 
and the two Latin versions of Cloud in Pemb. 221 and Bodl. 856 date 
from XV med. and XV ex. respectively. The fact that two are very 
late manuscripts and are closely linked, besides, to earlier ones - 
Royal 17 C XXVII is copied from Royal C XXVI - makes a prima facie 
case against taking the number of copies of a text as a reliable guide 
in itself to its popularity and distribution. 
The significance of Dr. Doyle's study, however, consists principally 
in its interpretative approach to the manuscript tradition of Cloud; 
it ranges more broadly than Prof. Hodgson's analysis to take account 
not only of the provenance and character of these manuscripts, but 
also of the principles on which they were compiled and the evidence 
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of their handling by early readers, as having bearing on the issue of 
circulation. The considerable interest in the Cloud among the Carthusians 
emerges as a dominant factor in Dr. Doyle's review of the transmission of 
the text in manuscript; in addition to the copies of certain Carthusian 
provenance, he identifies others which seem likely to have come from 
the same source, and thus modifies the pattern of distribution as 
suggested by Prof. Hodgson's grouping of the manuscripts. 21 Of the 
manuscripts of the English text of Cloud, three have inscriptions which 
guarantee them as Carthusian products: MS Had. 2373 was written at 
Mount Grace (a marginal note on f. 70b refers to an older book of the 
same house - "In veteri libro huius domus videlicet Montis gracie - 
De quattuor gradibus humilitatis nulla fit mentio") and was annotated 
by James Grenehalgh of Sheen in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth 
century; MSS Douce 262 and Park. D. 176 were both copied at the London 
Charterhouse22 (the former, also annotated by Grenehalgh, has the 
inscription on f. la "Liber domus Salutacionis matris dei prope 
londinium ordinis Carthusiensis", and a note in a sixteenth century 
hand on f. 118b at the end of the text of Cloud, "Scriptor huius libri 
erat d. Willelmus Tregooz professus istius domus videlicet Londonianum 
Cart(usie)"; the Parkminster manuscript has a similar colophon on 
f. 95b in a late sixteenth century hand, "Liber domus salutacionis 
beatissime virginis Marie iuxta London ordinis Chartusiensis per 
M. Chawncy quem exarauit sanctus Wille Exmewe"). 23 Dr. Doyle adds 
to these a further two manuscripts which almost certainly belonged 
to the Carthusians: MS Kk. vi. 26, a manuscript containing some northern 
forms from the same source as MS Harl. 2373 (Doyle comments on the 
late fifteenth or early sixteenth century inscription "Jhesus Maria 
Hieronimus" (ff-46b - 47), that the cult of St. Jerome in England 
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seems to have been concentrated in the charterhouses and at Syon), 
and ILLS Bod1.576,24 which seems to come from the same background as 
the Douce and Parkminster manuscripts -a group connected with the 
metropolitan charterhouse. MS Tr. Coll., Dublin 122, another northern 
volume, is also apparently close to Harl. 2373 and Kk. vi. 26 in terms of 
date, text and language. The manuscript of Richard Methley's Latin 
version of Cloud (translated at Mount Grace Charterhouse in 1491), 
MS Pemb. 221, is again Carthusian. Dr. Doyle suggests that the translation 
draws on more than one manuscript of the types in Carthusian ownership - 
probably including the original of Harl. 2373 - and that the MS Pemb. 
221 itself was possibly written at Sheen: its hand, he notes, resembles 
that of the Sheen scribe William Darker (d. 1512/13). Pr. Colledge, in 
his article "The Treatise of Perfection of the Sons of God: a fifteenth- 
century English Ruysbroek Translation", 25 assigns the manuscript to 
Mount Grace: 
.. since the Latin text of The Cloud in this manuscript, and the 
English interlinear and marginal glosses which an annotator has 
added, agree very closely with a type of English text at least 
one extant example of which was written at Mount Grace, and since 
the colophon which is added in yet another hand, and which ascribes 
the two translations to Methley, seems to show personal knowledge 
of him: 
... per Dompnum Richardum ffurth alias de Methley, domus 
assumptionis eiusdem beatissime virginis Marie ordinis 
carthusiensis (f. 99a) 
it may be assumed that the whole of the manuscript, additions, 
annotations and all, is the work of various Mount Grace 
Carthusians. 
Michael G. Sargent, however, confirms Dr, Doyle's conjecture that the 
hand of Femb. 221 is that of William Darker of Sheen, and adds this 
to the list of manuscripts annotated by Grenehalgh. These annotations, 
Sargent goes on, demonstrate that Grenehalgh compared the manuscript 
extensively with Douce 262 and that, further, some textual readings 
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in the Parkminster manuscript, which are unique except in Grenehalgh's 
annotations of Douce 262 and Pemb. 221, suggest that either Grenehalgh 
annotated these two manuscripts against the Parkminster manuscript, or 
that the Parkminster manuscript is in fact a copy of Douce 262 into 
which Grenehalgh's marginal annotations have been inserted. Harl. 2373, 
however, also annotated by Grenehalgh, does not seem to have formed part 
of this close textual group. The Carthusian manuscripts which include 
Cloud seem, therefore, to fall into two distinguishable though not 
completely unrelated categories. Dr. Doyle also associates the manuscript 
of Privy Counsel, li. vi. 31, with the texts of the Douce group. 
If, therefore, the number of extant manuscripts of Cloud is proof 
that the text enjoyed a vogue of any kind during the Middle Ages, the 
remarkably high proportion of Carthusian manuscripts among those which 
still survive argues the popularity of the text during the fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries within the strictest and most exclusive 
contemplative order in England and perhaps, by extension, at Syon. % It 
should, of course, be noted that the manuscripts which have been con- 
sidered so far are not the earliest known copies of the text: both 
Dr. Doyle and Prof. Hodgson agree in dating the East Midland manuscripts 
Harl. 674 and li. vi. 39 earlier. 
26 Moreover, the intrinsic significance 
of the survival of so many Carthusian manuscripts should not be over- 
estimated. The unique conditions for the production and circulation 
of religious works in manuscript within the order and the dedication 
of the Carthusians to the transmission of, for them, important texts 
in this way, are now widely recognized: research continues to add to 
the list of texts which were cultivated by the Carthusians and circulated 
narrowly among the English charterhouses, and some are known to have 
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been introduced to this country by the order. 
27 These, then, are 
necessary reservations. But clearly, the fact that so many of the 
extant manuscripts of Cloud are interrelated, and the possibility that 
their circulation was restricted to the order which produced them, must 
devalue indiscriminate claims that the audience for the text was large 
and composite. 
Investigation of the non-Carthusian manuscripts of Cloud tends 
to support this view of a restricted readership. Most of these, too, 
are in Dr, Doyle's opinion religious. He comments on two particular 
features of MS Harl. 674 which point to this conclusion: 
28 the first 
item in the manuscript (f. 1a A Tretis of Discrescyon of Spirites) is 
written with a column for a gloss or notes in Latin, though it is only 
filled in for a few pages; secondly, the passage in ch. 10 of Cloud 
which accommodates the possibility that its potential readers might 
lead different lives - 
& arte oblischid vnto any degree in deuoute leuyng in Holi 
Chirche, what-so it be, priue or aperte, & berto at wil be 
rewlid not after beire owne wille & beire owne witte, bot after 
be wille & be counsel of feire souereins, what-so bei be, 
religious or seculeres (36/8-12) - 
was originally present but later erased. Dr. Doyle observes that 
hardly anyone but the strictest religious would have cause to delete 
a passage such as this. The same passage, he notes, is absent from 
li. vi. 39, and the contents of this volume reinforce the impression 
that it is religious. 29 He judges a further three manuscripts to be 
in all probability religious: MS Harl. 959 - he remarks on the inter- 
polations by an amateur scribe that "superfluous interpolation and 
translation, as they may seem to us, were means of keen study 
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in the circumstances of cloistered religious life and devotion"; 
30 
the manuscript of the second Latin version of the text, MS Bodl. 856; 
MS University College 14.31 Of the remaining manuscripts which contain 
Cloud, two are closely related to the group of religious manuscripts 
to which MSS Harl. 674, li. vi. 39 and University College 14 belong: 
these are, MSS Royal 17 DV and 17 C xxvi. 32 MS Royal 17 C XXVII, a 
copy of Royal 17 CXXVI, belongs to the same group, though it is 
significantly later. 33 Like the seventeenth century manuscript Ff. 
vi. 41,34 it is too remote from the medieval situation to have 
particular relevance to the present discussion. 
When the tradition of Cloud in manuscript is put to this kind 
of scrutiny, therefore, the dominant impression is of a text whose 
circulation was limited, if not in area, then almost certainly in 
terms of the composition of its audience. Dialectal variations in 
the language of the different manuscripts and, in some cases, factual 
evidence of provenance, prove that the text was read and copied as 
far apart physically as London and the Charterhouse of Mount Grace 
in Yorkshire. Equally, however, the remarkably close ties which link 
the surviving manuscripts and the religious milieu in which the text 
seems consistently to have moved argue persuasively that it was in 
other respects current only within a very restricted sphere. Dr. Doyle 
is insistent that a large number of extant manuscripts of a text is 
compatible with the hypothesis of a narrow circulation, and he disputes 
Prof. Hodgson's conclusion, in the case of Cloud, that the survival 
of so many copies is indicative of a heavy loss: 
The considerable number of surviving copies of the Cloud are 
so closely related that the quantity and provenance of the 
lost ones may be estimated approximately, as not so very much 
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greater nor very different; in contrast with the great 
proliferation and complication of the Scale. 35 
He applies similar criteria to the manuscripts which contain the 
remaining texts of the Cloud Corpus, and again dissociates the issue 
of general popularity from the circumstances of their broad geographical 
distribution in manuscript: 
However they originated, the epistles, usually assigned with 
The Cloud, on general grounds of language and thought, to the 
end of the fourteenth century, were soon known in the most 
earnest religious houses and thereafter moved chiefly among them 
with few extensions beyond. Most of the manuscripts go back to 
a common collective archetype of East Midland origin, but the 
range of place ultimately covered by the descendants was wide... 
The relation of these manuscripts and texts was evidently so 
close that we may assume a comparatively small number of lost 
copies, though certainly exceeding in total the extant ones, and 
a restricted range of contexts which they might have reached. 
The same facts will be even more plainly revealed by examination 
of the Cloud itself. 36 
The hypothesis that Cloud - group texts had only a limited circul- 
ation may be substantiated on other grounds. The corroborative evidence 
is diverse and the significance of some of it, taken in isolation, is 
inconclusive. In sum, however, it is convincingly coherent. The history 
of the texts in print, for example, is hard to reconcile with the view 
that they were transmitted freely and widely. H. S. Bennett, in the 
first volume of his English Books and Readers which deals with the 
period 1475-1557,37 emphasizes the considerable demand for devotional 
works in the vernacular during the whole of this time. In lay and 
religious contexts alike, such works were valued for the accessibility 
of their teaching, and they were a particularly important means of 
instruction for nuns and anchoresses with little or no Latin education. 
A large and assured market of this kind was a strong incentive to printers 
in their choice of texts for publication, and in this sense, the lists 
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of early printed books naturally reflect trends which already existed 
in manuscript; the inclusion of a text among them is thus a fair 
indicator that its popularity was established. Alternatively, however, 
a printer might guarantee a return on his expenditure by producing books 
to specific commissions, in which case his market, though possibly 
small, was still dependable. It is uncertain, then, what inference 
may confidently be drawn concerning the circulation of a text in 
manuscript from the single fact that it was not printed at this time, 
when the circumstances which ensured publication could vary so radically. 
Nevertheless, the absence of Cloud from the handlist of publications 
by Wynkyn dp Worde, 1492-1535,38 is notable, since authors and texts 
which are in other respects comparable with Cloud are well represented: 
these include The Orcherd of Syon (1519), 39 the Book of Margery Kempe 
((1501)), the Scale of Perfection (1494, at the request of Margaret, 
meEherof Henry VII, and reprinted 1519,1525 and 1533), and various 
texts by Rolle, some of which were reprinted more than once, between 
1506 and 1519. Prof. Birrell notes that MS Ff. vi. 41 was a copy of 
Cloud and Privy Counsel prepared for the printer by William Parish 
in 1647, but that the text was never in fact published until the 
nineteenth century. 40 
The neglect of the printers extended also to the other works of 
the Cloud author. Deonise Hid Diuinite was first published in 1653, 
in the second volume of John Everard's Some Gospel Treasures Opened, 
where it appears with selections from Cusa's De Visione Dei, Tauler, 
Eckhart and Hermes Trismegistus. 41 The Pistle of Preier, Discrecioun 
of Stirings and Discrescyon of Spirites were printed once, in the 
Pepwell edition of 1521 (S. T. C. 20972): the source of this seems to 
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have been identical with that of MS Bodl. 576, which is probably a 
Carthusian manuscript. 42 Dr. Doyle, however, stresses that the 
circumstances of this edition preclude its being taken as a measure 
of the texts' general popularity, and tend, on the contrary, to imply 
that it answered a comparatively narrow, specialized demand: 
One edition, which these epistles would scarcely have received 
if there had not been some special understanding between the 
printers and the suppliers of the copy, who probably would absorb 
or assure the absorbance of a substantial part of the issue, 
sufficed to satisfy the potential market, before it was abruptly 
abolished fifteen to twenty years later. It is, in fact, not 
printing so much as reprinting which is an index of broader 
popularity; the contrast here with Mixed Life, or even the 
Counsels of Isidore is noteworthy, while the absence of the 
Mirror of Sinners or the Form of Living from this field of 
comparison is far from implying any inferiority in either. 
A more narrowly cultivated piece might, in the first half century 
or so of printing in English, have a better chance of being put 
into printed form, through effective sponsorship, which a widely- 
known work might lack in the absence of a completely commercial 
system of publication. 43 
The evidence is thus weighted against the assumption that any of 
the texts ascribed to the Cloud author was commonplace. Perhaps, 
however, their circulation was not uniformly limited. This would not 
be surprising, since the texts are not all equally esoteric, but differ 
considerably in character and, consequently, in appeal. Cloud, for 
example, inculcates a particular spiritual discipline; it is directed 
solely to those who intend a settled contemplative vocation, and 
unreservedly discourages potential readers who have no such qualification. 
The Tretyse of I)e Stodye of Wysdome, by contrast, is not addressed to 
a specific recipient; it gives access to one of the seminal texts of 
contemplative theology in the vernacular, in so impersonal a form as 
not to exclude anyone pursuing the Christian ideal from putting its 
doctrine to practical effect in his own life. 
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The manuscripts seem to give grounds for admitting some such 
distinction as a possibility. The number of texts which occur in 
manuscript with Cloud, for example, is remarkably small, and those 
which are included share, for the most part, the Cloud's special con- 
templative bias. Summary descriptions of the manuscript contents are 
included in Prof. Hodgson's editions of the texts: the following is a 
selective, interpretative account of the material she records. 
The seven treatises which make up the Cloud Corpus occur together 
with no additions in MS Harl. 674. All except Deonise Hid Diuinite 
appear in the Mount Grace manuscript, Harl. 2373, which also includes 
(f. 12b) a short piece headed How mans soule is made to be ymage and J)e 
lyknes of t)e Holy Trinite44 and closely related to St. Augustine's 
De Trinitate. The same piece appears in the related Carthusian 
manuscript Kk. vi. 26 (f. 26b), together with the seven Cloud-group 
texts and an extract from Cloud (chs. 63-66), distinct from the complete 
text which begins on f. 49a, which'is headed Howe be my3tes of mans 
saule stonden in t)e noumbre of fyfe. 
45 The Carthusian manuscript 
Douce 262 is clearly a compilation of contemplative texts in the 
Dionysian tradition: Cloud appears here with the extract from Book III 
of Hugh of Palma's Viae Syon Lugent, entitled Exposicio super auedam 
verba libri Beati Dionisij De Mistica Theologia (f. 119a), and the 
De Septem Gradibus Contemnlacionis by Thomas Gallus - one of the many 
copies of the earliest recension of the text. Privy Counsel (f. 139b) 
was added c. 1520 by the Carthusian scribe Andrew Boorde - also a 
treatise on repentance beginning "When a solle begynyth to fele 
grace... " (f. 132b)46 and the Directorium Quoddam Breuissimum Mentis 
in Deum Ad Conseauendam Vite Perfectionem (f. 134a) by the Franciscan 
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Henry Herp (Harphius). The only other substantial volume to contain 
Cloud is TATS li. vi. 39: here Cloud (ff-75-118), the text based on 
Augustine headed in this instance A Sermoun of Seynt Austin how man 
is maad to be ymage and }pe liknes of god his makere (ff. 118-20), and 
the Tretyse of be Stodye of Wysdome (ff. 120-31) occur consecutively, 
though they are sandwiched between a collection of standard devotional 
texts, in which a range of authorities on the spiritual life are 
represented7which is wide in comparison with other manuscripts 
incorporating the Cloud. The volume includes works by St. Bernard 
and Ailred of Rievaulx, for example, and a text of the Scala Claustralium, 
but was written, it should be remembered, over a long period and in a 
variety of hands between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
Otherwise, the Cloud and Privy Counsel occur unaccompanied in the 
Parkminster manuscript, and with only ex&rQcj-s fmr; Book II of the Scale (ncEQbl fro 
ch. 2) 
(f. 104) in MS Tr. Coll., Dublin 122. In MS Bodl. 576, they occur with 
two other texts belonging to the Corpus - the Pistle of Preier and 
Discrescyon of Spirites - and again with a text of Hilton, in this 
instance, Of The Songe of Aungells (f. 155a). These are all manuscripts 
connected with Douce 262 and the metropolitan charterhouse. In two 
other manuscripts, University Coll. 14 (f. 56b) and Royal 17 DV (f. 59a) , 
which are related to the apparently religious manuscripts Harl. 674 
and li. vi. 39, Cloud occurs in conjunction with St. Catherine of Siena: 
the text in the Royal manuscript is from the Lyf as printed by de Worde 
in 1493. St. Catherine's mystical treatise, the Dialogo, owes its 
introduction to this country to the Carthusians, and was anglicized 
for the Brigettine nuns of Syon as the Orcherd of Syon in the early 
fifteenth century: it is from this text that the piece in the University 
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College manuscript is extracted. This manuscript also contains on 
f. 65b the Latin Regula Aurea which Dr, Doyle has noted in other manuscripts 
from contemplative sources - at Sheen, in the possession of the recluse 
John Dygon, for example. The Royal manuscript contains besides only 
an untitled fragment in English on f. la and various notes and verses 
in Latin on f"5a, all apparently on religious themes. 
Cloud occurs alone in MSS Royal 17 C XXVI and 17 C XXVII, similarly 
Privy Counsel in li. vi. 31. In MS Harl. 959, the complete text of Cloud 
is accompanied by separate extracts from chs. 6 and 7 written in the 
same hand on ff-. 1a and 1b; the manuscript also includes a single leaf 
of notes from Valerius Maximus, Liber VII, De Quodam Rege (f. 2b) -a 
compendium of classical commonplaces which was a popular fund of 
exempla, widely read and copied in the Middle Ages. The seventeenth 
century manuscript Ff. vi. 41 contains only a Calvinistic justification 
of faith by the transcriber himself in addition to Cloud and Privy 
Counsel. The manuscripts of the Latin texts of Cloud are in a rather 
different category, but it is worth noting that the Methley version 
is accompanied only by the Latin Mirror of Simple Souls in MS Pemb. 
221, and in MS Bodl. 856, the second version is preceded beginning at 
f. 1a with the De Adhaerendo Deo of Johannes von Kastl -a text which 
is sometimes associated with Cloud in terms of doctrine and language - 
and followed (f. 77a) by some sermons of Augustine. 
The range of texts which occur in manuscript with Cloud, then, 
is demonstrably small, and restricted, for the most part, to works 
with particular relevance to the contemplative life. The results of 
this synopsis of the manuscript contents might, indeed, have been 
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predicted from consideration of the character of the text and from 
what may be ascertained concerning the provenance and close connexions 
of its manuscript copies. The inferences to be drawn from comparing 
the circulation of Cloud in manuscript with the other texts of the 
Corpus are, in some respects, equally unsurprising, though nonetheless 
significant. As a whole, the texts ascribed to the Cloud author form 
a remarkably cohesive group in manuscript. Privy Counselling - the 
companion treatise to Cloud - survives in eight manuscripts with Cloud 
(MSS Harl. 674 and 2373, Park. D 176, Douce 262, Ff. vi. 41, Kk. vi. 26, 
Tr. Coll., Dublin 122, Bodl. 576), and never independently of it except 
alone in MS li. vi. 31, which is related to the Douce copy. Deonise Hid 
Diuinite is similarly linked to Cloud in manuscript: they occur together 
in the only two extant manuscripts containing the translation (MSS Harl. 
674, Kk. vi. 26), both of which include transcriptions of the entire 
Corpus assigned to the Cloud author. The Pistle of Preier is reproduced 
with Cloud in the same two manuscripts, and also in MSS Harl. 2373 and 
Bodl. 576: these apart, it appears with other devotional works (The 
Chastising of God's Children, most of the table and Bk. I of Scale, 
and a treatise on prayer) in MTS Cohen Library, Liverpool University, 
Ryl. F. 4.10 (Harmsworth) and in MS University Library, Cambridge Ff. 
vi. 31. Discrescyon of Spirites is also in the same four manuscripts 
with Cloud (MSS Harl. 674 and 2373, Kk. vi. 26, Bodl. 576), and Discrecioun 
of Stirings occurs in all of these except the Bodleian manuscript. 
Both these treatises are included with the Pistle of Freier in MS Ff. 
vi-31 - in the case of the Discrecioun of 
Stirings it is the only other 
identified copy of the work still extant, while Discrescyon of Spirites 
occurs also in MSS Harl. 993 (a common-profit volume which eventually 
came into the possession of a nun of Syon)47 and Bristol Ref. Library 
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6.48 Ff. vi. 31 is an interesting manuscript: it, too, carries a 
common profit inscription which names the donor as John Colop, and 
was possibly made up from parts written during his lifetime whilst 
he was preparing other similar volumes (e. g. Lambeth 472 of works by 
Hilton). Its exemplars seem to come from the book trade as well as 
religious houses. 49 The connexions between MSS Harl. 993 and Ff. vi. 31 
through John Colop are sketched in footnotes here and explained more 
fully by Dr. Doyle; they seem to account for the close links between 
the texts of Discrescyon of Spirites in these two volumes. In general, 
however, the three treatises of the Cloud group which appear in MS 
Ff. vi. 31 seem to relate most closely to the texts in MS Harl. 674. 
The manuscript contains in addition various moderate Lollard tracts 
- some dealing with standard liturgical texts - in defence of popular 
scriptural knowledge, and a translation of Hugh of St. Victor on 
coping with temptation (the Latin of which Dr, Doyle has identified 
only in contemplative religious manuscripts). He also detects the 
hand of the scribe of MS Bodl. 938 in this volume. 50 
The Tretyse of 'pe Stodye of Wysdome has, of all the treatises 
associated with Cloud, easily the most diverse tradition in manuscript. 
It occurs with Cloud itself in NSS Harl. 674 and 2373, li. vi. 39 and 
Kk. vi. 26, and has been identified in seven manuscripts besides. 
Only a few details concerning these require comment here. Two are 
apparently Carthusian: MS Ff. vi. 33, which also contains A ladder of 
foure ronges (f. 115a), was probably transcribed by William Darker of 
Sheen (already mentioned as the scribe of Pemb. 221) for the nuns of 
Syon, and ISIS Glasgow University, Hunterian Library 258 (U. 4.16) seems 
to be in the hand of Stephen Dodesham of Sheen. The Stodye of Wysdome 
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tends to occur in larger volumes, and with an assembly of texts 
relating to the religious life which is wide in comparison with the 
contents of the manuscripts in which Cloud appears: 51 MS Westminster 
School Library, 10 Top. 17, for example, includes Rolle's Form of 
Living (f. 205a) and part of the Poor Caitiff (f. 112a) among a 
collection of didactic texts which apply severally to those in various 
states and degrees of the Church. In MS Harl. 1022, the Stodye of 
Wysdome again appears with the Form of Living (f. 47a), and also, in 
this instance, with Bk. I of Scale (f. 16a) and other religious pieces 
in English and Latin. MS Arundel 286 again comprises a compendium of 
devotional texts - including, in this case, part of the Revelations of 
St. Brigit (f. 15b), devout contemplations on the Hours translated from 
the Speculum Ecclesie (f. 129a) and a treatise on virginity (f. 134b) - 
many of which are vernacular translations and of particular relevance 
to a female audience. 
III. Concluding remarks on the audience of the Cloud Corpus, 
and speculations as to the possible provenance of the texts 
The Cloud author himself sets a precedent for leaving 'Isom mater 
... hanging & not fully declarid }sere as it stondeý" (Cloud 130/8-10), 
and his seems a good example to follow with regard to drawing further 
large conclusions from the evidence of the texts in manuscript at this 
point. There is an apparently strong case for claiming that none of 
the works grouped as the Cloud Corpus had more than a limited circulation, 
but that some may possibly have had a broader dissemination than others. 
Cloud and Privy Counsel are closely allied in manuscript, and Deonise 
Hid Diuinite, in its rare occurrences, seems to be narrowly associated 
with them. 52 The Pistle of Preier and the two treatises on discretion 
had at least the potential for a wider audience through their printing 
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and their incidence in common profit volumes - though, in each case, 
religious manuscripts were used in their compilation and the audience 
for both the printed and common profit copies may have been predominantly 
religious. Dr. Doyle relates the manuscripts in which the Stodye of 
Wysdome appears more closely than Prof. Hodgson would seem to allow; 
still, it is undoubtedly the most independent text of the Corpus in 
manuscript, and it tends to occur in the least restrictively contemp- 
lative volumes in which the Corpus is represented. In general, there 
seems to be a natural correlation between the character and appeal of 
the texts, and what may be inferred from manuscripts concerning the 
extent of the circulation and the status of their audience. 
The evidence of manuscript survival and of printings is, it has 
already been noted, all too readily liable to misconstruction - more 
so, perhaps, its obverse, which deals in speculation on-the non- 
appearance of a text in certain contexts. While the following facts 
seem worth recording here in the attempt to compose a picture of the 
Cloud's reception by its early readers, therefore, the limitations 
of such information cannot be overstated. Prof. Helen Gardner, 
reviewing the E. E. T. S. edition of Cloud in 1947,53 already challenges 
Prof. Hodgson's opinion as to its popularity. Besides drawing attention 
to the "marked exclusiveness" of the Cloud Corpus itself in comparison 
with the works of, say, Rolle and Hilton, she notes that Margaret 
Deanesly, in her scrutiny of more than 7,500 English wills of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, found no reference to copies of 
Cloud, though they give ample testimony to the popularity of the other 
two writers. 54 She also comments on the oddness of Cloud's absence 
from the Vernon and Simeon manuscripts if it was immediately and 
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widely popular.,. when Bk. I of Scale (which she assumes to have been 
written later) is incorporated. Dr. Doyle suggests that the Vernon and 
Simeon volumes were possibly intended for devout noblewomen and read 
within the household; 55 they were compiled from many different sources, 
and include a variety of devotional works ascribed to both Rolle and 
Hilton - Hilton's Mixed Life, appropriately enough, and the Form of 
Living. Prof. Gardner's observation seems warranted, yet it requires 
some qualification. Prof. S. S. Hussey, for example, has commented on 
the inclusion of only Bk. I of Scale in these collections: 
Like the seventeen manuscripts which contain Book I alone, 
Book II may originally have circulated as a separate work. It 
is interesting that in most of the manuscripts which have Book II, 
The Scale occurs alone. Where this is not so, the other contents 
are either Hilton's or of close interest to a reader of his work. 
There are no cases where Book II forms part of a really large 
collection of medieval texts like the Vernon and Simeon manuscripts. 
This is, however, the case with Book I where several manuscripts are 
extant. It may be fairly inferred that Book I was better known and 
more popular than Book II. 56 
Possibly, then, both Book II of Scale and Cloud could have been judged 
too advanced or specialized for the anticipated audience of these volumes. 
Perhaps, also, the date of Cloud may have some bearing on its omission 
from these collections, since the time which elapsed before the two 
books of Scale circulated jointly may have been a factor in the exclusion 
of the second book. 
Similar considerations of date and applicability to the anticipated 
audience might have more to do than popularity with the apparent 
absence of quotation from Cloud in a theological compendium such as 
the Speculum SDiritualium. This is probably a Carthusian text, compiled 
c. 1400 and intended, as the preface explains, to accommodate material of 
relevance to both the active and contemplative lives: 
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Et licet pro contemplativis precipue conscriptus sit liber: 
tarnen vite active deditus inueniet in eo multa sibi utilia et 
precipue in prima parte et secunda ac tertia parte. 57 
It draws on both Rolle and Hilton, but almost entirely in existing 
Latin versions of the texts. Only the Form of Living is quoted in 
English, and Hilton is represented in the Latin Fishlake text. Perhaps, 
then, the author neglected Cloud because it was not available in Latin 
(the Speculum probably antedates Richard Hethley's translation by some 
90 years). It is conceivable, however, that the author, if a Carthusian, 
may have been familiar with Cloud but considered it too advanced or 
esoteric for inclusion in a manual of this kind. The omission is in 
any case interesting, both as a possible index of the way the text was 
regarded by the Carthusians and as eliminating another possible route 
whereby the substance of the text could have passed into general 
circulation. 
There is, in general, what might be taken as negative evidence 
of the circulation of the Cloud in the comparative rarity of quotations 
from or allusions to it outside its own Corpus. It would be rash indeed 
to regard Margery Kempe as in any sense a norm, but it is interesting, 
that with her awareness of contemporary devotional literature, she does 
not give any hint of having known of this text - and particularly so, 
since it is in the vernacular. On several occasions she lists comparable 
works which have been read to her: 
He red to hir many a good boke of by contemplacyon & ober bokys, 
as be Bybyl wyth doctowrys berupon, Seynt Brydys boke, Hyltons 
boke, Boneventur, Stimulus Amoris, Incendium Amoris, & swech 
oiler. (143/25-29)58 
Her narrative, too, is steeped in transmuted echoes of such works; but 
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there is nowhere any indication, either specific or implied, that her 
familiarity with works of "hy contemplacyon" extended to Cloud. Perhaps 
the text would in any case have been too austere to be congenial to 
her tastes. Still, it seems possible that she did not know it because 
it never achieved the popularity which would have assured its currency 
in her fringe religious circle. 
On the other hand, there is good reason to suppose that the Cloud 
author's work was being read in precisely the kind of devout contexts 
for which it was intended. Fr. Walsh and Fr. Colledge, in their recently 
published research into the theological background of the Revelations of 
Divine Love, have argued for the breadth of Dame Julian's knowledge of 
vernacular contemplative literature: 
her writing, in the long text especially, constantly displays 
remarkable congruity of both thought and language with contemporary 
English writings: notably The Treatise of Perfection of the Sons of 
God, The Cloud of Unknowing and The Scale of Perfection and their 
ancillary treatises, and Chaucer's Boethius... she must, early in 
life, have attracted the benevolent attention of some scholar or 
scholars who perceived her spiritual and intellectual gifts, and 
passed on to her the learning of the schools. 59 
Their comments would also suggest that Cloud was being studied and 
transmitted with due respect for what this thesis has shown to be the 
very considerable intellectual demands which the text makes of its 
readers. Interestingly, however, they found little trace of the 
Deonise Hid Diuinite in Julian's thinking or expression, and the 
parallels which they cite between the Revelations and the remaining 
works of the Cloud Corpus, persuade that it was not the negative 
Dionysian elements of their author's theology which impressed her in 
his work. 
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Walter Hilton, too, seems to have known the Cloud author's writings. 
The Cloud Corpus as a whole has often been assumed to antedate Hilton's 
work - possibly on the authority of Dom David Knowles, who fixes its 
composition between 1345 and 1386 in his influential book, The English 
Mystical Tradition. It now seems more-likely that the two authors were 
near contemporaries and that they acknowledge one another's work in their 
own. Thus, Prof. Gardner has suggested that the earlier version of 
Scale I was influenced by Cloud, though the later version and Scale II 
develop a more mature and independent theology, 
60 and It. Colledge 
speculates that the Cloud author may have Hilton's "Epistola... ad 
quedam solitarii de leccione, intencione, oracione et alliis" (MS Royal 
6E III) in mind when he refers to "anober book of anoýer mans werk" 
(Cloud 71/15) in chs. 35 and 48 of Cloud. 
61 A note to ch. 48 in the 
margin of MS University College, Oxford 14 does in fact identify the 
unnamed work as "hylton's". Indeed, it is sometimes tempting to 
envisage a kind of dialogue between them, taking place obliquely in 
the works which they wrote for others. The short epistle, Of Angels' 
Song, for example, was clearly not conceived as a critique of Cloud, 
but it contains much that reads like a direct response to Hilton's 
study of the text. (The manner of its brief allusions suggests that 
Hilton's is the later work). The Cloud author's warnings that the 
very inexperience of the novice in contemplation might be his downfall, 
for instance, meet with Hilton's unreserved approbation, and the 
cautionary tone of Cloud ch. 52 is reproduced in Of Angels' Song: 
Sum man when he has long traueld bodili and gastli in destroyng 
of syns and getyng of uertus, and perauenture has getyn be grace 
a sumdele rest, and a clerte in conscience, anon he leues prayers, 
redyngs of haly wryt, and meditacions of ýe passion of Crist, and 
ýe mynde of his wrechednes; and, or he be called of God, he gadres 
his wittis be uiolence to sekyn and to byhalde heuenly thyngs, or 
his egh be mad gastly be grace, and ouertrauels by ymaginacioun 
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his wittis, and be undiscrete trauelyng turnes be braynes in 
his heued, and forbrekis be myghtis and be wittis of be saule 
and of body; and ban, for febilnes of be brayne, him think bat 
he heres wonderful sownes and sangs; and bat is nathyng els bot 
a fantasy, caused o trublyng of be brayn... (13/114-25)62 
By contrast, there is a strong sense that if Hilton does not thoroughly 
disapprove of the Cloud author's advocacy of the way of unknowing, he 
at least regards it with some suspicion and with considerable misgivings 
as to its possible effect. He ends Of Angels' Song with this admonition: 
For wyt bou wele at a naked mynde or a nakid ymaginacioun of 
Jesu or of any gastly }ging, withoutyn swetnes of luf in be 
affeccioun, or withoutyn light of knowyng in resoun, it es bot 
a blyndnes, and a way to dissayte, if a man hald it in his awen 
syght mare ban it es. barfore I hald it syker at he be mek in 
his awen felyng, and hald bis mynde in regard noght, til he may, 
be custum and oysyng of }gis mynde, fele be fere of luf in his 
affeccioun, and be lyght of knawyng in his resoun. (15/183-190) 
The discrepancies in the two authors' accounts of unitive knowledge 
will be considered below. 63 It is notable here, however, that Hilton 
writes with a vehemence which suggests an imagined adversary, and seems 
to use the Cloud author's distinctions and terminology to argue the 
opposing view. Perhaps there is rather tart irony in Hilton's 
recollection of the Cloud author's metaphorical vocabulary, when he 
says that to have a "naked" apprehension of spiritual realities, which 
relies on neither of the accepted faculties of perception, is to be 
"blind" indeed. 
Evidence such as this, then, indicates not only where and by 
whom the Cloud was read, but also suggests something of the response 
which it provoked. Equally, while Carthusian interest in the text 
has already been established from manuscript survivals, the use of 
it by Carthusian authors is a particularly valuable index of attitudes 
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to it within the order. There is the evidence of Methley's Latin 
text which, late though it is, is a testimony to the status of the text 
and the desire to overcome its provincial limitations, possibly to make 
it accessible to continental branches of the order, by putting it into 
the lingua franca of theology. The Carthusian compilation Of Actyfe 
Lyfe & Contemr, latyfe Declaracion is also particularly interesting in 
this respect. It appears in two fifteenth century manuscripts: B. M. 
Add. 37049 (ff-87b-89b) and, in a longer version entitled Via ad 
ContemDlacionem, B. M. Add. 37790 (ff. 234a-236a). Both are Carthusian 
volumes, and 37049 seems likely to be a product of one of the Northern 
charterhouses. 64 The texts in question are edited and discussed by 
P. S. Jolliffe in his article, "Two Middle English Tracts on the Contemplative 
Life". 65 Both deal with the three principal phases of the contemplative 
way - purgative, illuminative and unitive - though the version in MS 
Add. 37049, which seems to depend on some form of the text in I"IS Add. 
37790, is modified and extended to consider them in the broader context 
of Christian living. The structuring of the tracts around the three 
degrees of contemplation is adopted from Hugh of Balma's Viae Syon 
Lugent, and this, too, is the major single source for the compiler's 
textual borrowings. The Balma material is coupled, in the shorter 
version, with quotations from the Cloud Corpus and from Hilton's 
Scale; the longer text draws less on the Viae Syon Lugent, but 
supplements the material from English contemplative literature with 
recollections, in particular, of the Tretyse of be Stodye of Wysdome 
and Rolle's Form of Living. 
66 
As compilations, these are interesting and in some respects 
puzzling. Jolliffe has recognized that their significance consists, 
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not least, in their having borrowed from the Cloud Corpus: 
Compared with the Scale and the more popular writings by Rolle, 
the Cloud and its associated epistles occur in few extant manu- 
scripts. Whereas extracts by Hilton and Rolle have been copied 
to stand independently or in combination with other materials there 
is only one other instance yet identified of material from the 
Cloud having been borrowed; and that, occurring in a Cloud manu- 
script and being little more than an extract isolated for 
instruction on one topic, is less significant than these tracts. 67 
They are equally important, he stresses, as evidence that Hugh of Balma 
was being read by English Carthusians during the fifteenth century - and 
not only read, but studied in conjunction with the Cloud of Unknowing. 
Jolliffe recalls Fr. Walsh's inference that. Richard Methley shows 
knowledge of the Viae Syon Lugent in his Latin text of Cloud, and 
notes the appearance of an extract from Balma's work in the Carthusian 
MS Douce 262 which also incorporates Cloud and Privy Counsel. 
68 This 
need not mean, of course, as Jolliffe cautiously advises, that the 
Cloud author himself drew on the Viae Syon Lugent. But this apparently 
consistent link between the two works in Carthusian circles, though it 
may only be authenticated from fifteenth century sources, suggests at 
least that the Carthusians recognized the Cloud's affiliations with 
Hugh's development of the Dionysian mystical tradition (the intermediary 
influence of Gallus, it will be remembered, is also represented in 
MS Douce 262 by the De Septem Gradibus Contemplacionis), and perhaps 
even goes some way to corroborating the textual evidence of Cloud's 
affinities with Hugh, insofar as the Carthusian connexion intimates 
the kind of possible theological/literary milieu in which the author 
might have encountered the Viae Syon Lugent. 
The puzzling aspect of the tracts, however, is the compilers' 
method of selecting and combining material from the various sources. 
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The principal debt to Hugh, as Jolliffe notes, is in the description 
of the purgative way. The account of the illuminative way owes little 
to the Viae Syon Lugent, and that of the unitive way still less, and 
Jolliffe concludes, 
While it is true, therefore, that both tracts describe the 
contemplative life in terms of the threefold way which the M sy tica 
Theologia helped to popularise and used words partly borrowed from 
that treatise, there is little evidence to establish that the 
compilers depended on it for their teaching. Significantly they 
borrowed most from it to describe the purgative way, which it 
treats least distinctively and to which it devotes least attention. 
69 
Where the Cloud author and Hugh agree in their definition of the unitive 
way, the compilers opt for the account which occurs in the English text. 
The distinctive common elements in the unitive theology of Hugh and the 
Cloud author - the concepts of loving aspirations and of knowledge 
through unknowing - are, in fact, conspicuously underplayed in these 
compilations, and the Cloud author's theory of contemplation is represented 
without specific allusion either to unknowing or to the cloud metaphor, 
which are not only its most salient characteristics, but are essential 
to its meaning. The section on the unitive way also includes material 
from the Scale - Jolliffe comments, "the specific teaching about loving 
aspirations associated with the Mystica Theologia and the Cloud occur 
in words borrowed from the Scale. 7° He infers from this, 
Although it would be unwise to draw from this any conclusion as 
to the relationship between the Scale and the Cloud epistles, 
particularly as these sources, like the Nystica Theologia, appear 
to have been used to express the compilers' teaching rather than 
to determine it, nevertheless it suggests that there may have been 
a fairly settled tradition of teaching on the contemplative life 
to which both writers were seen by their successors and admirers 
to have contributed. 71 
Jolliffe's point is an important one. But it surely raises the question 
of the extent to which these compilers, at least, regarded the substance 
326 
of their sources as mutually compatible. Some peculiarities in their 
application of the Cloud author's unitive theology have already been 
suggested. It is equally curious that statements such as the following 
- which appears in both versions of the tract and is fundamental to the 
theory of negative mysticism - 
Therfore lyfte vp they herte unto god with a meke sterynge/ of luf. 
and mene hym seife. And berto luke/ at the lothe for to thynke 
on o3t bot on hymselfe. so }pat/ no3t worke in thy Witte nor in thy 
Wylie bot only hym seife (107/239-42), 
are aligned with expressions of Hilton's Christocentric concept of 
contemplation - 
For contemplacion is nou3t ellys bot a sight of Ihesu the whylke 
is verreyepees (101-102/183-4) - 
without acknowledgment on the part of the compilers that they intend 
different orders of experience or that the passages which they quote, 
in their original contexts, pertain to distinct and in some respects 
antithetical schemes of contemplation. Indeed, though the compilations 
are organized around Hugh of Balma's divisions of the contemplative 
way and draw on the Cloud Corpus, they are not intrinsically Dionysian 
works, but advocate a Christocentric form of devotion with special 
reverence for the Holy Name. 
Clearly, however, the works of the Cloud author and Hugh of 
Balma were integral to the thinking of the compiler of the earlier 
and shorter text,. at least, of the Of Actyfe Lyfe & Contemplatyfe 
Declaracion on contemplation. This is the version which occurs in 
MS Add. 37790, and it is completely at home there. The manuscript 
is described by Walsh and Colledge in their edition of the shorter 
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text of Julian as, 
... an anthology of less popular spiritual writings which comprises 
the unique copies of Julian's short text and of the English 
Ruysbroek Treatise of Perfection. 72 
They detect evidence of "connoisseurship" in its composition, suggest 
that it was a commissioned manuscript, and note that, while it was 
written in a single hand of the mid fifteenth century, numerous hands 
were at work throughout correcting errors. 73 Fr. Colledge has previously 
written, in his article on the Treatise of Perfection, that, 
It would seem that the scribe of MS Add. 37790 (or of its archetype) 
has been anxious to assemble an anthology of notable English trans- 
lations of mystical treatises, both Latin works written in England, 
such as the Incendium Amoris, and works written by foreign authors, 74 
and the Carthusian compiler is characterized in the introduction to 
the Revelations as "an editor with an eye for the rarities in the 
literature of contemplation". 75 On all these counts, the inclusion 
of a text extant itself in only two Carthusian manuscripts and incorpor- 
ating material from works as limited in their circulation as Cloud and 
the Viae Syon Lugent, does not seem surprising. The later expanded 
version, which occurs in the less specialized volume, MS Add. 37049, 
is also the one which deals more broadly with the Christian life; it 
even includes simple verse couplets on the distinctions between the 
active and contemplative vocations. 
This brief review of the kind of evidence which survives to 
suggest the reception of Cloud during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries tends, therefore, to the conclusion that the text was not 
widely and generally known, but was for the most part studied and 
respected in the sort of narrowly religious contexts to which its 
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content is appropriate and of which its author would assuredly have 
approved. One inescapable feature of the discussion so far has been 
the prominence of the Carthusians, not only as transmitters of the 
text, but as guardians and, in some cases, exponents of the tradition 
of Dionysian mystical theology with which the Cloud is so closely allied. 
So many and various are the text's links with the order, indeed, that 
the question becomes unavoidable - was the Cloud simply one of the works 
which the Carthusians naturally cherished for its teaching on contemplation, 
or was it also in fact written by a member of the order? 
There is good cause to be relieved that this question need be 
broached here only in the context of an afterword. The issue of author- 
ship remains as contentious as ever, despite the fact that it has been 
the focus of so much literature on the subject of the Cloud. Many 
valuable observations have been recorded in the course of this debate, 
but it is perhaps regrettable that the discussion has so often become 
entrenched in inconclusive reappraisals of the textual evidence for 
and against Hilton's possible authorship of the Cloud Corpus. The 
recent article by Wolfgang Riehle, "The Problem of Walter Hilton's 
Possible Authorship of The Cloud of Unknowing and its Related Tracts", 76 
is particularly disappointing in this respect, since it makes so little 
capital out of recent research into cognate issues with possible signif- 
icance for this question, but instead mainly rehearses the now overworked 
internal arguments which revolve round style, terminology, and the concept 
of the mystical night. Perhaps, then, the study of the precise theolog- 
ical background of the Cloud may be proposed as a more secure basis on 
which to hazard speculations as to its possible authorship. 
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There are, it should be acknowledged, a number of instances of 
the Carthusians acting as patrons to texts not composed within the 
order in circumstances which admit close comparison with their treat- 
ment of Cloud. It is now accepted that the English charterhouses 
preserved close ties with their continental counterparts, and that the 
links with the Low Countries - especially through Syon and Sheen - were 
particularly strong. Fr. Colledge has shown that Ruysbroek's works 
were introduced to this country through these channels, and that the 
translated texts of Ruysbroek, the Chastising of God's Children and 
Treatise of Perfection circulated in the English charterhouses. 
Dr. Roger Lovatt has argued that Bk. I at least of the Imitation of 
Christ was imported by the Carthusians - it was transcribed by John 
Dygon, the fifth recluse of Sheen, in 1438 - and that the longer text 
probably reached England in the same way and was likewise translated 
at Sheen. 77 Dr. Lovatt suggests that the Carthusians may also have 
introduced the De Adhaerendo Deo to this country: it survives in two 
manuscripts, the one certainly Carthusian (MS Bodleian Lat. th. d. 27, 
from Coventry Charterhouse) and the other probably so (MS Bodley 856). 
Similar examples are the Mirror of Simple Souls and the works of 
Catherine of Siena. 78 The relevant common denominator in these cases 
is that all are texts which moved primarily within the order. Cloud, 
though a native text, seems to have been treated in much the same way: 
Hilton and Rolle, on the other hand - whether as a natural consequence 
of their broader appeal or by design - were not engrossed by the 
Carthusians to quite the same extent, although their works were certaintly 
appreciated and much copied among the order. Dr Doyle has already com- 
mented on the similarities between Cloud and the Mirror in terms of the 
restrictions imposed on their circulation by the difficulties of their 
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teaching and the expressed intention of their authors, as well as in 
respect of their limited transmission in manuscript. 
79 
The evidence of circulation, then, is inconclusive as regards the 
possible Carthusian authorship of the text. It is equally difficult 
to support the case for authorship as against patronage on the grounds 
of the order's role in developing the Dionysian tradition of mystical 
theology. In 1923, a monk of Parkminster Charterhouse wrote a monograph 
on the Cloud which lists its exposition of Dionysian principles as one 
of the arguments against ascribing it to a Carthusian author. 
80 His 
claim that the order traditionally allied itself with the alternative 
school of devotional mysticism, through imitation of Christ, is now 
patently untenable81 - though it is true that a strong tradition of 
this kind of piety flourished within the order. Indeed, it is possible 
that the Cloud was not universally popular in the English charterhouses. 
If this were the case, it would not be without parallels. Dr. Lovatt 
has established that the readership for the Imitatio, for example, was 
probably small even by Carthusian standards: 
... its circulation in England was restricted to a small, 
conservative and spiritual elite. The Carthusians and the 
Bridgettines represented a collective elite of this sort, but, 
even amongst the members of these two orders, the individuals 
familiar with the Imitatio were distinguished for their learning 
and piety. 82 
Dr. Lovatt identifies Dygon as such a reader, and notes that the 
influence of the text, as a result, seems to have been slight. The 
implications of this observation may perhaps be of interest for Cloud, 
since the text is characterized and distinguished by its exposition of 
negative theology, yet its impact in this area - if it may be quantified 
from the extent to which it is mirrored in the works of other authors, 
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and even allowing that the literary groups within the Carthusian 
order were in a minority - seems to have been narrow. 
83 
But clearly, the evidence assembled here must obviate any doubt 
that the Dionysian tradition persisted in some sections at least of 
the English order, 84 and that the Cloud's affinities with this tradition 
were recognized in Carthusian circles. Perhaps, indeed, the special 
regard in which the Cloud seems to have been held within the order has 
to do with the very fact of its Dionysian bias. Possibly one could go 
further, and say that what is known of the attitudes to Dionysian theology 
in the English branch of the Carthusian order tends to confirm rather 
than exclude its members as likely contenders for the authorship of the 
text. There is, for example, the approval of the Dionysian style and 
content of Ruysbroek's contemplative works in the Confirmacio Ordinis 
Carthusiensis, which claims, albeit wrongly, that their author belongs 
to the Carthusian Order and commends his writings to those who are 
committed to the life of contemplation - those, as Fr. Colledge puts 
it succinctly in his article on the Treatise of Perfection, who are, 
... such instructed students and contemplatives as the Carthusians 
themselves, who might be expected to have passed beyond that which 
is merely popular in their devotional readings. 85 
The Cloud would certainly have been appropriate to much the same kind 
of audience, and Fr. Colledge in fact suggests, in the edition of the 
Chastising which he published with Joyce Bazire, that it was precisely 
because Cloud excelled others which drew on the same theological back- 
ground and were similarly directed to those advanced in the contemplative 
life, that texts such as the Treatise of Perfection were neglected - 
even by the prolific Carthusian commentator James Grenehalgh. 
86 
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Colledge and Bazire also draw attention to the manner of the Cloud 
author's adaptation of Hugh of St. Victor's indictment of the extravagant 
behaviour of misguided novices in the De Institutione, which, in Cloud 
ch. 53, is contrived rather to express condemnation of the self-indulgent 
excesses of false contemplatives: this they see as exemplifying con- 
temporary fears, especially prevalent among Carthusians, that this kind 
of ostentatious 'enthusiasm' in contemplative sects might lead to heresy. 
Walter Baier has also noted the stand taken by the order as a whole on 
this issue - 
1369 erläßt das Generalkapitel der Kartäuser die Anweisung, die 
Ndnohe sollten sich fernhalten von den Begarden, Kokarden, 
Fraticellen und Beginen87 - 
and Colledge and Bazire confirm that one sector at least of the Carthusian 
community in England voiced urgent concern with the potential dangers 
of 'enthusiasm': 
... although some of the English Carthusians, such as Methley 
and Norton, are known to have been great 'enthusiasts', the 
opposing point of view, discouraging and deploring extravagance 
and singularity in the spiritual life, was well represented in 
the order. Whether the author of The Chastising was himself a 
Carthusian or not, there is much evidence to show that it was 
possibly through Carthusian means that Ruysbroek's writings came 
to England; and it is clear that the author, who uses so much 
of The Spiritual Espousals, which is so specially commended in 
the Carthusian Confirmacio, also shares the point of view expressed 
here on enthusiasm. tlu 
Methley himself reinforces the text's wariness of heretical sects in 
the prologue to his translation of Cloud: "Et hoc: contra heresim 
begardorum" (MIS Pemb. 221 f. 1b). Colledge and Bazire also compare 
an anonymous tract in MS Christ's College, Cambridge DD. 1.11 - owned 
by Coventry Charterhouse and possibly written for the use of Carthusians 
- entitled 'Vt inclusi non querant signa et mirabilia fieri nichil, 
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quia per ostentacionem faciant et vanam gloriam omnino fugiant'. It 
seems, too, from the reply which the hermit Thomas Bassett made to an 
unidentified Carthusian correspondent, printed in part by R. E. Allen 
as the 'Defence against the Detractors of Richard', that the unknown 
monk may have been among those of his order who were nervous of the 
devotional extravagances which, in this instance, are imputed to the 
influence of Rolle. 89 
The Cloud, then, could well have been produced in such a context. 
The possibility perhaps becomes a likelihood in the light of the analysis 
of the precise theological and linguistic background of the text which 
has occupied this thesis. It has been submitted that the Cloud is 
essentially a Dionysian work which continues the tradition of negative 
mystical theology as it was fostered and developed in the continental 
charterhouses, and which has, moreover, particular affinities with 
Hugh of Balma's Viae Syon Lugent. This proposition may now be assessed 
with other complementary circumstances: the fact that the text was 
circulated in manuscript principally by the Carthusians; that it 
stands apart from other original contemplative works written in-the 
vernacular during the fourteenth century insofar as it expounds a 
theology which, in this country, was primarily associated with the 
Carthusians; the coincidence of its author's attitude to 'enthusiasm' 
and the concern being expressed on this point in some circles of the 
English order. It seems, therefore, that the Carthusian order is 
the most likely milieu in which the Cloud author might have been 
exposed to Dionysian theology and nurtured the personal commitment 
to the negative way of contemplation which inspired his writing. 90 
More importantly, perhaps, it is difficult to envisage another 
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environment in which the author might have acquired not merely an 
impressively wide knowledge of devotional literature, but have become 
thoroughly familiar with works of Dionysian theology - notably the 
Viae Syon Lugent - which all available evidence suggests were largely 
confined to the charterhouses, unless he was himself a Carthusian or 
at least had the closest contact with the order involving some form 
of access to its library. The four extant manuscripts which contain 
the whole or parts of Balma's work, it will be remembered, are all 
apparently Carthusian: MSS Add. 37790,37049 and Douce 262 have 
already been considered; the fourth is MS Douai 396, written by 
J. London of Sheen and once thought by Michael Sargent to have been 
annotated by Grenehaigh, though he has since revised his opinion on 
this point. 91 
The possibility of Carthusian authorship for the Cloud has been 
mooted before and has been challenged on a variety of grounds. While 
a particularized response to the many counter-arguments is impracticable 
in the present context, the case against Carthusian authorship has 
rested in the past on certain objections - notably its use of the 
vernacular and lack of reference to the Carthusian rule - which recent 
research has shown to be untenable. It is perhaps judicious, then, to 
anticipate a priori opposition to the revival of the theory by commenting 
on some of these points. 
The fact that Latin was and is the official language of the 
Carthusians is among the obstacles to assigning Cloud to one of the 
order which are listed by the Parkreinster monk. In practice, however, 
there seems to have been much more flexibility and regard for individual 
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circumstances in the medieval Carthusian's choice between Latin and 
the vernacular than this simple statement of principle seems to admit. 
The question has been considered in some detail by Fr. Colledge in 
connexion with his work on the Ruysbroek translations. The introduction 
to the Colledge and Bazire edition of the Chastising establishes that 
the order was careful to preserve standards of Latinity and preferred 
the office to be said in Latin, even if it were not perfectly understood 
by the participants. 92 Latin seems to have been regarded almost with 
veneration as an intrinsically sacred language, having "a virtue, 
power, strength which the vernacular lacked", 93 and its importance as 
the only international language of scholarship was undoubtedly respected. 
On the other hand, there is a body of evidence which testifies to the 
order's concern with the education of those whose knowledge of Latin 
was inadequate: this ranges from the provision made in various vernacular 
manuals of instruction for the lay-brothers, whose lack of Latin was, 
in many cases, complemented by a generally low level of education, to 
translations of advanced devotional works of the kind already mentioned, 
some of which were apparently intended for female religious communities 
such as Syon and Barking Abbey, where the standard of education though 
not of Latinity was outstandingly high. Fr. Colledge has put the 
situation concisely in a recent article: 
The more evidence we acquire, the more apparent does it 
become that throughout the fifteenth century and until the 
Dissolution, the forces in England most active in introducing 
into the country modern works of spiritual guidance, in trans- 
lating them into the vernacular, and in reversing the process 
so as to make known abroad insular spiritual writings, were the 
Carthusians, and that in this they were helped by the regular 
interchange of visits with their brethren in the Low Countries. 
To take only two, but outstanding examples, we now know with 
certainty that had it not been for them, John Ruysbroek's 
Espousals and his Treatise of Perfection,. and Walter Hilton's 
Scale would not have become known overseas in the way which 
has been shown. 94 
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This means, in the case of Cloud, that the fact that a Carthusian, 
in the late fifteenth century, translated the text into Latin, need 
not of itself preclude the text's having been originally written, in 
English, by a member of the same order during the late fourteenth 
century. Considerations of date and the status of English have in 
this instance no material bearing on the situation: the Carthusian 
prior, Nicholas Love, compiled his English Mirror in the early fifteenth 
century, while his fellow Carthusians John Norton and Irethley wrote 
predominantly in Latin as late as the end of the century. Nethley, 
in fact, though the translator of two substantial vernacular texts and 
the author of various Latin works describing his own religious experiences 
which were read within his order, is also known to have written in 
English where the occasion demanded it: his letter of advice to the 
hermit Hugh, printed by James Hogg as To Hew Heremyte. A Pystyl of 
Solytary Lyfe Nowadayes, 95 uses the vernacular and glosses essential 
Latin quotations in an effort to circumvent its recipient's near ignorance 
of Latin. His method and motive are clearly akin to those of the Cloud 
author, and these seem to have been key factors in determining the 
choice of language by Carthusian writers. It is thus entirely possible 
that one Carthusian might have opted for the vernacular in accordance 
with the needs of the intended recipient of his work, while in changed 
circumstances, once the same text had acquired a certain prestige within 
the order, a later Carthusian might have put it into Latin in order to 
open it to a wider, perhaps international audience. 
The question of the Cloud's original recipient, of course, looms 
large in all this, and this is in turn connected with the second bar 
to Carthusian authorship to be singled out above - namely, the absence 
337 
of textual references to the Carthusian rule. The principal objection 
to this objection must be that it does not necessarily follow from the 
supposition that the author was himself a Carthusian that he wrote in 
the first instance for his own order. Certainly, there was an audience 
for vernacular works within the order, particularly among its lay-members: 
Dr. Doyle comments on this point, 
The presence in each Charterhouse of a body of lay-brethren, 
separated from the choir-monks in duties and quarters, and 
supposedly in education, which was previously a characteristic 
of other orders such as the Cistercians and Gilbertines, may have 
given an excuse for the introduction of English literature to the 
communities, though the use of the vernacular was traditionally 
discouraged and literacy denied to these labourers, but whether 
the letter of the law was kept or not, the lay-brethren listening 
or reading for themselves accordingly, the latinate choir-monks 
were not backward in cultivating the study of the same works, 
justifiably in view of the innate and increasing preferability of 
the native tongue for all devotional purposes. 9c 
The situation which Dr. Doyle describes here is one possible way of 
accounting for the vernacular composition of Cloud and its subsequent 
inclusion in the contemplative literature which was valued among the 
full members of the order. It has already been observed that the 
allusion to the state of the disciple in the first chapter of Cloud - 
& berfore he kyndelid iii desire ful graciously, & fastnid bi it a lyame 
of longing, & led bee bi it into a more special state & forme of 
leuyng, to be a seruaunt of be special seruauntes of his (14/3-5) - 
seems to refer to some kind of regular existence or "binding by vow 
to a stable form of life", 97 and that the description "a seruaunt of 
'pe special seruauntes of his" seems particularly apt for the lay-brothers 
of the Carthusian order. 98 Richard Methley, indeed, in his notes on the 
classification of the three phases of the disciple's progress in the 
spiritual life which the Cloud author incorporates in this chapter - 
from "be comoun degree of leuyng" (14/7-8), that is, to "a more special 
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state & forme of leuyng" (14/4-5), and at last to "he J)rid degre & 
maner of leuing, ýe whiche hi3t synguleer" (14/11-12) - compares the 
first state with that of laymen, the second with that of religious and 
the clergy, and the third with solitaries and Carthusians. 
99 Prof. 
Gardner has properly pointed out that Nethley's comments might well 
have been prompted by "a natural loyalty to his order", 100 and that 
the inference throughout that the disciple's time is entirely his own, 
and the reference to his "house" (Cloud 23/15), reminiscent of Hilton's 
application of the word to a recluse's dwelling in Scale I, ch. 1, 
suggest that the disciple led a solitary rather than a communal life. 
Against this, Beatrice White observes that "house" could equally refer 
to the "domus" of a Carthusian, 101 and it is confirmed in the introduction 
to the Colledge and Bazire edition of the Chastising that, at least when 
Methley and Norton were writing, the Carthusians regarded themselves as 
modern hermits. 102 Fr. Colledge has also compared the passage in ch. 1 
of Cloud and Methley's annotations with what Hugh of Balma says of the 
Carthusian vocation in the Viae Syon Lugent: 
'Qui ipsum non ad regulam beati Benedicti vel Augustini_redemptoris 
gratia provocavit, sed ad illam beatissimam quam ipsemet eligit 
quando ductus est in desertum'. 103 
Clearly, then, there are allusions in the text which a partisan 
commentator such as Methley could, not unreasonably, interpret with 
reference to the Carthusian order, and potential recipients of the 
text in its original form could be found within the Carthusian framework. 
The Cloud author himself repeatedly reminds the disciple that he is in 
a specially privileged position, and that it is therefore incumbent on 
him to achieve much spiritually (e. g. Cloud 13/18-14/15,14/20-15/9). 
Colledge and Bazire's comment on the Chastising - written, they suggest, 
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for the nuns of Barking Abbey - that it, 
... nowhere exhorts its readers to embrace the religious profession: 
it is written for those who are already professed, and the matter 
requires no further discussion, 104 - 
may equally apply to Cloud, and the author's lack of reference to the 
routines of Carthusian life may warrant no further explanation than that 
his overriding concern, in this instance, was with the inner life and 
the individual soul's progress to union with God. 105 
On the other hand, the Carthusians are known to have addressed 
their works as often as not to readers outside their order, and there 
are grounds for looking to other contexts for the earliest audience of 
Cloud. Indeed, one of the interesting points to emerge from the present 
study of the Cloud's theological background and its use of language has 
been a strong impression of the kind of reader envisaged by the author, 
which is derived from the provision he clearly makes for the reader's 
accomplishments and limitations. It seems certain, therefore, both 
from the high proportion of translated works in his extant Corpus and 
the practices which he adopted as a translator, that he anticipated 
the recipients of his works - and there is no reason to suppose that 
they were all directed to the same disciple106 - to have no Latin 
education or at best a rudimentary knowledge of the language. At the 
same time, however, the earliest reader of the three texts which have 
been most under discussion here - Cloud, Privy Counsel and Deonise Hid 
Diuinite - who was presumably one and the same, 
107 is expected not only 
to be considerably advanced in contemplation, but to have an intellect 
strenuous and flexible enough to match the demands of his theology, and 
possibly some appreciation of the complex doctrinal issues being broached 
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by the author in, for example, his account of mystic union and the 
unitive way. It remains to determine a context in which a reader with 
these qualifications is likely to be found. 
It seems, in general, unlikely that a Carthusian lay-brother would 
have these accomplishments - even allowing that the standard was in some 
cases high, since the order seems to have attracted more than could be 
accommodated as choir-brethren in the small number of English charter- 
houses. It is perhaps easier to suit the circumstances of the text 
with its first recipient's being a novice of the order about to enter 
into full membership, or possibly a monk having lately progressed from 
the novitiate. The author's role as spiritual director to a young man 
committed to a life of contemplation but still at the threshold of its 
highest reaches - the disciple, he tells us, is twenty-four (Cloud 20/19) 
- would be consistent with such a situation. The disciple's comparative 
ignorance of Latin would, however, be slightly disturbing if this were 
the case. Colledge and Bazire have stated as a principle, 
... a boy who showed inclination or was intended for a religious 
vocation would whilst still at school receive sufficient instruction 
in Latin to enable him to satisfy the variable and often very 
accomodating examination standards of those to whom he would present 
himself for ordination or religious profession. 108 
Standards of Latin, therefore, might vary considerably among those who 
might be expected to show some proficiency in the language. Further, 
it is difficult to estimate the degree of education which might be 
expected of a specifically Carthusian novice. Walter Baier has recently 
remarked that Carthusian novices do not seem to have been put through a 
uniform set programme of theological instruction: 
Die jungen Kartäuser gingen in IIA durch keine theologischen 
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Ordenschulen und wurden durch kein einheitliches Novität 
geprägt. 1 09 
Moreover, James Hogg's volume of Carthusian miscellanea includes a 
document relating to the admission of a novice which is written in 
English: he comments, 
one is somewhat surprised at the use of the vernacular, 
though this was perhaps employed to make quite certain that the 
postulant - and later the novice - fully understood the serious- 
ness of the obligations he was taking on himseif.. 110 
It is an interesting example, since a prospective novice whose Latin 
was inadequate to the understanding of his vows might, at a later stage, 
achieve a spiritual maturity which outstripped his level of Latinity, so 
that he could appreciate the complexities of Dionysian literature in the 
vernacular though they might elude him in Latin. 111 
There are, however, two other categories of recipient for the text 
outside the Carthusian order for whom the Carthusians are otherwise known 
to have written. Richard Methley's letter to Hugh, for example, is a 
ready instance of a Carthusian's acting as correspondent and director 
to a hermit. Both]1ethley and the Cloud author are, indeed, gifted as 
spiritual directors, though they differ widely in temperament, and VIethley's 
epistle is much shorter than Cloud and his instruction both more personal 
and elementary. 112 The theory that the recipient of Cloud was vowed to 
solitude-but not bound by a monastic rule might not only account for the 
text's lack of reference to the regular life and concern with provision 
for the disciple's physical welfare, but also answer to the Cloud author's 
expectations of his reader. The other possibility is that it was written 
for a female audience. The combination of a high level of education in 
the broad sense and commitment to the contemplative life with a low 
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standard of Latinity is most consistently to be found among female. 
religious. Colledge and Bazire go on to contrast the normal circum- 
stances of a boy's education, as described in the passage quoted above, 
with the education a girl might expect to receive: 
no such instruction was given to girls and no such requirements 
were made of them when they sought admission to religion. In the 
Middle Ages, women who knew Latin were rare, although perhaps in 
our period rarer in England than the Low Countries and Germany..., 
and we can observe how unnatural female Latinity appeared by the 
frequency with which pious biographers inform us, as they do, for 
example, of St. Hildegard and St. Bridget, that such women only 
learned Latin by supernatural means... 
Such lack of Latin in a nun was no stigma, any more than was 
illiteracy in a well-born layman or his womenfolk. 
Communities such as Syon - established too late, of course, to have 
had any connexion with the Cloud author - and, earlier, the Dominican 
Priory of Dartford and Benedictine foundation of Barking Abbey, are 
known to have generated considerable demand for original works of 
devotion in the vernacular and for Latin works, often of quite advanced 
theology, in translation. 113 
Whether or not the Cloud author wrote in the first instance for 
one in such a community or perhaps for a female recluse, it seems certain 
that he appreciated the value of his work in these circles and anticipated 
their needs in its composition. It is clear that he expected Cloud 
itself to be passed on by its original recipient, 114 and several specific, 
even pointed allusions suggest that he envisaged that his larger audience 
would include women: 
A Song man or a womman, newe set to be scole of deuocion... (Cloud 
85/1-5-16) 
be whiche man or womman (wheýer at it be) feleb hym sterid borow 
grace & bi counsel to forsake alle outward besines, & for to sette 
hym fully for to lyue contemplatyue liif... (Cloud 49/1-3) 
... man or womman at leueb in }gis liif... 
(Cloud 100/8). 
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It is, indeed, possible that he avoided allusions to a particular 
monastic rule in order not to restrict the circulation of the text 
artificially more than its subject dictated. Perhaps, too, his usual 
form of address for the disciple, "Goostly freende in God" (e. g. Cloud 
13/1 & 8, P. C. 135/1, P. P. 48/1), is deliberately ambiguous to allow 
for potential readers of either sex. 
Colledge and Bazire have some interesting comparisons to make 
in this connexion between one text of the Cloud Corpus, the Deonise 
Hid Diuinite,. and the English version of the De Perfectione Filiorum 
Dei. The translator of the Treatise of Perfection, they note, claims 
that he undertook the work in order to improve his understanding of 
the text, yet, 
... there apparently were those who thought that his work might 
be of profit to other students of the mystics: the text in Add. 
37790 is obviously removed, by how many. stages we cannot conjecture, 
from the translator's autograph. The probability is that The 
Treatise was copied for the benefit of much the same type of student 
as would use, for example, the English translation of the Mystica 
Theologia itself, Denis Hid Divinity, persons advanced in contem- 
plation yet with inadequate or no Latin. Early in the fifteenth 
century we find, in Julian of Norwich, such a one: capable of the 
most refined speculation, and, it seems, versed in mystical liter- 
ature, she none the less was Latinless if not illiterate. To such 
as she, Jordaen's Latin was as useless as Ruysbroek's own Dutch: 
yet such persons would have listened with comprehension to the 
English translation of this abstruse and recondite text. 115 
The comparison with the Treatise is particularly apt, since its 
affinities with Cloud are closer than those of the Chastising, insofar 
as it too is essentially a Dionysian work and intended for those who 
are already advanced in contemplation. 
116 It provides interesting 
parallels with the Deonise Hid Diuinite, moreover, in the handling of 
the complexities of Dionysian theology and vocabulary in the native 
idiom. It is also notable, in view of the Carthusian connexions of 
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the Ruysbroek translation and the apparently narrow circulation of 
the Deonise Hid Diuinite, that the Treatise of Perfection possibly 
contains a rare allusion to the Cloud author's Dionysian translation: 
for lyke as the derknessys of god be comforth with alle ly3tes, 
and thay be hyd from alle knawlleges, aftyr the sayinge of saynt 
dyonyse, so is hid vnto vs ýe self dyuynyte... 117 
The possibility that the Cloud author may have contrived to give 
female readers access to his work by addressing it, non-committally, 
to a "Goostly freende in God", has already been advocated by Wolfgang 
Riehle as a corollary to his study of the metaphorical language of 
fourteenth century English contemplative literature. He calls attention, 
by way of comparison, to a letter which occurs in MS Harleian 2406, ff. 
50-68b118: it opens "My dere frende", and is clearly addressed to a 
woman, though both she and the author are anonymous. The text reports 
and relays a letter of spiritual guidance which the author has received 
from Walter Hilton. The recipient is apparently not cloistered, but 
seems to be free to follow her conscience in the conduct of her daily 
life. Riehle endorses Fr. Colledge's research, which has demonstrated 
that with the growth in the numbers of female nuns and solitaries, demand 
for books of instruction in the vernacular increased and was generously 
supplied by the Carthusians. He speculates, however, that the letter 
in Harl. 2406 was intended for, "eine laikaler Leserin..., die vielleicht 
ein nur klosterähnliches Leben führte". 119 There may have been, he 
suggests, groups of such lay-women in England during the fourteenth 
century, living communally in the manner of the Beguines. He interprets 
the Cloud author's vehemence towards religious enthusiasm - which has 
been considered above120 as a reaction against the excesses of a Free 
Spirit movement established in this country, but contends that both he 
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and Hilton urge true "freedom of spirit" in their writings. His 
observations and hypotheses lead him to draw the following conclusions 
about the circumstances in which the Cloud author might have written: 
Obwohl wir fast nichts Über sein Person wissen, so geht doch aus 
seinen Werken hervor, daß er einen Schülerkreis gegründet hat 
und daß er mit diesem in regem, mündlichen und schriftlichen 
Gedankenaustausch stand, zu welchem Zweck er auch seine erhaltenen 
Schriften dienen auch dieses Verhältnis von Autor und Publikum 
erinnert etwas an die Situation auf dem Kontinent. Denn in Deutsch- 
land gab es eine hauptsächlich unter der Leitung von Dominikanern 
stehende Gruppe von Kontemplativen, die in häufigen, mundlichen 
und schriftlichen Kontakt miteinander standen, sich Gottesfreunde` 
nannten und von denen Taulers Briefwechsel mit Rulman Merswin und 
Heinrichs von NT rdlingen brieflicher Kontakt mit Margaretha Ebner 
besonders bekannt sind. Ganz ähnlich wie der Autor der Cloud 
verhalten sich gerade auch die Gottesfreunde sehr ablehnend gegenüber 
der Theologengelehrsamkeit. Über Vermutungen kommen wir hier freilich 
nicht hinaus. 121 
The assumptions on which Riehle bases his theory of author and audience, 
however, seem neither sufficiently warranted nor substantial enough to 
support his association of Cloud with a lay movement of female piety. 
His contention that Cloud had a wide general circulation in manuscript, 
or that such a possibility was even envisaged by the author, has already 
been challenged. He is on equally dubious ground, moreover, when, 
disregarding the precise technical terms in which the author accounts 
for his contemplative theory and the attitude to scholarship which it 
involves, he links the use of the vernacular and the author's scepticism 
about the value of learning to the contemplative with lay spirituality: 
he speculates that the author might be a priest who, 
... sich ganz bewußt mit der Bewegung der Laienmystik des 
Spätmittelalters identifiziert, ja sich selbst unter die theologisch 
ungebildeten Laien einreiht, nicht nur aus bescheidener Demut, 
sondern weil er die theologische Gelehrsamkeit als ein Gefahr 
für die Unmittelbarkeit des mystischen Erlebens sieht..., 122 
and contends that he, 
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... in einer für den Charakter der spätmittelalterlichen Mystik 
bezeichnenden Weise sich über die Theologengelehrsamkeit abschätzig 
äußert und ihr die Unkomplizierheit des Laien, des Menschen, der 
"Lewyd", theologisch ungebildet ist, vorzieht. 123 
In sum, the study of the theological and linguistic background of 
Cloud which has been the subject of this thesis has discovered persuasive 
arguments for linking the text with Carthusian tradition. Further, the 
inference that the author may himself have been a Carthusian or had 
close ties with the order has been corroborated, or at-least not contrad- 
icted, by establishing that the circumstances of the early circulation 
of the text and many of its characteristics are entirely consistent with 
Carthusian authorship, and that the most likely categories of recipient 
for a work of this kind are such as are known to have received special 
attention from English Carthusian writers. The aspects of the debate on 
the authorship of Cloud which have been reviewed in this chapter have 
very much followed on the implications of the body of the thesis, and 
it seems apt to conclude with observations on some related issues which 
its discoveries have stimulated. 
"Carthusian self-effacement", as Margaret Thompson terms it, 124 
by no means ensured the anonymous circulation of all works written 
within the order. The apparent care which the author of the Cloud 
took to conceal his identity, however, is wholly consistent with the 
Carthusian ideal, and Walter Baier's summary of the characteristics 
of Carthusian writers which make it difficult to form a coherent 
impression of Carthusian spirituality, describes exactly the English 
author's attitude: 
Erschwerend fair die Herausarbeitung einer kartusianischen 
Spiritualität erweist sich ferner das beinahe ängstliche 
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Zurücktreten der'Kartäuschriftsteller hinter dem Inhalt ihrer 
Werke: Sie legen keinen Wert auf Berizhmtheit, sprechen und schreiben 
wenig über Persönliches in ihrem Leben. Oft verschweigen sie sogar 
ihren Namen, wie allein die gre e Anzahl der anonymen Werke des 
Ordens zeigt. 125 
Nevertheless, commentators on the Cloud have always been reluctant to 
concede the author his anonymity, and the ascription of the Cloud Corpus 
to Walter Hilton has a long and complex genealogy. The tradition of 
Hilton's authorship seems to have begun with James Grenehalgh and his 
annotations of MS Douce 262,126 and scholars have divided on the merits 
of the case for Hilton's claim. Some have vacillated in their opinion: 
Helen Gardner, writing in 1947, confesses herself less certain than 
when she wrote her articles in 1933,1936 and 1937; 127 and Prof. Hodgson, 
a staunch opponent of Hilton's authorship in 1955,128 has since hinted, 
rather enigmatically, in conversation, that she considers the question 
less settled than previously. More recently, Wolfgang Riehle has 
tentatively added his voice to the claim for common authorship, 129 
though in his book, Studien zur englischen Mystik des Mittelalters, 
he differentiates the two writers and distinguishes the Cloud author's 
exploratory approach to language and his verbal creativity from Hilton's 
more derivative usage. 13° 
The work of the present thesis, however, makes the earlier reluctance 
of Profs. Gardner and Hodgson to accept the ascription of the Cloud 
Corpus to Hilton unquestionably more sympathetic than their retractions. 
Its conclusions have, in a sense, been anticipated by the Rev. J. P. H. 
Clark, in his article "The 'Lightsome Darkness' - Aspects of Walter 
Hilton's Theological Background": 131 it provides, that is, the kind 
of detailed analysis of the relationship of Cloud to the Dionysian 
mystical tradition which complements Clark's approach to Hilton and 
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which, he anticipates, will strengthen his argument against common 
authorship by demonstrating that the two authors represent distinct 
schools of mystical theology. Thus, while he infers that concepts of 
nakedness, blindness, darkness and nought, in the Cloud group, usually 
have to do with the theory of the apophatic way, Hilton's use of the 
same terms derives from Augustinian theology, and they are consequently 
associated in his work with the soul's inability to apprehend God in 
the early stages of its life of faith while it is still trammelled by 
sin and not yet divinely illumined. Hilton's theory of contemplative 
knowledge, Rev. Clark maintains, is also fundamentally Augustinian; 132 
he cites Scale II, ch. 34: 
"the sight of ihesu is ful blis of a soule, & at is not only for 
the sight, bot it is also for the blissed lüfe that comith out of 
that sight. Nertheles for lufe comith oute of knowynge & not 
knowynge oute of luf, therfor it is seid that knowynge & in sight 
principally of God with lufe is the blis of a soule, & the more he 
is knowen the better is he lufed. Bot for as mikel as to this 
knowynge or to this luf that comith of it may not the soule come 
withoute luf, therfore seide I that thu schuldest only coueite 
luf... ""133 
Hilton affirms, that is, that although an impulse of love first rouses 
the soul's yearning to know God, it is knowledge which ultimately takes 
precedence: the soul can only love fully that which it knows. It is 
precisely this point of doctrine - as it is held, for example, by St. 
Augustine - which Hugh of Balma contradicts in respect of mystical awareness 
of God in the Quaestio Unica which concludes his Viae Syon Lugent. In 
this sphere, Hugh insists, the opposite obtains: the soul is united to 
God through love alone, and only then achieves a kind of experiential 
knowledge of God whose medium is always love. This, too, is the Cloud 
author's conviction: Mary, he writes, who is the type of the contemplative, 
... heng up hir loue & hir longing desire in bis cloude of unknowing, 
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& lernid hir to loue a king be whiche sehe mi3t not se cleerly 
in dis liif bi'li3t of vnderstondyng in hir reson... (Cloud 46/15-17). 
The Cloud author's concurrence with Hugh on this crucial issue was a 
major factor in the argument of Ch. III of this thesis, allying the 
Cloud, through Hugh, with the development of the Dionysian mystical 
tradition in Carthusian circles. His divergence from Hilton, here, is 
therefore radical, and seems to confirm that we have to deal with two 
authors, who drew, admittedly, on a common theological stock but wrote 
within distinct traditions. Hilton's theory of contemplation owes much 
to the Victorines: his equation of sight with knowledge in Scale II, 
ch. 34, for example, is characteristic of Victorine theology, and implies 
that the contemplative experience differs in degree rather than kind from 
natural modes of cognition in which the intellect is instrumental. 134 
The same association of sight and knowledge of this order occurs in the 
passage from Cloud, but both are isolated here from mystical awareness. 
Knowledge of the latter kind, for the Cloud author is something other, 
and a vocabulary of redefined terms is demanded to express it. For 
Hilton, there is no such tension between meaning and language, since he 
alludes to a kind of perception which has affinities with natural modes 
and to which their language is thus applicable. 
The blanket distinction Cloud Corpus/Hilton Corpus is, of course, 
a crude basis on which to establish theological points of difference 
between the two authors. It is often agreed that Cloud has closer 
affinities with Qui Habitat and Bonum Est, for example, than with other 
works attributed to Hilton. l35 Further, neither author's theology can 
be adequately considered as a static entity: the circumstances in which 
individual works were compiled as well as the authors' spiritual and 
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literary maturity must have influenced style and content. 
136 The two 
groups of texts are, however, sufficiently cohesive and distinct in 
terms of their manuscript traditions to sustain general comparisons, 
and some, which have a bearing on the issue of authorship, are, indeed, 
solicited by the present study. 
For the most part, such comparisons weigh against common authorship. 
Michael G. Sargent, dealing with MS Heneage 3084 in his article, "A New 
Manuscript of The Chastising of God's Children with an Ascription to-Walter 
Hilton", has recently written, 
... with the exception of the common manuscript description of 
the Eight Chapters on Perfection as a translation of a work of 
Louis de Fontibus, and the ascription of the translation of the 
Stimulus Amoris, there is no evidence that Hilton interested 
himself in reproducing in English the writings of other men. 137 
The Cloud author, by contrast, worked assiduously as a translator: no 
less than three of the seven texts attributed to him are based on Latin 
originals. He was, it seems, attentive to the needs of his audience for 
works of spiritual guidance in the vernacular, and as committed to giving 
them access to major theological sources at first hand in their own 
language as he was ready to address himself to their more immediate 
concerns in tracts of his own devising. As far as we know, he wrote 
exclusively in the vernacular, and perhaps his acknowledged mastery as 
a writer of English prose was due, in part, to innate literary instincts. 
But perhaps, too, it grew out of his response to the dual challenge of 
adapting the vernacular to the demands of Dionysian theology and engaging 
the understanding of his readers for its complexities - perhaps, indeed, 
he was impelled by these circumstances to exploit the resources of the 
English language and stretch his own creativity more than Hilton was 
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required to do, and Hilton has often been considered a more pedestrian 
prose writer. 
Similarities between Hilton and the Cloud author, indeed, on issues 
which have received prominence in this thesis, have consistently been 
outweighed by points of difference. The inference that the Cloud had 
only a limited circulation, for example, is strengthened by contrasting 
its history in manuscript with that of the obviously popular Scale - 
and especially with that of Scale I. Dr. Doyle summarizes the position: 
The magnitude of the success of the Scale may be gathered not 
only from the number of extant and recorded copies, -_but even more 
from the number and complication of the states and combinations of 
the text that may be found, and the pre-history they represent. 138 
Both Scale and the equally popular epistle Mixed Life were also printed 
by de Worde as early as 1494, and Scale's early translation into Latin 
by the Carmelite Thomas Fishlake was a mark of the general esteem which 
the text quickly achieved. 139 Scale's established status, with Love's 
Mirror, as a classic of English devotional literature in the early 
sixteenth century is confirmed, Dr. Lovatt has commented, by Thomas 
More's recommendation of both works as proper reading for devout laymen 
in the preface to his Confutation of Tyndale's Answers (1531-32). 140 
Hilton, it seems, wrote for a broader and more diverse audience 
than the Cloud author, and the different genres within which they worked 
must have had some bearing on the distribution of their respective texts. 
Undoubtedly, certain of the latter's works - notably the Tretyse of he 
Stodye of Wysdome, the Discrescyon of Spirites and the Discrecioun of 
Stirinas - are less speculative than Cloud and Privy Counsel and are 
more uniformly concerned with the basic conduct and premises of the 
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contemplative life. They were, perhaps, intended for a different 
audience: the Tretyse of })e Stodye of Wysdorne and Discrescyon of SDirites 
have no form of personal address, and the less restrictive character of 
their material seems to be consistent with the evidence of manuscripts, 
which suggests that they may have circulated more widely than the same 
author's more advanced, narrowly contemplative works. The Discrecioun 
of Stirings is again addressed to a "Goostly freend in God" (62/2), 
explicitly in response to a written request for spiritual guidance 
(63/13-15), but it does not seem to belong to the closely-knit group 
of Cloud, Privy Counsel and Deonise Hid Diuinite, and it makes no 
reference to them. It considers in detail, in fact, some of the issues 
which are treated rather perfunctorily in Cloud, ch. 42,141 and it seems 
likely that, if the recipient of the two texts was the same, the Discrecioun 
was the earlier work and deals with a stage of the contemplative life which 
the disciple had outgrown when he received Cloud. 142 The recipient of 
the Discrecioun, it has often been pointed out, seems more likely to 
have been a solitary than an enclosed religious, since the implied 
freedom of his lifestyle seems inconsistent with conventual life - 
though such a one could subsequently have adopted a stricter or regular 
mode of life. 143 The recipients of Hilton's works, however, seem to 
have been more diverse, and his use of the vernacular, in consequence, 
seems to have various functions. Bk. I of the Scale, as Fr. Colledge 
has recently put it, "... was composed for and addressed to a woman 
recluse living in canonical enclosure" - though it envisages and certainly 
reached a much wider and more varied audience144 - while Bk. II, he goes 
on, "... is written for 'a dear brother' evidently vowed to some form of 
contemplative life, but under conditions wholly different from those 
described in Book I". 145 Bk. II of Scale, in fact, rehandles the themes 
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of Bk. I with special emphasis on the more advanced stages of the 
contemplative life, and Prof. Hussey has, in fact, suggested that 
Hilton may have written it with a larger audience in view, who might 
benefit from a general manual on contemplation. 146 The use of the 
vernacular in Scale I, therefore, has possibly more in common with 
its use for the Ancrene Wisse, by Rolle in his writing of the Form of 
Livin and English Psalter, and later by Love, who says that his Mirror 
is written "not onliche to cle=kes in latyn but also in english to leveed 
men and wommen and hem that ben of symple understondynge", 147 than with 
its function for the Cloud author. In Cloud, Privy Counsel and Deonise 
Hid Diuinite, at least, the use of the vernacular is certainly not 
accompanied by any significant simplification of subject matter, and, 
if it was intended to open the text to a female audience, it assumes 
its readers to be none the less proficient intellectually for their 
lack of a Latin education. Nor - as may be the case with Scale II 
and is: undoubtedly so with Mixed Life - does the choice of the vernacular 
have to do with broadening the text's applicability and perhaps making 
it accessible to a lay audience. It is noteworthy that the relation- 
ship of Privy Counsel to Cloud is not that of Scale II to Scale I: it 
is addressed to the same disciple, and explores the subject of contem- 
plation more deeply and ruminatively, in accordance with the disciple's 
maturer understanding and richer experience of the contemplative life. 148 
The Cloud author's defensive restrictions on the circulation of 
his work (1/8-3/8), indeed - though they may echo the traditional 
prohibitions to the uninitiated or those uncommitted to the contemp- 
lative life which preface the De INNystica Theologia and Hugh of Balma's 
Viae Syon Lugent, for example - may derive something of their urgency 
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from his awareness that the use of the vernacular, dictated as it 
was by the needs and capabilities of his intended audience, could also 
not help but make his work indiscriminately accessible to readers who 
might abuse or misapply its teaching, or perhaps radically misinterpret 
his meaning. He is clearly disturbed by the fact that his writing in 
the vernacular might cause him to be associated with popular heretical 
movements, and possibly nervous, too, that the theocentric nature of 
his theology might, in this context, be all too easily misconstrued 
to imply a rejection of orthodox liturgical religion. 149 Had it not 
been for the requirements of his audience, he would presumably have 
opted for the safer, because more restrictive medium of Latin - as 
Hilton does, in some of his shorter works, which have significant 
affinities with Cloud and its two most closely related epistles, the 
Pistle of Preier and Privy Counsel. The recipients of Hilton's Latin 
works seem, as might be expected, to be also such as he might unreservedly 
entrust with his private concerns and for whose ears he is ready to 
venture his opinion on contemporary religious controversies. 
150 His 
Letter to a Hermit, 151 for example, which is addressed to a priest who 
had become a solitary, is forthright and insistent in its personal advice 
on the conduct of the contemplative life, and hints, also, at some crisis 
in Hilton's own life. 152 Hilton writes in Latin, too, when he broaches 
some of the contentious theological issues of his day: in the tract which 
begins "Numquid domini nostri.. " (ascribed to him in DIS Royal 11 B X, 
f. 178), as Joy Russell-Smith has shown, Hilton enters into the contemporary 
debate which had been activated by the Wicliffite movement and formally 
commends the practice of venerating images. 
153 His letter to Adam 
Horsley, written to support him in his decision to enter Beauvale Charter- 
house (between May 1383 and March 1385), is at once intimate and public, 
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and is particularly akin, in this, to Privy Counsel. Joy Russell-Smith's 
description of the work takes account of both aspects: 
The argument of his epistle, De Utilitate et Prerogatiuis Religionis 
shows that it was written to encourage and strengthen the half- 
formed intention of a friend to enter the religious life. Adam 
Horsley's hesitation and many personal fears become clear from 
Hilton's explanations and encouragement. At the same time there 
are signs that Hilton had other readers in mind also when he wrote: 
'quomodo prouocem to et alios uoscum ue ad religionis feruenciorem 
emulacionem' (fol. 129v Bod. ISIS Lat. th. e 26). Indeed the scope 
and scale of the work seem designed to meet greater objections than 
those likely to have been raised by Horsley of his own accord. 154 
The circumstances of Hilton's connexion with Beauvale Charterhouse 
through his relationship with Adam Horsley prompt a final speculation on 
the question of the authorship of the Cloud Corpus which is given some 
credibility by the work of this thesis. Prof. Hodgson's conclusion from 
her examination of the language of the Cloud author's works in manuscript, 
that they were most likely to have been written in a central district of 
the North-East Midlands, l55 has been generally approved. Supposing this 
to be indeed the case, it is perhaps not unreasonable to infer that the 
author, if a Carthusian, might have belonged to Beauvale Charterhouse, 
or that, if he were not himself enclosed, his association with the order 
might have been through this particular house. Its location at Gresley 
is within the appropriate dialect area, and the date of its foundation 
(1343) is consistent with the hypothesis. 156 Its geographical proximity 
to Hilton's house of Augustinian Canons at Thurgarton, moreover, would 
give substance to the textual evidence which suggests that a kind of 
ideological interchange went on between the two authors by providing 
a plausible physical context in which such a dialogue might have taken 
place. Perhaps, indeed, the possible connexion of both authors with 
Beauvale Charterhouse is at the centre of the complex web of associations 
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which link each author with the other and both with the Carthusian 
order. Hilton's ties with the order are various. Joy Russell-Smith 
comments on Hilton's reverence for the Carthusian ideal, and the 
reciprocal respect for Hilton's writings within the English charterhouses: 
Interest in Hilton among English Carthusians was early and con- 
tinuing... Hilton praises the Carthusian Order as 'mons Domini et 
mons pinguis in uertice aliorum monicum, id est aliorum religionum 
eminencius collocatus' in the De Utilitate et Prerogatiuis Religionis 
(fol. 132), and the link with Adam Horsley is a likely origin of sound 
tradition concerning Hilton. 157 
Hilton's letter to Adam Horsley was, in fact, commended by the Carthusian 
Prior Nicholas Love in his Mirror, and his popularity in Carthusian circles 
as it is reflected in their many transcriptions of his works has been amply. 
documented, in particular by Doyle, Colledge and Sargent. Scale, at least, 
was also read in the continental charterhouses. 
158 The particular esteem 
in which Hilton's works were held at Sheen seems, in fact, to have initiated 
a tradition that Hilton himself was professed there, which was propagated 
by Bale's reference to him as a Carthusian of Sheen. 159 The Cloud 
author's connexions with the order have been reviewed in this and the 
preceding chapter. The circumstances, then, are that two groups of work, 
close in theme, dialect and date, were produced towards the end of the 
fourteenth century. Cloud, and the texts which were early grouped with 
it in manuscript, circulated anonymously: Bk. I of Scale, Prof. Gardner 
suggests, may also have circulated anonymously at first, 1°0 but Hilton's 
works were often assigned to him by name in rubrics and colophons. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, on these grounds alone, that the Carthusian 
commentator Grenehalgh should have made the first ascription of Cloud to 
the more widely known and respected Hilton in his notes to I-IS Douce 262. 
It would be still less surprising, however, in view of the Cloud author's 
connexions with the order and Hilton's special links with Beauvale 
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Charterhouse, if the Cloud itself was produced at Beauvale. A 
Carthusian tradition which associated the Cloud with Beauvale Charter- 
house might well have become confused by the fifteenth century, and 
this might account for Grenehalgh's note that Hilton was the author 
of the Cloud. 
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